

PREFACE

This edition of the Tarkabhāṣa is specially prepared with a view to meet the needs of students studying for University examinations. The English Translation of the entire text has been printed just below it for ready reference. In the Notes all points which an ordinary student requires to be explained are explained. The notes are to the point and sufficiently exhaustive. The Introduction deals with questions like the date and life of the author, a general review of the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika systems, a critical appreciation of the Tarkabhāṣa etc. Care is taken not to swell the volume of the book by the addition of irrelevant matter or by the inclusion of unnecessary details which be wilder the student instead of helping him.

This edition is thus on the same lines as those which we followed in our edition of the Tarkasamgraha which we are glad to state met with unstinted approval from the students and professors alike. In the Notes is incorporated most of the important matter from the Tarkasamgraha. The text is divided into suitable sections and is presented in a form which would enable the student to grasp the subject matter easily.

We have to offer our grateful thanks to the Managers of the Āryabhāṣa Press for the efficient printing work done in a short time.

Sir Parashurambhu College
POONA 2
20th August 1934

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INTRODUCTION

I THE AUTHOR

HIS LIFE AND DATE

Beyond the fact that the name of the author of the *Tarkabhāṣa* is Kesavamisra, we have no definite knowledge about the author. Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana says that Kesavamisra "was a native of Mithila and a preceptor of Govardhana Misra who wrote a commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣa*, called *Tarkabhāṣa Prakāśa*." Kesavamisra quotes Udayana in his work¹ from which it is clear that he must have lived after Udayana. Now Udayana (or Udayanacarya or Ācarya as he is often reverentially called), the author of the well known works, *Kusumañjali*, *Kiraṇavali*, *Lakṣanavali* etc., is definitely known to have lived about 950-1000 A. D., as is clear from the colophon to his *Lakṣanavali* which gives 984 A. D. (Saka year 906) as the date of its composition. So Kesavamisra could not have lived before 1000 A. D.

Now, Cinnabhatta a commentator on the *Tarkabhāṣa* is definitely proved to have lived about 1350 A. D., by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar². Cinnabhatta lived about 1350 A. D. at the court of Harihara, brother to Bukkaraya of Vijayanagar, and was thus the contemporary of the famous Sayanacarya and Madhvacarya, so Kesavamisra's date could not be later than 1350 A. D. The most probable date for Kesavamisra therefore would be about 1250 A. D.

About Kesavamisra's personal history we know nothing. Whether he wrote any other work or works is also a sealed book for the present.

II NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEMS

The student of a manual like the *Tarkabhāṣa* is certainly not expected to be acquainted with the history of the develop-

(1) *A History of Indian Logic*, P. 381

(2) P. 104, अत्रोदयनेन व्यवहृत्य हेतोः फलवर्जितया प्रतीतिः सिद्धस्तद्व्यवहारादसिद्धिरियं सिद्धिरप्यनुवर्तते ।

(3) *Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts*, 1882-83

ment of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. But it is worth his while to know the salient features thereof. Both these systems originated independently about the beginning of the Christian era but it was found soon afterwards that their tenets had nothing irreconcilable about them, and long before writers like Śaṅkara came into the field expressly for the purpose of blending the two systems the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems had come to be grouped together, like the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems.

Like all other Darśanas or systems of philosophy, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems have their own Sūtras which must be regarded as the basis of their doctrines. The Vaiśeṣika system is also known as the system of Kanada or Aulūka (son of Ulūka). Kanada (probably a nick name due to his having propounded the theory of Kanās or atoms) was the son of Ulūka, of Kāśyapa gṛha. He is said to have been so called (Kanada or Kanabhakṣa), because he maintained himself on rice grains fallen in streets like a pigeon. According to another tradition God revealed himself to Kanada who was practising penance, in the form of an owl to expound the six Padārthas, hence the system received the name Aulūkyadarśana. Kāṭilya does not mention the Vaiśeṣikas by name, but Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva (about the 3rd century A. D.) criticise their doctrines. The Vaiśeṣikasūtras may therefore be said to have been composed about the first or second century A. D. It is possible that these Sūtras may have been revised from time to time, before they assumed their present form.

There is no Atomic theory in the Upaniṣads, though the word *Anu* occurs many times. The Buddhists had something of an Atomic theory and the Vaiśeṣikas may have been indebted to them for that doctrine. There is no direct evidence to show that the Vaiśeṣikas had come under Greek influence in the beginning.

As regards the Nyāya system, Gautama is said to be the author of the Nyāyasūtras. In the *Pratimānūṭaka* of Bhaṣa, the Nyāyasūtra of Medhatithi is referred to. According to the *Mahābhārata* Gautama and Medhatithi refer to the same person. Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana regards this Medhatithi as the founder of *Anvikṣikī*, and thus quite a

different person from Gautama Aksapāda' (hence the name Aksapādadarśana for the Nyāya system) the founder of the Nyāya system. The identification of Gautama Aksapāda with the Gautama of the Gautama Dharmasūtras is without any basis. Vātsyāyana wrote his famous commentary on the Nyāya sūtras about the fourth century A.D. It is therefore safe to say that Gautama Aksapāda must have lived at least a century or two earlier than Vātsyāyana. Gautama's date cannot be pushed further back than that.

The Vaiśeṣikasūtras contain ten Adhyāyas or books. Book I discusses the five Padārthas that enter into the Samavāya relation. In Book II there is the discussion about Dravyas. Book III discusses the nature of Ātman and Manas. Book IV deals with the nature of the body and the Atomic theory. Book V deals with Karman. Book VI with the Srautadharmas and Aśramadharmas. Book VII with Guṇa and Samavāya. Book VIII with Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka perceptio. Book IX with Buddhi and Book X with causality and Anumāna. (Read the following from the Sarvadarśanasamgraha: तदाहिन्द्रानामने प्रथमे याये समवेताशयपञ्चवचनमपारं । तत्रापि प्रथमाह्वरं पान मनिरप्यम् । द्वितीयाह्वरं ज्ञाताकाशयार्थनिरूपणम् । आह्वरद्वययुक्तं द्वितयायाये इया रपणम् । तत्रापि प्रथमाह्वरं भूताशयलक्षणम् । द्वितीयं ज्ञाताशयलक्षणम् । आह्वरद्वय युक्तं तृतीयं आमन्त्ररक्षणलक्षणम् । तत्रापि आमन्त्ररपणं प्रथमे । द्वितयेत करणलक्षणम् । आह्वरद्वययुक्ते चतुथं शरणादुपयायपञ्चवचनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमं तदुपयार्थं विवेचनम् । द्वितीये शरीरविचनम् । आह्वरद्वयवतं पञ्चमं कमप्रातपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे शरीरसंविद्वचनम् । द्वितीये मानसमचिन्तनम् । आह्वरद्वयशालं नष्टं धन धमानरपणम् । तत्रापि प्रथमं दानप्रतिप्रधानावेरे । द्वितीयं चान्तराध्यायितमानरपणम् । तयार्थं मसमे गुणममवायप्रातपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमं बुद्धिानरेपे मगप्रातपादनम् । द्वितीयं तस्याप गुणप्रातपादनं समवायप्रतिपादनं च । अष्टमे तन्निर्विरपसगतिरपसप्रत्य र प्रमाणाचननम् । नवमे बुद्धिवायप्रतिपादनम् । दशमे तमानभेदप्रतिपादनम् ।)

The Nyāyasūtras contain five Adhyāyas or Books. Book I deals with the sixteen Padārthas. Book II with the four Pri

1 Aksapāda literally means having eyes on the feet. Absurd traditions are in vogue to account for this appellation. One tradition says that Gautama was given a second pair of eyes on the feet by God as he happened to fall on his feet being ascribed to his mad dog and. According to another account Gautama once looked at his pupil Vyāsa with the eyes on his feet!

mānas and Samsaya and the rejection of Arthāpatti etc. as independent Pramānas, Book III with Ātman, body, sense-organs, objects of senses, Buddhi and Manas, Book IV with Pravṛtti, Dosa, Pretyabhāva, Phala, Duḥkha, Apavarga and the theory of Dosas, and Book V with the divisions of Jāti and Nigrahaśthāna (Read the following from the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, *Nyāyasāstra* च पञ्चाध्यायमस्मि । तत्र प्रत्यध्यायमाहिकद्वयम् । तत्र प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमाह्निके भगवता मौनमेव प्रमाणादिपदार्थनवरूपलक्षणनिरूपणं विधाय द्वितीये वादादिसप्तपदार्थलक्षणनिरूपणं कृतम् । द्वितीयस्य प्रथमे संशयपरीक्षणं प्रमाणचतुष्टयाप्रामाण्यशङ्कानिराकरणं च । द्वितीयेऽर्थापत्त्योदेरन्तर्भाजनिरूपणम् । तृतीयस्य प्रथम आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये बुद्धिमेव परीक्षणम् । चतुर्वस्य प्रथमे प्रवृत्तिरेव प्रत्ययभाववत्तदुक्तापत्त्यपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये दोषनिमित्तकत्वनिरूपणमनन्यादिनिरूपणं च । पञ्चमस्य प्रथमे जातिभेदनिरूपणम् । द्वितीये निग्रहस्थानभेदनिरूपणम् ।)

It will be seen that the Nyāyasūtras are more properly and systematically arranged than the Vaiśeṣikasūtras. The Nyāyasūtras declare in the very first sūtra that the study of the sixteen Padārthas or topics mentioned therein is to lead to Nihareyas. They are obviously intended to make the student fit for carrying on controversies and therefore explain in detail the Jātis and the Nigrahaśthānas etc. The Vaiśeṣikasūtras are more concerned with the nature of the Padārthas or categories (the Padārthas of the Nyāyasūtras are mere topics for discussion and should not have been so called at all) than with anything else, though they too bring in the Āsramadharmas and Śrautadharmas so as to make their system as complete as possible. It is now usually conceded that the Vaiśeṣikasūtras are older than the Nyāyasūtras.

We shall now merely mention some of the great writers of both the systems, who have played an important part in their development. As regards the Vaiśeṣikadarśana, the following authors should be noted—Prasastapāda (the writer of *Kaṇādasūtrabhāṣya*, 500 A. D.), Udayana (the author of *Kiraṇāvallī*, a commentary on *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, 1000 A. D.), Śrīdhara (the author of *Nyāyankandālī*, 991 A. D.), and Sankaramiśra (the author of *Kaṇādarabāṣya* and *Upaskāra*, about 1425 A. D.). As regards the Nyāyadarśana, the following are the writers of note—Vātsyāyana (the author of *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* about the fourth century A. D.), Uddyotakara (the author of

Nyayabhasyavartika 7th century A D) Vācaspatimīśra (the author of Nyayasutroddhāra 9th century A D) and Gaṅgeś opādhyaya (the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi, 12th century A D)

After the doctrines of the two systems had been more or less stabilised by the above writers by their commentaries on the Sūtras or sub commentaries on the commentaries there arose about the 10th century a class of writers who made it their business to show how the two systems were really complementary to each other and their tenets easily reconcilable (such a tendency was visible it must be confessed even earlier to some extent) Kesavamīśra belonged to this class of writers who claimed no originality but whose works are none the less important. Bhāsarvajña (the author of Nyayasāra about 1000 A D) Annambhatta (the author of Tarkasamgraha about 1700 A D) Sivāditya (the author of Saptapadārtha about the 11th century A D) Laugakṣībhaṣkara (the author of Tarkakaumud 17th century A D) are some of the authors belonging to what may be called the Syncretist School. Bhāsarvajña and Kesavamīśra were Naiyāyikas and the last three Vaiśeṣikas.

III THE TARKABHASA A CRITICAL APPRECIATION

Kesavamīśra wrote his Tarkabhāṣa with the express purpose of furnishing an easy text book or manual for a beginner desirous of studying the tenets of Nyāya and it can be easily proved that he has admirably succeeded in his attempt. There is also another purpose which he has in view namely to reconcile the tenets of Nyāya with those of the Vaiśeṣika system. While dealing with Arthas² he mentions the six padārthas of the Vaiśeṣikas as Arthas instead of the *gandha rasa* etc.³ mentioned in the Nyāyasūtras and being fully conscious of the disturbance⁴ in the original arrangement involved in equating the Vaiśeṣika padārthas with the Naiyāyika arthas he

1 वा १ ए ये चकार प्रवेशपदेन काठकोटस अनेन ; etc the opening sloka

² P 63 section 4 अथ धर्मत्वम् । ते च द्रव्यगुणकर्मणो नास्त्यसम्भवा ।

³ न चरन्त्येव पदार्थानां द्वयं वाच्यमाणमन्यथा । (Nyāyamantra I 1 11)

⁴ Thus Atman etc have to be discussed twice (Atman sections 44 and 57 Buddha 74-87 Duhkha-76-94 Mānasa-46-58-89 Iecha and Dve 77-78 and once again under Do 71 in 91 Viparīyaya under Buddha in 87 and again under Dosa in 91)

justifies his action by saying that he has done it on purpose¹. And that purpose is obviously to show that there is no conflict between the Nyaya system and the Vaiśeṣika system. We have pointed out that this purpose, however laudable it might be, is bound to fail in the very nature of things². But writers of the Syncretist school deliberately shut their eyes against the inherent absurdity of such a procedure and Kesavamisra is no exception to them. Truly is it said that none are so blind as those who will not see.

Kesavamisra begins his work with quoting the first Nyaya sutra where the sixteen padarthas are mentioned, thus showing that he is a Naiyāyika (Annambhatta begins his *Tarka-samgraha* with the mention of the seven Padarthas of the Vaiśeṣikas, which shows that the *Tarka-samgraha* is a Vaiśeṣika treatise). He then quotes the *Vātsyayanabhasya* to show the procedure he is going to adopt in his work viz. Uddesa, Lakṣana and Parikṣa. After defining these terms, he takes the sixteen topics, one by one and while closely following the *Nyayasutras* goes on discussing all relevant matters in a very systematic manner. Kesavamisra himself tells us at the end of his work what procedure he has followed in the presentation of the subject matter of his work. He says—'Here [in this treatise] there is treatment again and again of most useful [or important matters] in their nature and varieties that what is not most serviceable is not defined is no fault. By so much only is accomplished the training of beginners'.³ We shall presently show how the above statement by the author himself describes the actual state of things.—

Thus for a Naiyāyika the important topics in the Nyāya system are undoubtedly the *Anumāna pramāṇa* (with the fallacies) that *pramāṇa* are four and the nature of *samavāya* (or intimate relation). Kesavamisra treats the *Anumāna* topic in great detail. He is not tired of repetition. Whenever some important point is to be discussed he proceeds to do it step by step always beginning his treatment with *tathāhi*.

(to explain the same thing in detail) which expression occurs no less than a dozen times in sections 18-32 that treat of anumāna. The fallacies or hetvabhāṣas with their divisions and sub-divisions are expounded twice—once as a part of Anumāna (sections 28-32) and again as an independent topic (sections 106-114). Here there is much of repetition but Kesavamisra risks it to make the beginner understand the nature of fallacies thoroughly as the detection of fallacies is undoubtedly the most important thing in the eyes of a Nyāyika. Similarly Kesavamisra describes in detail the nature of Karana and Karana the six fold contact of sense organ and object the undesirability of admitting non perception and presumption as independent pramānas the nature of vākya pratīti and pada pratīti and so on. The self validity of knowledge also is described as an independent topic with considerable acumen. Unimportant topics such as Chala Jāti Nigrahasthāna Vada Jalpa etc. are simply referred to and no detailed treatment is given as they are useful only for one who has thoroughly mastered the Nyaya technique and not for a beginner.

It will be clear from the amount of space devoted to the treatment of different topics what topics are regarded as important by the author. Thus of the sixteen padārthas treated in the Tarkabhāṣa in 121 pages

Pramāna is described in 58 pages (1—58)

Prameya 38 (58—95)

Hetvabhāṣas are 15 (104-118)

(and also in 35-40) under Pramāna.

The three topics Pramāna Prameya and Hetvabhāṣas together have 111 pages devoted to them while the remaining thirteen topics are dismissed in ten pages! The last topic Nigrahasthāna has one whole section devoted to it in the Nyāyasūtra (V 2) where all the twenty two varieties are mentioned. Kesavamisra just mentions only seven of them. He also mentions only two varieties (out of twenty four) of Jāti and only one of Chala (out of three)

It will thus be seen that the Tarkabhāṣa is an admirable manual for a beginner. It is also complete in itself and compares favourably with the Tarkasamgraha in this respect. The Tarkasamgraha is more scrappy in its treatment (even when read along with the Tarka dīpikā) it

might be said to ignore altogether some of the topics of the Naiyayikas. The Tarkabhāṣā on the other hand, pays due attention to the controversy about the self-validity of knowledge, non perception and presumption as independent pramanas and other interesting matters. The treatment in the Tarkabhāṣā almost takes the form of lecture-notes in a class room. The views of the opponent are mentioned clearly and fully the argument is advanced step by step even a similar topic is treated independently and the device of referring the reader to other topics described before *mutatis mutandis*, is rarely resorted to. Consequently there is much of repetition, but the interests of the reader are thoroughly guarded.

Kesavamisra writes clearly and there is hardly any ambiguity about his statements. There is some looseness about his syllogism or *anumānavākya*. Thus he says अनित्य इदं in place of इदं अनित्य, sometimes the उदाहरणम् is given as यो यो धूमवान्, sometimes as यत्र वत्र धूम etc. But such lapses are very few, and on the whole, the Tarkabhāṣā can be justly described as an excellent manual of logic complete in itself, and doing full justice to the Nyāyanāya which it professes to expound.

IV THE NAIYAYIKAS AND THE VAISESIKAS THEIR DIVERGENT VIEWS

- It is necessary that the student should have a general idea about the points on which the Naiyayikas and the Vaiseshikas differ. We give below in parallel columns the views of both on some important topics (The list is not exhaustive)

Vaiseshikas

- (1) पदार्थs are seven, दृश्यम् गुण रसं सामान्याम् विशेषं समवायः अभाव इति (or six if अभाव is not admitted)

- (2) विशेषs are admitted as a पदार्थ

- (3) समवाय is अर्थादिय and only अनुमेय.

Naiyayikas

- (1) पदार्थs are sixteen प्रमाणम् प्रमेयम् मस्य प्रयोजनम् ह्यन्तः सिद्धान्तः अवयव तर्क निगम वाद उप विन्यास हेतुमात्रम् छद्मज्ञानि and निषेधसाम्यम्

- (2) नवनेत्यादिs do not admit विशेषs as a पदार्थ.

- (3) समवाय is प्रत्यय by the इन्द्रिय-संयोजनितेयतामनिरपे

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| <p>(4) The Vaiśeṣikas are पीड्याः वादिनः (पीड्य परमाण्व एव स्वतन्त्रा पच्यन्ते । तत्रैव पूररूपमादायिमहत्वायुपपत्तिः । कारणमुण्यप्रक्रमेण चावधारयन्ति न्यायपक्षेण)</p> <p>(5) द्विवादः is regarded as अपेक्षा युक्तिरन्य</p> <p>(6) The Vaiśeṣikas admit विभागवन्विभाग</p> <p>(7) आत्मन् is अप्रत्यक्ष and only अनुमानात्म्य</p> <p>(8) There are only two प्रमाणः प्रत्यक्षम् and अनुमानम् (दान् and उपमान are included in अनुमान and should not be regarded as separate प्रमाणः)</p> <p>(9) Only 3 हेतुभावाः are admitted (सम्बन्धित्व or सादृश्य इत्यद्वय and आशयः)</p> | <p>(4) The Naiyāyikas are पितृपात्रवादिनः (कार्यकारणमनुदाय एव पच्यन्ते न तु पीड्य पच्यन्ते)</p> <p>(5) द्विवादः is regarded as अपेक्षा युक्तिरन्य</p> <p>(6) The Naiyāyikas do not admit विभागवन्विभाग</p> <p>(7) आत्मन् is मानसप्रत्यक्षविषय</p> <p>(8) Pramanas are four — प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानम् उपमानम् and दान्</p> <p>(9) Five हेतुभावाः are admitted.</p> |
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[The Naiyāyikas are sometimes divided into two schools the ancients and the moderns. But these terms are often very loosely used. Sometimes the Vaiśeṣikas are meant by the term 'the ancients' and sometimes older Bhāṣyakaras Prasastapada Vātsyāyana and others.]

Kesavamisra accepts all the tenets of the Naiyāyikas except Nos. 4-6. He admits the पीड्यत्ववाद when he says about ह्यस्यचित्तत्वं प्रतीयमानेनैव regards द्विवादः as अनिवार्य everywhere and mentions the विभागवन्विभाग variety. He refers to the Vaiśeṣika padārthas under सर्व.

Kesavamisra generally follows the ancients. In his treatment of Kāraṇa he accepts the ancient view (आधारकदमाधारण कारण कारणम्) as regards प्रत्यक्ष for he mentions the अवाततव्यापार in the case of the three कारण (इन्द्रियाण, इन्द्रियार्थनिर्णय and गानम्). He follows the modern view (कलायोग यवचित्त कारणम्) as regards अनुमान for he gives लिङ्गप्राप्तये (and not लिङ्ग) as its कारण. In the case of उपमान he again seems to follow the ancient view as the कारण is given there as the सादृश्यत्वम् (and अपिदेवमात्रावस्थानम् as the अवान्तर व्यापार).

विषयानुक्रमणी

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॥ श्री ॥ तर्कभाषा

उपोद्घातश्लोकः ।

वालोलपि यो न्यायनये प्रवेश-
मल्पेन वाऽऽत्यलसं श्रुतेन ।
संक्षिप्तयुक्त्यन्विततर्कभाषा
प्रकास्यते तस्य कृते भवेया ॥ १ ॥
षोडशपदार्थानाम् उद्देशः ।

प्रमाण प्रमेय संशय प्रयोजन दृष्टान्त सिद्धान्त अथयय तर्क निर्णय-
याद जल्प वितण्डा हेत्वाभास चतुल जाति निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञा-
नान्निश्चयसाधिम इति न्यायस्यादिमं सूत्रम्-(-या मृ. १ १ १) । अस्यार्थः ।
प्रमाणादिषोडशपदार्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्मोक्षप्राप्तिर्भवतीति ॥ २ ॥

TARKABHĀṢĀ

[EXPOSITION OF REASONING]

(1) For the sake of him who though a man of immature understanding (*būlak*) and lazy desires entrance into the system of Nyāya [philosophy] with a little study is brought out by me this Tarkabhāṣa [Exposition of Reasoning] concise, and accompanied by arguments [or accompanied by brief arguments, or having brief arguments and consistent, or in such a way as to give brief arguments, O wise one (*ananda*)] :-

(2) 'The acquisition of the highest beatitude [is] from the true comprehension of (1) Proof [or, Means of right knowledge], (2) Object of knowledge (3) Doubt, (4) Motive, (5) Instance, (6) Tenet [or Demonstrated truth] (7) Member of syllogism (8) Hypothetical reasoning, (9) Conclusion, (10) Discussion (11) Wrangling, (12) Cavilling, (13) Fallacy, (14) Perversion, (15) Futility, and (16) Ground for confutation'—this [is] the first aphorism of the Nyāya [-sūtras of Gautama] The meaning of this [is] that there would be the attainment of final liberation from the true comprehension of the sixteen categories proof etc

तर्कभाषा

उद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षाविचारः ।

न च प्रमाणादीनां तत्प्रज्ञानं सम्यग् ज्ञानं तावद्भवति यावदेतेषां मुद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षा न क्रियन्ते । यदाह भाष्यकारः-त्रिविधा शास्त्र शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिरुद्देशो लक्षण परीक्षा चेति । (भा० भा० १०)

उद्देशस्तु नाममात्रेण यस्तुर्मर्कतिनम् । तत्रास्मिन्नयं सूत्रे कृतम् ।

लक्षणं त्वसाधारणधर्मवचनम् । यथा गोः साग्रादिमन्यम् ।

यथालक्षितस्येतत् लक्षणमुपपद्यते न चेति विचारः परीक्षा ।

तेनैते लक्षणपरीक्षे प्रमाणादीनां तत्प्रज्ञानार्थमस्य कर्तव्यं ॥ ३ ॥

(१) प्रमाणम् ।

प्रमाणलक्षण प्रमाणं च ।

तत्रापि प्रथममुद्दिष्टस्य प्रमाणस्य तावद्वलक्षणमुच्यते प्रमाकरणे

(३) Add further (*ca*) true comprehension—right knowledge—of proof etc, would not take place so long as Enumeration, Definition [or Characterization] and Examination of these are not made, as says the author of the Bhāṣya [Vātsyāyana, who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtras]—the procedure in this science, again, [is] three-fold—Enumeration, Definition, and Examination

As for (*tu*) Enumeration [it is] the statement of things [or topics] merely by name and that has been done in this very aphorism

Definition again, [is] the statement of a peculiar characteristic, as the possession of a dew lap etc [in the case] of a cow

Examination [is] the investigation as to whether the definition in question (*etat*) of [a thing] defined in a particular way (*yathā*) is applicable or not

Therefore [owing to Uddesh having been already made in the first aphorism] these two Definition and Examination must needs be gone through for the sake of true comprehension of [the categories] proof etc

(४) And therein too the definition of proof [which is] enumerated first is now stated—proof [is] the instrument of

कारणनिरूपणम्

प्रमाणम् । अत्र च प्रमाणं लक्ष्यम् प्रमाकरणं लक्षणम् ।

ननु प्रमायाः करणं चेत् प्रमाणं तर्हि तस्य फलं यत्कृत्यम् करणस्य फलवच्चनियमात् । सत्यम् । प्रमेव फलं साध्यमित्यर्थः । यथा छिदा-
करणस्य पद्मोद्भिद्धेन फलम् ॥ ४ ॥

प्रमानिरूपणम् ।

का पुनः प्रमा यस्याः करणं प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । यथार्थानुभवाः प्रमाः । यथार्थ इत्ययथार्थानां संग्रहविपर्ययतर्कज्ञानानां निरासः । अनुभव इति स्मृतेर्निरासे । अनुभवो नाम स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानम् ॥ ५ ॥

कारणनिरूपणम्

किं पुनः करणम् । साधकतमं करणम् । अतिशयितं साधकं साधकतमं प्रकृतं कारणमित्यर्थः ।

right cognition. Here again proof [is] what is defined, instrument of right cognition [is] the definition.

I say [says the objector *nana*] if proof [is] the instrument of right cognition, then its result [or effect, fruit] deserves to be stated, for an instrument is as a rule possessed of [that is, associated with] a result. [The siddhāntin replies—that is] true, right cognition itself [is] the result—what is to be accomplished, this [is] what is meant, as of the axe—the instrument of cutting [is] the cutting itself; the result.

(5) What again [is this] right cognition of which the instrument [is] proof? It is answered [as follows]—Right cognition [is] the apprehension of a thing as it is (*yathārtha*). By [the expression] 'of a thing as it is' [is effected] the exclusion of cognitions—Doubt, Error and Hypothetical reasoning, [which are] not in accord with their objects. By [the expression] 'apprehension' [is effected] the exclusion of Remembrance. [For] apprehension indeed (*ānna*) [is all] cognition other than remembrance.

(6) What again [is] the Instrument? Instrument [is] the most effective [agency]. Most effective [means] exceedingly effective; that is to say (*atyarthak*) the most efficient [or principal] cause.

१ निरासः । ज्ञातविषय ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । २ साधकतमं कारणम् ।

ननु माध्वकारणमिति पर्यायस्तदेव न ज्ञायते किं तत् कारण-
मिति । उच्यते । यस्य कार्यात् पूर्वभावो नियतोऽनन्यथासिद्धश्च
तत् कारणम् । यथा तन्तुरेमादिकं पटस्य । यद्यपि पटोत्पत्तौ
वैवादागतस्य रासभादे पूर्वभावो विद्यते तथापि नास्ती नियतः ।
तन्तुरूपस्य तु नियत पूर्वभावोऽस्त्येव किंत्वन्यथासिद्ध पटरूपजननो-
पक्षीणत्वात् । पटं प्रत्यपि कारणत्वे कल्पनागौरवप्रसंगात् ।

तेनानन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्वभाववित्त्वं कारणत्वम् । अनन्यथासिद्ध-
नियतपश्चाद्भाववित्त्वं कार्यत्वम् ।

१२ यत्तु कश्चिदाह कार्यानुकृतान्यन्यतिरेकित्वं कारणत्वमिति

I say *adharma* [effective] and *karana* [cause] [are but] synonyms and it is not yet known what that 'cause' is. We reply—That whose antecedent existence to the effect [is] invariable and not established [or proved] to be otherwise [that is, for another purpose than that of producing the effect] [is] the Cause—as for instance, threads loom etc [that are the cause] of cloth. Even though, in the case of the production of cloth, there does exist the antecedent existence of a donkey etc come [there] by chance, yet that [antecedent existence is] not invariable [hence, a donkey and other things can not be regarded as the cause of cloth]. There does indeed obtain the invariable antecedent existence of the thread-colour but [that is] proved to be [there] for another purpose, owing to [its] being exhausted in producing the colour of the cloth, [in regarding the thread colour] as the cause of cloth also there would arise the undesirable contingency of a complicated assumption.

Therefore, the state of being a cause [is] the state of being an invariable antecedent not proved to be [there] otherwise [or for another purpose], the state of being the effect [is] the state of invariably following [the cause] and not proved [to have come into existence] otherwise [that is, through another cause].

As regards what some one contends [viz] the state of being a cause [is] the state of having the presence and

समवायिकारणनिरूपणम् ।

तद्युक्तम् । नित्यविभूनां व्योमादीनां कालतो देशतश्च व्यतिरेकासम्भवे
नाकारणत्वप्रसंगात् ॥ ६ ॥

समवायिकारणनिरूपणम् ।

तत्र कारणं त्रिविधम् । समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । तत्र
यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत् समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तव पटस्य
समवायिकारणम् । यतस्तन्तुष्वेव पटः समवेतो जायते न तुर्यादिषु ।

तन्तु तन्तुसंज्ञक इव तुर्यादिसंज्ञां अपि पटस्य विद्यते तत् कथं
तन्तुष्वेव पटः समवेतो जायते न तुर्यादिषु । सत्यम् । द्विविधं 'संज्ञक' ।
संयोगः समवायश्चेति । तन्नायुतसिद्धयो 'संज्ञक' समवायः । अन्य
योस्तु संयोग एव ॥ ७ ॥

absence [of a thing] corresponding to [the presence and
absence of] the effect, that [is] improper, for [if the above
view is accepted] owing to the impossibility of [their] absence
in point of time and space eternal and all-pervading [things
like] ether and others, could not be a cause, which is an un-
desirable contingency

(7) That cause again [is] of three-kinds on account of the
distinction of Intimate [or Material or Constituent or Substa-
ntial or Inherent] Non-intimate [or Non-constituent] and
Instrumental [or Efficient] Of these (*tatra*) Intimate cause
[is] that in inseparable [or intimate or inherent] relation with
which an effect is produced as for instance, threads [are] the
intimate cause of [a piece of] cloth, for cloth is produced
in intimate relation with the threads alone [and] not in
[intimate relation with] shuttle and others

I say, there does exist, like the connection with the
threads, a connection also with the shuttle and others of the
cloth, then how is the cloth produced in intimate relation
with the threads alone [and] not in [intimate relation with]
the shuttle and others? Right [in a sense is your state-
ment] Connection [is] two fold—Conjunction and Inherence
Of these, the connection of two [things that are] known to be
never dissociated or separated [or joined, that is, which are
permanently connected] [is] Inherence, that again between
other two [things is] simple Conjunction

‘अयुतसिद्धौ कौ’ इति निरूपणम् ।

कौ पुनरयुतसिद्धौ । ययोर्मध्ये एकमविनश्यदर्पराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते
• तावयुतसिद्धौ । तदुक्तम् ।

तावेवायुतसिद्धौ द्वौ विज्ञातव्यौ ययोर्द्वयो ।

अविनश्यदेकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते ॥

• यथा अवयवावयवविर्ना गुणगुणिर्ना क्रियाक्रियावन्तो जातिव्यक्ती
विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चति । अवयव-वादयो हि यथाऽममवयवाद्याश्रिता
एवावतिष्ठन्तेऽविनश्यन्तः । विनश्यदवस्थास्त्वनाश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्ते ।

• यथा तन्तुनाशे सति पटः । यथा वा आश्रयनाशे सति गुणः ।
विनश्यत्ता तु विनाशकारणसामग्रीसानिध्यम् ।

तन्तुपदावप्यवयवावयवविर्ना । तेन तयोः संबन्धः समवायोऽयुतः

(8) Which again [are] the two [things which are] known to be never dissociated ? Those [two things are] known to be never dissociated [or are permanently connected] between which two the one as long as it is not destroyed continues to be just dependent upon the other . As [it] is said—

Those two [things] alone should be understood to be Ayutasiddha between which two the one as long as it is not destroyed continues to be just dependent upon the other

Thus—parts and the whole quality and the qualified or substratum action and [its] possessor class-characteristic and individual and particularity and eternal substance For the whole etc as long as they are not destroyed continue to be just dependent upon the parts etc in order [or respectively] But [when they are] in the state of being destroyed, [they] remain just not resorting to anything as for instance, the cloth [does not remain resorting to anything] when there is the destruction of the threads or the quality when there is the destruction of [its] substratum . The state of being destroyed again [means] the presence of the totality of causes of [that is] conducive to] destruction

Threads and cloth again [are in the relation of] parts and the whole . Hence the connection between them [is] inherence owing to [their] being known to be not dissociated ,

सिद्धत्वात् । तुरीयपटयोस्तु न समवायोऽयुतसिद्धत्वाभावात् । न हि १२
 तुरी पटाश्रितैवावतिष्ठते नापि पटस्तुर्याश्रितोऽनस्तयो सन्नः
 संयोग एव ।

तदेवं तन्तुसमवेत पटः । यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत् समवायि- १५
 कारणम् । अतस्तन्तुरेव समवायिकारणं पटस्य न तु तुर्यादिः । पटश्च
 स्वगतरूपादेः समवायिकारणम् । एव मृत्पिण्डोऽपि घटस्य समवायि
 कारणम् । घटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः ॥ ८ ॥

१८

‘घटः स्वगतरूपादेः समवायिकारणम्’ इति सिद्धान्तप्रस्थापनम् ।

ननु यदेव पटादयो जायन्ते तदेव तद्गतरूपादयोऽपि । अतः
 समानकालीनत्वाद् गुणगुणिनोः सत्येनरगोविपाणयत् कार्यकारणभावः ।

[that] between the shuttle and cloth on the other hand (*tu*),
 [is] not inherence, owing to the absence of the state of being
 known to be not dissociated Not indeed does the shuttle
 remain resorting to the cloth alone nor the cloth, for the
 matter of that, resorting to the shuttle [alone], 'hence
 the connection between them [is] conjunction alone [pure
 and simple]

Therefore thus the cloth is in intimate relation with the
 threads [Intimate cause [is] that in inseparable, [or inti-
 mate, or inherent] relation with which an effect is produ-
 ced Hence the thread alone [=] the intimate cause of
 cloth, and not the shuttle etc And the cloth [is] the intimate
 cause of colour etc, belonging to itself Likewise the clod
 of earth [or clay] also [is] the intimate cause of the jar,
 and the jar, of the colour etc belonging to itself

(१) I say [says the objector]—When indeed the jar
 and others are produced, at the same time are produced also
 colour etc belonging to them Therefore, owing to the
 quality and [its] possessor being contemporaneous, there
 exists not [between them] the relation of cause and effect
 itself, as between the right and left horn of a cow, owing
 to the absence of the relation of priority and posteriority
 Hence, the jar and others [are] not the intimate cause of
 colour etc belonging to them, owing to the intimate cause

एव नास्ति पौर्वाप्याभावात् । अतो न समवायिकारणं घटादयः स्वगत-
रूपादीनाम् । कारणविशेषत्वात् समवायिकारणस्य ।

६ अत्रोच्यते । न तावद् गुणगुणिनो समानकालीन जन्म । किंतु द्रव्य
निर्गुणमेव प्रथममुत्पद्यते पश्चात् तत्समवेता गुणा उत्पद्यन्ते । समान
कालोत्पत्तौ तु गुणगुणिनाः समानसामग्रीकत्वाद् भेदो न स्यात् ।

७ कारणभेदनियतत्वात् कार्यभेदस्य । तस्मान् प्रथमे क्षणे निर्गुण एव
घटो गुणेभ्य पूर्वभावीति भवति गुणानां समवायिकारणम् । तदा
कारणभेदोऽप्यस्ति । घटो हि घट प्रति न कारणमेकस्येव पौर्वा

१२ पर्याभावात् । न हि स एव तमेव प्रति पूर्वभावी पश्चाद्भावी च ।
स्वगुणान् प्रति तु पूर्वभावित्वाद्भवति गुणानां समवायिकारणम् ।

being [only] a particular cause [and the rule of *paurva-*
parya necessarily holding good in the case of a particular
cause as in the case of a cause in general]

To this we reply To begin with (*tāvat*) the production
of the quality and [its] possessor [is] not contemporaneous but
a substance void of qualities alone is first produced, [and]
afterwards the qualities inherent in it are produced But if
they [the quality and its possessor] were produced at the same
time [or contemporaneously], there would be no difference
between the quality and its possessor, owing to the sameness
of the totality of the causal agencies (*sāmigrī*), for the differ-
ence between effects is determined invariably by the differ-
ence between causes. Therefore, the jar just void of qualities
at the first moment becomes the intimate cause of qualities
because it exists prior to the qualities And in this way
(*tadū*) there would exist also the difference between the
causes [The objector now suggests that there need not still
be *kāranabheda* he is prepared to admit that *ghata* is the
intimate cause of its qualities, perhaps *ghata* may still be
its own cause as well] To this the *siddhāntin* replies]
The jar, for the matter of that (*hi*) [is] not the cause with
reference to the jar owing to the absence of the relation of
priority and posteriority in one and the same [object] Not
surely [can] the same [jar] be existing before and existing
after itself Owing to [its] existing before its qualities
however, [it] becomes the intimate cause of [its] qualities

• नन्येवं सति प्रथमेक्षणे घटोऽचाक्षुष स्यादरूपिद्रव्यत्वाद् वायुवत् । तदेव हि द्रव्यं चाक्षुष यन्महत्त्वे सत्युद्भूतरूपवत् । अद्रव्यं च स्यात् १५ गुणाश्रयत्वाभावात् । गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यमिति हि द्रव्यलक्षणम् । सत्यम् । प्रथमे क्षणे परमसूक्ष्मो घटो यदि चक्षुषा न गृह्यते तदा कानो हानि । नहि सगुणोत्पत्तिपक्षेऽपि निमेषान्तरे घटो गृह्यते । तेन व्यवस्थितमेत १८ त्तिगुण एव प्रथमं घट उत्पद्यते द्वितीयादिकक्षणेपु चक्षुषा गृह्यते । न च प्रथमे क्षणे गुणाश्रयत्वाभावाद्द्रव्यत्वापत्तिः । समवायिकारणं द्रव्यमिति द्रव्यलक्षणयोनात् । योग्यतया गुणाश्रयत्वाच्च । योग्यता च २१ गुणारयन्ताभावाभावा ॥ ९ ॥

असमवायिकारणनिरूपणम् ।

असमवायिकारणं तद्वृत्तं । यत् समवायिकारणस्यासत्त्वमयुत

I say,—such being the case the jar at the first moment would be invisible owing to its being [at that time] a substance void of colour, like air. For, that substance alone [is] visible, which [is] possessed of a developed colour, the dimension being large. And further [the jar] would be no substance, owing to the absence of being a substratum of qualities. Substance [is] the substratum of qualities—this [is] the definition of a substance. [The siddhantin replies]—True [what you say] [But] if the jar at the first moment being extremely subtle, is not apprehended by the eye, what then [is] the loss for us? Not indeed, even according to the theory of the production [of the jar] with qualities, is the jar apprehended in the time of the winking of the eye. So [it is] well established that the jar just void of qualities is first produced [and] apprehended by the eye during the second and following moments. Again, there would not be the [undesirable] consequence that [the jar] on account of the absence of being a substratum of qualities at the first moment would be no substance, owing to the application of the [following] definition of a substance—substance [is] an intimate cause, and further (ca) owing to [its] being a substratum of qualities, on account of [its] capability [of being such]. Capability again [is] the absence of the absolute negation of qualities.

(10) Now the Non intimate cause is explained. Non-

१ निमेषावसरे । २ गुणाश्रयत्वं गुणाश्रयन्ताभावानविकल्पत्वं ।

- ३ सामर्थ्यं तदसमवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणम् । तन्तुसंयोगस्य गुणस्य पटसमवायिकारणेषु तन्तुषु गुणिषु समवेतत्वेन समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात् अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्व
६ भावित्वेन पटं प्राप्ति कारणत्वाच्च ।

एवं तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणम् ।

- ननु पटरूपस्य पट समवायिकारणम् । तेन तद्वत्तस्यैव कस्य-
१ चिद्धर्मस्य पटरूपं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणत्वमुचितम् । तस्यैव समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात् । न तन्तुरूपस्य । तस्य समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नभावात् । मैवम् । तत्समवायिकारणसमवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नस्यापि परंपर्या समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

निमित्तकारणनिरूपणम् ।

✓

निमित्तकारणं तदुच्यते । यन्न समवायिकारणं नाप्यसमवायिकार-

intimate cause [is] that which is proximate to the intimate cause and whose [causal] capacity is ascertained [or established], as for instance, the conjunction of the threads [is] the non-intimate cause of the cloth, for the quality, the conjunction of threads, being in intimate relation with the threads, the possessors of the quality, [and] the intimate causes of the cloth, is proximate to the intimate cause, and is the cause with reference to the cloth, being invariably antecedent [to it], and not known to be [there] for another purpose

Likewise, the colour of the threads [is] the non-intimate cause of the colour of the cloth

I say, [says the objector] the cloth [is] the intimate cause of the colour belonging to the cloth, hence it is proper that some quality belonging to itself [that is, to the cloth], should be the non-intimate cause with reference to the colour of the cloth, for that alone is proximate to the intimate cause, [and] not the colour of the threads, that being not proximate to the intimate cause [Do] not [say] so That which is proximate to the intimate cause of the intimate cause of that [effect] is also indirectly proximate to the intimate cause

(11) Instrumental cause is now explained — Instrumental cause [is] that which is neither the intimate cause, nor again the non intimate cause and yet [is] = cause, as for

‘ नमथ च कारण तत्तिमित्कारणम् । यथा घमादिकं घटस्य निमित्त कारणम् ॥ ११ ॥

अभावस्य निमित्तमात्र कारणम् ।

तदेतद्भावानामेव त्रिविधं कारणम् । अभावस्य तु निमित्तमात्रं तस्य क्वचिदप्यसमवायात् । समवायस्य तु भावद्वयधर्मत्वात् ॥ १२ ॥

‘ अनधिगतार्थगन्तु प्रमाणम् ’ इत्यस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य स्पष्टनम् ।

इन्द्रियसंयोगादि प्रमाण न प्रमाणादि ।

तदेतस्य त्रिविधस्य कारणस्य मध्ये यदेव कवमपि सातिहायं तदेव कारणम् । तेन व्ययस्थितमेतत्तुल्यं प्रमाकरण प्रमाणमिति । —

यत्थनधिगतार्थगन्तु प्रमाणमिति लक्षणम् तन्न । एकस्मिन्नेव घटे यदोऽयं घटोऽयमिति धारावाहिकज्ञानानां गृहीतग्राहिणामप्रामाण्य-प्रसंगात् ।

न चान्यान्यक्षणाविशिष्टविषयीकरणादनधिगतार्थगन्तुता । प्रत्यक्षेण

instance the shuttle etc [are] the instrumental cause of the cloth.

(12) Now this three fold cause belongs to positive things [or entities] only As for negation [or absence] it has only the instrumental [cause], for there cannot be intimate relation of it anywhere, intimate relation again being a property of two positive things

(13) Whatever [cause is] in some way pre eminent amongst these three fold causes [is] itself the instrument Hence well-established [is] this definition—Proof [is] the instrument of right cognition

As regards the definition—Proof [is] that which makes known an object not known before, it [is] not [right] [For if this definition is regarded as correct], serial [or continuous] cognitions in the form ‘ this [is] a jar, ‘ this [is] a jar ’ with reference to one and the same jar, which apprehend something already apprehended, would not be right knowledge, which is undesirable

Neither [can] the character of making known what is not known before [be said to exist in each of the

- १ सूक्ष्मकालभेदानावहनात् । कालभेदघट्टे हि क्रियादिसंयोगान्तर्गतं चतुर्णां योग्यध्यामिमानां न स्यात् । क्रिया क्रियातो विभागो विभागात् पूर्वसंयोगनाशस्ततोत्तरसंयोगोत्पत्तिरिति ।
- १२ ननु प्रमाया कारणानि घट्टानि भवन्ति प्रमानुप्रमेयार्थानि तान्यपि किं करणानि उत नेति । उच्यते । सत्यपि प्रमातरि प्रमेय च प्रमानुत्पत्ते इन्द्रियसंयोगादी सत्याविलम्बेन प्रमोत्पत्ते इन्द्रियसंयोगादिरप्य
- १३ करणम् ^{प्रमाया} साधकत्वादिशेषोपपत्त्यनेनयोत्तरुपेक्षास्य प्रमायाधिभ्योऽतिशयितव्यान् । अतिशयितं साधकं साधकतममृतदेउ करणमित्युक्तम् । अत इन्द्रियसंयोगादिरप्य प्रमाकरणत्वात् प्रमाणं न प्रमायादि ॥ १३ ॥

above serial cognition] on the ground of referring to objects characterised by different moments successively for the comprehension of minute divisions of time [such as a moment] can not be had by direct perception. If [it were supposed that] there is the comprehension of [the minute] divisions of time, then there would not arise the apparent conception about the simultaneity of the four [actions] beginning with motion and ending with conjunction, namely, motion, disjunction through motion, destruction of the former conjunction through disjunction, and then the production of the second [or new] conjunction

- I say [says the objector] there are many causes of right cognition, the knower, the object of knowledge etc [are] they also the instruments or not ? We reply — Even though the knower and the object of knowledge are present, there does not arise right cognition, [while] when there is the conjunction etc of the organ of sense [with the object], right cognition arises without delay. [hence it follows that] only the conjunction of organ of sense etc [is] the instrument for though the character of being the cause is the same [in the case of Pramātr Prameya etc] this [Indriyasamyoga] has superiority over the knower etc, on account of this very pre-eminence [viz producing right knowledge without delay] [What is] pre-eminently effective [is] most effective [and] that same has been termed the instrument. Hence the conjunction of the sense organ etc [is] owing to [it-] being the most effective cause of right knowledge the proof [or means of right knowledge and] not the knower [or cognising agent] etc

प्रमाणचतुष्टयम् ।

तानि च प्रमाणानि चत्वारि । तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । प्रत्यक्षानुमानो-
पमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति ॥ १४ ॥

प्रत्यक्षम् ।

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणनिरूपणम् । कदा इन्द्रिय करणम् कदा इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः

करणम् कदा ज्ञान करणम् इति विचारः ।

किं पुनः प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्कारिप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्का-
रिणी च प्रमा संवीच्यते येन्द्रियज्ञा । सा च द्विविधा सचिकल्पकानि
विकल्पकमेवात् । तस्याः कर्णं त्रिविधम् । कदाचिदिन्द्रियम् कदा च
चिदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः कदाचिज्ज्ञानम् ।

कदा पुनरिन्द्रिय करणम् । यदा निर्विकल्पकरूपा प्रमा फलम्
तदैन्द्रियं करणम् । तथाहि । आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते मन इन्द्रियेण
इन्द्रियमर्थेन । इन्द्रियाणां वस्तुप्राप्यप्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् । ततोऽर्थ

(14) And those proofs [are] four And to the same effect
the Nyayasutra [I 1 3] Perception, Inference, Analogy ,
and Word [or Testimony] [are] the proofs

(15) What again [is] Perception ? Perception [is]
the instrument of direct (*saksatkari*) right cognition, and
that alone is called direct right cognition which is produ-
ced by a sense-organ. It [is] again two fold, owing to the
distinction of determinate [or concrete] and non-determinate
[or undifferentiated or abstract] Its instrument [is] three-
fold, sometimes an organ of sense, sometimes the contact
between sense-organ and object, [and] sometimes cognition

When again [is] a sense-organ the instrument ? When
right cognition of the form of non-determinate [knowledge]
[is] the effect, then a sense-organ [is] the instrument
To explain (*tathāh*)—The soul is brought into contact
with the mind, the mind with the sense organ, the
sense-organ with the object, it being a rule that the
sense-organs produce cognition [or illumination] after

संनिकृष्टेनेन्द्रियेण निर्विकल्पक नामजात्यादियोजनाहीन वस्तुमा-
 १२ त्रावगाहि किंचिदिदमिति ज्ञानं जन्यते । तस्य ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियं करणं
 छिदाया इय परञ्जु । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोऽग्रान्तरव्यापारः छिदाक
 रणस्य परशोरिव दारुसंयोगः । निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं फलं परशोरिव
 १५ छिदा ।

कदा पुनरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षं करणम् । यदा निर्विकल्पकानन्तर
 सविकल्पकं नामजात्यादियोजनात्मकं द्वित्योऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं इयामो-
 १८ ऽयमिति विशेषणविशेष्यावगाहि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः
 करणम् । निर्विकल्पकज्ञानमग्रान्तरव्यापारः । सविकल्पकं ज्ञानं
 फलम् ।

२१ कदा पुनर्ज्ञानं करणम् । यदोक्तसविकल्पकानन्तरं हानोपादानो-

having come into contact with [or reached] the thing. Then by the sense-organ coming in contact with the object is generated a cognition non determinate, [which is] void of the connection with name, genus, [quality, action] etc, which comprises the thing alone, [and] having the form 'this [is] something'. Of that cognition [is] the sense-organ the instrument, as of the cutting, the axe the contact between the sense-organ and object the intervening operation, as the conjunction of the wood and the axe [which is] the instrument of cutting, the non-determinate cognition [is] the effect, as the cutting, of the axe.

When again [is] the contact between the sense organ and object, the instrument? When after the non-determinate [cognition] is generated the determinate cognition embracing a connection with name, genus etc [and] comprising [the idea of] the qualification and the qualified, [and] having the form 'this [is] Dittha,' 'this [is] a Brahmana this [is] dark-coloured,' then the contact between the sense-organ and object [is] the instrument the non-determinate cognition the intervening operation, [and] the determinate cognition the effect.

When again [is] the cognition the instrument? When after the determinate [cognition] spoken of [above] are genera

पेशाबुद्ध्यो जायन्ते तदा निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं करणम् । सविकल्पक
ज्ञानमपान्तरव्यापारः । हानादिवुद्ध्यः फलम् ।^१

२४

अत्र कश्चिदाह । सविकल्पकादीनामपीन्द्रियमेव करणम् । यावन्ति
त्यान्तरालिकानि संनिकर्षादीनि तानि सर्वाण्यप्यान्तरव्यापार इति
॥ ६५ ॥

२७

षड्विध, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष ।

इन्द्रियार्थयोस्तु यः संनिकर्षः साक्षात्कारिप्रसाहेतुः स षड्विध एव ।
तत्रथा । संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः^२
समवेतसमवायो विशेष्यविशेषणभावश्चेति ।

तत्र यदा चक्षुषा घटविषयं ज्ञानं जन्यते तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं
घटोऽर्थः । अन्यो संनिकर्षः संयोग एवायुतसिद्धचभावात् । एव^३

ted notions about rejection acceptance or indifference, then
non-determinate cognition [is] the instrument determinate
cognition the intervening operation, notions about rejection
etc the effect

In this connection somebody says—The sense-organ it
self [is] the instrument also of the determinate [notion] etc
Whatsoever [are] the intervening contacts etc they [are]
all the intervening operation

(16) The contact of the sense-organ and object, which
[is] the cause of direct right cognition [is] six-fold only, it [is]
as follows. Conjunction. Intimate relation with what is in
conjunction, Intimate relation with what is intimately
associated with what is in conjunction Intimate relation
Intimate relation with what is intimately related and the
Relation of qualification and the qualified

Of these, when by the eye is generated cognition having
the jar for [its] object, then the eye [is] the sense-organ [and]
the jar the object the contact of these two [is] only conjunc-
tion, owing to the absence of not being known to be separa-
ed Likewise, when by the mind, the internal sense organ,

१ तस्मात्सन्निकर्षजननीज्ञानरव्यापारः । यथा कुटारजन्तु कुटारदाहमयोग
कुटारजन्तुः कुटारजन्तुः ।

मनसान्तरेणेन्द्रियेण यदात्मविषयकं ज्ञानं जन्यतेऽहमिति तदा मनः इन्द्रियम् आत्मा अर्थः । अनयो संनिकर्षः संयोग एव ।

- १ कदा पुनः संयुक्तसमवायः संनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुरादिना घटगत-
रूपादिकं गृह्यते घटे इयामं रूपमस्तीति तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं घटरूपमर्थः ।
अनयोः संनिकर्षः संयुक्तसमवाय एव । चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य
१२ समवायात् । एवं मनसात्मसमवेते सुखादौ गृह्यमाणे अयमेव
संनिकर्षः ।

घटगतपरिमाणादिमहे चतुष्टयसंनिकर्षोऽप्यधिकं कारणमित्यते ।

- १५ सत्यपि संयुक्तसमवाये तदभावे दूरे परिमाणाद्यग्रहणात् । चतुष्टय-
संनिकर्षो यथा । इन्द्रियावयवैरर्थावयवानाम् इन्द्रियावयवविनार्थाव

is generated cognition with regard to the soul [or, having the soul for its object], having the form 'I', then the mind [is] the sense-organ, the soul the object, the contact of these in ० [is] only conjunction.

When again [is] the contact, intimate relation with what is in conjunction? When by the eye etc., is apprehended colour etc., belonging to the jar, in the form 'There is dark colour about the jar', then the eye [is] the sense-organ, the colour of the jar, the object, the contact of these two [is] just intimate relation with what is in conjunction, owing to the colour being in intimate relation with the jar that is in conjunction with the eye. Likewise, when by the mind are being apprehended pleasure etc. that are in intimate relation with the soul, there [is] this very contact.

In the case of the apprehension of the dimension etc. belonging to the jar, a four fold contact is desired as a further cause, for, even though the [contact of] intimate relation with what is in conjunction be there, in the absence of that [four fold contact], there is the non-apprehension of the dimension etc. from a distance. The four-fold contact [is] as follows—contact of the [constituent] parts of the object with the parts of the sense-organ, of the object as a whole with the sense-organ as a whole, of the

यदिनः इन्द्रियावयवैरर्थोवयविनः इन्द्रियावयविनार्थोवयवानां
संनिकर्ष इति ।

कदा पुनः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय संनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुषा घट-
रूपसमवेतं रूपत्यादिसामान्यं गृह्यते तदा चक्षुर्निन्द्रियं रूपत्यादिसा-
मान्यमर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय एव । यतश्चक्षु- २१
संयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायः ।

कदा पुनः समवायः संनिकर्षः । यदा श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण शब्दो गृह्यते
तदा श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं शब्दोऽर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः समवाय एव ।
श्रोत्रस्याकाशात्मकत्वाच्छब्दस्य चाकाशगुणत्वाद् गुणगुणिनोश्च
समवायात् । ८

कदा पुनः समवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः । यदा शब्दसमवेत शब्दत्वादि-
सामान्यं श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण गृह्यते तदा श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं शब्दत्वादिसामान्य-

object as a whole with the parts of the sense-organ [and]
of the parts of the object with the sense organ as a whole

When again [is] the contact intimate relation with what
is intimately associated with what is in conjunction ?
When by the eye is apprehended the generality, colour ness
etc. in intimate relation with the colour of the jar, then the
eye [is] the sense-organ the generality colour ness etc the
object, the contact between these two [is] just intimate rela-
tion with what is intimately associated with what is in
conjunction For, the colour is in intimate relation with
the jar which is in conjunction with the eye, and colour-
ness has intimate relation with it [that is, the colour]

When again [is] intimate relation the contact ? When
by the organ of hearing is apprehended sound, then the ear
[is] the sense-organ, sound the object the contact between these
two [is] just intimate relation For, the ear [is] constituted of
the ether and sound is a quality of the ether and there
is intimate relation between the quality and [its] possessor

When again [is] the contact, intimate relation with
what is intimately related ? When by the organ of hearing

मर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः समवेतसमवाय एव । श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे-

३० शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् ।

कदा पुनर्विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुषा
संयुक्ते भूतले घटाद्यभावो गृह्यते इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति तदा विशेष-
३३ णविशेष्यभावः संबन्धः । तदा चक्षु संयुक्तस्य भूतलस्य घटाद्यभावो
विशेषणम् । यदा च मन संयुक्ते आत्मानि सुखाद्यभावो गृह्यतेऽहं सुखं-
रहित इति तदा मन संयुक्तस्यात्मनः सुखाद्यभावो विशेषणम् । यदा
३६ श्रोत्रसमवेते गकारे घट्याभावो गृह्यते घट्वरहितो गकार इति तदा
श्रोत्रसमवेतस्य गकारस्य घट्याभावो विशेषणम् ।

तदेव संक्षेपत पञ्चविधसंबन्धान्यतमसंबन्धसवद्धविशेषणविशे-

is apprehended the generality sound-ness etc. in intimate relation with sound, then the ear [is] the sense-organ, the generality sound-ness etc. the object. The contact between these two [is] just intimate relation with what is intimately related, owing to sound-ness being in intimate relation with sound which is in intimate relation with the ear,

When again [is] the contact between the sense-organ and object, the relation of the qualification and the qualified? When the absence of the jar etc., is apprehended on the ground in conjunction with the eye, in the form 'there is no jar here on the ground', then [there is] the contact, the relation of the qualification and the qualified. Then the absence of the jar etc. [is] the qualification of the ground in conjunction with the eye. And when the absence of pleasure etc. is apprehended in the soul in conjunction with the mind, in the form 'I [am] void of pleasure,' then the absence of pleasure etc. [is] the qualification of the soul in conjunction with the mind. When the absence of gha-ness is apprehended in the ga-sound in intimate relation with the ear, in the form 'the ga-sound [is] void of gha-ness', then the absence of gha-ness [is] the qualification of the ga-sound in intimate relation with the ear.

Thus, in short, absence [or negation] is apprehended by the sense-organ through the contact of the sense-organ and

व्यमायलक्षणेनेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेणाभाव इन्द्रियेण गृह्यते ।

१९

एवं समवायोऽपि । चक्षुस्तद्वन्तस्य तन्तोर्विशेषणमृतः पटसमवायो
गृह्यत इह तन्तुषु पटसमवाय इति ।

तदेवं षोढा संनिकर्षां वर्णितः । संप्रहृष्ट ।

२२

अक्षजा प्रभितिर्द्वेधा सविकल्पाविकल्पिका ।

करणं त्रिविधं तस्याः सनिकर्षस्तु षड्विधं ॥

पटतन्तुलनीलत्वदादृशदृश्यजातयः ।

२५

अभावसमवायो च ग्राह्याः सध्वन्धपदकतः ॥ १६ ॥

सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्षम् इति प्रस्थापनम् ।

ननु निर्विकल्पक परमार्थस्तु स्वलक्षणविषय भवतु प्रत्यक्षम् ।

सविकल्पकं तु शब्दलिङ्गवदनुगताकारावगाहित्वात् सामान्यविषयं ,

object, characterised by the relation of the qualification and the qualified, based upon any one relation of the five kinds of relation [mentioned above]

Likewise [is apprehended] intimate relation also The intimate relation of the cloth in the form of a qualification, with the threads in conjunction with the eye is apprehended, in the form 'There [is] here in the threads the intimate relation of the cloth

Thus then [is] described the contact in six ways . And [there is] the summing up [as follows]—

The cognition arising through the sense organs [is] two-fold, determinate and non determinate, its instrument [is] three fold and the contact [is] six fold

The jar, its blue [colour], [the genus] blue ness, sound, the genus sound ness, absence and intimate relation are to be apprehended through the six fold contact

(17) I say [says the objector]—The non-determinate [cognition], referring as it does to an individualised object (*avakāsanam*) which really exists may be [regarded as] sense perception determinate [cognition] on the other hand refer. to generality, comprising as

लिङ्गम् । यथा धूमोऽग्नेर्लिङ्गम् । तथाहि । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साह-
चर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः । तस्या गृहीतायामेव धूमोऽग्निं गमयति ।
अतो व्याप्तित्वलेनाग्न्यनुमापकत्वाद् धूमोऽग्नेर्लिङ्गम् । तस्य तृतीयं ज्ञानं
लिङ्गपरामर्शः । तथाहि । प्रथमं तावन्महानसादौ भूयो भूयो धूमं पश्यन्
वर्हिं पश्यति । तेन भूयोदर्शनेन धूमाग्न्योः स्वाभाविकं संबन्धमवधार
यति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।

यद्यपि यत्र यत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वं तत्र तत्र इयामत्यमपीति भूयोदर्शनं
समानमवगम्यते तथापि मैत्रीतनयत्वइयामत्ययोर्न स्वाभाविक संबन्धः १५
कित्वोपाधिक एव । शाकाद्यन्नपरिणामस्वोपाधेर्विद्यमानत्वात् । तथाहि ।
इयामत्ये मैत्रीतनयत्वं न प्रयोजकं किंतु शाकाद्यन्नपरिणतिमेव एव

itory mark [is that] which makes one comprehend an
object by virtue of the invariable concomitance as for in-
stance, smoke [is] the indicatory mark of fire To explain —
Where [there is] smoke there [is] fire this companionship
as a rule [is] the invariable concomitance Only when that
[vyapti] is apprehended the smoke brings about the know-
ledge of the fire So the smoke [is] the indicatory mark of
the fire, as it brings about the inference of fire, by virtue of
the invariable concomitance Its tard cognition [is] the
consideration of the indicatory mark To explain —First,
to start with, one seeing smoke again and again in the
kitchen etc., sees [at the same time] fire by that frequent
[or repeated] observation does one ascertain the natural
connection between smoke and fire in the form 'where
[there is] smoke, there [is] fire

Even though repeated observation in the form 'wherever
[there is] the state of Mātrī's son, there [is] also blackness'
can be experienced in the same way (as in where there is
smoke, there is fire) still [there is] no natural relation bet-
ween the state of Mātrī's son and blackness but only ad-
ventitious [or 'accidental] owing to the existence of the
limitation [or condition, *upādhi* viz] the effect [or diges-
tion] of food such as vegetables etc To explain —Being
Mātrī's son [is] not the producing factor for blackness but
the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc., alone [is]

कथं प्रत्यक्षम् । अर्थजस्यैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । अर्थस्य च परमार्थसत् एव
तज्जनकत्वात् । स्वलक्षणं तु परमार्थसत् । न तु सामान्यम् । तस्य
६ प्रमाणनिरस्तविधिभावस्यान्यव्यावृत्त्यात्मनस्तच्छ्रुत्वात् । मैवम् ।
सामान्यस्यापि वस्तुमत्तत्वात् ।

तदेव व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १७ ॥

अनुमानम् ।

लिङ्गपरामर्श (धूमस्य हेतोर् नृतीय ज्ञानम्) अनुमानम् ।

१ अथ अनुमानं निरूप्यते । लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् । येन ह्यनुमीयते
तदनुमानम् । लिङ्गपरामर्शनं चानुमीयतेऽतो लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् ।
तच्च धूमादिज्ञानम् अनुमितिं प्रति करणत्वात् । अन्यादिज्ञानमनु
६ मितिः । तत्करणं धूमादिज्ञानम् ।

किं पुनर्लिङ्गं कच्च तस्य परामर्शः । उच्यते । व्याप्तिवलेनार्थगमक

it does forms found in several objects (*anugata*), like word
and inferential reason, how [can] it [be] sense perception ?
[The cognition] produced by the object alone is perception,
an object too produces [it] only when it really exists
An individualised object again [is] one that really exists but
not the generality, because with its positive existence
refuted by [all] proofs, it is unsubstantial, owing to its hav-
ing the form of the exclusion of others [Do] not [say]
so The generality also has the nature of an object

Thus then has been explained Perception

(18) Now is expounded Inference : Inference [is]
the consideration of the indicatory mark That [is] inference
by means of which [something] is inferred [Something]
is inferred by means of the consideration of the indicatory
mark therefore consideration of the indicatory mark [is]
inference, and it [is] the knowledge of smoke etc., being
the instrument with reference to inferential cognition The
knowledge of fire etc., [is] the inferential cognition, [and]
the instrument thereof [is] the knowledge of smoke etc

What again [is] the indicatory mark (*lingam*) and
what a consideration (*parumarsah*) ? We reply The indica-

हिणा प्रत्यक्षेणैव धूमग्न्योर्व्याप्तिरवधारयते । तेन धूमग्न्योः स्वाभाविक एव संबन्धः । न त्वोपाधिकः । स्वाभाविकश्च संबन्धो व्याप्तिः ।

तदनेन न्यायेन धूमग्न्योर्व्याप्तौ गृह्यमाणाया महानसे यद् धूमज्ञानं ३० तत् प्रथमम् । पर्वतादौ पक्षे यद् धूमज्ञानं तत् द्वितीयम् । तत् पूर्वगृहीता धूमग्न्योर्व्याप्तिं स्मृत्वा तत्रैव पर्वते पुनर्धूम परामृशति अस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निना व्याप्तो धूम इति । तदिदं धूमज्ञानं ३१ तृतीयम् । एतच्च वाचस्पतेश्च्युतम् । अन्यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरित्येव स्यात् । इदं तु कथमग्निना भवितव्यम् । तस्माद्विहाय धूमोऽस्तीति ज्ञानमन्वेपितव्यम् । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमितिं प्रति करणव्याप्ता ३२ नुमानम् । तस्मादस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरित्यनुमितिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । ५

helped by the impressions caused by repeated observation. Therefore the relation between smoke and fire [is] only natural and not adventitious, and a natural relation [is termed] invariable concomitance.

Thus, when according to this procedure (*nyāya*) the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is being apprehended, what knowledge of smoke in the kitchen [is produced] that [is] the First [knowledge of smoke] what knowledge of smoke on the mountain etc. the subject [of the syllogism, is produced] that [is] the Second then having remembered the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, apprehended previously, once again one considers the smoke there on the mountain itself in the form there is smoke here on the mountain smoke invariably concomitant with fire—this knowledge of smoke then [is] the Third and this must needs be accepted, otherwise [the ultimate cognition] would be only 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire' [On the strength of this cognition only] how could the fire for the matter of that be existing *here* [on the mountain]? Therefore the knowledge in the form there is smoke here too must be searched after. This same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark, and [it is] inference, as it is the instrument of inferential cognition. From it is produced the knowledge, the inferential cognition in the form there is fire here on the mountain.

१ व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । २ यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।

१८ प्रयोजकः । प्रयोजकश्चोपाधिरित्युच्यते ।

- न च धूमाग्न्यो संबन्धे कश्चिदुपाधिरस्ति । अस्ति चेत् योग्योऽ
योग्यो वा । अयोग्यस्य शङ्कितुमशक्यत्वाद् योग्यस्य चानुपलभ्यमान
१९ त्वात् । यत्रोपाधिरस्ति तत्रोपलभ्यते । यथाग्नेर्धूमसंबन्ध आर्द्रेन्धन
संयोगः । हिंसात्वस्य चाधर्मसाधनत्वेन सह संबन्धे निषिद्धात्तमु
पाधि । भैत्रोत्तनयत्वस्य च इयामत्येन सह संबन्धे शाकाद्यन्नपरिणति
२० भेदः । न चेह धूमाग्निसाहचर्ये कश्चिदुपाधिरस्ति । यद्यभविष्यत्
तदाऽप्रक्ष्यत् । ततो दर्शनाभागास्तीति तर्कसहकारिणानुपलम्भसमा
येन प्रत्यक्षेणोपाध्यभावोऽवधार्यते । तथाच सति उपाध्यभावग्रहणज
२१ नितसंस्कारसहकृतेन भूयोदर्शनजनितसंस्कारसहकृतेन साहचर्यप्रा

the producing factor and the producing factor [which produces the particular effect] is termed the limitation [or condition]

But in [the case of] the relation between smoke and fire, there does not exist any limitation, if there is [one] is it capable of being perceived (*yogya*) or not capable of being perceived? It is not possible to suspect [the existence of a limitation] not capable of being perceived, and [a limitation] capable of being perceived cannot be found. Where there is a limitation, there [it] is found, as for instance, in [the case of] the relation of fire with smoke, the contact with wet fuel. In [the case of] the relation of 'the act of killing' with 'the state of being the producer of demerit' prohibition [by the Sastras] is the limitation and in [the case of] the relation of 'the state of Maitri's son with blackness' the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc alone [is the limitation]. But here in [the case of] the association of smoke with fire exists not any limitation, if there had been [one] one would have seen [it]. Therefore the absence of a limitation is ascertained by perception itself accompanied by non-observation and supported by hypothetical reasoning in the form 'it does not exist as it is not seen'. And this being the case, the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is ascertained by perception itself, apprehending their association helped by the impressions produced by the apprehension of the absence of the limitation, and

हिणा प्रत्यक्षेणैव धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तिरवधार्यते । तेन धूमाग्नयोः स्वाभाविक एव संबन्धः । न त्वौपाधिकः । स्वाभाविकश्च सवन्धो व्याप्तिः ।

तदनेन न्यायेन धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तौ गृह्यमाणायां महानसे यद् धूमज्ञानं ३० तत् प्रथमम् । पर्वतादो पक्षे यद् धूमज्ञानं तत् द्वितीयम् । ततः पूर्वगृहीतां धूमाग्नयोर्व्याप्तिं स्मृत्वा तत्रैव पर्वते पुनर्धूमं परामृशति अस्यैव पर्वतेऽग्निना व्याप्तौ धूम इति । तदिदं धूमज्ञानं ३१ तृतीयम् । एतच्च अद्यमेनाभ्युपेयम् । अन्यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरित्येव स्यात् । दह तु कथमग्निना भवितव्यम् । तस्मादिहापि धूमोऽस्तीति ज्ञानमभ्युपेतव्यम् । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमिति प्रति करणत्याद्या ३२ नुमानम् । तस्मादस्यैव पर्वतेऽग्निरित्यनुमितिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । ५

helped by the impressions caused by repeated observation. Therefore the relation between smoke and fire [is] only natural and not adventitious, and a natural relation [is termed] invariable concomitance.

Thus, when according to this procedure (*nyaya*) the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is being apprehended, what knowledge of smoke in the kitchen [is produced] that [is] the First [knowledge of smoke] what knowledge of smoke on the mountain etc. the subject [of the syllogism, is produced] that [is] the Second then having remembered the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, apprehended previously once again one considers the smoke there on the mountain itself in the form 'there is here on the mountain smoke invariably concomitant with fire - this knowledge of smoke then [is] the Third and this must needs be accepted, otherwise [the ultimate cognition] would be only 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire' {On the strength of this cognition only] how could the fire for the matter of that be existing here [on the mountain]? Therefore the knowledge in the form there is 'smoke here too,' must be searched after. This same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark, and [it is] inference, as it is the instrument of inferential cognition. From it is produced the knowledge, the inferential cognition in the form 'there is fire here on the mountain.'

१ व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । २ यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।

ननु कथं प्रथमं महानसे यद्धूमज्ञानं तन्नाग्निमनुमापयति । सत्यम् ।

३१ व्याप्तेरगृहीतत्वाद् गृहीतायामेव व्याप्तावेनुमित्युदयात् ।

अथ व्याप्तिनिश्चयोत्तरकालं महानस एवाग्निरनुमीयताम् । मैवम् ।

अग्नेर्दृष्टत्वेन संदेहस्यानुदयात् । संदिग्धार्थोऽनुमीयते । यथोक्तं
२ भाष्यकृता । नानुपलब्धे न निर्णयिष्ये न्यायः प्रवर्तते किंतु संदिग्धे ।

अथ पर्यतगतमात्रस्य पुंसो यद्धूमज्ञानं तत् कथं नाग्निमनुमापयति ।

अस्ति चाग्नाग्निसंवेदः । साधकबाधरूपमाणाभावेन संशयस्य न्यायप्रा-
प्तत्वात् । सत्यम् । अगृहीतव्याप्तेरपि गृहीतविस्मृतव्याप्तेरपि पुंसोऽ-
नुमानानुवयेन व्याप्तिस्मृतेरप्यनुमितिर्हृतव्यात् । धूमदर्शनाच्चाद्भुत

I say [says the objector] how is it that which [is] the first knowledge of smoke in the kitchen, does not make [one] infer fire? True [what you say, your objection is relevant, but the answer is], because the invariable concomitance is not apprehended [at that time] and it is only when the invariable concomitance is apprehended that there can arise inferential cognition

Then, at a time after the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance, let the fire be inferred in the kitchen itself' [Do] not [say] so Because as the fire is [actually] seen, no doubt [about its existence] can arise And [only] a thing about which there is doubt is inferred. As is said [or laid down] by the author of the Bhāṣya—

Reasoning operates neither in [the case of] an unperceived [or unknown or unheard-of] object, nor in [the case of] an object definitely ascertained, but in [the case of] an object about which there is doubt

Then, how is it that the knowledge of smoke of a man who has simply gone to the mountain, does not make [him] infer fire? There is indeed here doubt about the fire, owing to the absence of arguments for or against [it], doubt is reasonably produced True [what you say] Because inference cannot arise in [the case of] that man also who has first apprehended but later forgotten the invariable concomitance as in [the case of] one who has

सरकारो व्याप्तिं स्मरति यो या धूमश्च स सोऽग्निमात्रं यथा महानस
इति । तेन धूमदर्शने जाते व्याप्तिस्मृतौ भूताया यद्भूमहानं तत् तृतीयं
धूमवाच्यामिति । तदेवाग्निमनुमापयति नान्यत् । तदेवानुमान स एव
लिङ्गपरामर्शः । तेन व्यवस्थितमेतद्विङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानमिति ॥ १८ ॥

स्वार्थानुमानम् परार्थानुमानम् च ।

तद्यानुमानं द्विविधम् । स्वार्थं परार्थं चति । स्वार्थं स्ववृत्तिपत्ति
हेतुः । तथाहि । स्वयमेव महानसादौ विशिष्टेन प्रत्यक्षेण घमाग्नेया
व्याप्तिं गृहीत्या पर्यतसमीपं गतस्नङ्गते चाग्नीं सद्विहानं पर्यतयति
नीमवाचुक्षमूलामभ्रलिङ्गा धूमलेखां पश्यन् धूमदर्शनाद्योद्बुद्धसं

not apprehended the invariable concomitance and so the remembrance of the invariable concomitance also is a cause of inferential cognition And at the sight of the smoke with the [latent] impressions aroused one remembers the invariable concomitance in the form whosoever [is] possessed of smoke [is] possessed of fire as for instance the kitchen Therefore that knowledge of smoke [which takes place] when the sight of smoke has been produced and the remembrance of the invariable concomitance has taken place [is] the Third [knowledge] in the form this [is] possessed of smoke and that alone make [one] infer the [presence of] fire and none else That same [is] inference [and] that same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark Hence this [is] well established that inference [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark

(19) And that inference [is] of two kinds—Intended for oneself and Intended for another [The inference] intended for oneself [is] the cause of one's own understanding To explain —Having just by himself apprehended by means of qualified perception the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire in the kitchen etc [a man] goes near the mountain and entertaining a doubt as regards fire present (*padā*) on that [mountain] [and] seeing a streak of smoke present on the mountain not cut away from [its] source and reaching [it licking] the clouds [and]

६ स्कारो व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । ततोऽत्रापि धूमोऽस्तीति प्रतिपद्यते । तस्मादत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरप्यस्तीति स्वयमेव प्रतिपद्यते तत् स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

१ यन्तु कश्चित् स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं बोधयितुं पञ्चादयव-
वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तन् परार्थानुमानम् । तद्यथा

७ पर्वतोऽग्नमग्निमान् ।

१२ धूमवत्त्वात् ।

यो यो धूमयान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः ।

१ तथा चायम् ।

१० १ तस्मात् तथा । इति

अनेन वाक्येन प्रतिज्ञादिमता प्रतिपादितात्पञ्चरूपोपपन्नाहिक्वाव
परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते । तेनैतत् परार्थानुमानम् ॥ १९ ॥

with the [latent] impressions aroused at the sight of the smoke remembers the invariable concomitance, namely (iti) 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire'. Then [he] realises that here too is smoke [and] from that he by himself realises that here on the mountain, there is fire also—That [is] inference intended for oneself

But when [a man] having himself inferred fire from smoke, employs a five membered syllogism (*adhyam*) in order to make another comprehend [the same], that [is known as] inference intended for another. It [is] as follows—

This mountain [is] possessed of fire

Because [it is] possessed of smoke

Whatever [is] possessed of smoke, all that (*śah sah*) [is] possessed of fire, as the kitchen

And this [mountain] so [that is, possessed of smoke]

Therefore [it is] so [that is, possessed of fire]

From the indicatory mark endowed with the five qualifications [or characteristics] propounded by this syllogism possessed of assertion [or statement] etc, even another comprehends fire. Therefore this [is] inference intended for another

अन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणम् ।

अत्र पर्यतस्याग्निमत्त्वं साध्य धूमवत्त्वं हेतु । स चान्वयव्यतिरेकी
अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमत्त्वात् । तथाहि । यत्र यत्र धूमवत्त्व
तत्राग्निमत्त्वं यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । महानसे धूमाग्न्योरन्व
यसद्भावदर्शनात् । एवं यत्राग्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाहृद्
इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । महाहृदे धूमाग्न्योरव्यतिरेकस्य दर्शनात् ।
व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेस्तस्य क्रमः । अन्वयव्याप्तौ यद् व्याप्य तदभाषोऽत्र
व्यापकी यच्च व्यापक तदभाषोऽत्र व्याप्य इति । तदुक्तम् ।

व्याप्यव्यापकभाषो हि भाषयोर्यादृग्विप्यते ।

तयोरभाषयोस्तस्माद्विपरीतं प्रतीयते ॥

(20) Here the possession of fire by the mountain [is] what is to be established the possession of smoke the reason (*hetuh*) That [reason] again [is] positive-negative as it is possessed of invariable concomitance [with the *sadhya* both] positively [or affirmatively *anvayak*] and negatively (*vyatirekah*) To explain— Wherever [there is] possession of smoke there [is] possession of fire as for instance, in the kitchen —this [represents] positive invariable concomitance, as the existence of the positive association of smoke and fire : seen in the kitchen Likewise 'where [there] is no fire there smoke also exists not as for instance in the big pool—this [represents] negative invariable concomitance as the negative association of smoke and fire is seen in the big pool : For [the representation of] the negative invariable concomitance again this [following] procedure [or order holds good]—The absence of that which is the pervaded in the positive invariable concomitance [is] the pervader here [in the *vyatirekavyāpti*] and the absence of what = the pervader [in the *anvayavyāpti*] [becomes] the pervaded here [in the *vyatirekavyāpti*] As has been said —

What sort of relation of the pervaded and the pervader between two positive entities is admitted the reverse of that is understood [to hold good] between the negations of them

अन्वये साधन व्याप्य साध्य व्यापकमिष्यते ।

साध्याभावोऽन्यथा व्याप्यो द्वापक साधनात्यय ॥

व्याप्यस्य वचन पूर्व व्यापकस्य तत परम् ।

एव परीक्षिता व्याप्ति स्फुटीभूति तत्त्वत ॥

१५ तदेव धूमवत्त्वे हेतावन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिरस्ति ॥ २० ॥

अन्वय याप्तेरेव किमर्थं प्रदर्शनम् ।

यत्तु यावदे कवलमन्वयव्याप्तेरेव प्रदर्शनम् तदेकेनापि चरितार्थ
त्वात् । तत्राप्यन्ययस्यावृत्त्यात् प्रदर्शनम् । अजुभागेण सिध्यतोऽर्थस्य
यकेण साधनायोगात् । न तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तरभावात् ।

तदेव धूमवत्त्वं हेतुरन्ययव्यतिरेकी । एवमन्वेऽप्यनित्यत्वाद्वा साध्ये

In [the case of] positive association the reason (*sadha-
nam*) is admitted [or desired] as the pervaded and what is
to be established (*sadhya*) as the pervader in the reverse case
[*anyatha* that = in *vyatireka*] the negation of what is to
be established [is admitted] as the pervaded [and] the
negation of the reason as the pervader

First the statement of the pervaded then afterwards
[that] of the pervader. Thus examined the invariable
concomitance becomes explicit in its true nature

Thus then in [the case of] the reason the possession of
smoke there is invariable concomitance [both] positively
and negatively

(21) As regards the showing of the positive invariable
concomitance only in a syllogism [it is so] because [one's]
purpose is served even by one [form of *vyapti*] and therein
again the showing of the positive association [and not of
the negative association is usually resorted to] owing to its
straight forward [lit not crooked simple] nature—It is not
proper to accomplish [one's] object that can be achieved in
a straight forward [or direct] manner indirectly [or in a
round about way]—but not on account of the non-existence
of a negative invariable concomitance

Thus then the reason the possession of smoke
[is] positive negative Likewise other reasons too such as

कृतकत्वादयो हेतवोऽन्यव्यतिरेकिणो द्रष्टव्याः ॥ २१ ॥

केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः ।

कश्चिद्धेतुः केवलव्यतिरेकी । यथा सात्मकत्वे साध्ये प्राणादि-
मर्थ्य हेतुः । यथा

जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकम् । प्राणादिमत्त्वात् ।

यत् सात्मकं न भवति तत् प्राणादिमत्तं भवति यथा अयं घटः ।

न चेद् जीवच्छरीरं तथा । तस्मात्तत् तथेति ।

अथ हि जीवच्छरीरस्य सात्मकत्वं साध्यं प्राणादिमत्त्वं हेतुः । स
च केवलव्यतिरेकी अन्यव्यतिरेकभावात् । तथाहि । यत् प्राणादिमत्तं
तत् सात्मकं यथामुक्त इति दृष्टान्तो नास्ति । जीवच्छरीरं सर्व-
पक्ष एव ।

'being a product,' when what is to be established [is] 'non-
eternal nature' etc should be understood (*drastavyāh*) to
be positive-negative

(22) Some [kind of] reason [is] purely negative, as for
instance, the reason 'being possessed of breath etc,' when
'being possessed of the soul' is what is to be established
Thus—The living body [is] possessed of the soul

Because [it is] possessed of breath etc

What is not possessed of the soul is not possessed of
breath etc, as this jar

And this living body [is] not [so]

Therefore [it is] not [so]

Here again, 'being possessed of the soul' [is] what is to
be established of the living body, [and] 'being possessed
of breath etc' [is] the reason And it [the reason is]
purely negative owing to the absence [or impossibility] of
a positive invariable concomitance To explain—'What
[is] possessed of breath etc [is] possessed of the soul,' as X-
there can be no [such] instance Everything [whatsoever is]
living body [is] the subject itself

१ यथा शरीरमित्येव कृतकत्वाद् द्रष्टव्यम् । यत् कृतकम् तत्रानित्यत्वम्
यत्रानित्यत्वाभावात्तत्र कृतकत्वान्न । यथा शरीरे ।

लक्षणमपि केवलव्यतिरिक्ता हेतु । यथा पृथिवीलक्षण गन्धवत्त्वम् ।

यिवात्पदं पृथिवीति व्यवहर्तव्यम् । गन्धवत्त्वात् ।

यत्नं पृथिवीति व्यवह्रियते तत्त गन्धवत् । यथापि ।

प्रमाणलक्षणं वा । यथा प्रमाकरणत्वं । तथाहि ।

प्रत्यक्षादिकं प्रमाणमिति व्यवहर्तव्यम् ।

प्रमाकरणत्वात् ।

यत् प्रमाणमिति न व्यवह्रियते तत्त प्रमाकरणं यथा प्रत्यक्षा

मास्तादि ।

न पुनस्तथेदम् ।

तस्मान्न तथा इति ।

- २१ न पुनरन्वयः । यत् प्रमाकरणं तत् प्रमाणमिति व्यवहर्तव्यं यथामुक्तं
इत्यन्वयद्वयान्तो नास्ति । प्रमाणमात्रस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात् । अत्र च
व्यवहारः साध्यो न तु प्रमाणत्वम् । तस्य प्रमाकरणत्वाद्धेतोरभेदेन

A definition also [is] a purely negative reason as for instance the definition of the earth being possessed of odour

The matter under dispute should be called earth'

Because [it is] possessed of odour

What is not called earth [is] not possessed of odour as water

Or the definition of Proof as being the instrument of right cognition To explain

Perception etc should be called proof

Because [it is] the instrument of right cognition

What is not called proof [is] not the instrument of right cognition as fallacious perception etc

This again [is] not so

Therefore [it is] not so

But there [is] no positive association what [is] the instrument of right cognition that should be called Proof—there is no instance of positive association as for instance X the whole of proof being made the subject 'Here again what is to be established [is] the designation [or use] of the term pramāṇa and not the nature of proof for that [pramāṇatva] being identical with the reason [pramākaraṇatva] owing to its being the instrument of right cognition there

साध्यमेवदोषसंगात् । तदेवं केवलव्यतिरेकिणो दर्शिताः ॥ २१ ॥

२५

केवलान्वयी हेतुः ।

कश्चिदन्यो हेतुः केवलान्वयी । यथा

शब्दोऽभिधेयः । प्रमेयत्वात् ।

यत् प्रमेयं तदभिधेयम् यथा घटः ।

तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथा इति ।

अत्र शब्दस्य अभिधेयत्वं साध्यम् प्रमेयत्व हेतुः । स च केवलान्वयस्येव । यदभिधेयं न भवति तत् प्रमेयमपि न भवति ययामुक्त इति व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्ताभावात् । सर्वत्र हि प्रामाणिक एवार्थो दृष्टान्तः । स च प्रमेयस्याभिधेयमेति ॥ २१ ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतोः पञ्चरूपाणि ।

एतेषां खान्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेकिहेतूनां त्रयाणां

would arise the fault of the identity [of the reason] with what is to be established, which = an undesirable contingency (*prasaṅga*)

Thus then have been shown the purely negative [reasons]

(23) Some other [kind of] reason [is] purely positive. Thus—Sound [is] nameable

Because [it is] possessed of knowability

What [is] knowable [is] nameable, as a jar.

This again [is] so.

Therefore [it is] so

Here nameability [is] what is to be established about sound, [and] knowability [is] the reason. And it [is] only purely positive. What is not nameable is not also knowable, as for instance, X—there is the absence of an instance of negative association. In all cases an object which can be proved [to be existent] by means of some proof, [can] alone [be] an instance and that [must be] both knowable and nameable [as a matter of course]

(24) Of these three [kinds of] reasons, the positive-

१ विशेषोऽभिधेयः । २ प्रामाणिक एव दृष्टान्तो यस्तत्रैव ।

३ मध्ये यो हेतुरन्वयव्यतिरेकी स पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एव स्वसाध्यं साधयितुं क्षमते । न त्वेकेनावि रूपेण हीन । तानि पञ्चरूपाणि तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वम् विपक्षादव्यावृत्तिः अवाधितविषयत्वम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् चेति । एतानि रूपाणि धूमवत्त्वादावन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि हेतो विद्यन्ते तथाहि ।

१ धूमवत्त्वं पक्षस्य पर्वतस्य धर्मः पर्वते तस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।

२ एवं सपक्षे सत्त्वं सपक्षे महानत्ते सद् विद्यत इत्यर्थः ।

३ एवं विपक्षान्महाह्वदाह व्यावृत्तिस्तत्र नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

४ एवम् अवाधितविषयं च धूमवत्त्वम् । तथाहि । धूमवत्त्वस्य हेतोर्विषय

negative, purely positive, and purely negative, the reason which [is] positive-negative is able to establish what is to be established by it, only when endowed with the five characteristics, but not if void of even one [of them] Those five characteristics again [are]—Being an attribute of [or present in] the subject, Being present in a similar instance, Being excluded from a dissimilar [or contrary] instance, Not having its object [or sadhya] disproved [or contradicted by a stronger proof], Not having a rival [indicatory mark which proves the opposite of the sadhya] These [five] characteristics [again] are present in a positive-negative reason 'to be possessed of smoke' etc To explain—

'To be possessed of smoke [is] 'an attribute of the subject', the mountain, as it is present on the mountain

Likewise, 'being present in a similar instance'—in a similar instance—in the kitchen-existing, is present—this [is] the meaning

Likewise, 'from a dissimilar instance,'—from the big pool—'being excluded'—is not there—this [is] the meaning

Similarly 'being possessed of smoke' has also its object not disproved' To explain the object of the reason 'being possessed of smoke [is] the quality which is to be estab-

साध्यधर्मस्तत्त्वाग्निमत्त्व तत् केनापि प्रमाणेन न बाधित न खण्डित १२
मित्यर्थः ।

५ एवम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् असत् प्रतिपक्षो यस्येत्यसत्प्रतिपक्ष धूमवत्त्वं
हेतुः । तथाहि । साध्यविपरीतसाधक हेत्वन्तरं प्रतिपक्ष इत्युच्यते । १५
स च धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ नास्त्येवानुपलम्भात् ।

तदेवं पञ्चरूपाणि धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ विद्यन्ते । तनेतद्धूमवत्त्वमग्निमत्त्वस्य
साधकम् ॥ १४ ॥

१८

अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता च ।

अग्नेः पक्षधर्मत्व हेतौ पक्षधर्मताबलात् सिध्यति । तथाहि । अनुमा-
नस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता च । तत्र व्याप्त्या साध्यसामान्यस्य^१
सिद्धिः । पक्षधर्मताबलान्तु साध्यस्य पक्षसन्नधित्व विशेष सिध्यति ।

blished and that [is] being possessed of fire Not by any
proof is that contradicted not shattered this[is]the meaning

Similarly not having a rival the reason being possess-
ed of smoke [is one] not having a rival that is for which
there is no rival [or counter balancing rea on] To explain
Another reason establishing the reverse of what is to be
established is called the rival [reason] and that does not
to be sure exist in [the case of] the rea on to be possessed
of smoke because it is not found out

Thus then the five characteristics exist in the reason
being possessed of smoke therefore this being po-ssessed
of smoke establishes the being pos-essed of fire

(25) That the fire is an attribute of the subject is
proved by virtue of the reason's being an attribute of the
subject To explain Inference has two constituents—
invariable concomitance and [the reason's] being an
attribute of the subject Of them (*tatra*) by the invari-
able concomitance is established what is to be established
in a general form by virtue of [the reason's] being an
attribute of the subject is established the particular [fact
viz] the connection of what is to be established with the
subject From [the fact that] being possessed of smoke [is]

पर्वतधर्मण धूमवत्त्वेन बहिरपि पर्वतसंबद्ध एवानुमीयते । अन्यथा,
साध्यसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिमहादेव सिद्धे कृतमनुमानेन ॥ २५ ॥

केवलान्वयी तथा च केवल-यतिरेकी हेतु चतुरूपोपपन्न ।

यस्त्वन्योऽन्यन्यव्यतिरेकी हेतुः स सर्वं पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एव सद्-
हेतुः । अन्यथा ह्यगमासोऽहेतुरिति यावत् । केवलान्वयी चतुरूपो
पपन्न एव स्वसाध्य साधयति । तस्य हि विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिर्नास्ति
विपक्षाभावात् ।

केवल-यतिरेकी च चतुरूपोपपन्न एव । तस्य हि सपक्षे सत्य
नास्ति सपक्षाभावात् ॥ २६ ॥ ४

पक्षसपक्षविपक्षनिरूपणम् ।

३ के पुनः पक्षसपक्षविपक्षा । उच्यन्ते ।

सविधसाध्यधर्मा धर्मा पक्षा । यथा धमानुमान पर्वतः ।

an attribute of the mountain it is inferred that the fire
also is connected with the mountain itself. Otherwise,
when what is to be established in a general form is establish-
ed from the apprehension of the invariable concomitance
itself no need of [the complex process of] inference [at all] !

(26) Other positive negative reasons also all of them [are]
good reasons only if endowed with the five characteristics,
otherwise [they are] fallacious reasons, that is no reasons.
A purely positive [reason] establishes what is to be
established by itself endowed only with four characteri-
stics for there is no exclusion from a dissimilar instance
in its case the dissimilar instance being absent [or im-
possible]

And a purely negative [reason is] endowed with
only four characteristics for there is no presence in a
similar instance in its case owing to the absence [or
impossibility] of a similar instance

(27) What again [are] the subject similar instance and
dissimilar instance ? [They are stated [as follows]—

Subject [is] an entity having a characteristic about which
there is doubt and which is to be established [or having
the characteristic of a doubted vidhya or referring to which

सपक्षस्तु निश्चितसाध्यधर्मा धर्मी । यथा महानसस्तत्रैव धमानुमाने ।
विपक्षस्तु निश्चितसाध्याभाववान् धर्मी । यथा तत्रैव महाह्रद ६
इति ॥ २७ ॥

पञ्च हेत्याभासा । असिद्धहेत्याभासनिरूपणम् ।

सर्वेषामन्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेकिणो दर्शिता ।
अतोऽन्ये हेत्याभासा । ते च असिद्धविरुद्धनिकान्तकप्रकरणसम
कालात्ययापदिष्टमेवात् पञ्चैव ।

तत्र सिद्धहेतेनानेथितो हेतुरसिद्ध स चासिद्धास्त्रिभिः आश्रया ६
सिद्ध स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्यासिद्धश्चेति ।

आश्रयासिद्धो यथा ।

गगनारविन्द सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात् ।

९ सराजारविन्दवत् ।

अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रय स च नास्त्येव ।

स्वरूपासिद्धौ यथा ।

१२ अनित्य शब्द । चाक्षुषत्वात् । घटवत् ।

अत्र चाक्षुषत्व हेतु । स च शब्दे नास्त्येव तस्य आश्रयत्वात् ।

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्तु द्विविध । एको व्याप्तिमाहकप्रमाणाभावात् ।

१५ अपरस्तूपाधिसङ्गात् । तत्र प्रथमो यथा ।

शब्द क्षणिक । सत्त्वात् ।

यत्सत्क्षणीक यथा जलधरपटलम् ।

१८ तथा च द्वादशदिरिति ।

न च सत्यक्षणीकत्वयोर्व्याप्तिमाहक प्रमाणमस्ति । सोपाधिकतया

The sky lotus [is] fragrant

*Because [it is possessed] of the generality of lotus
like a lake-born lotus*

*Here the sky lotus [is] the support and that exists not
at all (etc)*

Unproven in its own nature [is] as follows —

Sound [is] non eternal

*Because of [its] visibility
like a jar*

*Here vis ibility [is] the reason and that exists not in
sound at all (etc) because that [sound] is audible*

*Unproven in invariable concomitance again [is] of
two kind. One [is caused] by the absence of a proof
apprehending the invariable concomitance the other again
by the existence of a limitation Of them the first [is] as
follows —*

Sound [is] momentary

Because of [its] existence

What exists that [is] momentary as the culmase

And sound to [is] so

*There is never (etc) no proof apprehending the
invariable concomitance of existence and momentary*

सत्त्वस्य व्याप्त्यासिद्धाबुच्यमानायां क्षणिकत्वमन्यथयुक्तमित्यभ्यु-
पगतं स्यात् । ✓

२१

द्वितीयं यथा ।

कृत्यन्तर्यतिनी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनम् ।

हिंसास्यात् ।

२२

ऋतुनाहं हिंसायत् ।

अत्र ह्यधर्मसाधनस्य हिंसात्वं न प्रयोजकं किं तु निषिद्धत्वमेव ।
प्रयोजकमुपाधिरिति यावत् । तथाहि । साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधना
व्यापक उपाधिरित्युपाधिलक्षणम् । तच्चास्ति निषिद्धत्वे । निषिद्धत्वं
हि साध्यस्याधर्मसाधनत्वस्य व्यापकम् । यतो यत्र यत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं

ness If [this reason] existence were to be declared as [an
illustration of] Unproven in-invariable concomitance due to
the possession of a limitation [that is the second variety of
vyaptyasiddha] momentariness would have to be
considered as having been caused by something else [than
existence, and would thus be as good as admitted, which
would go against our own view about sativa]

The second [is] as follows —

The killing existing inside a sacrifice [is] the
means of demerit

Because [it is possessed] of the nature of killing
like the killing outside sacrifices.

Here again the nature of killing [is] not the
producing cause for the means of demerit, but 'being
prohibited [by the Sastras] alone the producing
cause, is the same as the limitation To explain —
Limitation [or accident is that] which, while pervading
the thing to be established [that is, while being
invariably present in all those places where the sādhyā is
present], does not pervade the reason [that is, is not invariably
present with the reason] — this [is] the definition of limita-
tion And that exists in 'being prohibited' For 'being
prohibited' pervades what is to be established, [namely]
the means of de-merit as wherever [there is] 'being

३० तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वमपीति । एवं साधनं हिंसात्वं न व्याप्नोति निषिद्धत्वम् । न हि यत्र यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वं यद्वा य पशुहिंसायां निषिद्धत्वाभावात् । तदेवं निषिद्धत्वस्योपाधेः सद्भा

३३ वात् अन्यत्रयुक्तव्याप्त्युपजीवि हिंसात्वं व्याप्नोत्वासिद्धमेव ॥ २८ ॥

विरुद्धहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

साध्यविपर्ययस्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । स यथा ।

शब्दो नित्यः । कृतकत्वात् । द्यौर्मग्नत् ।

अत्र कृतकत्वं हि साध्यनित्यत्वविपरीतानिःसर्वेन व्याप्तम् । यद् कृतकं तदनित्यमेव न नित्यमित्यतो विरुद्धं कृतकत्वमिति ॥ २९ ॥

अनेकान्तिकहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

सद्यभिचारोऽनेकान्तिकः । स द्विविधः साधारणानेकान्तिकाऽसा-

the means of demerit' there surely [is] 'being prohibited' also, and further (*etiam*) the reason 'the nature of killing' does not pervade 'being prohibited'. For, where ever [there is] 'the nature of killing,' there [is] not necessarily 'being prohibited,' on account of the absence of 'being prohibited' in [the case of] the killing of sacrificial beasts. Thus then, owing to the presence of the limitation 'being prohibited,' [the reason] 'the nature of killing' depending upon the invariable concomitance caused by something else, is Unproven-in-invariable-concomitance itself.

(29) Contrary [fallacious reason] [is] the reason [which is] invariably associated with [or pervaded by] the reverse of what is to be established. It [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because of [its] being a product
like the sky

Here being a product [is] pervaded by non-eternality, the reverse of eternality [which is] what is to be established. What [is] produced, that is non-eternal only [and] not eternal, hence [the reason] being a product [is] Contrary

(30) Inconclusive [or Discrepant fallacious reason] which does not possess one extreme only, that is which does not tend to establish one thing only but also its opposite [is that] which involves the violation (*tyzhacjra*)

धारणानेकान्तिकश्चेति । तत्र पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्ति साधारणा नैकान्तिक । स यथा ।

शब्दो नित्य । प्रमेयत्वात् । व्यभिचयत् ।

अत्र हि प्रमेयत्व हेतुस्तच्च नित्यानित्यवृत्ति ।

सर्पक्षाद् विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तो य पक्ष एव वर्तत सोऽनाधारणानेकान्तिक । स यथा ।

गन्धनित्या । गन्धरत्त्वात् ।

गन्धयस्य हि सपक्षाच्चित्याद्विपक्षाच्चानित्यादव्यावृत्त भूमात्रवृत्ति ॥ ३० ॥

प्रकरणसमहेत्वाभासनिर्हरणम् ।

प्रकरणसमस्तु स एव यस्य हेतो साध्यविपरीतसाधक हेत्यन्तर विद्यते । स यथा ।

[of the invariable concomitance] It [is] of two kinds [namely] too-wide (*sūthārana*) inconclusive and too narrow inconclusive Of them the too wide inconclusive [fallacious reason is that] which exists in the subject in similar instances and in dissimilar instances It [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because [it is possessed] of knowability like the sky

Here again knowability [is] the reason and that exists in eternal as well as non eternal [things]

The too-narrow inconclusive [fallacious reason is that] which excluded from similar instances [and] dissimilar instances exists in the subject alone It [is] as follows —

Earth [is] eternal

Because [it is] possessed of odour

Being possessed of odour again excluded from similar instances [viz] eternal [things] and from dissimilar instances [viz] non eternal [things] exists only in earth

(31) The Counter balanced [fallacious reason] again [is] that alone for which reason [there] exists another reason establishing the reverse of what is to be established. It [is] as follows —

१ सपक्षविपक्ष व्यावृत्ता य क्यमात्रवृत्ति ना ।

- १) दारदाऽनित्यं नित्यधर्मरहितत्वात् ।
 दारदो नित्यः । अनित्यधर्मरहितत्वात् । इति ।
 अयमेव सारप्रतिपक्ष इति चोच्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

कालात्ययापदिष्टैकभासनिवृणम् ।

पक्षे प्रमाणात्तरायधृतमाध्यामायो हेतुवर्धितविषयकालात्ययाप-
 दिष्ट इत्युच्यते । यदा

अस्ति अनुष्णः । कृत्तकत्वात् । जलम् ।

अत्र हि कृतकत्वस्य हेतोः साध्यमनुष्णत्वं तदभावात् प्रत्यक्षेणैवार्-
 धारितः । स्वाशनेष्वत्यक्षेणैवोष्णत्वोपलम्भम् ।

इति व्याख्यातमनुमानम् ॥ ३२ ॥

Sound [14] not-et. in d

Because [it is] void of qualities of eternal
 [things or eternal qualities]

[and]

Sound [14] eternal

Because [it is] void of quality of non-eternal
 [things or non-eternal qualities]

This name is also (ca) called 'having a rival' [or
 neutralised or nullified or ambiguous]

- ६ (32) The reason where the absence [or negation] of
 what is to be established is ascertained in the subject by
 another [more powerful] proof and the object of which is
 [thus] contradicted is called the Bated [fallacious
 reason] or annulled or contradicted or refuted. It stated
 or adduced when the fit time for it has passed away, or
 rejected owing to the lapse of proper time] As

Fire [1] not-hot

Because [it is] produced
 like water

Here again what is to be established by the reason 'being
 produced [1] coolness its negation [viz hotness] is
 ascertained by perception itself hotness being experi-
 enced by me in the perceptible cognition of touch

Thus has been expounded Inference

उपमानविचार ।

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसद्वृत्त गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानमुपमानम् । यथा गवयमजानन्नपि नागरिको यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्यं कृतशिदारण्यकपुरुषाच्चतुत्वा चन गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् यदा गोसादृश्यविशिष्ट पिण्ड पश्यति तदा तद्वाक्यार्थस्मरणसद्वृत्त गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानम् उपमानम् उपमितिकरणत्वात् । गोसादृश्यविशिष्ट पिण्डज्ञानान्तरम् अयमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य पिण्ड इति संज्ञासहितसंन्यमतीतिरुपमिति । सर्व फलम् ॥ ३३ ॥

उपमान प्रमाणान्तरम् ।

इदं तु प्रत्यक्षानुमानासाध्यप्रमासाधकत्वात् प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानमस्ति ।

इति ध्यायेत्तमुपमानम् ॥ ३४ ॥

(33) Analogy [is] the knowledge of an animal (pṇḍah) characterised by resemblance with an ox helped by the remembrance of the meaning of the directing sentence (at desaiatyam) As when a city man although not knowing the gavaya having heard from some forest-dwelling man the sentence As an ox so the gavaya going to the forest [and] remembering the meaning of the sentence sees an animal characterised by resemblance with an ox then the knowledge of the animal characterised by resemblance with the ox helped by [or in collaboration with] the remembrance of the meaning of that sentence [is] analogy on account of its being the instrument of analogical cognition Analogical cognition again [is] the apprehension of the connection between a name (वाग्वा) and the object expressed by it (वाग्वा) in the form This animal here [is] denoted by the word gavaya after the knowledge of the animal characterised by resemblance with the ox And that same [upamiti] [is] the effect

(34) This Analogy again is an independent [or different] proof as it brings about right cognition not capable of being established by perception and inference

Thus has been expounded Analogy

शब्दः ।

शब्दविचारः । आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधिरूपणम् ।

- ३ आत्मवाक्यं शब्दः । आत्मस्तु, यथाभूतस्यार्थस्योपदेशा पुरुषः । वाक्यत्वाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधिमतां पदानां समूहः ।

अत एव गौरवः पुरुषो हस्तीति पदानि न वाक्यम् । परस्पराकाङ्क्षाविरहात् ।

अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न वाक्यं योग्यताविरहात् । न ह्यग्निसंकयोः परस्पराभ्यययोग्यतास्ति । तथाहि । अग्निर्नेति तृतीयया संकेतरूपकार्यं प्रति करणत्वमग्नेः प्रतिपादितम् । न चाग्निः संके करणीमदितु योग्यः । तेन न कार्यकरणसंरन्धाऽग्निसंकयोः । अयोग्यत्वात् । अतोऽग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न वाक्यम् ।

- १२ एवमेकैकश प्रदरे प्रहरेऽसहस्रचरितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न

(35) Word [13] the sentence of one trustworthy And (14) one trustworthy [14] a person who asserts things as [they] have happened And a sentence [is made of] a collection of words possessed of expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition

For this very reason (a/a eia) 'ox, horse, man, elephant' - these words [form] no sentence, because of the absence of mutual expectancy

'[One] should sprinkle with fire - this [is] no sentence', because of the absence of compatibility [between sprinkling and fire] Not indeed is there compatibility of mutual construction [or association] between fire and sprinkling To explain 'By the instrumental by the fire' is conveyed the instrumentality of fire with reference to the effect in the form of sprinkling fire [is] not, for the matter of that (ca), fit to become the instrument for the sprinkling Therefore [there is] no relation of instrument and effect between fire and sprinkling, on account of incompatibility So '[one] should sprinkle with fire' - this [is] no sentence

Likewise, words such as 'bring a cow' uttered at intervals (asa'a) every third hour, one by one [form] no

वाक्यम् । सत्यामपि परस्पराकाङ्क्षायां सत्यामपि च परस्पराभ्यव
योग्यताया परस्परसान्निध्याभावात् ।

‘यानि तु’ साकाङ्क्षाणि योग्यतावन्ति सनिहितानि पदानि तान्येव १५
वाक्यम् । यथा ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यादि । यथा वा नदी
तीरे पञ्च फलानि सन्तीति । यथा वा तान्येव गामानयेत्यादिपदान्य
विलम्बितोच्चरितानि ॥ ३५ ॥

१८

कथं पदानि साकाङ्क्षाणि ।

नन्वत्रापि न पदानि साकाङ्क्षाणि किंत्वर्था । फलादीनामाध्याना
तीराद्यापराकारादितत्यात् । न च विचार्यमाणऽर्था अपि साकाङ्क्षा ।
आकाङ्क्षाया इच्छात्मकत्वेन चेतनधर्मत्वान् ।

सत्यम् । अर्थास्तावन् स्वपदार्थोत्तर्यन्योन्यविषयाकाङ्क्षाजनकत्वेन

sentence. Because even though mutual expectancy is there
even though the compatibility of mutual construction is
also there there is no reciprocal juxtaposition

Only those words again that are possessed of expectancy
have compatibility and are [uttered] together [or
have juxtaposition] [or] a sentence as for instance
'one desirous of [securing] heaven should perform the
Jyotistoma sacrifice etc or as for instance on the river
bank are five fruits or as for instance the same words
'bring a cow etc uttered without any interval [or delay]

(36) I say [says the objector] Even here [it is] not
the words [that are] possessed of expectancy but the things
[denoted by them] because [it is] the fruits and others that
are the supported [that are] possessed of expectancy with
reference to the support the bank etc Considering [the
matter] still further (37) [it is] not the things either [that
are] possessed of expectancy for expectancy being of the
nature of desire is an attribute of sentient [objects]

True [what you say] The things for the matter of
that are said to have expectancy owing to [then] producing
expectancy between them [or for different objects] in the

६ साकाङ्क्षा इत्युच्यन्ते । तद्द्वारेण तत्प्रतिपादकानि पदान्यपि साकाङ्क्षाणीत्युपचर्यन्ते । यद्वा पदान्येवार्थान् प्रतिपाद्यार्थान्तरविषया काङ्क्षाजनकानीत्युपचारात् साकाङ्क्षाणि ।

७ एवमर्थाः साकाङ्क्षाः परस्परान्वययोग्यास्तद्द्वारेण पदान्यपि परस्परान्वययोग्यानीत्युपचर्यन्ते । संनिहितत्वं च पदानामेकैकैव पुस्त्यभिलम्बेनोच्चारितव्यम् । तच्च साक्षादेव पदेषु संभ्रमति नार्थद्वारा ।

८ तेनायमर्थः संपन्नः । अर्थप्रतिपादनद्वारा श्रोतुं पदान्तरविषयमर्थान्तरविषयां वाकाङ्क्षां जनयतां प्रतीयमानपरस्परान्वययोग्यार्थप्रतिपादकानां संनिहितानां पदानां समूहो वाक्यम् ॥ ३६ ॥

कथं पदप्रतीतिः वाक्यप्रतीतिर्वा ।

पदं च वर्णसमूहः । समूहश्चात्रेकज्ञानविषयीभायः । एव च वर्णानां

hearer of words denoting them, and through that agency, the words also denoting them are metaphorically described as having expectancy. Or, the words themselves [are said to be] possessed of expectancy figuratively because, after denoting [their] objects, they produce the expectancy with reference to other objects.

Similarly the objects that have expectancy [are] compatible for mutual construction, and through that agency, the words also are figuratively described as compatible for mutual construction. Juxtaposition, on the other hand (tu), [is] the uttering of words without any interval [between them or delay] by one and the same person and that is possible in the words themselves directly ; not through the agency of objects.

This then is the conclusion (artāh) arrived at—A sentence [is] the collection of words that produce in the hearer through the agency of denoting the objects the expectancy referring to other word or referring to other objects that denote objects compatible for mutual construction and [are so] being comprehended [and] that have juxtaposition [that is, that are uttered without any interval between them].

(37) A word again [is] a collection of letters [or syllables or sounds]. And a collection here [means]

कृमयतामाशुतरचिनाशित्वेनेकदानेकवर्णानुभवासंभवात् पूर्वपूर्ववर्णा ३
ननुभूयान्त्यवर्णश्रवणकाले पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृते-
नान्त्यवर्णसंबन्धेन पदव्युत्पादनसमयग्रहानुगृहीतिन ओत्रेणेकदेव
सदसदनेकवर्णावगाहिनी पदप्रतीतिर्जन्यते । सहकारिदाढ्यात् प्रत्य-
भिज्ञानवत् । प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रत्यक्षे ह्यतीतापि पूर्वावस्था स्फुरत्येव ।
ततः पूर्वपूर्वपदानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृतेनान्त्यपदविषयेन ओत्रे-
न्द्रियेण पदार्थप्रत्ययानुगृहीतनानेकपदावगाहिनी वाक्यप्रतीतिः १
क्रियते ॥ ३७ ॥

सन्दर्भमाणलक्षणं लोके वेदे च समानम् ।

तद्विदं वाक्यमाप्तपुरुषेण प्रयुक्तं सञ्ज्ञद्वयनामकं प्रमाणम् । फल

being the object of one cognition . Thus, because it is im-
possible to comprehend many letters at one and the same
time, owing to the letters coming in succession and being
quickly destroyed straight away (*lava*), there is produced
the comprehension of words comprising many letters, pre-
sent and absent, at one and the same time by the ear, which
is connected with the last letter which is helped by the
impressions caused by the apprehension of the various
preceding letters, at the time of the hearing of the last letter
after having apprehended the various preceding letters, and
which is favoured by the comprehension of the convention
(*samaya*) of explaining the word owing to the intensity
[or strength] of the auxiliaries, like recognition . For, in
the apprehension (*pratyakṣa*) of recognition the former
state, although past, does present itself . Then is effected the
comprehension of sentence, comprising many words, by the
organ of hearing which has for its object the last word,
helped by the impressions caused by the apprehension, of
the various preceding words, and favoured by the appre-
hension of the meaning of the words [or of the objects
signified by the words]

(38) This [that is, such a] sentence, then, when put
forth by a trustworthy person [is] proof called Word, its
effect [is] the cognition of the meaning of the sentence . And
this definition of word-proof [is] the same for wordly

३ त्वस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् । तच्चैतच्छब्दप्रमाणलक्षणं लोके वेदे च समा-
नम् । लोके त्वयं विशेषो यः काशिदेवाप्तो भवति न सर्वः । अतः किञ्चि
देव लौकिकं वाक्यं प्रमाणं यदाप्तवक्तृकम् । वेदे तु परमाप्तश्रीमहेश्वरेण
६ कृतं सर्वमेव वाक्यं प्रमाणं सर्वस्यैवाप्तवाक्यत्वात् ।

एवं वर्णितानि चत्वारि प्रमाणानि । एतेभ्योऽन्यन्न प्रमाणम् ।
प्रमाणस्य सतोऽत्रैवान्तर्भावात् ॥ १८ ॥

अर्थापत्तिर्न पृथक्प्रमाणम् ।

नन्यर्थापत्तिरपि पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति । तथाहि । पीनो देववृत्तो विद्या
न भुङ्क्त इति दृष्टे श्रुते या रात्रिभोजनं कल्प्यते । विद्या अभुञ्जानस्य
पीनत्वं रात्रिभोजनमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते । अतः पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्ति
प्रसृतार्थापत्तिरेव रात्रिभोजने प्रमाणम् । तच्च प्रत्यक्षादिभ्यो भिन्नं

[matters] and Vedic [sacred texts] But in [the case of] the
world, this [is] the distinction, some one or other only can
be a trustworthy person, not everybody So, only some
worldly sentence which has for its speaker a trustworthy
person [is] proof [or authoritative], in [the case of] the
Vedas, on the other hand, each and every sentence composed
by the most trustworthy Lord Mahesvara, [is] proof [or
authoritative] the whole itself being the sentence of a
trustworthy person

Thus have been expounded the four proofs Anything
else than these [is] no [independent] proof, being just
included in these, if it is a means of right knowledge.

(39) I say [says the objector]-Presumption [or Im-
plication] also is an independent [or separate] proof To
explain When it is heard or seen that the fat Devadatta
does not eat during the day eating by night [on his part]
is presumed Fatness is not possible without eating by
night in the case of one not eating by day Hence presump-
tion itself arising out of the impossibility of otherwise
accounting for the fatness, [is] the proof for eating by night
[by Devadatta] And it [is] different from perception etc.,

१ शब्दलक्षण प्रमाण । २ परमस्वरण । ३ अनुपपद्यमान भवदशनात् तदुपपादक ।
मताद्यन्तरकन्यनमर्थापत्ति ।

रात्रिभाजनस्य प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषयत्वात् । नतर्न । रात्रिभाजनस्यानुमान ६
विषयत्वात् । तथाहि ।

अयं देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्के ।

दिवा अभुञ्जानत्व सति पीनत्वात् ।

यस्तु न रात्रौ भुङ्के नासौ दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीन ।

यथा दिवा रात्रायभुञ्जानाऽपीन ।

न चायं तथा ।

तस्मान्न तथा ।

इति केवलव्यतिरेकानुमानेन रात्रिभाजनस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात्
किमर्थमर्थापत्तिं वृथक्त्वेन कल्पनीया ॥ ३९ ॥

न अभावाख्य वृथक्प्रमाणम् ।

नन्वभावाख्यमपि वृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति । तद्यथायमहण्ययाङ्किर-
णियम् । तथाहि । घटाद्यनुपलब्ध्या घटाद्यभावो निश्चीयते । अनुपल ३

because eating by night can not be the object of perception
etc [We reply] not so because eating by night is the
object of inference To explain

This Devadatta eats by night

Because [he is possessed] of fatness without eating
by day

He who does not eat by night [is] not fat without
eating by day as for instance [X] [who is] not
fat not eating either by day or by night

And this [Devadatta is] not so

Therefore [he is] not so

—When by means of this purely negative inference can
be comprehended eating by night for what purpose should
presumption be regarded separately [that is as an independ-
ent pramana] ?

(40) I say [says the objector] there is a separate proof
called non existence [negation absence] also And it
deserves to be accepted for the apprehension of negation
To explain Owing to the non apprehension of the jar,
etc is ascertained the non existence of the jar etc And

द्विद्योपलब्धरेभाव इत्यभावप्रमाणेन घटाद्यभावो गृह्यते । नैतद् ।
यद्यत्र घटोऽमसिष्यत् तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यदित्यादितर्कसहकारिणा-
नुपलम्भसनाथेन प्रत्यक्षेणैवाभावग्रहणात् किमभावप्रमाणेन ॥ ४० ॥

असंबन्धाभावस्येन्द्रियेण ग्रहणं कथं संभवति इति विचारः ।

नन्विन्द्रियाणि संबन्धार्थमाहकाणि । तथाहि ।

इन्द्रियाणि वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारिणि ।

ज्ञानकरणत्वात् । आलोकयत् ।

यद्वा चक्षुःश्रोत्रे वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारिणि ।

बहिरिन्द्रियत्वात् । त्वगादियत् ।

त्वगादीनां तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारित्वमुभयवासंसंमतमेव ।

न चेन्द्रियाभावयोः संबन्धोऽस्ति । संयोगसमवायी हि संबन्धो । न

non-apprehension [means] the negation of apprehension-
by this non-existence-proof is apprehended the negation of
the jar etc. [We reply]—[It is] not so; when the negation
is apprehended by perception itself, accompanied by non-
apprehension and helped by hypothetical reasoning in the
form -if the jar had been here, then [one] would have seen
[it], like the ground, what need of the non-existence-
proof?

(41) I say [says the objector]—The sense-organs cognise
things which are connected [with them] To explain:

Sense-organs illumine an object after reaching it.
Because [they are] instruments of cognition.
... like light.

Or, Eye and ear illumine an object after reaching it
Because [they are] external sense-organs.
... like the organ of touch etc.

And that the organ of touch and the like, illumine [an
object] after reaching [it], is, to be sure, agreed to by both
the partic. [or disputants]

Now there is no connection between a sense-organ and
negation conjunction and inference are indeed, []

न तौ तयो स्त । द्रव्ययोरेव सयोग इति नियमात् अभावस्य च द्रव्य-
त्वाभावात् । अयुतसिद्धत्वाभावात् समवायोऽपि ।

विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च संबन्ध एव न भवति भिन्नोभयाश्रित
कत्याभावात् । संबन्धो हि सगन्धिम्या भिन्नो भवति उभयसगन्ध्या १२
श्रितश्च एकश्च । यथा भेरीदण्डयो स्यात् स हि भेरीदण्डाभ्या
भिन्नस्तदुभयाश्रितश्चेकश्च । न च विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्तथा । तथाहि ।
दण्डपुरुषयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न ताभ्या भिन्नः । न हि दण्डस्य १५
विशेषणत्वमर्थान्तर नापि पुरुषस्य विशेष्यत्वम् अर्थान्तरम् अपि तु
स्वरूपमेव । अभावस्यापि विशेषणत्वात् विशेष्यत्वाच्च । न चाभावे
कस्यचित् पदार्थस्य द्रव्याद्यन्यतमस्य समयः । तस्मादभावस्य १८

[two] connection and there can not be those two between them [conjunction can not be there] because of the rule that conjunction [takes place] only between two substances and negation has not the nature of a substance [There is] no inference either owing to the absence of their being known to be not separated

The relation of qualification and qualified can no be connection at all because it is not different does not subsist in both [the connected things] and is not one A connection indeed is different from the [two] connected things does subsist in both the connected things and is one as for instance the conjunction between drum and stick It indeed [is] different from drum and stick does subsist in the two [viz drum and stick] and [is] one But the relation of qualification and qualified [is] not like that To explain The relation of qualification and qualified between stick and man is not different from them The character of being a qualification of the stick [is] not a different entity nor the character of being qualified of the man a different entity but [is] just its [of the stick of the man] own nature And non existence also [is] possessed of the character of a qualification and that of the qualified In negation again there can be no possibility [of the subsistence] of any one

स्वोपरक्तबुद्धिजनकत्वं यत् स्वरूप तद्वय विशेषणत्वं न तु तदर्थान्तरम् ।

एव व्याप्यव्यापकत्वकार्यकारणत्वादयामप्युक्तम् । स्वप्रतिबद्धबुद्धि

११ जनकत्वं स्वरूपमव हि व्यापकत्वमग्रादीनाम् । कारणत्वमपि कार्या

सुकृतान्वय-यतिरकिस्वरूपमव हि तन्त्वादीना न त्वर्थान्तरम् ।

अभावस्यापि व्यापकत्वात् कारणत्वाच्च । न हाभाव सामान्यादि

१२ समय ।

तद्वय विशपणविशप्यभावा न विशेषणविशप्यस्वरूपाभ्या भिन्न ।

नाप्युभयाभित । विशपणे विशपणभावमात्रस्य सत्त्वाद् विशप्य

२० भावस्याभावात् । विशेष्य च विशप्यभावमात्रस्य सत्त्वाद् विशेषण

भावस्याभावात् । नाप्येक । विशपण च विशप्य च तयोर्भाव इति

द्वन्द्वात् पर श्रूयमाणो भावशब्द प्रत्यक्षमभिसम्बध्यते । तथा च

category out of substance and others Therefore the character of being a qualification that belongs to negation [is] nothing but its own nature the character of producing a cognition tainted by itself and [it is] not a different entity

Similarly are to be regarded [the relations of] pervaded and pervader cause and effect and the like For the character of being a pervader of fire and others [is] but [their] very nature the character of producing a cognition [of an object] [invariably] associated with them The character of being a cause also that belongs to threads etc [is] but [their] very nature of being present and absent corresponding to the effect [being present and absent] and not a different entity And negation also is possessed of the character of the pervader and that of the cause Again there is no possibility of generality etc [subsisting] in negation

Thus then the relation of qualification and qualified [is] not different from the natures of the qualification and the qualified nor [is it] subsisting in both for in the qualification exists only the nature of the qualification [and] the absence of the nature of the qualified and in the qualified exists only the nature of the qualified [and] the absence of the nature of the qualification. Nor [is it] one The word relation heard [or put in] after the copulative compound [dissolved]

विशेषणभावो विशेष्यभावश्चेत्यापन्नम् । द्वावेता एवञ्च सन्नधः । १०
तस्माद्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न सन्नधः । एवं व्याप्यव्यापकभावाद्
योऽपि । सन्नधशब्दप्रयोगस्तूभयनिरूपणीयत्वसाधर्म्योपाचारात् ।
तथा चासन्नधस्याभावस्येन्द्रियेण ग्रहणं न सम्भवति । ११

[सत्यम् । भावावच्छिन्नत्वाद् व्याप्तः । भावप्रकाशयदिन्द्रियं प्राप्तं
मेव प्रकाशयति न त्वभावमपि । अभावप्रकाशयदिन्द्रियं विशेषण
विशेष्यभावमुखेनेति सिद्धान्तः । असंबद्धाभावेति प्रसङ्गो १६
पस्तु विशेषणतयेव निरस्तः । समञ्च परमतः ।

यन्मोमयो समो दाप परिहारोऽपि वा सम ।

नैक पर्यनुयोक्त यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥ (श्लोकवार्तिक) ४१ ॥

ज्ञानस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्य परतः प्रामाण्य वा इति विचारः ।

इदमिदानीं निरूप्यते । जलादिज्ञाने जाते तस्य प्रामाण्यमवधार्य
३ कश्चिजलादौ प्रवर्तते । कश्चित् सदेहादेव प्रवृत्तः प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकाले जला
दिप्रतिलम्भे सति प्रामाण्यमवधारयतीति वस्तुगतिः ।

अत्र कश्चिदाह ^{प्रामाण्य} प्रामाण्यमवधार्य पुरुषः प्रवर्तते इत्यत एव
६ प्रामाण्यावधारणम् । अस्यार्थः । येनैव यज्ज्ञानं गृह्यत तेनैव तद्वत्
प्रामाण्यमपि । न ॥ ज्ञानमाहकादन्यज् ज्ञानधर्मस्य प्रामाण्यस्य ग्राह-
कम् । तेन ज्ञानमाहकातिरिक्तानपेक्षत्वमेव इत्यतस्त्वं प्रामाण्यस्य ।
१ ज्ञानं च प्रवृत्तेः पृथग्वै गृहीतम् । कथमन्यथा प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य-

Where the objection [or fault is] equal [that is equally stands applicable] to [the views of] both and the removal [or refutation thereof] also [is] the same one [party] should not be questioned [or taken to task] in a discussion of such a matter

(42) Here is now expounded [the following topic]—When the knowledge of water etc is produced some one proceeds to [take] the water etc after having ascertained the validity [or correctness] of it [the knowledge] Someone again proceeding [to take the water etc] on the strength of mere suspicion [about its presence] ascertains the validity [of the knowledge] when water has been found at a time after he has acted—this [is] the state of things

[Now] here some one contends—Having already beforehand ascertained the validity [of the knowledge] a man proceeds the validity [of the knowledge] being ascertained from [the knowledge] itself The meaning [or idea] of this [is as follows]—By the same [process] by which indeed is apprehended some knowledge [is apprehended] the validity also thereof Other than that which makes [one] apprehend the knowledge [is] not that which makes [one] apprehend the validity the attribute of the knowledge Hence the self-sufficiency of the validity [of knowledge] [is] nothing but not being dependent on something different from what

संदेहोऽपि स्यात् । अनधिगते धर्मिणि संदेहानुदयात् । तस्मात् प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेव ज्ञाततान्वथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतवार्थापत्त्या ज्ञाने गृहीते ज्ञानगतं प्रामाण्यमप्यर्थापत्त्यैव गृह्यते । ततः पुरुषः प्रवर्तते । न तु प्रथमं^{१२} ज्ञानमात्रं गृह्यते ततः प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकाले फलदर्शने जाते ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमवधार्यते ।

अत्रोच्यते । ज्ञाततान्वथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतवार्थापत्त्या ज्ञानं गृह्यत इति^{१५} यदुक्तं तदेव खर्यं न मृष्यामहे । तथा प्रामाण्यप्रदस्तु कृतं एव । तथाहि । एवं किल परस्वाभिमतम् । घटाद्विषय्ये ज्ञाने जाते मया ज्ञातोऽयं घट इति घटस्य ज्ञातता प्रतिसधीयते । तेन इदं जाते^{१८} सति ज्ञातता नाम कश्चिद्वर्गो जात इत्यनुमीयते । स च ज्ञानात्

makes [one] apprehend the knowledge. As regards the knowledge, it is apprehended, to be sure, before the activity. Otherwise, how could there be even the doubt about [its] validity or non-validity? Doubt can not arise as regards an object that is not apprehended. Therefore, prior to the activity itself, when the knowledge is apprehended by means of presumption arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the known-ness = apprehended the validity belonging to the knowledge also, by presumption itself, then the man moves on. But not that only the knowledge is apprehended first, and afterwards the validity of the knowledge is ascertained, when the sight of the result takes place at a time after the activity [is gone through].

To this we reply -- What has been said by you viz. that knowledge is apprehended by means of presumption arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the known-ness--this itself we would not tolerate [that is admit to be true], as regards the apprehension of the validity by it, it [i. e. a question] still farther off [we admit that still less]. To explain. The following indeed [is] the view of [our] opponent. When the knowledge having for [its] object, a jar etc., arises, known-ness is recognised as belonging to the jar in the form 'This jar is known by me'. Hence it is inferred that when the knowledge is produced, some attribute

पूर्वमजातत्वाद् ज्ञाने जाते च जातत्वादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ज्ञानेन
 २१ जन्यत इत्यवधार्यते । एवं च ज्ञानजन्योऽसौ ज्ञाततानाम धर्मो ज्ञान
 मन्तरेण नोपपद्यते कारणाभावे कार्यानुदयात् । तेनार्थापत्त्या स्वका
 रणं ज्ञान ज्ञाततयाक्षिप्यत इति ।

२२ न चेतदुक्तम् । ज्ञानविषयतातिरिक्ताया ज्ञातताया अभावात् ।

ननु ज्ञानजनितज्ञातताधारत्वमेव हि घटादेर्ज्ञानविषयत्वम् ।
 तथाहि । न तावत् साक्षात्मेन विषयता । घटज्ञानर्यास्तादात्म्या
 २३ नभ्युपगमात् । तदुत्पत्त्या तु विषयत्व इन्द्रियादिरपि विषय
 त्वापत्तिः । इन्द्रियादिरपि तस्य ज्ञानस्योत्पत्तेः । तेनेदमनुमीयते । ज्ञानेन

called known-ness is produced, and because it [ज्ञातता] is not produced prior to the knowledge, and is produced when the knowledge is produced, it is ascertained that it is produced by knowledge, owing to the positive and negative association. And likewise, this attribute called known-ness arising out of knowledge could not be possible without knowledge, owing to the non-production of the effect in the absence of the cause. Therefore through presumption, is indicated knowledge, its own cause, by known-ness.

But this [argument of the opponent is] not proper, because known-ness exists not as different from the character of being the object of knowledge.

I say [says the objector]—The character of being the object of knowledge, of a jar etc. is the same as being the substratum of known-ness produced by the knowledge. To explain. The character of being the object, [it] not, for the matter of that [produced] by identity, is identity is not admitted between the knowledge and the jar. If, again, [it be held that] objectivity [is due to the fact that the cognition] [is] produced by it [the object], then the sense-organs etc. would have to be regarded as being possessed of objectivity, because that knowledge arises from the sense-organs etc., as well. Hence this is inferred—Something is produced in the jar by the knowledge.

घटे किञ्चिज्जनितं येन घटे एव तस्य ज्ञानस्य विषयो नान्य इति ।
अतो विषयत्वान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतयार्यापत्त्येव ज्ञातताभिद्धि न तु
प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण ।

मेयम् । स्वभावादेव विषयत्वोपपत्तेः । अर्थज्ञानयोरतादृश
एव स्वाभाविको विशेषः यन्नानयोर्विषयविषयिभावः । इतरथाती ३३
तानागतयोर्विषयत्वं न स्यात् । ज्ञानेन तत्र ज्ञातताजननासम्भवात्
अन्यति धर्मिणि धर्मजननायोगात् । किं च ज्ञातताया अपि स्वज्ञान
विषयत्वात् सत्रापि ज्ञाततान्तरप्रसङ्गस्तथा चानवस्था । अयं ज्ञातता ३४
न्तरमन्तरणापि स्वभावादेव ज्ञानविषयत्व ज्ञातताया । एव च तर्हि

by which the jar is not [in] the object of that know-
ledge [and] not another by a established known-ness by
presumption itself arising out of the impossibility of other-
wise accounting for the character of being an object [and]
not merely by perception

[Do] not [say] so. Objectivity can be accounted for
by the very nature [of things]. Such indeed [is] the natural
peculiarity of object and knowledge that [there exists]
between these two the relation of object and possessor of the
object. Otherwise there would be no character of an object
in past and future [things]. For it is impossible for the
knowledge to produce known-ness in them owing to the im-
possibility of the production of attributes [in a thing] when
the thing [is] the possessor of attributes [is] non-existing.
Moreover as known-ness also is the object of its own know-
ledge there also would [have to] be [admitted] another known-
ness which is an undesirable contingency and thus [it
would lead to] endlessness [regressum ad infinitum]. Well
[to obviate the anavasthadosa if you were to say] even
without a different known-ness there would be the character
of being an object of known-ness by its very nature [then
we would resort] if [that is] so then what need [is there] of
[admitting] known-ness in the case of [the knowledge of]
the jar etc ?

घटादायपि किं ज्ञाततयेति ।

- ३९ अस्तु वा ज्ञातता तथापि तन्मात्रेण ज्ञानं गम्यते । प्रामाण्यं तु कुतः । अथ ज्ञाततया ज्ञानमात्रं गृह्यते प्रामाण्यं ज्ञातताविशेषेणेत्युच्यते तर्हि ज्ञाततया ज्ञानं गृह्यते ज्ञातताविशेषेण प्रमाण-
 ४० ज्ञानाद्यभिचारिणा प्रामाण्यमिति कुत एव ज्ञानग्राहकग्राह्यता प्रामाण्यस्य । अथ केनचिज् ज्ञातताविशेषेण प्रमाणज्ञानाद्यभिचारिणा ज्ञानप्रामाण्ये सहैव गृह्यते । एवं चेदप्रामाण्येऽपि शक्यमिदं
 ४१ यक्तुम् । केनचिज् ज्ञातताविशेषेणाप्रमाणज्ञानाद्यभिचारिणा ज्ञानाप्रामाण्ये सहैव गृह्यते इति अप्रामाण्यमपि स्वत एव गृह्यताम् । अथैवमप्यप्रामाण्यं परतस्तर्हि प्रामाण्यमपि परत एव गृह्यताम् ज्ञानग्राह-
 ४२ कादन्यत इत्यर्थः ।

Or, let the known-ness be [admitted to exist for the time being] still by that only is apprehended the knowledge, but whence [its] validity ? Now [if you say that] knowledge alone is apprehended by means of known-ness, [and its] validity by means of a special known-ness then how indeed would the validity be capable of being apprehended by the same means which would make [one] apprehend the knowledge, inasmuch as [its] knowledge is apprehended
 • by means of known-ness, [and its] validity by means of a special known-ness which never fails (*avyabhicārin*) in respect of correct knowledge ? Now [if you were to say that] by means of some special known-ness never failing in respect of correct knowledge, are apprehended just together [both] knowledge and [its] validity, then likewise this could be said with respect to the invalidity [of knowledge] as well—by means of some special known-ness never failing in respect of incorrect knowledge knowledge and [its] invalidity are apprehended just together—so let the invalidity [of knowledge] also be apprehended from [the knowledge] itself । Now if thus [you are prepared to admit] that non validity [arises] from other means, then let the validity also be [accepted as] apprehended by other means that is, by other than what makes [one] apprehend knowledge

ज्ञानं हि मानसप्रत्यक्षेणैव गृह्यते प्रामाण्यं पुनरनुमानेन । तथाहि ।
जलज्ञानानन्तरं जलार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिर्द्वेधा फलवत्यफला चेति । तत्र या
फलवती प्रवृत्तिः सा समर्था । तया तज्ज्ञानस्य याथार्थ्यलक्षणं ५५
प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । प्रयोगश्च ।

विवादाध्यासितं जलज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ।

समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् ।

५४

यत्र प्रमाणं न तत् समर्था प्रवृत्तिं जनयति यथा प्रमाणाभासः ।
इति केवलव्यतिरेकी ।

अत्र च फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजनकं यज्जलज्ञानं तत् पक्षः । तस्य प्रामाण्यं ५५
साध्यं यथार्थत्वमित्यर्थः । न तु प्रमातृत्वं स्मृत्या व्यभिचारापत्तेः ।
हेतुस्तु समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वं फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वमिति यावत् ।

Knowledge, indeed is apprehended by means of percep-
tion by the mind itself [its] validity on the other hand, by
means of inference To explain After the knowledge of
water, the activity of one desirous of water [is] of two
kinds—fruitful and fruitless The activity which [is] fruitful
[is] the successful [or competent] one, and from that is
inferred the validity characterised by being in accord with
the thing of that knowledge And the syllogism [is
follows]—

The knowledge of water under dispute [is] valid

Because it produces successful activity

What is not valid, does not produce successful
activity, as apparently valid knowledge

This [is] a purely negative [hetu]

And here, the subject [is] the knowledge of water,
which produces fruitful activity : What is to be established
[is] its validity, that is, being in accord with its object, and
not the character of being a direct cognition otherwise, there
would be the violation [of the vyapti] owing to remembrance
[being samarthapravrittyjanaka though not a prama] And
the reason [is] 'producing a successful activity,' that is pro-
ducing a fruitful activity

- ६) अनेन केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानेनानभ्यासदशापन्नस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्येऽप्रबोधिते तद्दृष्टान्तेन जलप्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमपि तज्जातीयत्वेन लिङ्गेनान्यव्यतिरेक्यनुमानेनान्यस्य ज्ञानस्याभ्यासदशापन्नस्य
६) प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । तस्मात् परत एव प्रामाण्यं न ज्ञानमाहकेणेव गृह्यत इति ।

चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि युक्तिलेशोक्तिपूर्वकम् ।

- ६) केशवो बालबोधाय यथाशास्त्रमवर्णयत् ॥ ४० ॥

(२) प्रमेयम् ।

प्रमेयाणि ।

प्रमाणाद्युक्तानि । अथ प्रमेयाण्युच्यन्ते । आत्मदर्शिनोन्द्रियार्थबुद्धि

- When the validity of knowledge having no scope for previous experience, is ascertained by means of this purely negative inference, with that as an instance, is inferred, even before the activity [undertaken] for [securing] the water, the validity of other [later] knowledge having scope for previous experience, by means of a positive-negative inference, with the indicatory mark 'being of the same type' Therefore the validity is apprehended through another means alone, and not by what makes [one] apprehend knowledge itself

The proofs [that are] only four, Kesava has expounded, after stating in brief the arguments, and according to the treatises accepted as authority, for the understanding of beginners

(41) The proofs have been explained, now are explained the objects of cognition Soul, body, sense-organ, object, [or categories], cognition, mind, activity, defect, transmigration fruit [or result of deeds], pain, and salvation

मन प्रवृत्तिदोषभेद्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयमिति सूत्रम् ॥
(न्यायसूत्र ११) ॥ ४३ ॥

आत्मनिरूपणम् ।

तत्रात्मत्वसामान्यवानात्मा । स च देहन्द्रियादियतिरिक्तः प्राति-
शरीरं भिन्नो नित्यो विभुश्च । स च मानसप्रत्यक्षः । यिप्रतिपक्षो तु
बुद्ध्यादिगुणलिङ्गकः । तथाहि ।

बुद्ध्यादयस्तावद् गुणाः ।

अनित्यत्वे सत्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । रूपवत् ।

गुणश्च गुण्याधित एव । तत्र बुद्ध्यादया न गुणा भूतानां
मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । ये हि भूतानां गुणास्ते न मनसा गृह्यन्ते यथा
रूपादयः । नापि द्विकालमनसा गुणा विशेषगुणरगात् । ये हि दिगाः १

[or final liberation] [these form] the object of cognition—so
[runs the Nyaya-] Sutra

(44) Of them Soul [is that] which is present of the
generality soul-ness And it [is] distinct from body sense-
organs etc, different in each body all pervading and eternal
It [is] again perceptible by the mind if there be disagree-
ment [over the manasapratyakṣa] it has qualities, cogni-
tion etc as the indicatory mark [to prove by inference its
existence] To explain

Cognition etc to start with (anur) [are] qualities.

Because being non-eternal they are capable of
being apprehended by one sense-organ

like colour

And a quality must resort to a substance [its possessor
of qualities] Now cognition etc [can not be] the quali-
ties of material substances on account of their being per-
ceptible by the mind For what [are] the qualities of material
substances they are not apprehended by the mind
[manasapratyakṣa] like colour and others not again
[are they] the qualities of space time and mind owing to
their being special qualities The qualities that belong
to space etc —number etc [are] not special qualities,

दिगुणाः सरयादयो न ते विशेषगुणाः । ते हि सर्वद्रव्यसाधारणगुणा
एव । बुद्ध्यादयस्तु विशेषगुणाः । गुणत्वे सत्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् रूपवत् ।
१२ अतो न दिगादिगुणाः । तस्मादेभ्योऽष्टभ्यो व्यतिरेकी बुद्ध्यादीनां
गुणानामौश्रयो वक्तव्यः । स एवात्मा । प्रयोगश्च ।

बुद्ध्यादयः पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिताः ।

१५ पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानांश्रितत्वे सति गुणत्वात् ।

यस्तु पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रितो न भवति नासी

पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानांश्रितत्वे सति गुणोऽपि भवति

१८ यथा रूपादि ।

इति केवलव्यतिरेकी । अन्यव्यतिरेकी वा । तथाहि ।

बुद्ध्यादयः पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिताः ।

they [are] indeed qualities common to all substances Cognition etc [are] on the other hand, special qualities, because being qualities, they are capable of being apprehended by one sense-organ like colour Hence [they are] not qualities belonging to space etc Therefore a substratum [or resort] for the qualities, cognition and others, distinct from these eight [substances referred to above] must be admitted [or stated] that [is] just the Soul And the syllogism [is as follows] —

Cognition and others subsist in a substance distinct from the eight substances, earth etc

Because, not, subsisting in the eight substances, earth etc, they are qualities

That again, which does not subsist in a substance distinct from the eight substances earth etc is not a quality as well, not subsisting in the eight substances earth etc, like colour etc

This [is] a purely negative [hetu]

Or a positive-negative one To explain

Cognition and others subsist in a substance distinct from the eight substances earth etc

पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वं सति गुणत्वात् ।

२१

यो यदनाश्रितो गुणः स तदतिरिक्ताश्रितो भवति

यथा पृथिव्याद्यनाश्रितं शब्दः पृथिव्याद्यतिरिक्ता-
काशाश्रित इति ।

२२

तदेव पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तं नवमं द्रव्यमात्मा सिद्धं । स च सर्वत्र कार्योपलम्भाद्विशुद्धः । परममहत्परिमाणवानित्यर्थः । विशुद्धाद्य निर्व्याप्तो व्योमयत् । सुखादीनां वेचिङ्गत्वात् प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नं ॥४३॥ २५

शरीरनिरूपणम् ।

तस्य भोगायनमन्यावयवमि शरीरम् । सुखदुःखान्येतरसाक्षा-
त्कारां भोगः । स च यदयच्छिन्नं आत्मनि जायते तद्भोगायतनं तदेव ।

Because not subsisting in the eight substances,
earth etc they are qualities

That which is a quality not subsisting in a particu-
lar [substance] subsists in [a thing] distinct
from that as for instance sound which does not
subsist in earth etc subsists in the ether distinct
from earth etc

Thus then [is] established the soul the ninth substance dis-
tinct from the eight substances earth etc And owing to [its] ,
function being found everywhere it [is] all pervading that
is possessed of the highest large dimension And owing to its
being all pervading it [is] eternal like the sky [It is] dif-
ferent for each body owing to the variation of pleasure etc

(45) Body [is] the abode of its enjoyments [being] a
final product [or ultimate composition] Enjoyment [is]
the experience of one or other of pleasure and pain [and],
that [is] the abode of enjoyment, circumscribed by which is
produced in the soul that [experience] [and] that it elf [is] the
body Or body [is] the substratum of [physical] activity Acti-
vity again [is] the action intended for securing and avoiding

१ नवमं च द्रव्यं पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तत्वात् । २ नयनानुभवा ।

शरीरम् । चेष्टाश्रयो वा शरीरम् । चेष्टा तु हिताहितप्रातिपरिहारार्थं
क्रिया न स्पन्दनमात्रम् ॥ ४५ ॥

षडिन्द्रियविचारः ।

शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणम् अतीन्द्रियम् इन्द्रियम् । अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रिय
३ मित्युच्यमाने कालादेरपीन्द्रियत्वप्रसंगः । अत उक्तं ज्ञानकरणमिति ।
तथापि इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेऽतिप्रसंगः । अत उक्तं शरीरसंयुक्तमिति ।
शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियमित्युच्यमान आलोकादेरपीन्द्रियत्व-
६ प्रसंगः । अत उक्तमतीन्द्रियमिति ।

तानि चेन्द्रियाणि यद् । धाणरसनचक्षुस्तत्त्वक्ष्मोन्नमनांसि ।

तत्र गन्धोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं घ्राणम् नास्ताम्रयति । तच्च पार्थिवं
९ गन्धयत्त्वाद् घटयत् । गन्धयत्त्वं च गन्धमाहकत्वात् । यविन्द्रियं

[respectively] the wholesome and unwholesome, [and] not mere motion

(46) Sense-organ [is that] which is conjoined with the body, [is] the instrument of cognition, and [is] supersensuous. If it had been said [that is, if the definition had been stated as] sense organ [is that which is] supersensuous, then there would be the undesirable contingency, that time etc also would be sense organ so it is said [in addition] ' instrument of cognition ' Still [even with this addition, the definition is faulty as] there would be the undesirable contingency of [the statement being] too-wide in [respect of] the contact between sense-organ and object, so [it] i. e. said [in addition] ' conjoined with the body ' If it had been said, sense organ [is that which is] conjoined with the body [and i. e.] the instrument of cognition, there would be the undesirable contingency of even light etc, being sense-organs, so [it] i. e. said [in addition] ' supersensuous '

And these sense organs [are] five—[organs of] smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing, and mind

Of them, the organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of odour [is] the sense of smell, residing on the tip of the nose. And it [is] earthly, because [it is] possessed of odour, like a jar. Being possessed of odour, again, [is there] on

रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये यं गुणं गृह्णाति तदिन्द्रियं तद्गुणसंयुक्तं यथा चक्षुः रूपग्राहकं रूपवत् ।^१

रसोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं रसनम् जिह्वाग्रवर्ति । तच्चाप्य^{१२} रसवत्त्वात् । रसवत्त्वं च रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये रसस्येवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात् लालावत् ।

रूपोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं चक्षुः कुण्डलताराग्रवर्ति । तच्च तेजस^{१५} रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये रूपस्येवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात् प्रकाशवत् ।

स्पर्शोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं त्वक् सर्वगरीत्यापि त्वक्स्थानम् । तत्तु वायवीयं रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये स्पर्शस्येवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात्^{१८} अङ्गुलीसलिलशक्त्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वजनवातवत् ।

account of its making [one] apprehend odour What quality out of the five colour etc a [particular] sense organ apprehends with that quality is conjoined that sense organ, for instance the eye making [one] apprehend colour, [is] possessed of colour

The organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of taste [is] the sense of taste residing on the tip of the tongue And it [is] watery because [it is] possessed of taste Being possessed of taste again [is there] on account of its manifesting taste alone out of the five colour etc like the saliva

The organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of colour [is] the sense of sight [or the eye] residing on the tip of the black pupil And it [is] of the essence of light [or luminous] on account of its manifesting colour alone out of the five, colour etc like a lamp

The organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of touch [is] the sense of touch pervading the whole of the body having for its location the skin And it [is] of the essence of wind on account of its manifesting touch alone out of the five colour etc like the breeze from the fan which manifests the cool touch of the water clinging to the body

- शब्दोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं श्रोत्रम् । तच्च कर्णशङ्कुस्यवच्छिन्न-
 २१ माकाशमेव । न द्रव्यान्तरं शब्दगुणत्वात् । तदपि शब्दमाहकत्वात् ।
 यदिन्द्रियं रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये यद्गुणमाहकं तत्तद्गुणमयुक्तम् यथा
 चक्षुरादि रूपादिमाहकं रूपादिसंयुक्तम् । शब्दमाहकं श्रोत्रम् अतः
 २२ शब्दगुणकम् ।

सुरागुपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच्चाणुपरिमाणम् हृद-
 यान्तर्वाते ।

- २३ ननु चक्षुरादीन्द्रियसङ्भाव्यं किं प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । अनुमानमेव
 स्यादिति ।

रूपाद्युपलब्धयः करणसाध्याः । स्मियात्वात् ।
 छिदिक्रियाद्यन् ॥ ४६ ॥

The organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of sound [is] the sense of hearing [or the ear] And it [is] either itself limited by the tympanum [or drum] of the ear, not another substance, on account of having sound as a quality, and that too, on account of its apprehending [or making one apprehend] the sound. What quality out of the five, colour etc, a [particular] sense-organ manifests, with that quality is conjoined that [sense-organ] as for instance, the eye, etc making [one] apprehend colour etc, are conjoined with colour etc The ear makes [one] apprehend sound, therefore it has sound as a quality

The organ [which is] the means 'of the apprehension of pleasure etc [is] the mind and it has the dimension of an atom residing inside the heart

I say [says the objector]—What [is the] proof for the existence of the same organs, sense of sight etc ? We reply— [It is] inference itself To explain

Apprehensions of colour etc are fit to be
 produced by an instrument
 Because [they are] action
 like the action of cutting

षट्पदार्थाः । द्रव्यनिरूपणम् ।

अर्थाः षट् पदार्थाः । ते च द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-सम-
वायाः । श्रमाणादयो यद्यप्यत्रैवान्नर्भवन्ति तथापि प्रयोजनवशाद्
भेदेन कीर्तिताः ।

सत्र समवायिकारणं द्रव्यम् । गुणधर्मो वा द्रव्यम् । तानि च
द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनसि नवैव ॥ ४७ ॥ ६

पृथिवीनिरूपणम् ।

सत्र पृथिवीत्वसामान्यवती पृथिवी । काठेन्द्रकोमलत्वाद्यवयव-
संयोगविशेषेण युक्ता । घ्राण-शरीर-मृत्विण्डपापाणवृक्षादिरूपा । ॥ ४
रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणवृथम् प्रसङ्गविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरु-
त्वद्रव्यत्वसंस्कारवती । सा च द्विविधा नित्या अनित्या च । नित्या
परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या च कार्यरूपा । द्विविधायां पृथिव्या रूपर

(47) Objects [are] the six categories. And they [are]—
Substance, quality, action generality, particularity [or in-
dividuality] inherence [or intimate association] Though
proof and others [mentioned in the first Nyayasutra] are
comprised just under here till they have been mentioned
separately for the sake of [some definite] purpose

Of them, the material [or constituent] cause [is] sub-
stance or the substratum of qualities [is] substance And
those substances [are] only nine [namely] earth water, fire,
wind ether, time space, soul and mind

(48) Of them, earth [is] that [which is] possessed of the
generality, earth-ness [It is] associated with the peculiar
combination of parts, [giving rise to] harshness softness etc
[It is possessed] of the form of organ of smell body, lump of
clay, stones, trees etc [and] is possessed of [qualities]
colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension [or magnitude]
severality, conjunction, disjunction remoteness nearness,
gravity [or heaviness], fluidity, [and] impression And it [is]
of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal Eternal [earth is] of
the form of atoms, and non-eternal [is] of the form of pro-
duct [The qualities] colour, taste, odour and touch of the two-

सगन्धस्पर्शा अनित्याः पाकजाश्च । पाकस्तु तेजःसंयोगः । तेन
पृथिव्या पूर्वरूपादयो नश्यन्त्यन्ये जन्यन्त इति पाकजाः ॥ ४८ ॥

अभिरूपणम् ।

अप्स्वसामान्ययुक्ता आपः । रसनेन्द्रिय-शरीर-सरित्समुद्भिर्मकर
३ कादिरूपाः । गन्धवर्जस्नेहयुक्तपूर्वोक्तगुणवत्यः । नित्या अनित्याश्च ।
नित्यानां रूपादयो नित्या एव । अनित्यानाम् अनित्या एव ॥ ४९ ॥

तेजोनिरूपणम् ।

तेजस्त्यसामान्यवत् तेज । चक्षुः शरीर-सवितृसुवर्णवह्निद्युदादि
३ प्रभेदम् । रूपस्पर्शसेत्यापरिमाणवृत्त्यसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्यद्व
यत्वसंस्कारवत् । नित्यमनित्यं च पूर्ववत् । तच्चतुर्विधम् उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शम्
अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शम् अनुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शम् उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शम्

fold earth [are] non-eternal and [are] produced by heat
Heat [is] again the conjunction with fire [or light] Through
it are destroyed the former colour etc. of earth [and] others
are produced—thus [they are] produced by heat

(49) Water [is that] which is possessed of the genera-
lity, water-ness [It is] of the form of organ of
taste, body, rivers, oceans, snow, hail etc [It is] possessed
of qualities mentioned above [as possessed by earth]
except odour, and with the addition of viscosity [It is]
eternal and non-eternal Colour etc. of eternal [water are]
eternal only, [colour etc.] of non-eternal [water are] non-
eternal only

(50) Fire [is that] which is possessed of the generality,
fire-ness [It is] divided into organ of sight, body, the sun,
gold, [terrestrial] fire lightning etc [It is] possessed of
[the qualities] colour touch, number, dimension [or
magnitude] severality, conjunction, disjunction remoteness,
nearness fluidity and impression [It is] eternal and
non-eternal as above It [is] of four kinds—having [both]
developed colour and developed touch, having [both] colour
and touch undeveloped having undeveloped colour and
developed touch, and having developed colour and undeve-
loped touch That having [both] developed colour and deve-

चेति । उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं यथा सोरादितेजः पिण्डीभूत तेजो वह्न्यादिकम् । ६
 गुणं ॥ उद्भूताभिभूतरूपस्पर्शम् । अनुद्भूतरूपत्वञ्चाभुप स्यात्
 अनुद्भूतस्पर्शत्वं त्वचा न गृह्येत । अभिमवस्तु बलवत्सजातीयेन
 पार्थिवरूपेण स्पर्शेन च कृतम् । अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं यथा चक्षुरिन्द्रियम् । ९
 अनुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शं यथा तप्तगारिस्थ तेजः । उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शं
 यथा मदीपप्रभामण्डलम् ॥ ५७ ॥

वायुनिरूपणम् ।

वायुः स्वाभिसङ्गेष्वप्यप्यवायुः त्वमिन्द्रिय शरीर प्राणवातादिप्रभेदः ।
 स्पर्शस्तरपापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभाजपरत्वापरत्ववेगवान् । स च
 स्पर्शानुमेयः । तथाहि त्रौऽत्र वाया चाति अनुष्णशीतस्पर्शं उप
 लभ्यते स गुणत्वाद्गुणिनमन्तरेणानुपपद्यमानां गुणिनमनुमापयति ।

Developed touch [is] as for instance the heat of the sun etc [and] fire formed in a mass—[terrestrial] fire etc Gold on the other hand has a clear and touch developed but overpowered If it had undeveloped colour it would not be visible if it had undeveloped touch it could not be apprehended by the sense of touch The overpowering [of the tawny colour and touch in gold] again is effected [by the colour and touch of [the particles of] earth [in it] which belong to the same kind and [are more] powerful [fire] having [both] undeveloped colour and touch [is] as for instance the organ of sight [fire] having undeveloped colour and developed touch—as for instance the heat residing in hot [or boiling] water [fire] having developed colour and undeveloped touch—as for instance the halo of the light of a lamp

(51) Wind [is that] which is associated with [the generality] wind n 5 [It is] divided into organ of touch body vital air breeze etc [It is] possessed of [the qualities] touch number dimension [or magnitude] severality conjunction disjunction remoteness nearness and velocity And it is to be inferred from touch To explain This here not hot not cold touch that is experienced [or felt] when the wind blows being a quality and impossible to be accounted

क्रमेण पृथिव्यादिनाशः । यथा वा तन्तूनां नाशे पटनाशः । तद्वतानां
रूपादीनां स्वाश्रयनाशेनैव नाशः । अन्यत्र तु सत्येवाश्रये विरोधिगु-
णप्रादुर्भावेण विनाशः । यथा पाकेन घटादौ रूपादिनाश इति ॥ ५२ ॥

परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् परमाणोरनारब्धत्वम् दण्डुकद्व्यणुकोत्पत्तिः ।

किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । यदिह जालसूर्यमरी-
चिस्थं सूर्यतः सूक्ष्मतमं रज उपलभ्यते तत् स्वल्पपरिमाणद्रव्यारब्धं
कार्यद्रव्यत्वाद् घटयत् । तच्च द्रव्यं कार्यमेव महद्द्रव्यारम्भकस्य
कार्यस्यनियमात् । तदेवं दण्डुकारस्य द्रव्यं सिद्धम् । तदपि स्वल्पपरि-
माणसमवायिकारणारब्धं कार्यद्रव्यत्वाद् घटयत् । यस्तु दण्डुकार-
म्भकः स एव परमाणुः । स चानारब्ध एवेति ।

thus in order [takes place] the destruction of earth etc. Or as for instance, the destruction of the cloth on the destruction of the threads, the destruction of colour etc belonging to it [takes place] through the destruction itself of their substratum. In other cases, on the other hand, destruction [takes place] through the appearance of contrary qualities, even though the substratum continues to exist, as for instance, the destruction of colour etc in the jar etc through heating

(53) What again, [19] the proof for the existence of atoms? We reply —What this [particle of] dust, the finest of all, is found existing in the rays of the sun coming from a lattice, that is produced by a substance possessing a smaller dimension [than its own], because it is a product-substance like a jar [And] that substance, in its turn (ca), [is] also a product, as it is a rule that what produces a substance of a large dimension is a product. Thus then the substance called the binary is established. And that too is produced by an intimate cause possessing a smaller dimension, because it is a product substance, like a jar. What again is the producing cause of the binary, that [is] the atom itself and that [is] verily, unproduced

ननु कार्यद्रव्यारम्भकस्य कार्यद्रव्यत्वाव्यभिचारात् तस्य कथम् नारब्धत्वम् । उच्यते । अनन्तकार्यपरंपरादेः प्रसङ्गात् । तथा च सत्यनन्तकार्यद्रव्यारब्धत्वाविशेषेण मेरुसर्पणयोरपि तुल्यपरिमाणत्वप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादनारब्ध एव परमाणुः । ११

दण्डक तु द्विभ्यामेव परमाणुभ्यामारभ्यते । एकस्थानारम्भकत्वात् इत्यादिकल्पनायाः प्रमाणाभावात् । दण्डक तु त्रिमिरिव दण्डकैरारभ्यते । एकस्थानारम्भकत्वात् । द्विभ्यामारम्भे कार्यगतमहत्त्वानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । कार्यं हि महत्त्वं कारणमहत्त्वाद्वा कारणवद्गुत्वाद्वा । तत्र प्रथमस्यानमशास्त्रमपि नोपपद्यते । न च चतुरादिकल्पनायाः प्रमाणमस्ति त्रिमिरैव महत्त्वारम्भोपपत्तेरिति ॥ १२ ॥ १८

I say [says the objector]—How can it [the atom] have the character of not being a product owing to the invariable association of the producer [or component parts] of a product substance with the nature of a product substance ? We reply Because there would be the undesirable contingency of an endless series of products. And in that case there would be the undesirable contingency of even [the mountain] Meru and the mustard seed having a similar dimension being equally produced by infinite product substances. Therefore the atom [is] verily unproduced.

A binary on the other hand is produced by two atoms only because one [atom] can not be the producer [or the component part] and there is no valid reason for admitting three etc [atoms as the arambhaka]. The triad again is produced by only three binaries because one can not be the producer. If two [binaries] were to produce [the triad] there would be the undesirable contingency [namely] the impossibility of accounting for the magnitude belonging to the product. For the magnitude in a product [arises] from the magnitude of the cause or from the plurality of the cause. [Now] here the first being impossible [as the binary have no mahatva] the latter must be sought. And there is no valid reason for admitting four etc [binaries as the cause of a triad] on account of the possibility of accounting for the production of the magnitude by three [binaries] only.

आकाशनिरूपणम् ।

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । शब्दसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागवत् ।
 ५ एकं विभु नित्यं च । शब्दलिङ्गकं च । शब्दलिङ्गकत्वमस्य कथम् । परि-
 शेषात् । तथाहि । शब्दस्तावद्विशेषगुणः । सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मद्वादि-
 वाह्यैकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद् रूपादिवत् । गुणश्च गुण्याश्रित एव । न चास्य
 ६ पृथिव्यादिवत्तुल्यमात्मा च गुणी भवितुमर्हति । श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वाच्छ-
 ब्दस्य । ये हि पृथिव्यादीनां गुणा न ते श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण गृह्यन्ते यथा
 रूपादयः । शब्दस्तु श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते । न च दिक्कालमनसां गुणः । विशेष-
 ७ गुणत्वान् । अत एभ्योऽपुभ्योऽतिरिक्तः शब्दगुणी एवितदयः । स एवाकाश-
 इति । न चैकः । भेदे प्रमाणाभावात् एकत्वेनैवोपपत्तेः । एकत्वाच्चाका-

(54) Ether [is that] which has sound for [its special]
 quality [It is] possessed of [the qualities] sound, number
 dimension, severality, conjunction and disjunction. [It is]
 one, all pervading and eternal and has sound as the indi-
 catory mark [to prove its existence by inference] How has
 it sound as the indicatory mark ? Through [the rule of]
 elimination [or remainder, exclusion] To explain Sound, to
 start with, [is] a special quality, because while possessed
 of a generality, it is fit to be apprehended by means of one
 external sense organ of people like us [that is, ordinary
 people], like colour etc. And a quality must subsist in a
 substratum. Again, the four [elements] earth etc, and the
 soul do not deserve to be the substratum of this [quality],
 because sound is fit to be apprehended by the ear. For what
 [are] the qualities of earth and others they are not appre-
 hended by the sense of hearing as for instance, colour etc.
 Sound, on the other hand is apprehended by the ear.
 [Sound is] not the quality of space time and mind either,
 because it is a special quality. Therefore a possessor of the
 quality sound, distinct from these eight [substances] must
 be sought. And that [is] ether alone. And it [is] one there
 being no valid reason for [admitting] divisions, and [every
 thing being] accounted for, by its being just one. Because
 it is one, the generality called ether-ness does not exist in

अत्र नाम सामान्यमाकाशे न विद्यते । सामान्यस्यानेकवृत्तित्वात् ।
 विभु आकाशम् परममहत्परिमाणमित्यर्थः । सर्वत्र तत्कार्योपलब्धे ॥ १२
 अत एव विभुत्वान्नित्यमिति ॥ १४ ॥

कालनिरूपणम् ।

कालोऽपि दिग्बिपरीतपरत्वापरत्वानुमेयः । सख्यापरिमाणवृत्तित्वे ,
 सयोगविभाग्यात् । एको नित्यो विभुश्च । कथमस्य दिग्बिपरीतपरत्वा
 परत्वानुमेयत्वम् । उच्यते । सनिहिते वृद्धे सनिधानादपरत्वाहं तद्विप
 रीत परत्व प्रतीयते । व्यवहिते यूनि व्यवधानात् परत्वाहं तद्विपरी
 तमपरत्वम् । तदिदं दिक्कृतविपरीतपरत्वमपरत्व च काय सत्कारणस्य
 दिगादेरसम्भवात् कालमेव कारणमनुमापयति ।

either because a generality exist in more than one Either
 again [is] all pervading that : having the highest large
 dimension because [its] effect [or function] is apprehended
 everywhere for this very reason [it is] eternal owing
 to [its] all pervading nature

(55) Time also is to be inferred from the [notions of]
 remoteness and nearness contrary to [those caused by]
 space [It is] possessed of number dimension severality
 conjunction and disjunction [It is] the eternal and all
 pervading How is it to be inferred from the [notions of]
 remoteness and nearness contrary to [those caused by]
 space? We reply In [the case of] an old man near to
 [us] and [though] fit for [being regarded as possessing]
 nearness owing to proximity [the notion of] remoteness
 contrary to it is apprehended [and] in [the case of] a youth
 remote [from us] and [though] fit for [being regarded as
 possessing] remoteness [is apprehended the notion of] near
 ness contrary to it Now this remoteness and nearness
 contrary to [that] caused by space being an effect makes
 [us] infer time alone as [its] cause owing to the impossibi
 lity of space etc being [its] cause

- १ स चेकांऽपि वर्तमानातीतमविष्यत्क्रियां पाधिवशाद् वर्तमानादि-
व्यपदेशं लभते पुरुष इव पद्यादिभ्यो पाधिवशात् पाचकं याचका-
दिद्वयपदेशम् । नित्यत्वविभुत्ये चास्य पूर्ववत् ॥ ५५ ॥

दिङ्निरूपणम् ।

- कालविपरीतपरत्वापरत्वानुमेया दिगेका नित्या विम्बी च ।
३ सख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसयोगविभागवती । सा च पूर्वादिशतयैरनु-
मेया । तेषामन्यनिमित्तासमवात् । पूर्वस्मिन् पश्चिमे वा देशे स्थितस्य
वस्तुनस्तादवस्थ्यात् । सा चेकापि सविस्तृतदेशसंयोगोपाधिवशाद्
६-प्राच्यादिसङ्गा लभते ॥ ५६ ॥

आत्मनिरूपणम् ।

आत्मत्याभिसम्बन्धवानात्मा । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात् नानाभूत

And though one, it secures the appellation 'present'
etc [that is 'past' and 'future'] owing to the limiting
adjunct (*upādhi*) of present, past, and future actions, like a
man the appellation of 'a cook,' 'a mendicant' etc owing
to the limiting adjunct of the actions, cooking etc Its
eternal nature and all pervading nature [are] as before
[that is, like ether]

(56) Space inferable from the [notions of] remote-
ness and nearness contrary to [those caused by] time
[is] one eternal and all pervading [It is] possessed of
[the qualities] number, dimension severality, conjunction
and disjunction. And it is to be inferred from the notions
of 'east' etc owing to the impossibility of any other cause
for them because a thing remains just the same whether it be
in the western or eastern region. And though one it secures
the name 'the east' etc by virtue of the limiting adjunct of
the conjunction of the sun with those particular regions

(57) Soul [is that] which is associated with soul-ness
[It is] indeed manifold, owing to the multiplicity [or
variation] of pleasure, pain etc and it has been already

एव । स चोक्त एव । तस्य सामान्यगुणा सायादय पञ्च बुद्ध्यादयो ३
नव विशेषगुणाः । नित्यत्वविमुक्ते पूर्ववत् ॥ ५७ ॥

मनोनिरूपणम् ।

मनस्त्याभिसंबन्धवन्मनः । अण्वात्मसयोग्यन्तरिन्द्रियम् । सुखाद्य-
पलब्धिकारणं नित्यं च सत्त्वाद्यष्टगुणवत् । तस्मयोगेन बाह्येन्द्रिय ५
मर्यादाहकम् । अत एव सर्वोपलब्धिसाधनम् । तच्च न प्रत्यक्षम् अपि
त्यनुमानगम्यम् । तथाहि ।

सुखाद्युपलब्धयश्चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तकरणसाध्या ।

असत्स्यापि चक्षुरादिषु जायमानत्वात् ।

यद्य तत् चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तम् करण तन्मनः । नृचाणुपरिमाणम् ।
इति द्रव्याण्युक्तानि ॥ ५८ ॥

१२

described It has five general qualities number etc and
nine special qualities cognition etc Eternal nature and all-
pervading nature [are in it] as above [as in space]

(58) Mind [is that] which is associated with mind
ness [It is] atomic having conjunction with the soul [and]
an internal sense organ : [It is] the cause of the apprehen-
sion of pleasure etc eternal and possessed of the eight
qualities number etc Through conjunction with it the
external sense organ makes [one] apprehend the object and
for this very reason [it is] the means of all apprehension
It again [is] not perceptible [directly] but is fit to be
known by inference To explain

Apprehensions of pleasure etc are produced by an
instrument distinct from the eye etc

Because [they are] being produced even when the
eye etc are not present

And what is the instrument distinct from the eye etc
that [is] the mind And [it is] of atomic dimension

Thus have the substance been expounded

१ यद्वन्तु यद्विनिर्वात्यने तत्तदतिरिक्तकरणमाह यथा बुद्धार विनोन्वयमाना
पञ्चक्रिया तदतिरिक्तबुद्ध्यादिरूपसाध्या ।

गुणानिरूपणम् ।

अथ गुणा उच्यन्ते । सामान्यवान् असमवायिकारणम् अस्पन्दात्मा गुणः । स च द्रव्याश्रित एव । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व-संयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वशुरूत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कारभेदाच्चतुर्विंशतिधा ॥ ५९ ॥

रूपनिरूपणम् ।

तत्र रूपं चक्षुर्मात्रमाहो विशेषगुणः । पृथिव्यादित्रयवृत्तिः । तच्च शुक्लाद्यनेकप्रकारकम् । पाकजं च पृथिव्याम् । तच्चानित्यं पृथिवीमात्रं । आप्यतेजसपरमाण्वोनित्यम् । आप्यतेजसकोर्यप्यनित्यम् । शुक्लमास्वरमपाकजं तेजसि । तदेवाभास्वरमप्सु ॥ ६० ॥

रसनिरूपणम् ।

रसो रसनेन्द्रियमाहो विशेषगुणः । पृथिवीजहवृत्तिः । तत्र पृथिव्या

(59) Now are expounded the qualities. Quality [is that] which is possessed of generality, [is] the non intimate cause, [and is] not of the nature of motion. And it subsists in a substance alone [It is] of twenty-four kinds through the division into colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension [or magnitude] severality, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, gravity [or heaviness] fluidity, viscosity, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain desire, aversion activity, merit, demerit, and impression.

मधुराद्विषयकारो पाकजश्च । अप्सु मधुरोऽपाकजो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । ३
नित्यं परमाणुरूपास्वप्सु । कार्यरूपास्वप्सु नित्यः ॥ ६१ ॥

गन्धनिरूपणम् ।

गन्धो घ्राणग्राह्यो विदोषगुणः । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः । अनित्य एव । स
द्विविधः सुरगिरसुरभिश्च । जलादौ गन्धप्रतिमानं तु सयुक्तसमवायेन ।
द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ ६२ ॥

स्पर्शनिरूपणम् ।

स्पर्शस्त्वग्निन्द्रियग्राह्यो विदोषगुणः । पृथिव्यादिवत्तुप्रवृत्तिः । स
च त्रिविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णाश्तोमेदात् । शीतं पश्यति । उष्णं स्तोत्राति ।
अनुष्णाशीतं पृथिवीवाच्याः । पृथिवीमात्रं हानित्य । आप्यतेजस
वायवीयपरमाणुषु नित्यः । आप्यादिकार्येष्वनित्यः । एते च रूपाद
यथात्वारो महत्त्वेकार्यसमवयवत्व मत्युद्भूता एव प्रत्यक्षा ॥ ६३ ॥ ४

In water [it is] sweet not produced by heating eternal
and non eternal [It is] eternal in water of the form of
atoms [and] non eternal in water of the form of a product

(62) Odour [is] a special quality to be apprehended by
the sense of smell [It] resides in earth alone [is] only
non eternal It [is] of two kinds—fragrant and non fra-
grant The apprehension of odour in water etc is however
to be understood [as caused] by intimate relation with
[earth that is] conjoined [with it]

(63) Touch [is] a special quality to be apprehended by
the sense of touch [It] resides in the group of four earth etc
And it [is] three fold through the division into cold hot not
cold not hot [It is] cold in water hot in fire no hot not cold
in earth and wind [It is] again non eternal in earth only,
eternal in the atoms of water fire and wind non eternal in
the products of water etc These four colour etc are directly
perceptible only when they are developed and are in in-
timate relation with an object possessed of magnitude

सग्यानिरूपणम् । द्वित्वम् अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यम् ।

सदस्या एकत्वादियवहारोत्तु सामान्यगुणः । एकत्वादिसाध-
पयन्ता । तत्रैकत्व द्विविधं नित्यानित्यभेदात् । नित्यगतं नित्यम्
अनित्यगतमनित्यम् । तत्राश्रयसमवायिकारणमर्तकत्वजन्यं च । द्वित्वं
नित्यजन्यमेव । तच्च त्रयोऽपि षण्ढयोरेकमेकमिदमेकमित्यपेक्षाबुद्ध्या
जन्यते । तत्र द्वौ षण्ढौ समवायिकारणम् । षण्ढयोरेकत्वसमवा-
यिकारणम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिनिमित्तकारणम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशादत्र
द्वित्वविनाशः । एव त्रित्यादुत्पत्तिर्विज्ञेया ॥ ६४ ॥

परिमाणनिरूपणम् ।

परिमाणं मानस्यवहारासाधारणं कारणम् । तच्चतुर्विधम् । अणु महद्
दीर्घं ह्रस्व इति । तत्र कार्यगतं परिमाणं सग्यापरिमाणप्रचययेति ।

(64) Number [14] a general quality the cause of the
employment of words [regarding] one-ness [or the chara-
cteristic of being one] etc [It] begins with one-ness and
ends with paridhr. There one-ness [or conception of uni-
ty] [14] of two kinds on account of the division into eternal
and non-eternal [It is] eternal [when] belonging to eternal
[things] non-eternal [when] belonging to non-eternal
[things] and produced by the one-ness belonging to the
intimate cause of its substratum. Duality on the other
hand [14] non-eternal only and it is produced by the
relative [and combined] notion about two objects in the
form this [is] one this [is] one. Here the two objects
[are] the intimate cause the two unities of the two objects,
the non-intimate cause [and] the relative notion the
instrumental cause from the destruction of the relative
notion itself [follows] the destruction of duality. Thus
the production of three-ness etc is to be understood.

(65) Dimension [1] the special cause of the employ-
ment of words [regarding] measurement. It [is] of four
kind — minute large long and short. There the dimension
belonging to a product is produced by number dimension or
loose combination of part (prajah). It [is] as follows —

तद्यथा । द्वाणुकपरिमाणमीश्वरापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यपरमाणुद्वित्वजनित-
त्वात् संख्यायोनि । संख्याकारणकमित्यर्थः । त्र्यणुकपरिमाणं च
स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणतत्त्वबहुत्वसंख्यायोनि । चतुरणुकादिपरिमाणं
तु स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणपरिमाणजन्यम् । तुलपिण्डपरिमाणं तु
स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणावयवानां प्रक्षिप्तसंयोगजन्यम् । परमाणु-
परिमाणं परममहत्परिमाणं आकाशादिकृतं नित्यमेव ॥ ६५ ॥

वृथस्त्वनिरूपणम् ।

वृथक्तये वृथमवयवहारात्साधारणं कारणम् । तद्ये द्विविधम् । एक-
यक्तये द्विवृथक्त्वादिकं च । तद्यद्य नित्यमनं नित्यमनित्यमतमनि-
यम् । द्विवृथक्त्वादिकं चानित्यमेव ॥ ६६ ॥

संयोजननिरूपणम् ।

संयोगः संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः । द्वाश्रयाऽप्यप्यवृत्तिश्च । स च द्विविधः ।

The dimension of a binary is produced by number, being caused by the duality of atom produced by the relative notion of God, that is it has number for its cause. The dimension of a triad again has for its cause, number [viz] plurality belonging to the intimate cause of its substratum. The dimension of a quaternary etc., on the other hand, is produced by the dimension of the intimate cause of its substratum, the dimension of a mass of cotton, again, i. e. produced by the loose combination of the component parts of the intimate cause of its substratum. The dimension of an atom and the highest large dimension belonging to ether etc. [are] eternal only.

(66) Severality [1-] the partial cause of the employment of words [each is—'This thing is' different [from that] It [is] of two kinds, severality in one and severality in two etc. Of them, the first belonging to eternal [things is] eternal, [and], belonging to non-eternal [things is] non-eternal. Severality in two etc. [is] non-eternal only.

(67) Connection [1-] the [special] cause of the employment of words [each is 'The two things are' joined,]

१ स्वराणावयवजन्ययोनि । प्रत्यक्षवयवार्थं ग्राह्यमवयवविज्ञानप्रमाणवित्त-
संयोगः । २ निचयनित्यम् । अनित्ये कार्यं वृथक्त्वादिकं बुद्धिबुद्धिबुद्धिबुद्धिजन्यम् ।

- ३ अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मज संयोगजश्चेति । तत्रान्यतरकर्मजो यथा क्रियावता इत्येनेन सह निष्क्रियस्य स्थाणो संयोगः । अस्य हि इत्येनक्रिया असमवायिकारणम् । उभयकर्मजो यथा सक्रिययोर्महयोः संयोगः । संयोगजो यथा कारणाकारणसंयोगात् कार्याकार्यसंयोगः । यथा हस्ततरुसंयोगेन कायतरुसंयोगः ॥ ६७ ॥

विभागनिरूपणम् ।

- विभागोऽपि विभक्तप्रत्ययहेतुः । संयोगपूर्वको द्वाश्रय । स च त्रिविधः अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजो विभागजश्चेति । तत्र प्रथमो यथा इत्येनक्रिया शैलइत्येनयोर्विभागः । द्वितीयो यथा महयोर्विभागः ।

has two substratums and never covers them entirely [or reside, in them without pervading them altogether] It [is] of three kinds—arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums], arising from the action of both, and arising from conjunction. Of them, [that] arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums] [is] for instance, the conjunction of the motionless post with the moving falcon, the motion of the falcon [is] its non intimate cause [That] arising from the action of both [is] for instance, the conjunction [clash] of two active [or fighting] wrestlers. [That] arising from conjunction [is] for instance, the conjunction of the effect [body] and what is not an effect [tree] due to the conjunction of the cause [the hand] and what is not a cause [tree], as the conjunction of body and tree, through the conjunction of hand and tree

(68) Disjunction again [is] the [special] cause of the notion [such as These two things are] separated [or disjointed] ' [It] has a conjunction beforehand and has two substratums. And it [is] of three kinds—arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums] arising from the action of both, and arising from disjunction. Of them the first [is] for instance the disjunction of the mountain and the falcon, through the motion of the falcon. The second [is] for instance, the disjunction of [two]

तृतीयो यथा दस्ततरुविभागात् कायतरुविभाग ॥ ६८ ॥

परत्वापरत्वनिरूपणम् ।

परत्वापरत्वे परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे । ते ॥ द्विविधे विकृतये कालकृत च ।

तत्र विकृतयोरुत्पत्तिः कथ्यते । एकस्यां दिव्यवस्थितयोः पिण्डयोरिदमस्मात् सन्निकृष्टमितिवुद्धयानुगृहीतेन विहपिण्डसंयोगेना परत्वं सन्निकृष्टे जन्मते । विप्रकृष्टवुद्धया तु परत्वं विप्रकृष्टे जन्मते । सन्निकृष्टस्तु पिण्डस्य द्रष्टुं जरीरापक्षया सयुक्तसंयोगाल्सीयत्वम् । तद्व्यस्य विप्रकर्ष इति ।

कालकृतयोस्तु परत्वापरत्वयोरुत्पत्तिः कथ्यते । अनियतदिग्द- स्थितयोर्युवस्थविहपिण्डयोरयमस्मादुत्पत्तरकालसर्ववर्णीति धिया

wrestlers the third [is] for instance the disjunction of body and tree through the disjunction of hand and tree

(69) Remoteness and nearness [are] the special causes of the employment of words [such as This thing is] remote [from or] near [to that] They again [are] of two kinds—caused by space and caused by time

Of them [now] is described the production of [remote ness and nearness] caused by space Out of two objects residing in the same quarter is produced in the nearer [object] nearness through the conjunction of space and object favoured by the cognition This [is] nearer than that in the farther [object] however is produced remoteness through the cognition of [its being] remote Nearness again [is] the [comparatively] smaller number of conjunctions of conjoined [things] of the object with reference to the body of the observer a larger number thereof [is] remoteness

And [now] is described the production of remoteness and nearness caused by time Out of two objects a young man and an old man sitting not in any particular direction [there arises] nearness in the young man owing to the

१ सद्रूप । २ सर्वदृश्यपेक्षावुद्धयानुगृहीतेन कालविण्मत्तयोगेनासमनती कारणेन ।

यूनि अपरत्वम् । अयमस्माद् बहुतरकालसवन्धीति धिया स्थविरे
१२ परत्वम् ॥ ६९ ॥

गुरुत्वनिरूपणम् ।

गुरुत्वम् आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणम् । पृथिवीजलवृत्ति । यथाक्रमम् ।
३ संयोगवेगप्रयत्नाभावे सति गुरुत्वाद् पतनमिति ॥ ७० ॥

द्रवत्वनिरूपणम् ।

द्रवत्वम् आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणम् । भूतेजोजलवृत्ति । भूते
३ जलोर्ध्वतादिसुवर्णयोरग्निसंयोगेन द्रवत्व नैमित्तिकम् । जले नैसर्गिक
द्रवत्वम् ॥ ७१ ॥

स्नेहनिरूपणम् ।

स्नेहश्चिकणता । जलमाश्रवृत्ति । कारणगुणपूर्वको गुरुत्वादिवत्
३ यावद्द्रव्यमायी ॥ ७२ ॥

notion in the form This one is connected with a smaller [degree of] time than the other [and] remoteness in the old man owing to the notion in the form This one is connected with a higher [degree of] time than the other'

(70) Gravity [or heaviness weight] [is] the non intimate cause of the first [act of] falling [It] resides in earth and water As has been said The falling [of an object is] due to gravity in the absence of conjunction velocity or conscious effort

(71) Fluidity [is] the non intimate cause of the first [act of] flowing [It] resides in earth fire and water In earth and fire [as for instance] in ghee etc and gold etc, the fluidity due to the conjunction of fire [is] artificial [or occasioned] in water [there resides] natural fluidity

(72) Viscidity [is] greasiness [It] resides in water alone [It has the same] quality in the cause before hand [and] like gravity etc is present in the substance as long as it lasts

शब्दविचारः । कथं शब्दस्य श्रोत्रेण ग्रहणम् । कार्यशब्दनाशविचारः ।

शब्दः श्रोत्रघात आकाशस्य विशेषगुणः । ननु कथमस्य श्रोत्रेण ग्रहणम् । यतो भेर्यादिदेशे शब्दो जायते श्रोत्रे पुरुषदेशेऽस्ति । १
सत्यम् । भेरीदेशे जातः शब्दो बीबीतरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन
या सनिहितः शब्दान्तरमारभते । स च शब्दः शब्दान्तरमिति क्रमेण
श्रोत्रदेशे जातोऽन्यः शब्दः श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते । न त्वाद्यो नापि मध्यमः । २
यं वशे पाठ्यमाने इलङ्क्यादिभागदेशे जातः शब्दः शब्दान्तरारम्भ
क्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशेऽन्यः शब्दः जनयति । सोऽन्यः शब्दः श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते
नाद्यो न मध्यमः । भेरीशब्दो मया श्रुत इति मेतिस्तु भ्रान्तैव । ३
भेरीशब्दोत्पत्तौ भेर्याकाशसंयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । भेरीदण्ड

(73) Sound [is] the special quality of ether to be apprehended by the sense of hearing. I say [says the objector]—How [can there arise] its apprehension by the sense of hearing? For, the sound is produced in the region of the drum etc., while the sense of hearing is in the region of the man [who hears]. True [what you say]. The sound arising in the region of the drum produces another sound near by after the manner of one wave producing another wave or after the manner of the buds of the Kadamba [tree, that come out in all directions as soon as rain begins to fall] [and] that sound in its turn [produces] another sound [and so on] in this order the last sound arising in the region of the sense of hearing is apprehended by the sense of hearing. Neither the first nor the intermediate [sound]. Likewise when a bamboo is being cleft asunder, the sound arising at the region of the parting of the two pieces by producing other sounds in [due] order, produces the last sound in the region of the sense of hearing that last sound is apprehended by the sense of hearing, neither the first, nor the intermediate. The notion namely The sound of the drum has been heard by me [is] but simply illusory.

In the [matter of the] production of the sound of the drum the conjunction of ether and drum [is] the non-inti-

- संयोगो निमित्तकारणम्^१। एतं वंशोत्पादनाच्चट्टचटाशब्दोत्पत्तौ यश-
 १२ दलाकाशविभागोऽसमवायिकारणम्। दलद्वयाविभागो निमित्तकार-
 णम्। इत्यमाद्यः शब्दः संयोगजो विभागजो वा। अन्त्यमध्यमशब्दास्तु
 शब्दासमवायिकारणका अनुकूलचातनिमित्तकारणकाः। यथोक्तम्
 १५ संयोगाद्विभागाच्छब्दाश्च शब्दनिष्पत्तिरिति। (वे. सू. २.२.११)
 आद्यादीनां सर्वशब्दानामाकाशमेकमेव समवायिकारणम्।

- कर्मबुद्धिवत्त्रिषणायस्थायित्वम्। तत्राद्यमध्यमशब्दाः कार्यशब्द-
 १८ नाद्याः। अन्त्यस्तूपान्त्येन उपान्त्यस्त्यन्त्येन सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायेन
 विनश्येते। इदं त्युक्तम्। उपान्त्येन त्रिषणायस्थायिनामन्त्यस्य
 द्वितीयक्षणमात्रानुगामिना तृतीयक्षणे चासतान्त्यनाशजननासंभवात्

mate cause, the conjunction of drum and stick, the instru-
 mental cause Similarly, in the [matter of the] production
 of the cracking [catacata] sound, due to the cleaving of
 the bamboo, the disjunction of the bamboo-pieces and ether
 [is] the non-intimate cause [and] the disjunction of the
 two pieces, the instrumental cause Thus the first sound [is]
 produced by conjunction or produced by disjunction The
 last one and the intermediate sounds, on the other hand, have
 the sound as the non-intimate cause and favourable wind
 as the instrumental cause As has been said--The product-
 ion of sound [takes place] from conjunction, disjunction
 and sound. Of all sound, the first one etc, ether alone [is]
 the one intimate cause

[Sound] lasts for three moments [only] like action
 and cognition Now the first one and the intermediate sounds
 are destroyed by the sounds which are [their] products, the
 last one, again, by the last but one and the last but one,
 by the last one--[thus these two] are destroyed after the
 maxim of Sunda and Upasunda [that is, mutually] This
 [is] however, improper It is impossible for the penultimate
 [sound] to cause the destruction of the last [sound] as it [the
 penultimate sound] liable to last [only] for three moments and
 accompanying only the second moment of the last [sound]
 does not exist [at all] in the third moment of the last
 [sound] Therefore, the destruction of the last [sound]

तस्मादुपान्त्यनाशदेवान्त्यनाश इति ।

२१

विनाशित्वं च शब्दस्यानुमानात् । तथाहि ।

अनित्यः शब्दः ।

सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् ।

२४

यदयत् इति ।

शब्दस्यानित्यत्वं साध्यम् । अनित्यत्वं च विनाशावच्छिन्न-
स्वरूपत्वं न तु विनाशावच्छिन्नसत्तायोगित्वम् । प्रागभाये सत्ता २७
हीनेऽनित्यस्याभावप्रसंगात् । सामान्यवत्त्वं सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रिय-
ग्राह्यत्वं हेतुः । इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वादित्युच्यमान आत्मनि स्वाभिचारः
स्यादत उक्तं बाह्योति । एवमपि तेनैव योगिबाह्येन्द्रियेण ग्राह्यः ।

[arises] from the destruction of the penultimate [sound]
itself

The destructibility of sound, again, [follows] from in-
ference To explain

Sound [is] non-eternal

Because while being possessed of a generality,
[it is] to be apprehended by the external
sense-organ of [people] like us

.. like a jar

[Here] the impermanence of sound [is] what is to be
established Impermanence [means] having a nature
characterised by [or liable to] destruction but not being
connected with being [or existence] liable to destruction,
otherwise there would be the undesirable contingency of
the absence of impermanence in antecedent negation which
is without being While being possessed of a generality,
to be apprehended by the external sense organ of [people]
like us [is] the reason If it were [only] stated 'owing
to being fit to be apprehended by a sense organ' there would
be the violation [of the rule] with reference to the
soul [that would be comprised by the reason] there-
fore it has been said 'external' [sense-organ] Even
so, there would be the violation [and unwarranted ex-
tension] with respect to atoms etc that are fit to be appre-

परमाण्वाद्वा व्याभिचारः स्यादतो योगिनिरासार्थमुक्तमस्मदादीति ।
किं पुनर्योगिसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते ।

३३ परमाणवः कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षा । भ्रमयत्वात् घटवदिति ।

यस्य प्रत्यक्षा स एव योगी ।

तथापि सामान्यादेना व्याभिचारोऽत उक्त सामान्यवत्त्वे सतीति ।

३५ सामान्यादित्रयस्य नि सामान्यत्वात् ॥ ७३ ॥

बुद्धिनिरूपणम् ।

अर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिः । नित्या अनित्या च । एशी बुद्धिर्नित्या । अन्य
३ दीया त्वनित्या ॥ ७४ ॥

सुखनिरूपणम् ।

प्रीतिः सुखम् । तच्च सर्वोत्तमनामनुकूलवेदनीयम् ॥ ७५ ॥

दुःखनिरूपणम् ।

पीडा दुःखम् । तच्च सर्वोत्तमना प्रतिकूलवेदनीयम् ॥ ७६ ॥

handed by the very same external sense organ of the Yogin therefore it has been said of people like us for the purpose of excluding the Yogin

What again [is] the proof for the existence of Yogins ?
We reply

Atoms must be directly perceptible to some one
Because [they are] objects of knowledge
like a jar

He to whom [they are] perceptible [is] just the Yogin
Still there would be the violation with respect to generality
etc therefore it has been said while being possessed of a
generality the three generality etc having no generality

(74) Cognition [consists in] the illumination of an
object [It is] eternal and non eternal The cognition of
God [is] eternal other [cognition is] but non eternal

(75) Pleasure [is] joy and it [is that] which is to be
experienced as favourable [or agreeable] by all

(76) Pain [is] suffering and it [is that] which is to
be experienced as disagreeable by all

इच्छालक्षणम् ।

राग इच्छा ॥ ७७ ॥

द्वेषलक्षणम् ।

क्रोधा द्वेष ॥ ७८ ॥

प्रयत्नलक्षणम् । बुद्ध्यादिना मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

उत्साहः प्रयत्नः ।

बुद्ध्यादयः पण् मानसप्रत्यक्षा ॥ ७९ ॥

धर्मधर्मनिरूपणम् ।

धर्मधर्मौ सुखदुःखयोरसाधारणकारणे । तौ चाप्रत्यक्षायानु-
मीयेतैः सथाहि ।

देवदत्तस्य शरीरादिक देवदत्तविशेषगुणजन्यम् ।

कार्येति सति देवदत्तस्य भोगहेतुत्वात् ।

देवदत्तप्रयत्नजन्यवस्तुम् ।

यत्र शरीरादिजनक आत्मविशेषगुण स एव धर्मोऽधर्मश्च ।

प्रयत्नादीनां शरीराद्यजनकत्वादिनि ॥ ८० ॥

(77) Desire [is] attachment [or passion]

(78) Aversion [is] anger [or irritation]

(79) Effort [or activity] [is] energy

The six cognition etc [are] perceptible by the mind

(80) Merit and Demerit [are] the special causes of
pleasure and pain Though [they are] not for the matter
of that perceptible [by the sense-organs] they can be in-
ferred To explain

The body etc of Devadatta must be produced by
a special quality in Devadatta

Because while being a product they are the cause
of enjoyment

Like an object produced by Devadatta's effort

What is the special quality in the soul, which produces
body etc, that itself [is] merit and demerit, because effort
etc, could not be producing body etc

१ तौ चाप्रत्यक्षायानुमानगम्यौ च ।

संस्कारविचारः ।

संस्कारस्त्रिविधो वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्च । तत्र वेगं
पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः । स च क्रियाहेतुः । भावनाख्यस्तु संस्कारं
आत्ममात्रवृत्तिरनुभवजन्यः स्मृतिहेतुः । स चोद्बुद्ध एव स्मृतिं
जनयति । उद्बोधश्च सहकारिलाभः । सहकारिणश्च संस्कारस्य
सदृशदर्शनादयः । यथोक्तम् । सादृश्याद्वृत्तिचिन्तायाः स्मृतिर्गोचरस्य
बोधका इति । स्थितिस्थापकस्तु स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यविशेषवृत्तिः । अन्य
थाभूतस्य स्पर्शध्वंस्य धनुरादेः पुनस्तादृयस्थापादकः ।

एतं बुद्ध्यादयोऽधर्मान्ता भावना चात्मविशेषगुणाः ।

गुणा उक्ताः ॥ ८१ ॥

कर्मविचारः ।

अविमुद्रव्यपरिमाणेन मूर्तत्वापरनाद्या सहैकार्यसमवेतं विभागद्वारा
पृथक्शसंयोगनाशो सत्युत्तरदेशसंयोगहेतुश्च । तच्च उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणा
कुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनभेदात् पञ्चविधम् । भ्रमणादयस्तु गमनग्रहणेनैव
गृह्यन्ते ॥ ८२ ॥

सामान्यविचारः ।

अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुः सामान्यस्य । द्रव्यादित्रयवृत्तिः । नित्यमेकमने-
कानुगतं च । तच्च द्विविधं परमपरं च । तत्र परं सत्ता बहुविधपत्त्यात् ।
सा चानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययमात्रहेतुत्वात् सामान्यमाश्रयः । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि ।
अल्पविधपत्त्यात् । तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद् विशेषः ।
अग्नः कथिनाह । व्यक्तित्यतिरिक्तं सामान्यं नास्तीति । तत्र

essence of motion [It] resides like quality in substance
alone [It] is in intimate relation with one [and the same]
object, along with the non-all-pervading dimension of sub-
stance, otherwise called corporeality [or bodily form], and
[is] the cause of the conjunction with a latter region, when
there is the destruction of the conjunction with the former
region, through the agency of disjunction It [is] again, of five
kinds, owing to the division into throwing upwards, throwing
downwards, contraction, expansion, and going Revolving
etc are apprehended by the apprehension of going itself

(83) Generality [is] the cause of the notion of conform-
ity [It] resides in the three [padarthas], substance etc [that
substance, quality and action] and [is] eternal, one, and
conforming to many And it [is] of two kinds—wider
(para) and narrower (apara) The wider [generality is]
being [or existence], owing to [its] comprising many objects.
And it [that is, being] owing to [its] being the cause of
merely the notion of conformity [is] pure generality The
narrower [generality is] the generality of substance etc,
owing to [its] comprising fewer objects It, again, owing
to [its] being the cause of exclusion as well, [is] parti-
cularity, though continuing to be generality

Here some one contends—There is no [such thing as]
generality distinct from the individual objects To this we

द्रुम । किमालम्बना तर्हि भिन्नेषु विलक्षणेषु पिण्डेष्वेकाकारा बुद्धि
 र्धिना सर्वानुगतमेकम् । यच्च तदालम्बनं तदेव सामान्यमिति ।

- १ ननु अतद्व्यावृत्तिकृते वैकाकारा बुद्धिरस्तु । तथाहि । सर्वेष्वेव हि
 गोपिण्डेषु अगोम्योऽश्वादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तिरस्ति । तेनागोम्यवृत्तिविषय
 एवायमेकाकार प्रत्ययोऽनेकेषु न तु विधिरूपगोत्वसामान्यविषय ।
 २ नैवम् । विधिसुरतेनैकाकारस्फुरणान् ॥ ८३ ॥

विशेषविचारः ।

- विशेषो नित्यो नित्यद्रव्यप्राप्ते । व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिमात्रहेतुः । नित्य
 ३ द्रव्याणि त्वाकाशादीनि पञ्च पृथिव्यादयश्चत्वारः परमाणुरूपा ॥ ८४ ॥

समवायविचारः ।

अयुतसिद्धयोः सन्नन्धः समवायः । स र्थाक्त एव ॥ ८५ ॥

नन्यवयवावयविनावप्ययुतसिद्धौ तेन अनयो सवन्ध समवायः ।
न चेतद्युक्तम् अवयवातिरिक्तस्यावयविनोऽभावात् । परमाणव एव
बहवस्तथा सनिकृष्टा पटोऽय पटोऽयमिति गृह्यन्ते ।

अत्रोच्यते । अस्त्येकं स्थूलो घट इति प्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिः । न च सा
परमाणुजनकेष्वस्थूलेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु भवितुमर्हति । भ्रान्तेयं बुद्धिरिति
चेत् । न । बाधकाभावात् ।

तदेव पट् पदार्थो द्रव्यावयो वर्णिता । ते च विधिमुखप्रत्ययवेषत्वाद्
मायस्त्वा एव ॥ ८६ ॥

अभावविचारः ।

इदानीं निवेद्यमुखप्रमाणमन्योऽभावात् सततं पदार्थं प्रतिपाद्यते ।
स चाभावः संक्षेपतो द्विविधः । ससर्गाभावाऽभ्याभ्याभावश्चेति ।

I say [says the objector] [It has been said that] parts and
the whole are also such as are known to be never separated
and therefore the connection between them [is] inherence
This however [is] not proper owing to the absence of the
whole as distinct from the parts. Because the atoms them-
selves in large numbers (*bahavah*) and brought together in
particular ways are apprehended in the form This [is] a jar
This [is] a cloth

To this we reply. There [is] the direct [or actual]
cognition in the form. There is one gross jar. And
it does not deserve to exist with reference to atoms
[that are] many not gross and supersensuous. If you argue
that [this cognition] is illusory [we reply] No owing to
the absence of any contradictory [proof or knowledge]

Thus have been expounded the six categories beginning
with substance. And owing to their being fit to be known by
notions of a positive nature they [are] of a positive form only

(86) Now is described the seventh category non entity
[or absence negation] fit to be known by a proof negative in
form. That negation again [is] in brief of two kinds—Rela-

संसर्गाभावोऽपि त्रिविधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति ।

उत्पत्तेः प्राक् कारणे कार्यस्याभावः प्रागभावः । यथा तन्तुषु पटो
६ भावः । स चानादिरूपत्तेरभावात् । विनाशी च कार्यस्यैव तद्विनाश
रूपत्वात् ।

उत्पन्नस्य कारणेऽभावः प्रध्वंसाभावः । विनाश इति यावत् । यथा
९ मग्ने घटे कपालमालार्या घटाभावः । स च सुदूरप्रहारादिजन्य
स चोत्पत्तिमानप्यविनाशी नष्टस्य कार्यस्य पुनरुत्पत्तेः ।

प्रैकालिकोऽभावोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा यायौ रूपाभावः ।

१२ अन्योन्याभावस्तु तादात्म्यप्रतियोगिकोऽभावः । घट पटौ न
भवतीति ।

तदेवमर्था व्याख्यातम् ॥

tive negation and Reciprocal [or Mutual] negation Relative
negation too [is] of three kinds—Antecedent negation,
Negation by destruction, and Absolute negation

Antecedent negation [is] the absence of the effect in
the cause, before [its] production, as for instance, the
absence of the cloth in the threads And it has no beginning,
owing to the absence of origination, but (ca) has an end
[or, is destructible] the effect itself having the form of its
• destruction

Negation by destruction [is] the absence of [the
effect] produced in [its] cause, that is, [its] destruc-
tion, as for instance, the absence of the jar in the mass of
pot-sherds, when the jar has been broken It again, is
produced by the strokes of hammer [or stick] &c And it,
though having an origination [or beginning] has no end
an effect destroyed not being originated again

Absolute negation [is] the negation belonging to [all]
the three times [past, present and future] as for instance,
the absence of colour in wind.

Reciprocal negation, on the other hand [is] the nega-
tion which has for [its] counter-entity, co-substantiality
[or identity of two objects] in the form "A jar is not cloth."

Thus have been expounded the objects.

ननु ज्ञानाद् ब्रह्मणो वा व्यातिरिक्ता अर्था न सन्ति । मैत्रम् । अर्थाः १५
नामपि प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वेनाशङ्क्यापलापत्वात् ॥ ८६ ॥

बुद्धिविचार ।

बुद्धिरूपलब्धिर्ज्ञानं प्रत्यय इत्यादिभिः पर्यायशब्दैर्याभिधीयते सा
बुद्धिः । अर्थप्रकाशो वा बुद्धिः । सा च संक्षेपतो द्विविधा । अनुभवः
स्मरणं च । अनुभवोऽपि द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्चेति ।

तत्र यथार्थोऽर्थ्याविसंवादी । स च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेर्भज्यते । यथा
चक्षुरादिभिरदुष्टेर्घटादिज्ञानम् । घृमलिद्रुकमग्निज्ञानम् । गोसाहच्य-
दर्शनाद् गवयशब्दवाच्यताज्ञानम् । ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेते-
त्यादियाख्याज् ज्योतिष्टोमस्य स्वर्गसाधनताज्ञानं च ।

अयथार्थस्तु अर्थःप्रभिचार्यप्रमाणजः । स त्रिविधः । संशयस्तर्को,

I say [says the objector] There do not exist objects
distinct from [or over and above] knowledge or Brahman
[Do] not [say] so The object, also being established by
means of direct perception etc it is impossible to deny them

(87) Cognition [is] that which is denoted by synonyms
such as knowledge apprehension cognition notion, or
ognition [is] the illumination of an object And it [is],
briefly, of two kinds—apprehension and remembrance,
apprehension again [is] of two kinds—true [in accord
with the object] and false [not in accord with the object]

Of them true [apprehension] [is that] which is not in-
consistent with the object [as it is] and that is produced by
proofs, perception etc as for instance, the knowledge of a
jar etc by means of non defective eyes etc the knowledge of
fire having smoke as the indicatory mark, the knowledge of
[an object] being denoted by the word gavaya, at the sight of
[its] likeness to an ox, and the knowledge of [the sacrifice]
Jyotistoma being the means of [securing] heaven from the
sentence 'one desirous of [securing] heaven should sacrifice,
with the Jyotistoma [sacrifice]' etc

False [apprehension] on the other hand, [is] not con-
sistent with the object [as it is] [and is] produced from what

विपर्ययश्चेति । संशयतर्कां यक्ष्येत ।

विपर्ययस्तु अतस्मिंस्तद्ग्रहः । भ्रम इति यावत् । यथा पुरोवर्तिन्य-

१२ रजते शुक्त्यादी रजतरौष इदं रजतमिति ।

स्मरणमपि यथार्थमयथार्थं चेति द्विविधम् । तदुभयं जागरे । स्वप्ने तु सर्वमेव ज्ञान स्मरणमयथार्थं च । दोषवशेन तदिदं स्थान इदमि-

१५ त्युदयात् ॥ ८७ ॥

ज्ञान निराकारमेव ।

सर्वं च ज्ञानं निराकारमेव । न तु ज्ञानेऽर्थेन स्वस्याकारो जन्यते । साकारज्ञानवादनिराकरणात् । अत एव ज्ञानाकारेणार्थानुमानमपि निरस्तम् । प्रत्यक्षासिद्धत्वाद् घटादं । सर्वं ज्ञानमर्थनिरूप्यमर्थप्रतिषेद्धस्येव तस्य मनसा निरूपणात् घटज्ञानवानहमिति । न तु ज्ञानवान-

is not a means of right knowledge It [is] of three kinds—doubt, guess [or, hypothetical reasoning] and misapprehension. Doubt and guess would be explained [later]

Misapprehension [or error] [is] the apprehension [of a thing] as that which it is not, that is, illusory knowledge, as for instance, the superimposition of [the notion of] silver in the form this [is] silver* on the mother-of-pearl etc, lying in front and [which are] not silver

Remembrance also [is] of two kinds, namely, true and false. Both these [arise] during the waking state. In dream on the other hand, all cognition without exception (eva) [is] remembrance and false [not in consonance with the object], because [there the cognition] this arises in place of 'that' owing to [some] defect

(88) All cognition is verily, formless. [It is] not that by the object is produced its own form in the cognition, because the doctrine of the cognition possessing a form has been refuted. For the same reason [the doctrine of] inference of the object through the form of cognition is [to be] brushed aside, because a jar etc are proved by direct perception. All cognition [is] object-determined as it is defined by the mind only when it is linked with the object, in the form 'I am possessed of the knowledge of the jar.'

१ न वधन जन्यत । न । २ घटज्ञानवानहमित्येतन्मात्रं गम्यते ।

इमित्येतावन्मात्रं ज्ञायते ॥ ८८ ॥

मनोरक्षणम् ।

अन्तरेन्द्रियं मनः । तच्चोक्तमव ॥ ८९ ॥

प्रवृत्तिविकारः ।

प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्ममयी वाङ्मादिक्रिया । तस्या जगद्व्यवहारसाध-
कत्वात् ॥ ९० ॥

3

दोषलक्षणम् ।

दोषा रागद्वेषमाहा । राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः क्रोध इति यावत् ।
मोहो मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्यय इति यावत् ॥ ९१ ॥

प्रेत्यभावनिवृत्त्यपवादः ।

पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावे । स चात्मन भूतपूर्वदृष्टादिसंघातलाभः ॥ ९२ ॥

फललक्षणम् ।

फलं पुनर्भोगं सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारः ॥ ९३ ॥

and not only this much namely I am possessed of know-
ledge is known.

(89) Mind [is] the internal sense-organ. And that
has been already (evam) explained.

(90) Activity consisting of merit and demerit [is] the
operation of tongue etc because it brings about [all] trans-
actions in the world.

(91) Defects [are] attachment aversion and infatua-
tion. Attachment [is] desire aversion [is] irritation that
is anger infatuation [is] wrong knowledge that is mis-
apprehension.

(92) Transmigration [or] existence after death [i.e.
departing from here] [is] Rebirth. And it [is] the acquisition
of the aggregate of a new body etc.

(93) Fruit again [is] enjoyment the experience of
one or the other of pleasure and pain.

१ वागाद । २ पूर्वदेहिनिवृत्तिरूपं । ३ स तु सुखदुःखानुभवः ।

दुःसत्क्षणम् ।

पीडा दुःखम् । तद्योक्तमेव ॥ ९४ ॥

अपवर्गविचारः ।

मोक्षोऽपवर्गः । स चैकविंशतिप्रभेदभिन्नस्य दुःखस्यात्यन्तिकी
निवृत्तिः । एकविंशतिप्रभेदास्तु शरीरं पञ्चिन्द्रियाणि पञ्चविषया-
पञ्चबुद्ध्यः सुखं दुःखं चेति गौणमुख्यभेदात् । सुखं दुःखमेव दुःखानु-
पगत्यात् । अनुपगोऽवेनाभावः । स चायमुपचारो मधुनि विषसमुक्ते
मधुनोऽपि विषपक्षानिक्षेपवत् ।

स पुनरपवर्गः कथं भवति । उच्यते । शास्त्राद्विदितसमस्तपदार्थ-
तत्त्वस्य विषयदोषवदनेन विरक्तस्य मुमुक्षोर्ध्यायिनो ध्यानपरिपाक-
वशात् साक्षात्कृतात्मनः क्लेशहीनस्य निष्कामकर्मलिघ्नानावृणागत-
धर्माधर्मविनर्जयतः पूर्वोपात्तः च धर्माधर्मप्रचयं योगधिर्भ्रमायाद्

(94) Pain [is] suffering and that has been already explained

(95) Salvation [is] release [or emancipation] And it [is] the absolute cessation of pain divided into twenty one varieties The twenty one varieties being the primary and secondary divisions [are] —body, six sense-organs six objects of senses six cognitions [obtained through the six sense-organs] pleasure and pain Pleasure [is] pain itself being linked up with pain Being linked up [means] not being without And this [is] just a metaphorical application as when honey is mixed with poison honey also steps on to the side of poison

How again does that salvation take place ? We reply - In [the case of a person] who has realised the true nature of all categories through [the study of] authoritative text-books who has become disgusted [with the world] at the sight of the defects in the objects [of senses] [and hence] has become desirous of release [from Samsara] who has taken to meditation who has directly perceived the soul by virtue of the maturity [or perfection] of [his] meditation, who has been free from the afflictions who has not been

विदित्वा समाप्त्य भुञ्जानस्य पूर्वकर्मनिवृत्तौ चर्तमानशरीरा-
पगमेऽपूर्वशरीरारम्भमावाच्छरीराद्येकविंशतिद्वयसंबन्धो न भवति
कारणाभावात् । सेयमेकविंशतिप्रभेदमिन्द्रसहानिर्भोक्ष । सोऽप-
वर्गः ॥ १५ ॥

(३) संशयः ।

एकस्मिन् धर्मेण विरुद्धनानार्थधर्मसंशयः । स च त्रिविधः ।

तत्रैको विशेषादर्शने सति समानधर्मजः । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो
येति । एकस्मिन्नेव हि पुरोवर्तिनि द्वये स्थाणुत्वनिश्चायक वक्रकोटरा-
दिकं पुरुषत्वनिश्चायकं च शिर पाण्यादिक विशेषमपश्यत स्थाणुपुरु-
षयो समानधर्मसूक्ष्मेत्यादिकं च पश्यत पुरुषस्य भवति संशयः किमयं ६

acquiring any further merit or demerit owing to the perform-
ance of acts in a disinterested manner [or without a desire
for the fruit], who having known by the power of efficaci-
ous Yoga, the marks of merit and demerit acquired before,
has been enjoying [the fruit] thereof together, there does
not exist [any longer] on account of the absence of [any] cause,
connection with the twenty one sorts of pain, body, etc
owing to the absence of the production of a new body, on the
departure of the present body when the previous actions
have become extinct This the cessation of pain differen-
tiated owing to twenty-one divisions, [14] release [and] that,
[15] salvation

(16) Doubt [is] the consideration of many contradic-
tory things with reference to one [and the same] object
And it [is] of three kinds

The first [is that which is] caused by common qualities,
when the distinguishing features (*viseshak*) are not observed,
as for instance '[it may be] the trunk or a man' When
referring to one and the same substance near at hand [it
lying in front] a person does not see the distinguishing
features, crookedness, necks etc that would settle the nature
of a trunk, and head, hand etc that would settle the nature of
a man, but only sees the common quality between the trunk

१ हृदानीं सहायमाह । २ विशेषादर्शने सति समानधर्मदर्शनजो विप्रतिपत्तिजो-
साधारणधर्मजश्चेति ।

स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ।

द्वितीयस्तु संशयो विंशेपादर्शने सति विप्रतिपत्तिजः । स यथा ।
१ शब्दो नित्य उतानित्य इति । तथाहि । एको दृते शब्दो नित्य इति ।
अपरो दृते शब्दोऽनित्य इति । तयोर्विप्रतिपत्त्या मध्यस्थस्य पुंसो
विशेषमपश्यतो भवति संशयः किमयं शब्दो नित्य उतानित्य इति ।

- १२ तृतीयोऽसाधारणधर्मजस्तु संशयः । यथा नित्यादनित्याद्य
व्यावृत्तेन भूमाजासाधारणेन गन्धवत्त्वेन विशेषमपश्यतो भुवि
नित्यत्वानित्यत्वसंशयः । तथाहि । सकलनित्यव्यावृत्तेन गन्धवत्त्वेन
१५ योगाद्भूः किमनित्या उत सकलनित्यव्यावृत्तेन तेनैव योगान्नित्येति
संशयः ॥ ९६ ॥

and the man, tallness etc. there arises in him the doubt, namely, 'Is this a trunk or a man?'

The second [sort of] doubt, again [is that which is] caused by difference of opinion, when the distinguishing features are not observed. It [is] as follows — Whether sound [is] eternal or non eternal. To explain. One says, sound [is] eternal, another says, sound [is] non-eternal. Owing to the difference of opinion between them, in a neutral person not seeing any particularity [of sound, which would settle the question one way or the other] arises the doubt—'[Is] this sound eternal or non-eternal?'

The third [sort of] doubt [is] again [that which is] caused by a property peculiar [to the thing in question] as for instance, the doubt whether earth is eternal or non eternal in one not seeing any particularity [indicative either of *nityatva* or *anityatva*] owing to [the quality] being possessed of odour, which, excluded from eternal and non-eternal [things], is peculiar to earth alone. To explain. Doubt [arises] thus—Is earth non-eternal owing to [its] connection with 'being possessed of odour' which is excluded from all eternal [things], or is it eternal, owing to [its] connection with the same which is excluded from all non-eternal [things]?

(४) प्रयोजनम् ।

प्रयोजननिरूपणम् ।

येन प्रयुक्तः पुरुषः प्रवर्तते तत् प्रयोजनम् । तच्च सुखदुःखावाप्ति-^३
हानी । तदर्थं हि प्रवृत्तिः सर्वस्य ॥ १७ ॥

(५) दृष्टान्तः ।

दृष्टान्तनिरूपणम् ।

वादिप्रतियोगिनाः संप्रतिपत्तिविषयोऽर्थो दृष्टान्तः । स द्विविधः ।^३
एकः साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यथा धूमवत्त्वस्य हेतोर्महानसम् । द्वितीयस्तु
वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यथा तस्मैव हेतोर्महाह्व इति ॥ १८ ॥

(६) सिद्धान्तः ।

सिद्धान्तनिरूपणम् ।

प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । स चतुर्धा सर्वतन्त्रप्रति-^३
तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तभेदान् ।

(१७) Motive [is] that, prompted by which a man acts
And it [is] attainment and abandonment [respectively] of
pleasure and pain The activity of every body is indeed
intended for that

(१८) Instance [is] a topic with regard to which there
is agreement between both the disputants [the objector and
the siddhantin] It [is] of two kinds One [is] an instance
by similarity, as for instance, the kitchen, for the 'reason'
'being possessed of smoke' The other, again, [is] an
instance by dissimilarity, as for instance, the big pool, for
the same 'reason'

(१९) Tenet [is] a matter which has been admitted as
authorised [or proved by means of regular proofs] It [is]
of four kinds, being divided into—tenet admitted by all
systems, admitted by related systems, following from the
matter in question, provisional admission

तत्र सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तो यथा धर्मिमात्रसदभावः । द्वितीयो यथा नैयायिकस्य मते मनस इन्द्रियत्वम् । तद्धि समानतन्त्रे वैशेषिके सिद्धम् । तृतीयो यथा क्षित्यादिकर्तृसिद्धो कर्तुः सर्वतन्त्रम् । चतुर्थो यथा जैमिनीयस्य शब्दनित्यानित्यत्वाविचारे भवतु तावच्छब्दो गुण इति ॥ ११ ॥

(७) अवयवाः ।

अवयवनिरूपणम् ।

- ३ परार्थाहेतुमानवाक्यस्यैकदेशा अवयवाः । ते च प्रतिज्ञाद्वयः पञ्च । तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवा इति । तत्र साध्यधर्मविशिष्टधर्मिप्रतिपादकं वचनं प्रतिज्ञा । यथा पर्वतोऽयं वह्निमानिति ।

Of these, the tenet admitted by all systems [13] as for instance, the existence of an entity as such. The second [13] as for instance—according to the view of the Naiyayikas, the mind is a sense-organ and that is proved in the related Vaiśeṣika system. The third [13] as for instance, the omniscience of the creator, when the creator for the earth etc. is established. The fourth [13] as for instance, during the consideration as to whether [sound is] eternal or non-eternal [the admission] of a follower of Jaimini 'let then sound be a quality'.

(100) Members [of the syllogism] [are] the parts of a sentence [constituting a syllogism] in an inference for the sake of another. And they [are] five, statement etc. To the same effect [is] the Nyāya-sūtra 'Statement [or assertion of the proposition to be proved] reason, illustration, application and conclusion [are] the members.' [1 1 32]

Of these, Assertion [13] the statement propounding the subject as qualified by the attribute that is to be established, as for instance, This mountain [is] possessed of fire.

तृतीयान्तं पञ्चम्यन्तं वा लिङ्गप्रतिपादक वचन हेतुः । यथा धूम-
वत्त्वेन धूमवत्त्वादिति वा ।

सध्यात्मिकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । यथा यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽ
ग्निमान् यथा महानस इति ।

पक्षे लिङ्गोपसंहारवचनमुपनयः । यथा यद्विध्याप्यधूमवांश्चायमिति
तथा चायमिति वा ।

१२

पक्षे साध्योपसंहारवचनं निगमनम् । यथा तस्मादग्निमानिति
तस्मात् तथेति वा ।

एते च प्रतिज्ञाव्ययः पञ्चानुमानवाक्यस्यावयव इव अवयवा न ॥ १५
समयाधिकारणं द्वादश्याकाशसमवेतत्वादिति ॥ १८० ॥

(८) तर्कः ।

तर्कविचारः ।

तर्कोऽनिष्टप्रसंगः । स च भिन्नध्यात्मिकयोर्धर्मयोर्ध्याप्यादीकारेण ।

Reason [is] the statement laying down the indicative
mark, either in the instrumental or in the ablative [case] as
for instance ' by being possessed of smoke or from being
possessed of smoke '

Illustration [or example] [is] the statement of the in-
stance, along with the invariable concomitance as for
instance ' Whoever [is] possessed of smoke [is] possessed of
fire, as for instance, the kitchen

Application [is] the statement of the summing up of
[the presence of] the indicative mark in the subject, as for
instance, ' And this [is] possessed of smoke pervaded by fire '
or ' And this [is] so '

Conclusion [is] the statement of the summing up of
[the presence of] what is to be established in the subject,
as for instance, ' Therefore [it is] possessed of fire ' or
' Therefore [it is] so '

These five, assertion etc, members of the syllogism [are]
as though members [or parts] but not the intimate cause [
[of the syllogism], because sound [of which the syllogism
is formed] is in intimate relation with either

(१०१) Hypothetical reasoning [is the imposition of] an

;

अनिष्टत्यापकप्रसन्नरूप' ।

स चायं तर्कः प्रमाणानामनुयाहकः । तथाहि । पर्वतोऽयं साग्निरुता-
नग्निरितिसदेहानन्तरं यदि कश्चिन्मन्यतानग्निरयमिति तदा तं प्रति
यद्ययमनाग्निरमविष्यत् तदानग्निरत्वादधूमोऽप्यमविष्यदित्यधूमवत्त्वप्र-
सन्नं क्रियते । स एष प्रसंगस्तर्कः इत्युच्यते । अयं चानुमानस्य
विषयशोधकः प्रवर्तमानस्य धूमोत्पत्तिद्विकानुमानस्य विषयम-
ग्निरनुजानाति । अनाग्निरत्वस्य प्रतिक्षेपात् । अतः अनुमानस्य भवत्यनु-
याहक इति ।

१२ अत्र कश्चिदाह । तर्कः सशयः पचान्तर्भवतीति । तन्न । एककोटि-
विषयत्वात् तर्कस्य ॥ १०१ ॥

undesirable contingency [on the opponent] And it [is] of
the form of the contingency of [admitting] the undesirable
more extensive [or pervader] by 'admitting [for a moment]
the less extensive [or pervaded] out of two attributes between
which invariable concomitance has been established

And this hypothetical reasoning favours [or helps other]
proofs To explain If after the doubt whether this mountain
[is] with fire or without fire some one were to opine that
it is without fire then is made on him the imposition of the
undesirable contingency of [the mountain] being not posse-
ssed of smoke in the form If this [mountain] had been
without fire then on account of being without fire it would
have been without smoke also This above [imposition of an]
undesirable consequence is called Hypothetical reasoning
And it serves to clarify the conclusion of the inference and
supports fire the object of the inference which is launched-
having being possessed of smoke as the indicatory mark
because not being possessed of fire is refuted [or denied]
Therefore it favours the inference

Here some one says [or objects] Hypothetical reasoning
is included in doubt itself [We reply] It [is] not [so],
for hypothetical reasoning refers to only one end [or altern-
ative while doubt refers to two]

१ यथा यद्यत्र घनोऽभविष्यत् तर्हि मूलमिवाद्भवतो २ अथ च साध्य-
रूपाऽर्थो वर्तमानस्य तर्कस्य विषयः । नानाप्रसंगस्य

(९) निर्णयः ।

निर्णयनिरूपणम् ।

निर्णयोऽवधारणज्ञानम् । तच्च प्रमाणानां फलम् ॥ १०२ ॥

(१०) वादः ।

वादनिरूपणम् ।

तत्त्वबुभुत्सो कथा वाद् । स चाहनिग्रहाणामधिकरणम् । ते च
न्यूनाभिकापसिद्धास्ता हेत्यामासपञ्चक चेत्यष्टौ निग्रहा ॥ १०३ ॥

(११) जल्पः ।

जल्पनिरूपणम् ।

उभयसाधनपती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स च वथासम्य सर्वानि ३
ग्रहाणामधिकरणम् । परपक्षे कूपिते स्वपक्षस्थापनप्रयागाय
सान्द्य ॥ १०४ ॥

(१२) वितण्डा ।

वितण्डानिरूपणम् ।

स्वपक्षस्थापनाहीना वितण्डा । सा च परपक्षवृण्णमात्रप ३

(102) Conclusion [is] definite knowledge and it [is] the result [or fruit] of proofs.

(103) Discussion [is] the talk of one [with another] desirous of arriving at the truth. And it [is] the abode of eight grounds of confutation [or clinchers rebukes] The eight clinchers again [are] —deficiency redundancy deviation from a tenet and the five fallacious reasons

(104) Wrangling [is] the talk of [disputants] who are desirous of victory [over each other] containing arguments supporting both [the sides] And it [is] the abode of all clinchers according to circumstances And it concludes with the [statement of a] syllogism establishing one's own view after the view of the opponent has been demolished [or proved to be faulty]

(105) Cavilling [is *vijigī ukatha*] void of the establishment of one's own view And [it] concludes merely with the

यवसाना । नस्य वेताण्डिकस्य स्याप्य- पक्षोऽस्ति ।

कथा ॥ नानावचकपूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसंदर्भः ॥ १०१ ॥

(१३) हेत्वाभासाः ।

हेत्वाभासाः । असिद्धिविचारः ।

- ३ उक्तानां पक्षधर्मत्वादिरूपाणां मध्ये येन केनापि रूपेण हीना अहे-
तव । तेऽपि कतिपयहेतुरूपयोगाद्देतुवशाभासमाना हेत्वाभासाः । ते
चासिद्धिरुद्धानैकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिप्रभेदात् पक्षेय ।
- ६ अत्रोदयनेन दद्यात्तस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मतया प्रतीतिः सिद्धिस्तदभासोऽ-
सिद्धिरित्यासिद्धिलक्षणमुक्तम् । तच्च यद्यपि विरुद्धादिपि संभव
तीति सांकर्यं प्रतीयते तथापि यथा न सांकर्यं तथोच्यते । यो हि
१ यत्र साधने दोषः पुरः परिस्फुरति समर्थश्च दुष्टज्ञप्तौ स एव दुष्टज्ञप्ति-

demolishing of the opponent's view / There is no view of
his own, that is to be established, for a cavilling person.

Talk [or interlocution, disquisition] again, [is] a con-
sistent group of sentences, setting forth the two sides of a
question, for and against uttered by various persons

(106) The non reasons [are those] lacking in some cha-
racteristic or other, out of the characteristics ' being an
attribute of the subject ' etc, that have been mentioned [above]
They [are] also [called] fallacious reasons, looking like
reasons owing to [their] connection with some characteristics
of a reason . And they [are] only five, on account of the
[following] division,—the Unproven [or Futile, Uncertain],
the Contrary, the Inconclusive [or Non-cogent] the
Counter balanced [or Neutralised] and the Related [or
Annulled]

Here, Udayana has stated the definition of ' non-
proven nature as the absence of ' proven nature ' (or
reality, which =] the apprehension of the reason pervaded
[by the sadhya] as being the attribute of the subject . Now
though [some] confusion is felt as this [definition of
asiddhi] is possible even in [fallacious reasons] ' the
Contrary ' etc, still it is explained [below] how there
could be no confusion—That defect alone which flashes
up prominently [or first] in a reason and which is

एको दूषणमिति यावत् नान्य इति । तेनैव पुरोवत्कृतिर्केन दुष्टो
पितायां कथापर्यवसाने जाते तदुपजीविनोऽन्यस्यानुपयोगात् ॥२॥
या च सति यत्र विरोध साध्यविपर्यय-याप्त्याहयो दुष्टज्ञानिकारक
एव चिह्नो हेत्वाभास । एतं यत्र व्याभिचारादयस्तथाभूतास्तेऽ-
कान्तिकादयः । यत्र पुनर्व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताविशिष्टहृत्स्वरूपज्ञान्य ॥५॥
मयेन पूर्वोक्ता असिद्ध्यादयो दुष्टज्ञानिकारका दूषणानीति यावत्
तथाभूत सोऽसिद्ध ॥ १०६ ॥

आश्रयासिद्धविचार ।

स च त्रिविध आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्धव्याप्यत्वासिद्धभेदात् ।
तत्र यस्य हेतोरश्रयो नावगम्यते स आश्रयासिद्ध । यथा

sapable of producing the fallacious cognition is the cause
of the fallacious cognition that is a flaw and none else
And when by means of that alone which has flashed forth
prominently, has been apprehended the fallacy and [con-
sequently] the discussion has come to an end it is no use
pointing out another [defect] depending upon that Under
these circumstances that alone [is] the Contrary fallaci-
ous reason where the contradiction namely the invariable
concomitance with the reverse of what is to be established,
causes the fallacious apprehension Similarly where
[there flash forth] violation [of the invariable concomit-
ance] etc of that nature [the fallacies are] the Inconclusive
etc And where the unproven nature etc mentioned
above through the absence of cognition of the nature of the
reason characterised by invariable concomitance and being
an attribute of the subject [are] the cause of the fallacious
cognition that is [are] flaws that [fallacy is] the Un-
proven thus circumstanced

(107) And it [is] of three kinds on account of the
[following] division—Unproven in the support (or subject),
Unproven in [its] own nature and Unproven in invariable-
concomitance

Of them Unproven in the support [is] that reason the
support of which is not known as for instance

गगनारविन्दं सुरभिः । अरविन्दत्वात् । सरोजारविन्दवत् ।

अत्र हि गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्त्येव ।

६ अयमप्याश्रयासिद्धः ।

घटोऽनित्यः । कार्यत्वात् । पटवदिति ।

नन्वाश्रयस्य सत्त्वात् कार्यत्वादिति हेतुर्नाश्रयासिद्धः । सिद्धः

१ साधकस्तु स्यात् । सिद्धस्य घटानित्यत्वस्य साधनात् । भैवम् । न हि

स्वरूपेण कश्चिदाश्रयो भवत्यनुमानस्य किं तु संदिग्धधर्मस्त्येन ।

तथा चोक्तं भाष्ये नानुपलब्धे न निर्णयितव्यं न्यायः प्रवर्ततेऽपि

१२ तु संदिग्धे । न च घटोऽनित्यत्वसदेहोऽस्ति । अनित्यत्वस्य निश्चितत्वात् ।

The sky-lotus [is] fragrant

Because [it is possessed] of the generality of lotus-
like a lake-born lotus

Here, the sky-lotus [is] the support and that exists not
at all (*eva*)

This [the following] also is Unproven-in the support

The jar [is] non eternal

Because [it is] a product
like the cloth.

I say [says the objector]—The reason ‘Because [it is] a product [is] not unproven in the-support, owing to the existence of the support [the jar], [it] might however be [an instance of] proving what is [already] established, owing to [its] proving the non eternal nature of the jar, that is [already] established [We reply]—[Do] not [say] so For, nothing by its own nature becomes the support [or subject] in an inference, but only by being possessed of an attribute about which there is doubt To the same effect, has been said in the Bhasya [of Vatsyayana]—Reasoning operates neither in the case of an unperceived [or unknown or unheard-of] object, nor in the case of an object definitely ascertained but in the case of an object about which there is doubt There is to be sure, no doubt about the non eternal nature of the jar, the non eternal nature being definitely ascertained Therefore, though the jar exists in its own nature still owing to the absence of doubt

तेन यथापि स्वरूपेण घटो विद्यते तथाप्यनित्यत्वसंदेहाभावाभावा
अथ इत्याश्रयासिद्धत्वादहेतु ॥ १०७ ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धविचार । भागासिद्ध स्वरूपासिद्ध एव ।

स्वरूपासिद्धस्तु स उच्यते यो हेतुराश्रये नैवावगम्यते । यथा
सामान्यमनित्यम् । कृतकत्वात् ।

कृतकार्यं हेतुराश्रये सामान्यं नास्त्येव । भागासिद्धोऽपि स्वरूप
सिद्ध एव । यथा

पृथिव्यादयश्चाचारः परमाणवो नित्या । गन्धवत्त्वात् । इति ।

गन्धवत्त्वं हि पक्षीकृतेषु सर्वेषु नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तित्वात् । अत
एव भागे स्वरूपासिद्धः ॥ १०८ ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धभेदविचार ।

तथा विदोषणासिद्धविदोष्यासिद्धासमर्थविशेषणासिद्धासमर्थवि-

about [its] non eternal nature it can not be the support ■
[the hetu karyatva is] no reason owing to its being unprov-
en-in the support

(108) That reason is called Unproven in-its-own-nature,
which is not at all known [to exist] in the support, as
for instance,

Generality [is] non eternal

Because [it is] a product

[Here] the reason ' Being a product ' exi ts not at all
in [its] support, generality The partially unproven also [is]
unproven in-its-own-nature itself, as for instance,

The four, earth etc [of the form of] atoms [are]
eternal

Because [they are] possessed of odour

[Here] indeed ' being possessed of odour ' exists not in
all [atoms] that are made the subject [of the syllogism] on
account of its residing in earth alone. Therefore indeed
[it is] unproven in its own nature with regard to a part
[of the subject]

(109) Similarly [there are the following sub-] divisions
of Unproven-in-its-own-nature—Unproven-in-the-qualifi-
cation, Unproven-in-the-object Unproven-in-impotent-

• शेष्यासिद्धादयः स्वरूपासिद्धमेदाः ।

तत्र विशेषणासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्यः । द्रव्यत्वे सत्यस्पर्शवत्त्वात् ।

६ अत्र हि द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टमस्पर्शवत्त्वं हेतुर्नास्पर्शवत्त्वमात्रम् । शब्दे च द्रव्यत्वं विशेषणं नास्ति गुणत्वादतो विशेषणासिद्धः । न चासति विशेषणे द्रव्यत्वे तद्विशिष्टमस्पर्शवत्त्वमस्ति । विशेषणाभावे विशिष्टस्याप्यभावात् । यथा वृण्डमात्राभावे पुरुषाभावे वा वृण्डविशिष्टस्य पुरुषस्याभावः । तेन सत्यप्यस्पर्शवत्त्वे द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टस्य हेतोरभावात् स्वरूपासिद्धत्वम् ।

७२ विशेष्यासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्यः । अस्पर्शवत्त्वे सति द्रव्यत्वात् ।

qualification, Unproven-in-impotent-object, and others. Of them Unproven-in-the-qualification [13] as follows —

Sound [13] eternal

Because being a substance, [it is] not possessed of touch

Here, again 'not being possessed of touch, characterised by being a substance' [13] the reason [and] not 'being possessed of touch' only. Now (ca) the qualification 'being a substance' exists not in sound, on account of [sound] being a quality, hence [the hetu is] unproven-in-the-qualification. Not indeed, in the absence of the qualification 'being a substance,' can exist 'not being possessed of touch' characterised [or qualified] by it, because in the absence of the qualification, is there the absence of [the object] characterised [by it] also as for instance in the absence of the stick alone or in the absence of the man, ■ there the absence of the man qualified by the stick. Therefore even though 'not being possessed of touch' is there [there is] the nature of the unproven-in-its-own-nature owing to [in this case] the absence of the reason as qualified by 'being a substance'.

Unproven-in-the-object [13] as follows —

Sound [13] eternal

Because [it is] a substance, without being possessed of touch

अत्रापि विशिष्टो हेतुः । न च विशेष्याभावे विशिष्टं स्वरूपमस्ति ।

विशिष्टश्च हेतुर्नास्त्येव ।

१५

असमर्थविशेषणासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्यः । गुणत्वे सत्यकारणकत्वात् ।

अत्र हि विशेषणस्य गुणत्वस्य न किञ्चित् सामर्थ्यमस्ति । १६

विशेष्यस्याकारणकत्वस्येव नित्यत्वसाधने सामर्थ्यात् । अतोऽसमर्थ-
विशेषणता । स्वरूपासिद्धत्वं तु विशेषणाभावे विशिष्टस्याप्यभावात् ।

ननु विशेषणं गुणत्वं तच्च शब्देऽस्त्येव तत् कथं विशेषणाभावात् । २१

सत्यम् अस्त्येव गुणत्वम् । किं तु न तद्विशेषणम् । तदेव हि हेतुर्विशेषणं
ममति यद्व्यवस्थितं तदेव प्रयोजनयत् । गुणत्व तु निव्ययोजनमतोऽ-
समर्थमित्युक्तमेव ।

२४

Here also there [is] a qualified reason. Not indeed in the absence of the object can there be [its] qualified form. So the qualified reason exists not at all.

Unproven-in-impotent qualification [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because, being a quality, [it] has no cause

Here, again, the qualification 'being a quality' has no potency whatsoever, the qualified 'having no cause' alone, being potent to prove the eternal nature [of sound]. Therefore, [there is] the impotency of the qualification, the character of unproven-in-its-own-nature, [is] again [there], because in the absence of the qualification, is there the absence also of the object characterised [by it] [say (says the objector)] — The qualification [is] 'being a quality,' and it, to be sure, exists in sound, so how [can you say that there is] the absence of the qualification? We reply—True [what you say] there is, undoubtedly (ev), 'being a quality' [in sound], but that [is] not a qualification. For that alone becomes a qualification of the reason, which serves the purpose in so far as it excludes others, while, it has been already said that 'being a quality' serves no purpose [and] so, [is] impotent.

१ अतोऽसमर्थविशेषण स्वरूपासिद्धः । विशेषणाभावे ।

असमर्थविशेष्यो यथा तत्रैव तद्वेपरीत्येन प्रयोगः । तथाहि ।

शब्दा नित्यः । अकारणकत्वे सति गुणत्वात् ।

- २७ अत्र तु विशेषणमात्रस्यैव नित्यत्वसाधने समर्थत्वाद् विशेष्यस्य समर्थम् । स्वरूपासिद्धत्वं तु विशेष्याभावे विशिष्टाभावाद् विशिष्टस्य च हेतुत्वेनोपादानात् । शेषः पूर्ववत् ॥ १०९ ॥

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धविचारः ।

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्तु स एव यत्र हेतोर्व्याप्तिर्नावगम्यते । स द्विविधः ।

- १ एकसाध्येनासहचरितः । अपरस्तु सोपाधिकसाध्यसद्वन्धी ।

तत्र प्रथमो यथा

यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम् यथा जलधरः ।

- ६ सञ्च धिवादास्पदीभूतः शब्दादिरिति ।

अत्र शब्दादिपक्षस्तस्य क्षणिकत्वसाध्यः सत्त्वं हेतुः । न चास्य

Unproven in impotent object [is] as for instance in the same [matter] the syllogism by the reverse To explain Sound [is] eternal

Because [it is] a quality without having a cause

Here again only the qualification alone being potent to prove the eternal nature the object [or the qualified is] impotent [There is] again the character of unproven in its own nature because in the absence of the object is the absence of the [something] qualified and [something] qualified has been accepted as the reason The rest as before

(110) Unproven in invariable-concomitance again [is] that alone where the invariable concomitance is not apprehended from the reason It [is] of two kinds —The one [is] that which is not concomitant with what is to be established the other again [is that] which is connected with what is to be established by means of an adventitious circumstance.

Of them the first [is] as follows —

What exists is momentary as for instance the cloud.

And sound etc that form the matter under dispute exist.

Here sound etc [are] the subject momentariness what is to be established and existence the reason And there

हेतोः क्षणिकत्वेन सह व्याप्तो प्रमाणमस्ति ।

इदानीमुपाधिसहिता व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः प्रदर्श्यते । तद्यथा

स इयाम् । मेत्रीतनयत्वात् ।

परिदृश्यमानमेत्रीतनयस्तोमवत् ।

अत्र मेत्रीतनयत्वेन श्यामत्वं साध्यते । न च मेत्रीतनयत्वं श्यामत्वे प्रयोजकं किं तु शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम एवात्र प्रयोजकः । प्रयोजकशोपा-
धेरुच्यते । अतो मेत्रीतनयत्वस्य इयामन्वेन सन्नन्धे शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम
लोपाधिः । यथा वा अग्नेर्धूमसन्नन्ध आर्द्रमन्धनसदीमः । अतः
रयोपाधिसन्नन्धाद् व्याप्तिर्नास्तीति व्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽयं मेत्री-
तनयत्वादिहेतुः ।

तथा परीऽपि दद्यादश्वत्वासिद्धः । यथा

is no proof for the invariable concomitance of this reason
with momentariness

Now is illustrated the unproven in invariable concomi-
tance, accompanied by a limitation It is as follows —

He is black

Because he is a son of Maitri

like the group of Maitri's sons that are being
seen

Here being black is established by means of being a
son of Maitri Not indeed is being a son of Maitri the
producing factor in respect of being black but the [pecu-
liar] effect of food such as vegetables etc alone is the pro-
ducing factor And the producing factor [which produces
the particular effect] is termed the limitation [or condition]
Therefore in [the case of] the relation of the state of Maitri's
son with blackness the peculiar effect of food such as vege-
tables etc alone is the limitation Or in the [case of the]
relation of fire with smoke the contact with wet fuel is the
limitation So therefore this reason being Maitri's son etc
is unproven in invariable-concomitance because there is no
invariable concomitance owing to [its] connection with
the limitation

Similarly another also is unproven in invariable-con-
comitance [It is] as follows —

ऋत्वन्तर्वर्तिनी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनम् । हिंसात्वात् ।

ऋतुवाह्यहिंसायत् ।

२१ अत्रापि न हिंसात्वमधर्मं प्रयोजकं किं ॥ निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिरिति पूर्ववदुपाधिसद्भावाद् व्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽयं हिंसात्वं हेतुः ।

ननु साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापको यः स उपाधिरित्युपाधिलक्षणम् । तच्च निषिद्धत्वे नास्ति । तत् कथं निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिरिति । मैवम् । निषिद्धत्वेऽप्युपाधिलक्षणस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । तथाहि । साध्यस्य अधर्मजनकत्वस्य व्यापकं निषिद्धत्वम् । यत्र यत्राधर्मः २७ साधनत्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति निषिद्धत्वस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । न च यत्र यत्र हिंसात्य तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वं ऋत्यङ्गहिंसाया

The killing existing inside a sacrifice [is] the means of demerit

Because [it] has the nature of killing like the killing outside sacrifices

Here also, the nature of killing' is not the producing cause of demerit but 'being prohibited' [by the Sastra²] [which is] the limitation and so this reason 'the nature of killing owing to the existence of the limitation, as before [is] unproven in-invariable-concomitance

I say [says the objector]—Limitation [or accident is that] which while pervading the thing to be established [that is while being invariably present in all those places where the sadhya is present] does not pervade the reason [that is, is not invariably present with the reason] this [is] the definition of limitation And that exists not in [that is, is not applicable to] 'being prohibited' So, how can 'being prohibited' be the limitation? [We reply—Do] not [say] so, because the definition of limitation is applicable to [it present in] 'being prohibited.' To explain 'Being prohibited pervades what is to be established [namely] 'being the producer of demerit' Wherever [there is] 'being the means of demerit' there surely [is] 'being prohibited'—thus 'being prohibited' does exist But not wherever [there is] 'the nature of killing' there [is] necessarily 'being prohibited,' on account of the violation [of the vyāpti] with respect to

व्यभिचारात् । अस्ति हि कृत्वद्बहिर्द्विषायां हिंसात्वं न तु निषिद्ध-
त्वमिति ।

३०

तदेवं त्रिविधोऽसिद्धो दर्शितः ॥ ११० ॥

विरुद्धविचारः ।

संप्रति विरुद्धः कथ्यते । साध्यविपर्ययवाप्तौ हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा

शक्नोति नित्यः । कृतकत्वात् ।

३

अत्र हि नित्यत्वं साध्यं तद्विपर्ययेण चाभिव्यक्तत्वेन कृतकत्वं
व्याप्यम् । यतो यद्यत् कृतकं तत्तत् सहस्रनित्यमेव । अतः साध्य-
विपर्ययवाप्तत्वात् कृतकत्वं हेतुर्विरुद्धः ॥ १११ ॥

१

अनैकान्तिकविचारः ।

साध्यसंशयहेतुरनैकान्तिकः सध्यविचार इति धोष्यते । स द्विविधः ।

साधारणानैकान्तिकोऽसंभारणानैकान्तिकश्चाति ।

३

तत्र प्रथमं पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः । यथा

the killing [which forms] a part of the sacrifice For,
there is the nature of killing in the killing [which forms]
a part of the sacrifice but there exists not being prohibited
there

Thus has been pointed out the Unproven of three kind.
(111) Now is described the [fallacious reason] Contrary
Contrary [is] the reason [which is] invariably associated
with [or pervaded by] the reverse of what is to be establish-
ed. [It is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because of [its] being a product

Ifere again eternal nature [is] what is to be established,
[and] being a product [the reason is] pervaded by non-eter-
nality, the reverse of it [the sadhya] because whatever [is] a
product, all that indeed [is] non-eternal only Therefore, the
reason being a product owing to [its] being pervaded by
the reverse of what is to be established [is] the Contrary

(112) That reason which produces doubt about what is
to be established [is] call'd the inconclusive or the Discrep-
ant It [is] of two kind- namely, too-wide Inconclusive, and
too narrow inconclusive

Of them the first [is that] which exists in the subject,
in similar instances, and in dissimilar instances [It is]
as follows —

१ स्वकल हेतु ।

शब्दो नित्यः । प्रमेयत्वात् ।

१६ अत्र प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः पक्षे शब्दे सपक्षे नित्ये व्योमादौ विपक्षे चानित्ये घटादौ विद्यते । सर्वस्यैव प्रमेयत्वात् । तस्मात् प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः साधारणा नैकान्तिकः ।

१७ असाधारणानैकान्तिकश्च स एव यः सपक्षविपक्षभ्याम् व्यावृत्तः पक्ष एव वर्तते । यथा

भूर्नित्या । गन्धयत्त्वात् ।

१८ अत्र हि गन्धयत्त्वं हेतुः । स च सपक्षाधित्याद् व्योमादेर्विपक्षाच्चानित्याज्जलादेर्व्यावृत्तो गन्धयत्त्वस्य पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तित्वादिति ।

व्यभिचारस्तु लक्ष्यते । संभवत्सपक्षविपक्षस्य हेतोः सपक्षवृत्तित्वे

१९ सति विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिरेव नियमो गमकत्वात् । तस्य च साध्यविपरी

Sound [is] eternal

Because [it is possessed] of knowability

Here, the reason, 'knowability' exists in the subject, sound, in similar instances, eternal [things such as] sky etc, and in dissimilar instances, non-eternal [things, such as] a jar etc, because every thing without exception is knowable. Therefore, the reason, 'knowability' [is] too-wide Inconclusive

८ The too narrow Inconclusive, again, [is] that alone which, excluded from similar instances [and] dissimilar instances, exists in the subject alone. [It is] as follows:—

Earth [is] eternal

Because [it is] possessed of odour

Here again, 'being possessed of odour' [is] the reason. And it [is] excluded from similar instances, eternal [things, such as] sky etc, and from dissimilar instances, non-eternal [things, such as] water etc, because 'being possessed of odour' exists only in earth.

Violation is now defined. The rule [is] that in the case of a reason for which [both] similar instances and dissimilar instances are possible, there should be exclusion only from dissimilar instances, while there is presence in similar instances,

१ पक्षे वर्तमान सपक्षे नित्ये विपक्षे चानित्ये वर्तते । २ नियमासम्बन्धे सपक्षविपक्षवृत्ते, हेतोः ।

ताव्याप्तस्य तन्नियमाभावो व्यभिचारः । स च द्वेषा संसृतिं सपक्ष-
विपक्षयोर्वृत्तौ ताव्यां व्यावृत्तौ च ॥ ११० ॥

प्रकरणसमाविचारः ।

यस्य प्रतिपक्षभूतं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स प्रकरणसमः । स एव सप्र-
पक्ष इति शोच्यते । तद्यथा

शब्दोऽनित्यो नित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः ।

शब्दो नित्योऽनित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः इति ।

अत्र हि साध्यविपरीतसाधकं समानचलमनुमानानन्तरं प्रतिपक्ष-
स्तुच्यते । यः पुनरतुल्यबलो न स प्रतिपक्षः । तथाहि ।

विपरीतसाधकानुमानं भिविधं सयति । उपजीव्यमुपजीवकमनुमयं
चेति ।

as [then it] enables [us] to arrive at a conclusion The ab-
sence of that rule [in the case of a reason] not pervaded by
the reverse of what is to be established [is] violation And it
is possible in two ways— when [the rule on] exists in [both]
similar instances and dissimilar instances [and] when [it
is] excluded from both [these]

(113) That [reason] which has another reason which
has become a rival [is] the Ambiguous [or Neutralised or
Stultified] The same is also called the Counter balanced
[or possessed of a rival] It [is] as follows—

Sound [is] non-eternal

Because of [our] not finding [in it] qualities of
eternal [things]

[and]

Sound [=] eternal

Because of [our] not finding [in it] non eternal
qualities

Here again, another inference of equal efficacy, proving
the reverse of what is to be established is called ' a rival ' .
But that [he] which is not of equal efficacy [is] not ' a
rival ' To explain —

An inference proving the reverse [of the *sādhya*] is of
three kinds — that on which is dependent [the other in-
ference, that is, the strong one], that which depends on the

- तत्राद्य बाधक वदवत्त्वात् । यथा अनित्य परमाणुर्भूतत्वाद्
 घटवदित्यस्य परमाणुसाधकानुमान नित्यत्वं साधयदपि न प्रतिपक्षः ।
 १२ किं तु बाधकमेवोपजीव्यत्वात् । तच्च धर्मिमाहकत्वात् । न हि प्रमाणे
 नागृह्यमाणे धर्मिणि परमाणावनित्यत्वानुमाननिदः सम्भवति । आश्रया
 सिद्धे । अतोऽनेनानुमानेन परमाणुमाहकस्य प्रामाण्यमप्यनुज्ञातम् ।
 १५ अन्यथा अस्योदयासमग्रात् । तस्मादुपजीव्य बाधकमेव ।
 उपजीवक तु दुर्धलत्वाद्वाध्यम् । यथा इदमेवानित्यत्वानुमानम् ।
 दुर्तीथ तु सत्प्रतिपक्षः समञ्जलत्वात् ॥ ११३ ॥

other [that is the weak one] and that which [is] neither

Of them the first [is] stultifying [or rendering nugatory] on account of [its] being strong as for instance

An atom [is] non eternal

Because [it is] possessed of corporeality [or tangible form]

like a jar

—this inference establishing [the existence of] the atom though proving [its] eternal nature is not [to be regarded as] the rival of this [the above inference] but [it is] the stultifying [reason] itself because on it depends [the above inference] and that such because it makes [us] apprehend the object [namely the atom] Surely this inference [intended to prove] the non eternal nature is not possible with respect to the object the atom which is not apprehended by means of a proof owing to the character of unproven in-support [in that case] Therefore by this inference is admitted the validity as well of that which makes [us] apprehend the atom otherwise it [itself] could not arise Therefore that on which depends the other [is] the stultifying itself

That which depends on the other [is] on the other hand the stultified on account of its weakness as for instance this same inference [intended to prove] the non eternal nature

The third [kind] again [is] one having a rival being of equal strength

कालात्ययापदिष्टविचारः । लक्षणदोषविचारः ।

यस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन पक्षे साध्याभावः परिच्छिन्नः स कालात्य-
यापदिष्टः । स एव बाधितविषय इत्युच्यते । यथा

अग्निरनुष्णः । कृतकत्वात् । जलवत् ।

अत्र कृतकत्वं हेतुः । तस्य च यत् साध्यमनुष्णत्वं तस्याभावः
प्रत्यक्षेणैव परिच्छिन्नः । त्वग्निन्द्रियेणाग्नोरनुष्णत्वपरिच्छेदात् ।

तथा परोऽपि कालात्ययापदिष्टः । यथा घटस्य क्षणिकत्वे साध्ये
शशुक्तं सत्त्वं हेतुः । तस्यापि च यत् साध्यं क्षणिकत्वं तस्याभावोऽ-
क्षणिकत्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रत्यक्षेण परिच्छिन्नम् । स एवायं घटो यो
मया पूर्वमुपलब्ध इति प्रत्यभिज्ञया पूर्वानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृते-

(114) That [reason] where the absence [or negation] of
what is to be established is ascertained in the subject by
[a more powerful] proof, perception etc [is called]
the Belated [it stated or adduced when the fit time for
it has passed away, or rejected owing to the lapse of
proper time] The same is called [the reason] the object
of which is contradicted [or refuted, annulled], as for
instance,

Fire [is] not-hot.

Because [it is] produced

like water

Here, 'being produced' [is] the reason That which is
to be established by it [viz.] coolness, the negation of that
has been ascertained by perception itself, because by the
sense of touch, is fire ascertained to be possessed of hot-ness

Similarly another [sort of reason] also [is] the Belated,
as for instance, when the transitoriness of the jar
is to be established, the reason 'being existent' mentioned
above In the case of that [reason] also, that which is
to be established, [namely] momentariness, the negation of
that, [namely] non-momentariness is ascertained by percep-
tion leading to recollection. This [is] the same jar
which had been apprehended by me before—by recollec-
tion in this form arising from the sense-organ helped by im-
pressions produced by former apprehension, is ascertained

न्द्रियप्रभवया पूर्वापरकालाकलनया घटस्य स्यादित्यपरिच्छेदादिति ।
 १२ एते चासिद्धादयः पञ्च हेत्वाभासा यथाकथंचित् पक्षधर्मत्वाद्यन्य
 तमरूपहीनत्वादहेतवः स्वसाध्यं न साधयन्तीति ।

येऽपि लक्षणस्य केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतोस्त्रयो दोषा अव्याप्त्यतिव्या
 ५ प्त्यसंभवास्तेऽप्यत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति न तु ते पञ्चभ्योऽधिकाः । तथाहि ।

असिद्ध्यापि न व्यप्यत्वासिद्धिः । विपक्षमाश्रादध्यावृत्तत्वात् सोपाधि
 क्त्याञ्च । यथा गोलक्षणस्य पशुत्वस्य । गोत्वे हि सास्नादिमत्त्वम्
 १८ प्रयोजकं न ॥ पशुत्वम् ।

तथा अव्याप्तिर्भागासिद्धत्वम् । यथा गोलक्षणस्य शाबलेयत्वस्य ।
 एवमतमयोऽपि स्वरूपासिद्धिः । यथा गोलक्षणस्येकश
 २१ फत्वस्येति ॥ ११४ ॥

the continuing [or permanence] of the jar, through the consi-
 deration of former and later time

These five fallacious reasons Unproven etc [are] no
 [valid] reasons because they do not prove what is to be
 established by them, owing to [their] being void of some
 one of the characteristics, 'being an attribute of the subject'
 etc in some way or other

The three faults also of definition [which is] a purely
 negative reason [namely] being too narrow being too
 wide and being impossible, are comprised here too, they are
 not indeed (tu) over and above the five To explain

Being too wide [is] being unproven in invariable-con-
 comitance, on account of [the hetu] not being excluded from
 all (mūtra) di- similar instances or on account of [its] being
 possessed of a limitation, as for instance 'being a beast'
 [as] the peculiar attribute of a cow For being possessed
 of a dew lap etc is the producing cause with respect to cow-
 ness but not 'being a beast'

In the same way, being too narrow [is] being partly-
 unproven as for instance [the hetu] being variegated [as]
 the peculiar attribute of a cow

Likewise being impossible too [is] being unproven
 in its own nature, as for instance, [the hetu] having undi-
 vided hoofs [as] the peculiar attribute of a cow

(१४) छलम् ।

छलविचारः ।

अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य शब्दस्यार्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य दूषणाभिधानं छलम् । यथा नवकम्बलोऽयं देवदेत्त इति वाक्ये नूतनाभिप्रायेण प्रयुक्तस्य नवशब्दस्यार्थान्तरमाशङ्क्य कश्चिद् दूषयति । नास्य नव कम्बला सन्ति वृद्धिश्चात् । न ह्यस्य ह्ययमपि संभाव्यते कुतो नवेति । स च वादी छलवाचितया ह्रियते ॥ ११५ ॥

(१५) जातयः ।

जातिनिरूपणम् ।

असङ्गत्तर जातिः । सा चोत्कर्षसमापकर्षसमादिभेदेन बहुविधा । विस्तराभिया नेह कृत्स्नोच्यते ।

तत्राव्याप्तेन दृष्टान्तगतधर्मेण पक्षे अयापरुधर्मस्वापादनम्

(115 / Perversion [is] the pointing out of defect after having [deliberately] imagined another sense for a word which has been used [by the opponent] to convey a different idea, [it is] as follows In the sentence 'This Devadatta has a new blanket,' some one taking for granted another sense for the word 'nava' used to convey the idea of 'new' finds fault [with it as follows]—He has no new blankets, because he is poor, surely not even two could he possibly have, how [then] nine? Such a disputant is known as one who uses perversion in discussions

(116) Futility [is] futile rejoinder It [is] manifold [having twenty four varieties] through the division into Utkar-asama Apakar-asamā etc [It] is not fully (kṛtsnā) dealt with here, for fear of prolixity

There, Utkar-asama [variety of] futility [is] the attributing of a non pervading attribute to the subject, on the strength of the attribute belonging to an instance, which is

६ उत्कर्षसमा जाः । यथा

शब्दोऽनित्यः । कृतकत्वात् । घटवत् ।

इत्युक्ते कश्चिदेवमाह यदि कृतकत्वेन हेतुना घटवच्छब्दोऽनित्यः

१ स्यात् तर्हि तेनैव हेतुना तद्वदेव शब्दः सावयवोऽपि स्यात् ।

अपकर्षसमा तु दृष्टान्तगतेन घर्मेणाद्याप्तेनाद्यापकस्य धर्माभावः

स्यापादनम् । यथा पूर्वस्मिन् प्रयोगे कश्चिदेवमाह यदि कृतकत्वेन

१२ हेतुना घटवच्छब्दोऽनित्यः स्यात् तर्हि तेनैव हेतुना घटवदेव हि शब्दः
आवयवोऽपि न स्यात् । न हि घटः आवयव इति ॥ ११६ ॥

(१६) निग्रहस्थानानि ।

निग्रहस्थाननिरूपणम् ।

३ पराजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । तच्च न्यूनाधिकापसिद्धान्तार्थान्तरा-

not invariably concomitant [with the hetu] As for instance, when it is stated,

Sound [is] non-eternal
Because [it is] produced
like a jar

some one would argue thus—If through the reason 'being produced' sound would be non eternal like a jar, then by means of the same reason, exactly like it [the jar], would sound be possessed of parts also

Apakarsasamā [variety of] futility [is] the attributing of the negation of a non pervading attribute, on the strength of the attribute belonging to an instance, which is not invariably concomitant [with the hetu] As for instance, referring to the former syllogism, some one thus argues—If through the reason 'being produced' sound would be non-eternal, like a jar, then by means of the same reason, like the jar itself, sound would not be audible as well For, surely the jar [is] not audible

(११७) Occasion for reproof [is] what leads to defeat. Although it [is] of various kinds, on account of the division into deficiency, redundancy, deviation from a tenet, a new object

१ पूर्वस्मिन्नेवानुमाने ।

प्रतिभामतानुज्ञाविरोधादिभेदाद्बहुविधमपि विस्तरमयाज्ञेह कृत्स्न
मुच्यते ।

यद्विवक्षितार्थे किञ्चिदूनं तन्न्यूनम् । विवक्षितार्थे किञ्चिदधिकं ६
तदधिकम् । सिद्धान्तादपध्वसोऽपसिद्धान्तः । प्रकृतेनानभिसवन्धाथ
यच्चनमर्थान्तरम् । उत्तरापत्तिरूपार्तिरप्रतिभा । पराभिमतस्यार्थस्य
स्यप्रतिकूलस्य स्वयमेवाभ्यनुज्ञान स्वीकारो मतानुज्ञा । इष्टार्थभङ्गो ९
विरोधः ।

इहात्यन्तमुपयुक्तानां स्वरूपभेदेन भूयो भूयः प्रतिपादनम् । यदन
तिप्रयोजन तदलक्षणमदोषाय । एतावतीव बालद्युत्पत्तिसिद्धे ॥११७॥ १२

इति श्रीकेशवमिश्रविरचिता तर्कभाषा समाप्ता ।

[or digression], fatuity consent [to the opponent's view]
[self-] contradiction etc [it] is not fully dealt with here for
fear of prolixity

That [is] deficiency when in a matter intended to be
set forth something [is] wanting that [is] redundancy when
in a matter intended to be set forth something [is] more
[than required] deviation from a tenet [is] backing out of
the tenet digression [is] the statement of an object not
connected with the matter in hand fatuity [is] absence of
inspiration to give an answer [to the opponent] consent to
the view [is] approval acceptance of one's own accord of
the matter sponsored by the opponent and opposed to one's
own view contradiction [is] rejecting the desired view

Here [in this treatise] there is treatment again and
again of most useful [or important matters] in their nature
and varieties that what is not most serviceable is not
defined, is no fault By so much only is accomplished the
training of beginners

End of the Exposition of Reasoning
composed by Kesavamisra

Notes

(1) It is a curious, and altogether inexplicable fact that Kesavamisra begins his work without any Mangalasloka, against the established practice among Sanskrit writers not to begin a work without a verse or verses in honour of some deity, preceptor etc

Sanskrit writers are very touchy on the question of the efficacy of such Mangala verses and cases where the Mangala has failed to be effective are often explained away in a very fantastic manner! Thus, in the case of a work which has been successfully brought to an end even in the absence of a Mangala verse, it is argued that the writer must have paid his homage to the gods in his mind or in some other way (प्र-याद् बहिः), and if a work is left unfinished even though the Mangala is there, it is pointed out that the non-completion of the work was probably due to some other potent Dosas in the writer! But no word is to be uttered against the efficacy of the Mangala as such! Read the following comments of the Tarka dipika about the efficacy and necessity of the Mangala, which are so often quoted ननु महत्त्वस्य समानि साधनानि नास्ति । महत्त्वं ह्येतेषु कादाचनवादी सत्यान्वेषणात् महत्त्वमात्रेऽपि शिष्टाण्युपादौ समानि दर्शनाद-वयमपि निरूपयामि चापि नास्ति चेत् । कादाचनवादी शिष्टाण्युपादान-मात्रमात्र । किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारानु वेतयन्तेरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथाहि । महत्त्वं वेदेषु धन-मूर्त-मन्यमानं अहं किंवादिगीतशिक्षायात्वात् विद्यमानं । दर्शयितुं । मोक्षमात्रे व्यभिचारवात्तयाया लौकिकेति । शत्रिबाह्यादौ व्यभिचारवात्तयाया विद्यमानं । शिष्टेषु श्रुत्यायम् । न कृत्वा किमकल सम इति जलनादमात्रेऽपि विविद्धमात्रेति ॥


बालेऽपि—यान here means a beginner, one who has not studied the व्यापशास्त्र, but has studied शास्त्रम्, व्यास्य etc. and is thus fit to comprehend the व्यापशास्त्र, for instance, the Intermediate Arts or II A student! प्रवृत्तप्राणवदुक्तं न नृत्तनयम् । अर्थात् प्रारम्भका-परोक्षानधीन-व्यापशास्त्रम् । Kesavamisra says that his work is mainly intended for beginners who would not be able to grasp the more ponderous and difficult treatises on व्यापशास्त्र. He has no idea what over of trying conclusions with the great masters of व्यापशास्त्र. His is a very humble mission, that of initiating the beginner into the vast domain of व्यापशास्त्र अहोय युनेन-युन at bearing, study Kesavamisra means to say that he has tried to make the subject so easy to understand that even a beginner who is lazy by nature, need not work very hard to master it सक्षिप्तपुन्यमन्त्रिनं may be explained in a number of ways—(1) सक्षिप्ता च पुन्यमन्त्रिना च (युक्ति-arguments, reasoning), (2) सक्षिप्तपुन्यमन्त्रिना अनन्तरा (where सक्षिप्त goes with युक्ति), (3) सक्षिप्तपुन्य च अनन्तरा च (अनन्तरा consistent); (4) सक्षिप्तपुन्य as an adv, and अनन्तरा as voc singular (O wise

one) ननुपक्ष-नक्षत्रे परिपाद्यते इति ननु प्रमाणविषयपक्षार्थं (in explaining नक्षत्रपक्ष, the Dharma explains नक्षत्र as द्रव्यादिस्तत्रपक्षार्थं) ते पक्षपक्षे अत्र इति or नक्षत्रार्थं प्रायः (exposition) and then metaphorically, the work containing such an exposition or ननु might simply mean 'logical reasoning'. In section 101, ननु is used in the sense of argument by reductio-ad-absurdum method.


(2) प्रमाणपक्षे - This is the first sūtra of the Nyayasūtras of Gaṇama Aksapada the traditional founder of the Nyaya system (see Introduction). The sixteen padārthas or topics mentioned therein are expounded in detail, one by one in the text. Though Rāsaṅgama belongs to the Syncretist school and so tries to reconcile the two systems, Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika, it is clear that he is by inclination a Naiyāyika, from the fact that he begins his work, by quoting the Nyayasūtra. On the other hand Śaṅkara (the author of the Saptasūtra) Annambhūta (the author of the Tarkasamgraha) also of the Syncretist school, are Vaiśeṣikas and so begin their works by quoting the padārthas or categories from the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (Lane 2).—ननुपक्षानाम् - It is a characteristic of the Hindus that all their activities are directed towards the one goal of securing Salvation, and all systems are agreed that Mokṣa can come only from Jñāna (though they differ as to the nature of this Jñāna and the means of securing it). A modern student would naturally be puzzled to know that the study of logic or physics is to secure salvation for him (see section 93, where the author tells what Mokṣa is and how it is secured) (Lane 3).—तु मयः विगतम् अत्र अत्रात्—beyond which there is no further good the highest bliss, salvation (Lane 4).—पक्षः—The word is used here in the sense of 'a topic'. In section 47, it is used in its technical sense of categories or knowable things which are six or seven, according to the Vaiśeṣikas.

लक्षण is usually translated as 'definition'. This is not strictly correct, लक्षण does not point out the thing to be defined but to the differentia or the peculiar characteristic possessed by the thing alone and which is not common (असाधारण) to others. लक्षण thus more accurately means 'differentia', but as the word 'definition' is more easily understandable, and as the Nyaya and Vaisesika writers themselves are often loose in their use of this term (see section 9, line 16, where गुणधर्म is said to be द्रव्यलक्षणम्, instead of गुणधर्मवत्), we have generally translated लक्षण as 'definition' unless the context requires the more accurate sense. It is obvious that an accurate definition must refer only to the द्रव्य it must neither refer to things which have no right to be included therein, nor exclude things that deserve to be included. In other words a definition must not be too wide or too narrow. Section 114 mentions the three faults to which a definition is liable, viz असंक्षिप्त (being too narrow), अनिश्चित (being too wide) and असम्भवं (impossibility).

An illustration would make this clear. Suppose, we want to define a cow and वद्व्य is proposed as the लक्षण. Now as the cow is a वद्व्य, it undoubtedly possesses वद्व्य but वद्व्य is also found in horses, buffaloes, etc. which are all वद्व्य but not cows. Thus the लक्षण, वद्व्य, is too wide, possessing the द्रव्य of अने वद्व्य.



If we give रुवेद as the लक्षण, it would be seen that the definition becomes अक्षिप्त or too narrow as all cows that are not रुवेद would be thereby excluded.



(कपिलम् may also be regarded as अति-वात्त on the ground that कपिलत्व belongs to objects other than cows, but what strikes us here most is the अव्याप्ति Secondly, अतिव्याप्ति strictly speaking implies that the लक्षण covers the लक्ष्य completely and in addition extends to other objects Here कपिलम् does not cover the whole of the लक्ष्य at all, hence it is properly a case of अव्याप्ति)

If the लक्षण is एकशकत्व (having one hoof that is, undivided hoof), the दोष is असम्बन्ध, as all cows without exception have no एकशकत्व




साम्नाविमर्श is a correct definition of गौ as साम्ना (dew lap) is possessed by a cow and cow alone Or to take a more familiar instance If we define 'a college student as 'one who is studying in the Vernacular fourth standard' the definition has obviously the fault of असम्बन्ध, if the definition is amended as 'who visits the cinema-shows, there is the fault of अतिव्याप्ति, as there are thousands other than college students who visit the cinema shows, the definition 'a college student is a University student who plays cricket' is असम्बन्ध as those who play other games are excluded thereby A correct definition would be—A college-student is one who after passing the entrance examination to the University, pursues his higher studies in an institution recognised for that purpose (Some cynic may find fault with this definition also, on the ground that there are some students who join a college, without the slightest intention of pursuing any studies whatsoever) (Line 8)—तेन Because उद्देश is already made in the first sūtra so only लक्षण and परिणाम are now to be dealt with

(४) प्रमाण—means of right knowledge, proof प्रमाण is the लक्ष्य (what is to be defined) and प्रमाकरण (strictly speaking प्रमाकरणत्व which is an emendation made in one manuscript) the लक्षण (Line 4)—ननु introduces the objector's point of view Here the objector is not finding fault with the definition itself, but only wants some further information, with a view to have a complete picture of the matter in question A कर्त्ता always suggests some कार्य or फल, so he wants to know what the फल of प्रमाकरण would be (Line 5)—सर्वम्—(इति अवगच्छी-कारे) that is, the siddhāntin accepts the objector's view point in so

far as it goes, but he would not accept that as going against his fundamental stand point (the definition of प्रज्ञा here)

(3) Keśavamisra is now examining the definition प्रज्ञाज्ञान. Naturally he first wants to expound fully the two words in the definition, प्रज्ञा and ज्ञान (The student would be able to understand this section properly, only when he reads sections 67, 96, and 101, where most of the terms occurring here, are explained in detail) The following table would make the idea in this section clear



That is, all cognition is first divided into अनुभव and स्मृति, अनुभव is further divided into right अनुभव and wrong अनुभव (In section 67, we are told that स्वप्रज्ञान is always अव्यर्थ) and wrong अनुभव is further sub-divided into संशय (doubt), विषयव (error or misapprehension) and तर्क

(Line 1)-उच्यते-अस्याभि is understood, it is usually translated as ' we reply ' प्रज्ञा is defined as व्यर्थानुभव, and the author now shows how each and every word in the definition is significant (that is what constitutes the वक्ष्य of the definition)

If we drop the word व्यर्थ, and define प्रज्ञा = only अनुभव, then the definition would be अनिष्पन्न as it would include संशय, विषयव etc which are wrong knowledge. So to exclude them, व्यर्थ must be put in the definition

If we drop अनुभव and read the definition as व्यर्थ (ज्ञानम्) only, then the definition would be अनिष्पन्न, as it would extend to स्मृति, the word अनुभव thus excludes स्मृति.

व्यर्थ -correct, grasping the object as it is प्रज्ञा or व्यर्थानुभव is defined as तद्वति तत्प्रत्ययक, रजने इदं रजतम् is a व्यर्थानुभव, for it amounts to रजतत्ववद्विशेषकत्वे सति रजतत्वप्रमाणक ज्ञानम्. In this ज्ञान, रजत is the विशेष्य

which being possessed of रजत्व (विशिष्ट), is known to have the same रजत्व as the प्रकार or characteristic. If we know the रजत्ववद्विशेष्यरजन as possessed of the characteristic ज्ञानित, it would be wrong knowledge. वयव्यवृत्तज्ञान would be वयव्यवृत्तविशेष्यक and also वयव्यवृत्तप्रकारक, = wrong वयव्यवृत्तज्ञान would be वयव्यवृत्तविशेष्यक but वयव्यवृत्तप्रकारक. Thus whether a cognition is right or wrong would depend upon what kind of प्रकार it is associated with. The thing which is the object of cognition and the form in which it is cognised need not necessarily be related to each other by the विशिष्टविशेष्यभाव (as in the case of प्रमा, इदं रजनम्). The सप्तम्य (an तद्धित) is not विशेष्यविशेषणभाव or the आधारधियभाव, but rather अवच्छिन्नत्व. By admitting अवच्छिन्नत्वे सप्तमी, we can show the ज्ञान, वदे वयव्यवृत्तम् as प्रमा. वदे वयव्यवृत्तम् can be put in the form of तद्धित प्रकारक thus—वयव्यवृत्तं वयव्यवृत्तं वयव्यवृत्तं अनुवृत्तं. There वयव्यवृत्त is the विशेष्य the object of cognition, (while in अयं वदं, वदं is the विशेष्य and वयव्यवृत्त the विशेषण) and वदं the विशेषण or प्रकार. Putting it more elaborately, the ज्ञान would be वयव्यवृत्तविशेष्यक and वयव्यवृत्तप्रकारक. But the difficulty is वदं is not found in वयव्यवृत्त (वयव्यवृत्त is found in वदं). Therefore if we take the सप्तमी to be आधारधियार्थे, the cognition वदे वयव्यवृत्त which is undoubtedly प्रमा, would be अप्रमा. The answer is, we should interpret the सप्तमी to be अवच्छिन्नार्थे, so that the cognition would be वयव्यवृत्तवदवच्छिन्नविशेष्यक which is a correct statement. In cases where two or more things are cognised together, it is essential that each thing should be cognised with its correct प्रकार, it would not do to have an aggregate knowledge of such things. Thus if we are cognising रज and रजन, we must not have the knowledge of the two any how, we must know रजन as possessed of रजतावाकावच्छिन्नत्व and रज as possessed of रजत्ववाकावच्छिन्नत्व. Then only we shall have वयव्यवृत्तत्व.

स्मृति is defined as ज्ञानविषय ज्ञानम्. Remembrance is a cognition referring to something which had been already known before (under different circumstances). Kesavamurti does not elsewhere define स्मृति as such. Hence the reading ज्ञानविषय स्मृति seems to have been inserted here to make up for the deficiency (सप्तम्यप्रकारक ज्ञानम् is another definition of स्मृति for संस्कार, = co-section 51 below here मानसस्वरूपसंस्कार is meant संस्कार means the impressions formed when we see a thing). If the definition were simple ज्ञान स्मृति (that is, if we drop ज्ञानविषय) it would extend to वयव्यवृत्त as well. The definition is however still faulty, as it would extend to प्रमाप्रज्ञा (recognition). According to the ancient Naiyāyikas, प्रमाप्रज्ञा is caused by संस्कारजनितचक्षुस्मृति and not by संस्कार, (स्मृति संस्कारं च प्रति अनुभवस्य अनुभव इत्येव जनकम् इति प्राचा मतम् । नयानां मतं तु अनुभवस्य ज्ञानत्वेन जनकत्वम्) Others say that स्मृति is प्रमाप्रज्ञा and not संस्कारजन्या.

(6) (Line 3)—ननु The objector complains that he is being fooled by the siddhāntin who, instead of explaining the thing properly, is merely furnishing him with synonyms which are equally unintelligible, and throw no further light on the matter. Thus कारणम् = साधकनमम् = अविशदिन साधकम् = प्रवृत्त कारणम्, so साधकम् was explained as कारणम्, but this is hardly helpful in understanding the nature of कारण. The siddhāntin appreciates the point of view of the objector and defines कारण in detail. The reading साधकनम कारण is faulty as it comes into conflict with the passage साधक कारणमिति पदार्थ, for then साधक and कारण do not become पदार्थ, साधक would be a विशेषण of कारण.

A कारण must satisfy three conditions —

(1) It must be antecedent to the कार्य, that is, it must exist before the कार्य is produced.

This seems to be an obvious condition. If we go to a potter's house when the potter is engaged in producing a jar, we shall come across a number of objects that exist prior to the jar that is to come into existence, such as clay, wheel, stick, the potter's house, Mrs. Potter, the ass etc. But all these could not be regarded as the cause of बट (We leave out of count what are called the सकारणकारण, which must exist before any thing that is produced, namely इधर नञ्ज्ञानेच्छाद्वय प्रागभाव फल दिक् अदृष्टम् (धर्माधर्म) प्रतिबन्धकसामान्यादाव in addition, according to some) So some other condition must be satisfied, which is—

(2) That the antecedence of the कारण to the कार्य must be invariable.

This would exclude many of the above non-essential things. Thus Mrs. Potter, the potter's house, the donkey, etc. all are eliminated. For, in the manufacture of a jar, the potter may not use the ass to bring the amount of earth required for it, he could have used a cart for that purpose, and so on.

Still some superfluous things do remain, so there is the third and most important condition, namely,

(3) The कारण must not be अवयवसिद्ध. A कारण is अवयवसिद्ध (proved or known to be otherwise or intended for another purpose that is, remote, not directly connected or essential) when it is proved that it is only remotely or indirectly connected with the cause, it may have निवृत्तप्राप्ति, but it is connected with the कार्य, only through the real कारण and not on its own merit.

The Tarkahpika describes the three varieties of अवयव भेद in detail—

(1) तन्तुः is known to be the cause of घट. But can we say that तन्तुः and तन्तुव (which are invariably antecedent to घट, because they are in सदाय relation with the तन्तुः) are the cause of घट? The answer is no. Because तन्तुः and तन्तुव are अवयवसिद्ध. No doubt तन्तुः and तन्तुव are intimately related to the तन्तुः but they are related to the घट only through the तन्तुः and not directly. Hence they cannot be the कारण of घट (येन सहेव यद्यपि पुनरुक्तिरप्यगम्यते न घट इति तत्र ननु यथासिद्धम् । यथा न तुना तन्तुव च घट इति । द्विविधा यथा तन्तुः may be elaborated thus—येन न तुना सहेव यद्यपि तन्तुवस्य य एत इति पुनरुक्तिरप्यगम्यते न घट इति तेन तन्तुना तद्वत् तन्तुवम् अवयवसिद्धम् ।)

(2) The potter has obviously नियन्त्रणमात्र to the घट manufactured by him. But what about the potter's father? He has also नियन्त्रणमात्र, for without the Senior potter, the Junior potter would not have been born. But the नियन्त्रणमात्र of the Senior potter is only indirect. Only on knowing that the Senior potter has नियन्त्रणमात्र with reference to the Junior potter, we understand his नियन्त्रणमात्र to the घट. His presence for the production of the घट is not certainly essential. The Senior potter may have been gathered to his father's years before the घट came to be produced (अथ प्रति पुनरुक्तिरेव ज्ञाने एव यस्य य इति पुनरुक्तिरप्यगम्यते न घट इति तद्वत् यथासिद्धम् । द्विविधा अवयव कुलाल इति पुनरुक्तिरेव ज्ञाने एव यस्य कुलालपितुः य एत इति पुनरुक्तिरप्यगम्यते न घट इति स कुलाल इति अवयवसिद्धम् ।)

(3) When the effect is capable of being produced by certain causes that are invariably antecedent to it, other things that come there incidentally or in addition along with those causes, are अवयवसिद्ध. Thus the तन्तुः which is only incidentally connected with the production of a particular घट is अवयवसिद्ध. (We have seen above that तन्तुः is ruled out of order by the word नियन्त्रण in the definition. So this variety of अवयवसिद्धि is not necessary to exclude तन्तुः. Some however argue that नियन्त्रण excludes तन्तुवत्त्व in general which means any conveyance for bringing the earth, or any similar incidental thing, while this variety of अवयवसिद्धि excludes a तन्तुः in the case of a particular घट.) Or to take another instance. When a jar is baked, it changes its रूप and गन्ध. Before the new रूप and गन्ध are produced, there are in the jar वायु, गन्धप्रमाणमात्र and रूपप्रमाणमात्र. Now for the production of the गन्ध, वायु and गन्धप्रमाणमात्र are absolutely necessary, but रूपप्रमाणमात्र is not. It is true that रूपप्रमाणमात्र exists along with the गन्धप्रमाणमात्र, but it is not necessary to produce गन्ध. It is necessary to produce रूप. Therefore रूपप्रमाणमात्र is अवयवसिद्ध with reference to the production of रूप (अथ

कदप्रनियतपूर्ववर्तिनेव कार्यसमये तत्सत्पुत्रमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाञ्चरत्नके गन्धं प्रति रुद्रप्राण-
मावह्य । दर्शयन् । It must be confessed that this is not a very happy
instance For गन्धप्रावणम् is only the साधारण cause of गन्ध like इश्वर,
आकाश etc) Thus = कारणम् is अनवयवसिद्धनिवर्तयुक्ति

Some regard अययःशुद्धि to be five-fold

(1) यत्कायं प्रति ज्ञानं नृशक्तिर्येन रूपं ध्यानं तस्या प्रति तद्वत्त्वमयम् ।
तिष्ठत् । यथा च प्रति दण्डत्वम् ।

(2) यस्य स्तानभ्येगाद्यस्य निरेजौ न सन् किंतु स्वकाशमादायान्नस्य निरेजौ पृथगे
निर्यथालिङ्गम् । यथा धनं प्राप्तिं दुष्कम्पम् । These two correspond to the 1st
variety in the *Dīraka*

(३) अन्य प्रति पूवश्रुतिव एहीनैव यस्य वक्तार्यं प्रति पूवश्रुतिव एवमेव नम्य वक्तार्यं प्रति अन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा धर्मादिकं प्रवक्तार्यशब्दः ।

(4) यत्कायजनेन प्रति दृश्यन्ति एहीनैः यस्य इत्कार्यं प्रति दृश्यन्ति एवम्
तस्य तत्कार्यं द्रष्टव्यमिति द्रष्टुम् । यथा यत्र यन्ति कृत्वातिन् । Varieties 3 and 4 cor-
respond to the second variety of the Dipika

(5) अण्डवक्त्रनिवत्प्रवृत्तानि एष कार्यतमवे तद्विन्नमयथासिद्धम् । यथा यथादिकं मनि रासप्राप्तिनि । This corresponds to the 3rd variety of the *Dipika*.

परं तु अत्र अवश्यमप्यत्र लघुनिधनवृत्तिर्न बोध्यम् । तेन वाक्यजागृधी-पत्तिं प्रति अवश्यमप्यत्र पूर्वपत्तिं वाक्यनिरूपणप्रतिपादय्य कारणावतिरास्य गन्धप्रायभाष्यस्याप्युपासिह्यत्वात्-
 श्रियाह । एतेषु पञ्चस्य-यथातिदेश्य पञ्चममात्रमप्यम् । अ वेदां श्रुत्यामिनेष पञ्चमं स्यथामिनेषैव
 समुदादिनि बोध्यम् । ('सायकोपा pp 42-43)

The problem of causality is one of the most important problems in philosophy. From a common sense point of view, the view about कर्म given above, seems to be sound enough. But it has got a number of serious flaws. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, the कार्य is absolutely a new thing produced, in समवाय relation with the कारण. But how can we say that वट is an altogether different thing from वृत्तिरा? Simply because वट has a different form and shape, form वृत्तिरा, it cannot be regarded as different from वृत्तिरा. Surely Devadatta standing is not altogether different from Devadatta sitting or Devadatta lying down. It would be more correct to say therefore, that the कार्य is a mere transformation (परिवर्तन) of the कारण, or to go one step farther, an illusory change (विवर्तन) of the कारण, etc. The Naiyāyikas are असकार्यवादिन्स (The Banddhās say that सत् comes out of nothing, the वैवायिका in saying उत्पत्तेर् पूर्ववन्विद्यमान कार्यं नत कारणाज्जायते practically regard the कार्यव्यापार as not being based upon सत्, hence they are called अर्थवेनाशिरूपा. The Advaitavedāntins regard व्यावहारिक सत् as the कार्य of सत्, according to the Sāmkhyas the कार्य is पारमार्थिक सत्. Both the Vedāntins and the Sāmkhyas are सत्कार्यवादिन्स, the

Advaitavedāntins are rather सत्कारणवद्भिः) Śaṅkarācārya attacks the असत्कारणवाद in his Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya (II 1 18) mercifully. There cannot be any कारक-कार्य so essential to the production of the कार्य if the कार्य does not exist before. If the -कार्य belongs to मृत्तिका, then we should say that मृत्तिका is being produced and not the घट which ought to exist throughout the whole व्यापार. If घट is a wholly new thing produced, why should not घट be produced from मृत्तिका, because घट is equally a wholly new thing etc. (The student is recommended to read the Śaṅkarabhāṣya passage in this connection)

(Line 12)—कार्यानुपूर्व्या , न ह्य-प्रसङ्गः, व्यतिरेकः absence. The objector suggests a simpler definition. A कारण is that whose presence and absence are invariably followed by the presence and absence of the कार्य. Thus if मृत्तिका is present, घट is present, if मृत्तिका is absent, घट is absent. Hence we conclude that मृत्तिका is the cause of घट. The siddhāntin's objection to this definition is that it could not apply in the case of all pervading objects, which being eternal can never cease to exist. For instance we know that आकाश is the cause of शब्द, but the definition proposed by the objector would not do in this case. We can say, If आकाश is present शब्द is present but we cannot say (or visualise) ' If आकाश is absent शब्द is absent ' for आकाश can never be absent. The definition thus is faulty when applied to विमिश्र objects otherwise it is all right.

(7) समवायिकारणम्—the material cause or the इतरात्मानकारण out of which the कार्य is made. यत्समवेतम्-वस्त्वित् समवयिन सत्त्वं नत् कार्याद् व्यतिरेकः, that being in समवाय relation with which the effect is produced. तन्तुः are the समवायिकारण of घट which is in समवाय relation with the तन्तुः (अवयवावयविनो संन्यसः), similarly मृत्तिका is the समवायिकारण of घट and घट of घटत्व (गुणगुणिनो सन्धः) . A द्रव्य can alone be the समवायिकारण.

(8) अनुसंसिद्धिः सन्धः समवाय-समवाय is explained by the Vaiśeṣika sūtras as इहेदुमिति यत् कारककारणया स समवायः । That by which we are able to say of the cause and the effect that the one is in the other is समवायः. Thus that the घट (कार्य) is in the तन्तुः (कारण) is due to the समवाय relation. From this it is clear that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras admitted the समवाय relation in order to account for the very close relationship of cause and effect only. But later on the sphere of समवाय was extended to other close relations also that could not be regarded as mere सन्धेय which is an अनियत relation. Thus Keśavamīśra explains समवाय as अनुसंसिद्धिः सन्धः । अनुसंसिद्धिः means ' proved to be not joined ' (if यु means ' to join ') or ' proved to be not separated ' (if व्य means ' to separate ') that is things that are always together until one of them

is destroyed. The *समवाय* of the *समवाय* is to be understood only in a secondary or relative sense. *समवाय* is *निर्य* as long as one of the things where it inheres is not destroyed. The five pairs of *अयुतसिद्ध* things are (1) *आववायविनी*, *तन्तु* and *घट*, (2) *गुणगुणनी*, *घट* and *शुद्धगुण* in a white *घट*, (3) *क्रियाक्रियावनी* a moving cow, (4) *जनिवनी*, *घट* and *घटत्व*, (5) *विशेषनिर्यद्वये*, *विशेष* and the *परमाणु*s. Now the *समवाय* between *तन्तु* and *घट*, or *घट* and *घटत्व* is not mere accidental like the relation *संयोग* between *हस्त* and *पुस्तक*. The *हस्तपुस्तकसंयोग* can vanish away even though *हस्त* and *पुस्तक* remain in tact, but the relation between *घट* and *घटत्व* vanishes only when *घट* is destroyed. Thus *समवाय* is different from *संयोग*. The original *कार्यकारणयो* *समवाय* admitted by Kanada is to be included in the first division, that of *अवयवावयविनी*. It is clear that Kanada's intention in admitting *समवाय* was to explain the theory of causation only. His followers however wanted to make *समवाय* more comprehensive so as to admit of all cases of very close relationship. The followers of Prabhakara and the modern Naiyāyikas regard *समवाय* to be *नाश* and also *अनिर्य*. The Naiyāyikas regard *समवाय* as *प्रत्यक्ष* (*समवायप्रत्यक्ष* इति इन्द्रियसंबन्धविशेषणतासतिर्निर्यो हेतुः । इह स्वान्ते घटसमवाय इति प्रत्यक्ष विशेषणतः सतिर्निर्येव भवति ।) According to the Vaiśeṣikas *समवाय* = *अतीन्द्रिय* and only *अनुमेय* (*समवायोऽतीन्द्रिय स्वतन्त्रागते सति असमवेतमाववात् प्रत्यक्ष आकाशादिवहा*) The relation between two objects can be perceived only if both those objects are perceived, we cannot perceive *घटाकाशसंयोग*, for *आकाश* is not *प्रत्यक्ष*. Some of the *अवयव*s of *समवाय*, viz *परमाणु*s are not *प्रत्यक्ष* (but the opponent might retort by saying that such cases may be treated as exceptions or that they are *द्वय* to the *Yogins*) *समवाय* has no *जाति*, for there is the *शारक*, *असंबन्ध*. Only *द्रव्य*, *गुण* and *कर्म* can be in *समवाय* relation with others (even if *समवाय*s are held to be many there is still this *असंबन्ध*) Again *समवाय* is a peculiar kind of relation and so must be regarded as one only. If *समवाय* is taken to be produced by some *समवायविकारण* like other objects (with which it is in the *समवाय* relation) we shall have to postulate the existence of another *समवाय* and thus there would be *अनन्तरता*. The Vedāntins and the Sāṃkhyaas do not regard *समवाय* as a *पदार्थान्तर*, for according to them the relation between the five *अयुतसिद्ध* pairs = nothing but *स्वभाव* or *तादात्म्यसंबन्ध*. If *समवाय* is able to connect itself with the two objects which are intimately connected with each other, without the assistance of another *समवाय*, what need is there of the *समवाय* relation itself? Why should we not be satisfied with the *स्वभावसंबन्ध* between, say, *घट* and *घटत्व*, the *तन्तु* and the *घट*? Sāṃkhyacarya in his *Bhāṣya* on II 2-17 launches a fierce attack on the *समवाय* relation showing how the supposition is

absurd and unnecessary (The passage is too long to be quoted here, but the student would do well to read the same carefully)

(Line 6)—For जानि and विदेश, see sections 83 and 84 below

(Line 10)—विन-यत्ता this statement is made to explain what विन-यद्वय (referred to in line 8) is, (it being understood that there is no प्रतिबन्ध factor)

(9) It was said in the last section (lines 16-18) that घट is the intimate cause of घटरूप and घट is the intimate cause of घटद्वय (the सप-ध between घृण and घृणिन् being सवयव) The objector now wants to point out that this could not be the case

OBJECTOR

घट cannot even be the cause, much less the समवायिकरण of घटरूप because both घट and घटरूप are produced at the same time and it is a patent fact that there must be पूर्वपर्य between कारण and कार्य (कारण must be antecedent to कार्य) In the absence of पूर्वपर्य, no कार्य कारणभाव can exist There can be no कार्यकारणभाव between the left horn and the right horn of a cow, as both the horns are produced simultaneously

SIDDHĀNTIN

Our reply to your objection is of the वृत्ते कुटार type We do not accept your statement that घट and घटरूप are produced at the same time Our position is this घट is first produced and it remains without any qualities for the first moment, and then the qualities are produced in intimate relation with it

This is exactly as it should be, for that ensures different effects being produced from different causes

Cause Effect

वृत्तिः—घट

घट—घटरूप

If घट and घटरूप were produced at the same time, there would be no difference between them, the cause घृणिन् being the same for both of them Perhaps you might say that घट might be accepted as the cause of both घट and घटरूप (if वृत्तिः cannot be their cause), but this would be still more absurd, as घट can not be its own cause, there being no पूर्वपर्य

If we accept the position that
 १ द्रव्य is *निर्गुण* at the first moment,
 a serious complication arise viz

(1) द्रव्य at the first moment
 would not be visible, for the
 rule is that a द्रव्य having a
 developed colour and touch can
 alone be visible

(2) द्रव्य could not at that
 moment be called even द्रव्य (for
 you define द्रव्य as a substratum of
 qualities and द्रव्य at that time has
 no qualities at all)

(1) What harm is there if
 द्रव्य at the first moment is invisible
 Even if we suppose that
 द्रव्य along with the qualities is
 produced at the first moment, it
 can be visible only at the second
 moment (for during the first
 moment the द्रव्य comes into exist-
 ence and one moment is required
 for our eye to come into contact
 with it)

According to our view the
 situation would be

1st moment—निर्गुण द्रव्य

2nd " सगुण द्रव्य

3rd " चक्षुर्व

According to you द्रव्य would be
 चक्षुर्व at the second moment This
 is no fundamental difference

() When we say that a द्रव्य is
 गुणधारक we do not mean that a
 द्रव्य is always possessed of quali-
 ties, as a matter of course We
 simply mean that it has the *capacity*
of being a substratum of
qualities It does not matter
 in the least if at a particular
 time, it is not actually possessed
 of qualities

If you are still not satisfied,
 we present you with another
 definition of द्रव्य, that it is a
 सगुण विवर्तन which does apply in
 the case of निर्गुण द्रव्य as well [Per-
 haps the objector might retort
 that a निर्गुण द्रव्य can
 not be सगुण विवर्तन either, at the
 first moment for there are no
 qualities at that time But this


would be hyper-critical. We call *मूर्ति* the cause of *वद* in the sense that given the necessary auxiliaries, it produces *वद* }

(Line 15)—महत्वे मति-महत्त्व magnitude, any dimension between अमरमिण and निरमरमिण (both of which are not वास्तव) is महत्त्व which is necessary to make an object वास्तव उद्भूतम् is also essential for that purpose (Line 11). For अमरमिण there is another (and perhaps a better) reading गुणमय गुणमयताभावमिच्छावत् (because it is गुणमयत्व (referred to) by the objector in his definition (cf द्रव्य in line 16) that deserves to be explained and not योग्यता)—being a substratum of qualities means not being the abode of the absolute absence (like शून्यम्) of qualities—that is the absence of qualities is not there for all time. If the qualities are not there now they would be coming into existence later on. This does not affect the position of a द्रव्य as a द्रव्य.

(10) असमवायिकारणम्—This is admitted only by the Naiyayikas, in order to connect कारण and कारण which are regarded as distinct. The Vedantins and others admit only two कारणs, उत्पत्ति and निमित्त. The असमवायिकारण can only be a गुण or कर्म, it can never be a द्रव्य. The name असमवायिकारण which literally means not a समवायिकारण and hence would refer to the निमित्तकारण as well, is to be understood in a special sense to denote a कारण which is पद्य हस्त to the समवायिकारण. The समवायिकारण may be direct or परोक्ष. असमवायिकारण is thus two fold. It is described in the Tarkasamgraha as

(1) which has an intimate relation (समवाय) with a thing with which the कारण also is intimately related. *कारणं सह एकस्मिन्नेव समवाये सति य कारणम् (कारणं एतेन सह एकस्मिन्नेव ततो समवाये तन्तुसंयोगे पदस्य कथस्य असमवायिकारणम्)* thus तन्तुसंयोग is an intimate relation with तन्तु with which the कारण is also intimately related. Therefore तन्तुमयत्व is the असमवायिकारण of कारण of वद.

(2) the which is in intimate relation with a thing with which the समवायिकारण of the कारण is also intimately related—कारणं सह एकस्मिन्नेव समवाये सति य कारणम् (पदस्य सापेक्षसंयोगे कारणेन सह सह एकस्मिन्नेव ततो समवाये तन्तुसंयोगे पदस्य कथस्य असमवायिकारणम्) thus तन्तुसंयोग is an intimate relation with तन्तु with which वद the समवायिकारण of the कारण पदस्य is also intimately related. Therefore तन्तुसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of कारण. The following diagrams would make this clear



The first अमयविरागम् is called वटो (समवायविरागम्) and the second वटो (तन्तुमयविरागम्)

(11) निमित्तकारणम्—All causes (satisfying the definition of कारण properly) other than the समवाय and the अस्तमयविराग are classed as निमित्तकारणम्. तूरी, वेप etc are the निमित्तकारण of वट, and वट, चक्र, etc of वट. समवायकारण and निमित्तकारण correspond respectively to the material cause and the efficient cause of Aristotle. The formal cause of Aristotle is the सामान्य, the Naiyayikas have nothing similar to his final cause

(12) अमयविरागम्—अमयविरागम्, for the other kinds of अमयविराग can not be produced (see section 86) समवायविरागम् तन्तुमयविरागम्—This sentence tells us why अमयविराग can not stand in समवाय relation to anything and furnishes a reason for the statement made in the last sentence. A conjectural reading here is कारणविरागम्. Since समवाय is a characteristic feature of both समवाय and अस्तमयविराग, as shown above, अमयविराग which does not possess that characteristic, viz the समवाय relation, can not obviously have those कारणम्

(13) कारणम्—the most potent cause, बहुल कारणम् कारण is the सतिशयकारण among the three causes, समवाय, अस्तमयविराग and निमित्त. According to the ancients, this सतिशयकारण must be व्यापारम् (व्यापार is defined as तन्मयविराग सति तन्मयविराग the operation which is itself produced by the cause and which in turn produces the effect produced by the cause. Thus, the axe fells a tree. Here वटविराग is the कार्य of the वट. But unless the व्यापार viz वटविराग takes place, the वटविराग would not take place. वटविराग is जन्म of वट and is itself the जन्म of वटविराग which is also the जन्म of वट. Thus कारण is a potent operative cause. The moderns describe कारण as कदाचित्कालावधि (which is most proximate to the effect, without whose appearance the effect would

not be produced) or यदि क्वा मङ्गलकायादुत्पाद According to the moderns therefore प्रज्ञाप्रसङ्गयोग itself would be the प्रज्ञा

In section 14, Kesavanusira describes इन्द्रिय, इन्द्रियार्थहेतुः and ज्ञान as करण under different circumstances. He therefore does not stick to any one view in particular. What could be strikingly regarded as a potent cause, should be regarded as the प्रज्ञा, according to him.

(Line 3)—यत् The author now shows how the definition of प्रमाण = अनधिगतायत्तु is wrong

OBJECTOR

By means of a Pramana we cognise something which we had not known before, so why should not Pramana be defined as अनधिगतायत्तु ?

In the case of a series of cognitions about the same jar, we might argue that वृत् 1 is different from वृत् 2, वृत् 2 from वृत् 3 etc., so that every time we do apprehend something not apprehended before, so our definition is correct.

We see no objection why we should not be taken to cognise the minute divisions of time

SIDDHANTIN

If we accept your definition of a Pramana, a series of cognitions about the same jar, for instance, in the form of 'this is a jar' 'this is a jar' would be invalid, which is manifestly absurd, so your definition is wrong. The first knowledge of the वृत् would be valid, but the knowledge of the वृत् at the second, third, fourth moments etc. is invalid. It is a knowledge of the वृत् already apprehended. For according to you, Pramana makes known things not apprehended before.

Your supposition is vitiated by actual experience. Who has ever been able to cognise such minute divisions of cognitions representing the jar in successive moments ?

Our actual experience is other wise. We feel that we cognise one single whole movement (strictly speaking this is an inaccurate apprehension, but that is another matter) and not several different actions comprising it.

It is better always to be guided by facts and so we reject your definition.

(Line 11)—*सततवृत्तिवृत्त- cognition in the form of चर or series, serial or continuous cognitions*. This is postulated, because the supposition is that no cognition lasts for more than one moment. This is so akin to the Buddhist doctrine सर्वं सत् क्षणिकम्. That is why the Naiyāyikas are called अपरिवर्तशक्तः (Line 8)—अवाच, the objector suggests that चर 1 (चर at the first moment of cognition) may be regarded as different from चर 2, चर 2 from चर 3 and so forth (Line 10)—योगवशादभिप्राय-Thus shows that the कानन्दे is not comprehended किरा (this is dropped in Paranjpe's edition perhaps rightly). It seems to be an explanation by some copyist of the expression किरादिप्रमाणम्. Let us see what happens when Derodatta is on the move. We say that he has taken one step, but that one step is really made up of four operations—(1) There is first किरा or movement in his foot (2) then there is disjunction of the foot from the ground where it was placed through this movement, (3) as a result of that there is the destruction of the former conjunction of the foot with the ground, (4) and lastly the production of the conjunction of the foot with the next spot. It would perhaps appear that (2) किरातो विषय and (3) वृत्तविवर्तन are not different, but according to the Vaiśeṣikas, they are different (Anumambhatta, in his Tarkasaṅgraha defines विषय as अयोगन प्ररूपण) (Line 14)—कानन्देन प्रयोगे—This is in accordance with the view of the moderns about कान (viz कानविनाशवाच्यता प्रमाण see above).

(14) The Vaiśeṣikas admit only two independent Pramanas, प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the Naiyāyikas admit four.

(15) प्रत्यक्ष—the means of direct perception and प्रत्यक्षज्ञान is ज्ञान produced by the contact of the sense organs with the objects of knowledge. The Nyāyasūtras define it as इन्द्रियवशात्तत्त्वार्थोपपन्नं ज्ञानमपवद्वैतप्रत्यक्षं विषयि त्ववसायान्तरम् (अवयवदेशम् 13 विविक्तवृत्तवत् अवयववर्ति-अवयविनम्, and अवयववर्तमानम्-अविकल्पकम्) प्रत्यक्षम् is derived as अवयवम् प्रती वे वद्वैत इति (असाति इन्द्रियवर्ति प्रमाणवत्तत्त्वार्थोपपन्नं प्रत्यक्षं इति) The definition in the text of course only applies to the ज्ञानप्रत्यक्ष and not to the प्रत्यक्ष of ईश्वर, which is निर्वच प्रत्यक्ष is thus produced—(आत्म-यन्त्र-इन्द्रिय-अप) Ātman is connected with Manas, Manas with Indriyas and Indriyas with Artha, thus there are three स्तरार्थ of which the first two are common to other ज्ञान as well, only the last is peculiar to प्रत्यक्ष विविक्तवृत्त is विषयवर्तमानं ज्ञान (विशेषणविशेष्यवत्तत्त्वार्थोपपन्नं ज्ञानम् इतिवेदव्याख्यानम्) that is, where no notice is taken of the relation of the विशेष्य and its qualifying attributes, knowledge in the form इदं निश्चितम्. The निर्वचप्रत्यक्षम् is thus प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. The Buddhists regard निर्वचप्रमाणम् alone as प्रमाण

The existence of निर्विकल्पज्ञान is proved by अनुमान (ननु निर्विकल्पकं हि प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञान विशेषणजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् दुर्णिति ज्ञानवै-
 स्युमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशिष्टज्ञानाभ्यां सविस्तरत्वेन ज्ञानप्रसङ्गाच्चिन्त्यत्वात्सिद्धि-
 दीपिका) सावकत्पक—having विस्तर or प्रसरता constituted of ज्ञानि, पुण,
 क्रिया and सत्ता according to the well-known dictum of the
 Mahabhasyakara चतुर्थो दाशानां प्रवृत्तिः । Read the following from
 Kavyaprakasa II in this connection, गो चतुर्थोऽपि विषय इत्यादि
 चतुर्थो दाशानां प्रवृत्तिः इति यद्व्याख्यानम् । उपाधिष्व द्विविधः । वस्तुधर्मो
 वस्तुधर्मोऽपि द्विविधः । सिद्ध सत्त्वधर्मः । सिद्धोऽपि द्विविधः ।
 पञ्चमस्य प्राणप्रदो विशिष्टज्ञानदेवधर्मः । नानायां जातिः । इत्येव हि वस्तुधर्मो न हि गो रक्षणम्
 गोनाम्यतो गोत्वमित्येव चतुर्थो गो इति । द्विविधो पुणः । प्रवृत्तिर्नाम ज्ञानप्रसरता चतुर्विधोऽपि ।
 साध्यं पञ्चावस्थावत्तद्वत् क्रियात्मकम् । all these are explained in the text further
 on The सविस्तरज्ञान about गो would be गान्तरिकविमान् । गान्तरिकं चान्तरिकं
 साधनं द्विविधं नाम । It is thus नामनां द्विविधोऽपि विज्ञानस्य सत्त्वधर्मो ज्ञानम्
 According to the Vedantins ज्ञानस्यैवैकधर्मज्ञानम् is सविस्तरम् प्रसरण
 is also divided into निवृत्ति and अनिवृत्ति, the latter being further divided
 into लौकिक and अलौकिक, लौकिक is sixfold, प्रवृत्ति, वस्तु, चेतुः, स्थान
 भोग and मानस अलौकिक is three-fold, सामान्यज्ञान, ज्ञानज्ञान and ध्यान
 Out of the sense-organs (including mind) that are सत्त्वधर्मज्ञानम् चतुर्विधम्
 लक्ष्म and प्रवृत्ति are द्रव्यप्रवृत्ति, the rest are द्रव्यप्रवृत्ति The द्रव्यप्रवृत्ति are the
 कारण of प्रवृत्तिज्ञान according to Annambhatta Another view is सविस्तर-
 द्रव्यप्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति इन्द्रियप्रवृत्ति कारणम् । विषया द्रव्यप्रवृत्ति इन्द्रियप्रवृत्ति ज्ञानोपाधि साधनम् ।
 द्रव्यप्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति इन्द्रियप्रवृत्ति कारणम् । (भाष्यप्रकाश I 542)

(Line 8)—कदा पुनर्निद्रिय कारणम्—

(1) (कारणम्) इन्द्रियम् (वस्तु)—यत् (वस्तु)—कारणम् (विज्ञानप्रवृत्तिम्)
 इन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति (अन्तरात्मिका)

(2) , यत्—यत्—कारणम् (विज्ञानम्)
 यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति (अन्तरात्मिका)

(Line 16)—(1) (कारणम्) इन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति—कारणम्
 निद्रियप्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति (अन्तरात्मिका)
 (अन्तरात्मिका)

(Line 21)—(1) (कारणम्) निद्रियप्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति—कारणम्
 सविस्तरज्ञानम् इन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति (अन्तरात्मिका)

(Line 10)—यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति
 नानाभिनिर्दिष्टम् । अथवा यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति । The Naiyaya
 has held that senses produce cognition only after coming into
 contact with the object. The sense of sight is actually supposed to
 travel over to the object and to come into contact with it before it
 is seen (Line 11)—यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति यत्प्रवृत्तिप्रवृत्ति (Line 21)

इति वादानो , after perceiving an object in all its bearings, we might think of having it or rejecting it or we might choose to remain indifferent about it. The reading नञ्वायसञ्जन्य etc explains what व्यापार is. If it is genuine, it ought to come with propriety in line 13, where the अतान्तरव्यापार is first mentioned. See notes on section III for व्यापार (Line 25)—अत्र कश्चिद्वाह—The objector suggests that it would be simpler to regard इन्द्रिय as the करण in all cases, and what ever intervenes between the करण (इन्द्रिय) and the फल as the intermediate operation. Thus according to this view, when the फल is हानाविबुद्धय, the position would be

अतान्तरव्यापार


कारणम् (इन्द्रियम्) ————— फलम्
 चक्षुः [(1) इन्द्रियायसन्निकृष (2) निरिक्तकृषक ज्ञानम् (हानाविबुद्धय)
 (3) सन्निकृतक ज्ञानम्]

Kesavamisra simply refers to this view, he neither accepts it nor rejects it


(16) The इन्द्रियायसन्निकृष which is the cause of न पक्षज्ञान is six fold, that is, taking into consideration the peculiar nature of the various इन्द्रियाय, and of अभाव (which can not be the direct object of perception) we find that the इन्द्रियायसन्निकृष takes place in six ways. श्रोत्र (which is nothing but अक्काश circumscribed by the cavity of the ear) can perceive only शब्द with which it can have only समवाय relation (as शब्द is the peculiar गुण of अक्काश) सयोग is not at all possible (समवेत समवाय is possible in the perception of शब्दम्). In the case of other इन्द्रियाय, as they can have सयोग relation with their object, सयोग, सयुक्तसमवाय and सयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय सन्निहित are possible (for the perception respectively of घट, घटत्व, and घटत्वम् by the eye). The following diagrams would make this clear

(1) A चक्षुः — सयोग — घट
 B घट — " — आत्मा
 घट (आत्मा)

(1) सयोग



(2) सयुक्तसमवाय



The sixth *समिर्द्ध* is necessary for the perception of *अभाव*, and of *समवाय* also, according to the *Vaiyavikyas* as expressed in the form *इह कपले घटसमवाय*, the *Vaisesikas*, on the other hand regard *समवाय* as अनुमेय only. How can we perceive *घटाभाव*? If there had been *समवाय* between *घट* and *घटाभाव*, there would have been no difficulty in the matter. But neither *सयोग* nor *समवाय* can exist between *घट* and *घटाभाव*, hence we must find a round about way of perceiving *घटाभाव*. We leave aside *घटाभाव* and concentrate our attention on the *घृतल* where the *घट* would have been if it had been existing. Thus in perceiving *घटाभाव*, we as a matter of fact are expected to perceive *घृतल* (the *विज्ञेय*) characterised by (the *विज्ञातृ*) *घटाभाव*. *घटाभाववत् घृतम्* is the nature of our perception. *घृतल* is of course *सद्युक्त* with the eye. To be quite accurate the *समिर्द्ध* should be called *सद्युक्तविज्ञातृविज्ञातव्यम्*. According to the *Tarkadipika* the perception can be expressed as *घृते घटाभाव* also. Here *घटाभाव* becomes the *विज्ञेय* and *घृते* the *विज्ञातृ*. Though ultimately the idea is the same, this view is not correct as *घटाभाव* there becomes the *विज्ञेय* which obviously it can not be. The *Dipika* also incidentally remarks that this way of perceiving *अभाव* dispenses with the *अनुपलब्धिप्रमाण* which is recognised by some as an independent *प्रमाण* (देवातुष लब्ध प्रमाणं न निरस्तम् । यद्यपि अत्रापि विषयवर्ति घृतलमिति द्रष्टव्यम् । दशकामाशास्त्रादानीं तस्मिन्प्रमाणेनैव विज्ञेयविषयसंयुक्तं वैवस्वद्वक्त्रेन्द्रियेणैव साधनानुपपन्नो अनुपलब्धिप्रमाणान्तरात् । अधिकरणज्ञानाद्यमनेतर्थादिद्वयवदेव कारणत्वोपपत्त्यानुपपत्त्ये कारणत्वस्य युक्तत्वात् ।) See also notes on sections 40 and 41 (Line 14) — *सद्युक्तसमिर्द्ध*. The necessity of this four-fold contact in the case of the perception of

the dimension of an object is proved on the ground that the perception of the dimension depends on the perception of each single constituent part of the object, as well as of the object as a whole. This however is not the case in the perception of the colour. For, if we saw only one side of an object, we should be able to perceive what its colour is. If we are very near the object, we might be able to perceive its dimension without the additional four-fold contact, but this contact is absolutely necessary, when the object is at a distance (Line 24)—The reading *चर्कण्युक्त* is unnecessary here. It is in its right place in section 46 (Line 31)—*मनःसंयुक्त*, the *सुखाद्यभाव* is perceived in the form *सुखाद्यभाववत्* मनः (Line 34)—the *चरमाद्य* is perceived in the form *चरमाद्यवत्* मनः (Line 38)—*वर्णविशेष* the *सद्विषय* which gives us the *प्रत्यक्ष* of *अभाव* is the *विशेषणविशेष्यभाव* (or *विशेषणता*) *सद्विषय*, and this *विशेष्यभाव* is based upon any one of the five relations mentioned before, it is of five kinds. These may be stated as follows—

(1) *बहुसंयुक्ते भूतं पदार्थात्म्ये यत्ते संयुक्तविशेषणता*, in the form *पदार्थाद्यत् भूतत्वम्*

(2) *बहुसंयुक्तपदसमवेतस्य सद्यप्यवयवस्य संयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणता* in the form, *सद्यप्यवयवत् पदत्वम्*

(3) *बहुसंयुक्तव्यवस्थेनैकवस्तुसमवेतस्य सद्यप्यवयवस्य संयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणता* in the form *व्यवस्थेनैकवस्तुत्वं पदत्वम्*

(4) *भोक्तृत्वमेवमाकारे वस्तुसद्यप्यवयवस्य समवेतविशेषणता* in the form *वस्तुसद्यप्यवयवत्*

(5) *भोक्तृत्वमेवमाकारसमवेतवस्तुसमवेतस्य सद्यप्यवयवस्य समवेतसमवेतविशेषणता* in the form *वस्तुसद्यप्यवयवत्*

विशेषणविशेष्यभावविशेषणता which would be the possible sixth variety for the perception of *पदभाव* on *व्यवस्था* is apparently not admitted as after all it is only a double *विशेषणतासद्विषय*

(Line 40)—*एव समवायिनि*, the role is *वेदेन्द्रियेण यद् गृह्यते मनोद्वयेन तद्वत्* *सामान्यम्*, तद्वत् *अभावः*, तद्वत् *अभावः* *पृथगे*.

(Line 45)—The verse *पदार्थस्य* etc. is dropped in some manuscripts

(17)—*अनु निर्विकल्पक*. This is an objection set forth by one who is a follower of the Buddhist system of philosophy. According to the Buddhists, everything that exists is momentary, *यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्*. Now *सामान्य* or generality is *नित्य* according to the Naiyayikas, but according to the objector, *सामान्य* is *असत्*, because it follows from *यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्*, that *यत् क्षणिकत्वात्* (that is, *नित्य*) *तत् असत्*. Secondly *सामान्य* is absolutely of no use, it is *बुध्य*, having no positive nature

For according to the Bauddha गौ (the सामान्य in गौ) does not tell us anything about गौ, but is useful only in enabling us to exclude what is not गौ. It has therefore only a negative nature. The objector puts forward his objection, taking for granted that it is proved that (1) सामान्य is not वस्तुमान and (2) it serves no useful purpose.

The objector says —I can understand that the निर्विकल्पकज्ञान in the form इदं किंचित् can be had by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण, for there the sense of sight comes into contact with the वस्तु पक्षि. But how can we have सर्ववस्तुज्ञान by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण ? For according to you, सर्ववस्तुज्ञान is नापवादवादि-योजनोत्पन्न. The सर्ववस्तुज्ञान about घट would be घट-वधान् (निःशृणुवन् etc) पदाद. Now I have shown above that the सामान्य is not वस्तुमान. Hence the घटत्वसामान्य which is not वस्तुमान can not produce any ज्ञान at all. So no सर्ववस्तुज्ञान can be had, it can never be had by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण at any rate.

Kesavamisra summarily dismisses the objection by asserting that सामान्य is वस्तुमान and it is silly to argue that whatever exists is साक्षिक (see section 83 for the nature of सामान्य)

(Line 1)—समस्तगतम् is the शक्ति, that which possesses a peculiar characteristic of its own, that which is specially individualised (Line 3)—शब्द-लिङ्गवत् अनुगतकत्वग्राहित्वत्-लिङ्ग (indicative mark) is explained in detail in section 18, and शब्द (Word, Testimony) in section 30. सामान्य is by its very nature अनुगतकत्वग्राहि, as it resides in all objects belonging to the same class (see section 83). शब्दज्ञान is also अनुगतकत्वग्राहि, as it necessarily involves the ज्ञान of different objects possessed of सामान्य etc. लिङ्गज्ञान likewise is impossible without the knowledge of सामान्य existing in the different अवस्था belonging to the same class.

(18) The author now starts on the treatment of अनुमान, which forms perhaps the most important topic in the न्याय system. Sections 18-32 deal with अनुमान and should be carefully studied by the student.

अनुमिति means the cognition or, to borrow a term from western logic, the judgment, which we arrive at by means of inference and अनुमान represents inference or the process by which this cognition is obtained. Thus अनुमान is naturally the special cause or instrument of अनुमिति. Again अनुमिति is described as परामर्शजन्य ज्ञानम्. From this it follows that अनुमान which produces अनुमिति, is the same as परामर्श परामर्श, or लिङ्गपरामर्श is obtained as लिङ्गवत् न्याय ज्ञानम्. In order to understand this, we must take a concrete instance of an अनुमान and learn the meaning of a few technical terms.

The classical instance of an *anvaya*, like the celebrated illustration of Socrates and his mortality in western logic, is that in which we infer the presence of fire on a mountain by observing smoke issuing from it. This is expressed as follows *पर्वतो वह्निमान् । यमात्रात् । यत्र यत्र धूम तत्र तत्र वह्निः । अथ यत्र न वह्निस्तत्र न धूमः । तस्मादयं पर्वतः वह्निमान्*. Here the mountain about which we want to prove something *viz* वह्निमान् in this case, is known as *वस्तु* or the subject *वद्भि* which is the thing that we want to establish or prove, is called *साक्ष्य भूय* is designated *साधन* or *लिङ्ग* or the *indicatory mark* because it is on account of this smoke that we are able to prove वह्नि on the mountain. Smoke proves the presence of fire on the mountain, because there is invariable concomitance or association between smoke and fire. Wherever there is smoke, there fire is necessarily found. This invariable association of smoke with fire is known as *साक्षि*.

साक्षि is one of the most important terms in Sanskrit Nyaya and long and elaborate discussions are carried on regarding its nature and definition. Our author has perhaps given the simplest definition of this difficult word, when he says that *साक्षि* is *सहसर्गविवरण* or invariability of association or concomitance. *साक्षि* thus possesses two elements *viz* सहसर्ग and विवरण or *विवक्षित्वम्*. Some explain सहसर्ग as *सामानाधिकरान्य* or possession of the same abode. Wherever smoke is found, there fire is also present. We have noted this phenomenon by actually observing several smoky places such as the kitchen, the chimney and the steam-engine. Thus we know that between smoke and fire सहसर्ग or सामानाधिकरान्य exists. But is this association निरुद्ध or invariable? निरुद्ध or invariability is the same as *व्यापकत्वम्* or the absence of the violation of their association. If a single instance could be found where there is smoke, but no fire, the सहसर्ग between smoke and fire would be violated or *अविच्छिन्न*. And no such contrary instance is available, *साक्षि* exists between smoke and fire and is expressed by the sentence *यत्र यत्र धूम तत्र तत्र वह्निः*. Now let us take the converse of this proposition *viz* *यत्र यत्र वह्नि तत्र तत्र धूम* and see whether *साक्षि* exists between वह्नि and धूम. Here we find that in a large number of cases such as the kitchen and the cigarette which that follow is smoking fire is associated with smoke. Thus there is general association or सहसर्ग between fire and smoke. But this association is not invariable, because contrary instances where fire is present without smoke are found. For example, in a red-hot ball of iron or in a lighted electric bulb, there is fire, but no smoke. Hence the सहसर्ग between वह्नि and धूम is not निरुद्ध and consequently *साक्षि* exists between fire and smoke.

In the *vyākhyāni* 'यत्र यत्र धूम तत्र तत्र वह्नि' धूम which is the साधन and वह्नि which is the सद्य are known as व्याप्य and व्यापक respectively. The meaning of these two terms must be clearly understood. व्याप्य and व्यापक as their grammatical formation shows, are relative terms. व्यापक means that which pervades or is more extensive and is opposed to व्याप्य which signifies that which is pervaded by or included in the व्यापक or which is less extensive than the व्यापक. वह्नि is व्यापक with reference to धूम, because besides being present in all those cases where धूम is present वह्नि is found in others where धूम is not present viz. the red hot ball of iron or the lighted electric bulb. धूम is thus pervaded by वह्नि and is consequently known as व्याप्य. It will thus be seen that wherever the less extensive is present, the more extensive is bound to be there. Hence all those conclusions which are based on a व्याप्य साधन are correct. In fact the *sūtravārtikā* defines साधन and सद्य as व्याप्य and व्यापक respectively.

It should be noted that though व्यापक and व्याप्य are translated as more extensive and less extensive, the terms more extensive and less extensive mean occurring in greater and less number of cases respectively. A field of ten acres is certainly more extensive than others which extend over five acres only. But a ten acre field is not व्यापक with reference to a five-acre one, as the meaning of the term व्यापक in this *Sāstra* is concerned. For it does not occur in greater number of cases. To explain. A five-acre field is present wherever fields extending from five to nine acres are present, besides being present in all those cases where a ten acre field is found. Thus in the terminology of *Sāstra* a five-acre field is व्यापक with reference to a ten acre field, which becomes व्याप्य. To take another illustration. The number 10, though numerically greater than 5 is only व्याप्य with reference to 5 because 5, being present in all the cases where 10 is present is in addition found in the numbers 3 to 9 and hence is व्यापक with reference to 10. It will thus be seen that व्यापक or the more extensive means that which is found in a greater number of cases than its व्याप्य and व्याप्य signifies that which occurs in a less number of cases than its व्यापक.

We have seen above that व्याप्य and व्यापक stand for साधन and सद्य respectively. But this does not mean that in every instance the साधन should be such as is found in a less number of cases and the सद्य such as is present in a greater number. For sometimes the साधन and साधन may be co-extensive or such as occur in an equal number of cases. For example in the अनुमान *षटा द्रव्यम् । गुणप्रत्ययत्वात्*, गुणप्रत्ययत्वं which is the

साधन or व्याप्य is found in exactly the same number of cases as द्रव्य. For, no case where द्रव्यत्व exists without गुणधर्मत्व can be conceived. Thus to be more accurate व्यापक or साध्य means that which is not found in a less number of cases than the व्याप्य or साधन. Similarly व्याप्य or साधन means that which is not found in a greater number of cases than the व्यापक or साध्य.

We are now in a position to understand the author's statement in section 20, अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्तिरवयवमन्तश्च (अनुमान consists of two parts viz व्याप्ति and अवयवमन्तश्च). On account of व्याप्ति we understand in a general way that wherever the साधन, that is smoke, is present, the साध्य, that is, fire is also found. साधनस्य अवयवमन्तश्च or the fact that the साधन is an attribute of the present एव viz the mountain tells us that fire must also be present on this mountain. Thus for a valid अनुमान or परामर्श both these parts are necessary.

The necessity of these two constituents of अवयवमन्तश्च can be easily proved. Take the case 'शब्दोऽनित्यः प्रमेयत्वात्'. This is not a valid अनुमान, because though अवयवमन्तश्च is present here, that is, though प्रमेयत्व resides in शब्द there is no व्याप्ति between प्रमेयत्व and अनित्यत्व. We cannot say एव द्रव्य प्रमेयत्व तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम् because though प्रमेयत्व and अनित्यत्व may be सहचर in such objects as वायु and पृथ्वी, प्रमेयत्व is not accompanied by अनित्यत्व in such substances as आर्यः, कालः, दिग्, आत्मन्, and मनस्, which are all नित्य. On the other hand in 'शब्दोऽनित्यः अद्वयत्वात्', we have a correct व्याप्ति but no अवयवमन्तश्च. एव द्रव्य अद्वयत्वात् इति तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम् is a correct proposition. But अद्वयत्वात् does not reside in शब्द, because शब्द is a द्रव्य. It will thus be seen that for a proper परामर्श or अनुमान both व्याप्ति and अवयवमन्तश्च are necessary. The सूत्राक्षरी defines अनुमान as 'व्याप्तिरवयवमन्तश्चैव शब्दोऽनित्यत्वात्'.

(Lane 10)—तस्य (धूमस्य लिङ्गस्य) दृश्यं ज्ञानं लिङ्गपरामर्शः—It is the third ज्ञान of the indicator, mark धूम, that is the instrument of अनुमानि. Thus first there is—

(1) The knowledge of धूम in the kitchen when by means of धूमेदर्शनं, the observer is in a position to understand the invariable concomitance between धूम and अग्नि. This is the first ज्ञान.

No inferential cognition about अग्नि can arise from this ज्ञान, as the व्याप्ति between धूम and अग्नि is not yet apprehended, it is only after the व्याप्ति is apprehended that अनुमानि can arise.

It might be argued that we might wait for the apprehension of the व्याप्ति, and after the व्याप्ति is apprehended, proceed to draw inference about fire, from the first धूमज्ञान in the kitchen itself.

The answer to this argument is simple enough — There can be no inference about fire in the kitchen itself. For we actually see fire there and inference has scope only when there is doubt about something.

(2) The second धृषण is the knowledge of धृष on the mountain

It is true that when we have this second वृत्तान, the अग्नि is already ascertained and there is also doubt about the presence of fire on the mountain, but this second वृत्तान also does not enable us to have अनुविधि, because there must be व्याप्तिरसम्भ before अनुविधि can take place.

(3) The third पुद्गल arises after the स्वाप्ति originally apprehended in the kitchen, is remembered

And it is this *third* *पुनरावस्था* that produces the *अवस्था* and it is the *कारण* thereof, according to the modern view of *कारण* viz it must be *कलावागम्यवर्तिनः*

Some regard सिद्ध or सिद्धज्ञान as अनुविनिरूपण. These people hold कर्म to be 'राधापदम् अनावरण कारणम्' and as सिद्धरासम्पत्ति is immediately followed by अनुविनि, निरूपणसम्पत्ति if regarded as अन विनिरूपण, would not be राधापदम्. Hence they consider सिद्ध to be अन विनिरूपण. Now सिद्ध or सिद्धज्ञान is followed by the राधापदम् सम्पत्ति, which in its turn is followed by अनुविनि. So सिद्ध is राधापदम् and thus the कारण of अनुविनि. Kesavamiyasa evidently held, in the case of अनुविनि at any rate, that कर्म is 'कलायोगव्यवहित कारणम्' सिद्धरासम्पत्ति is कलायोगव्यवहित, because it is immediately and invariably followed by the कर्म चित् अनुविनि. Hence it is the कारण of अनुविनि.

नरेश्वरिका points out that if mere सिद्ध or सिद्धिदान is regarded as अनश्विनिरक्षण, even past or future सिद्ध would lead to अनुश्विनिरक्षण. Thus the smoke that we saw on the mountain yesterday would enable us to infer the presence of fire to-day. But this is absurd. Therefore mere सिद्धिदान is not enough. वसुधैकुवत्यम् is also necessary.

समग्र, as we saw before, contains two elements अज्ञान and एतद्वयम् । Why should we not regard these two severally as the कर्तव्य of अनुमिति ? Why should we invent a new complex term such as समग्र and regard it as the one कर्तव्य of अनुमिति ? श्रीविद्या answers these questions by saying that to regard समग्र and एतद्वयम् severally as the two कर्तव्य of अनुमिति involves गौरव । So it is better to consider समग्र which contains these two ideas, as the one कर्तव्य of अनुमिति । Read 'ननु यत्रैव विद्यमानं ज्ञानमप्यत्र अनुमितिर्मात्रं व्याप्तिर्विशिष्टाद्विज्ञानमज्ञानं किमर्थमुक्तं यत्र इति चेन्न । यद्वै तत्त्वप्रधानमिति शङ्करमनस्येते विद्वन्मनस्येते अपरपरतया लक्षणैः सर्वे एतद्वयमेव कर्तव्यम् ।' 'विद्या न पराजयः । अर्थाभासो व्यवस्थितः ।'

(Line 14)—यद्यपि यत्र यत्र The author now sounds a note of warning that sometimes mere *सुयोद्दर्शन* = likely to deceive us in making us believe that there is *व्याप्ति* between two objects, when as a matter of fact, there is no *व्याप्ति* between them. We should of course avail ourselves of *सुयोद्दर्शन*, but we must at the same time be sure that there is *स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध*. Thus we see fire and smoke together a number of times, but considering the matter further, we find there cannot be *व्याप्ति* between fire and smoke, for fire is not the *प्रयोजक* of smoke, but *आद्भिन्नसंयोग*, hence the *सम्बन्ध* between fire and smoke is not *स्वाभाविक*, but *सौकरिक*. Likewise the *सम्बन्ध* between *यत्किञ्चिद् हिंसा* and *अधर्मसाधनत्व* is not *स्वाभाविक*, because *निबिडत्व* is the *प्रयोजक* of *अधर्मसाधनत्व* and not merely *हिंसा*, *मेघनिबन्धनत्व* is not the *प्रयोजक* of *व्यापन*, but *शाकाक्षपाननिमित्त*, hence there can be no *व्याप्ति* or *स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध* between *मेघनिबन्धनत्व* and *व्यापन*. (See section 26.) This whole passage (lines 14-29) should be read along with section 28, after the student has mastered sections 19-27.)

(Line 42)—नानुवचनम्, quoted from Vatsyayana's *Bhāṣya*, this is once again quoted in section 107.

(19) This section describes the two kinds of inference known as *स्वार्थ* and *पराथ*. When we want to infer something for our own benefit, we go through the process more or less mentally without caring to express in so many words the various stages through which our mind passes. But when we desire to make another comprehend the conclusion that we have formed we must state in definite terms the various stages by which we reach that conclusion. This is the distinction between these two kinds of inference. Thus, while in *स्वार्थानुमान* emphasis is laid on the sense, in *पराथानुमान* word is more important. The *सामान्यार्थ* defines them as follows: 'स्वार्थानुमानं परोक्षम् । परार्थानुमानं शब्दरूपम् ।' *स्वार्थानुमान* is informal, *पराथानुमान* is formal and must be expressed by the use of a regular syllogism. The *स्वार्थयोगिनी* defines them as '*न्यायबोध्यम्*' and '*न्यायप्रयोज्यम्*' respectively, where *न्याय* means a formal syllogism. Other definitions of these two kinds of *अनुमान* are '*पराथानुमानं शब्दबोध्यम् । स्वार्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानानुसंगम् ।*' '*पक्षावयवेन वाक्येन स्वनिश्चितार्थनिर्वाचनं परार्थानुमानम् ।*'

It will be noticed that *पराथानुमान* follows and is based on *स्वार्थानुमान*. For, unless we ourselves are sure of a certain conclusion we are not likely to proceed to convince another of it. Kesavamisra thus describes the process of *स्वार्थानुमान*. Having repeatedly observed in places such as the kitchen that smoke is accompanied by fire, we realise the invariable concomitance between the two. We then approach =

mountain and wonder if it has fire on it. Then we see smoke thereon and remember the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire that we have already realised. After this the cognition that the mountain is possessed of smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire dawns on us. This cognition, as we saw before, is nothing but अनुमान or लिङ्गगमन, which at once leads to the conclusion that the mountain is possessed of fire. Such is the process of inference for one self.—It will be noticed that the various stages through which अनुमानप्राप्त्यनुरूपः passes are मूयोद्गमन, व्याप्यप्रवृत्तिः, पवनसमीपगमन, सदेह, धूमदर्शन and अग्निस्मरण. After this is produced the लिङ्गपरावृत्ति which is immediately followed by the अनुमानेति.

(Line 7) — अग्नि-उत्पत्त्याद- This excludes the possibility of smoke being imported there from outside.

(Line 8) — अनुमानपरावृत्तिः consists in the use of a regular five-membered Sanskrit syllogism for the purpose of making another understand the presence of fire on the mountain after one has inferred it for oneself. The five sentences beginning with 'यदेतन्निर्वाणम्' represent the five members of a Sanskrit syllogism stated in the proper form. The five membered syllogism when formally stated enables even another to infer the presence of fire on the mountain.

It will be noticed that the Sanskrit अनुमान includes in it to a certain extent what in western logic is known as Induction. This latter consists in the observation of several particular cases and in inferring therefrom a general conclusion which will be found to be true in a subsequent case resembling those that we have already observed. If we were to remember the way in which we arrive at अनुमान in a Sanskrit अनुमान, we would find that we do so by following the Inductive method. For अनुमान is based on मूयोद्गमन or the repeated observation of particular cases. Thus the Sanskrit अनुमान is a mixture of Induction and Deduction. It must at the same time be admitted that Sanskrit logicians did not develop Induction as an independent process.

This division of अनुमान into स्वयं and वार्य is not known to Gautama and Harada, who were respectively the founders of the Nyaya and the Vaisheshika systems. It is however mentioned in the Bhasya of Prasastapada on the Sūtras of Kanada and is consequently fairly old.—Gautama divides अनुमान into three kinds viz पूर्वाह, उपपत्ति and समस्यना दृष्ट. This is the oldest division available. पूर्वाह अनुमान is that where from the cause we infer the effect, as when we infer that a shower of rain would fall when clouds threaten in the sky. उपपत्ति is

the opposite of this viz when we infer the cause from the effect Thus when we see a river in floods, we infer that there must have been rains somewhere up in its course All other cases of inference which are not from the cause to the effect or vice versa fall under the heading of सामान्यतो दृष्ट Thus, if after seeing a person in one place we find him in another some time later, we know that he must have gone from the first place to the other during the interval We see the sun in the morning in the east and find him in the west in the evening We therefore infer आदिद्यश्च मनसि from the east to the west during the course of the day, though his movement is not directly perceived Read 'अथ तदुक्तं त्रिविधमनुपपन्नं पूर्ववत्पक्षेपक्षश्च सामान्यतो दृष्टं च (१८ वस्तु १ : ०) यत्र कारणेन कारणमुदायो नत् पूर्ववत् । पूर्वे कारणेन उपपन्नं = कारणलिङ्गवत् । यथा मेघोक्त्या नदिप्यति वृष्टिरिति अनुमानम् । यत्र कार्येन कारणमुदायो नत् पक्षेपक्षश्च । शब्द साध तद्विद्वत् शेषवत् । यथा नदीदृष्ट्या वृष्ट्यानुमानम् । कार्यकारणविलिङ्गः सामान्यतो दृष्टम् । यथा, मृग्यादुक्तमन्वय दृष्टवन्त्वत्र दृष्टान्तिनि, तथा चादि-ब्रह्म, तन्मादन्ति अद-वत्त वे आदि पक्षे नव्या इति अनुमानम् ।

(Line 16) - कारयेन पञ्चिदादिपक्षा—the syllogism containing the five members प्रतिज्ञा etc It is strange that our author who does not mind repetition, should not even give the names of the five members, here They are given and explained in section 100 below The five members are प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु, उदाहरणम्, उपनय and निगमनम् The सप्तशब्दी defines them as follows 'साधयत्वन पक्षवचन प्रतिज्ञा । लिङ्गस्य पक्षधर्मवचन हेतु । उदाहरणं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । परामर्शवचनमुपनय । लिङ्गस्य वक्तुं निमित्तसाधयत्वन निगमनम् । (1) प्रतिज्ञा consists in the statement of the proposition that we want to prove e g परितो वैद्विमान् Here we assert that the साधय viz पक्षि is possessed by the पक्ष viz परित (ii) हेतु consists in stating that the indicatory mark is an attribute of the पक्ष, that is, = present on it e g वृष्टवन्तः It should be noted that a distinction is here made between लिङ्ग and हेतु, though the two words are often used = synonyms लिङ्ग is the actual indicatory mark and हेतु is the statement that this indicatory mark is present on the subject (iii) उदाहरणम् consists of two parts viz सार्थं or the statement of the invariable concomitance between the लिङ्ग and साधय and an instance to illustrate it e g यो यो भूमिमान् स वैद्विमान् यथा महानसः (iv) उपनय, lit bringing near, is the application of the general statement embodied in the सार्थं to the case under discussion 'तथा च अन्वय' is the technical form in which उपनय is expressed तथा means वद्विज्यावद्विमान् and अन्वय means परित This is nothing but the परामर्श as we have it in section 18 (v) निगमनम् or conclusion is the re-statement of the proposition, which forms the

on Nyāya-sūtra I : 32, 'स्नेहा च न न्यायवस्तुत्वे न्यायवद्वत्त्वात् । न वा न्याय-पदा-
प्रादुर्भावोऽत्रैव असम्भवम् । अनिप्रसंगात् प्रयोजनाभ्यासेऽत्र ।' विषयस्य स वृत्तिः on the same

The five membered syllogism is not however universally accepted. The Vedāntins accept only three members viz प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and उदाहरण, or उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन ('अवयवाश्च त्रय एव प्रतिज्ञाहेतु उदाहरणरूपा उदाहरणोपनय-
निगमनरूपा वा न तु पञ्च । अवयवत्रयेणैव व्याप्यप्रत्यक्षयोः पदार्थजननेन अधिकारवशाद्वयस्य
व्यर्थत्वत् वेदा नपारिभाषा) The Mīmāṃsākas also admit three viz प्रतिज्ञा,
हेतु and उदाहरण, or हेतु, उदाहरण and उपनय. The Buddhās on the other
hand are satisfied with only two viz उदाहरण and उपनय, or प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु
where व्याप्ति and हृदा न are included under हेतु

Students of logic will be interested in comparing the five mem-
bered Nyāya of Gautama with the three-membered syllogism of Aris-
totle and the modern European logicians. It would appear at first
sight that either some members in Gautama's Nyāya are superfluous
or that the syllogism of Aristotle is defective. But a closer examina-
tion will show that neither of these alternatives is true. Both the
Gautamian Nyāya and the Aristotelian syllogism lead to valid con-
clusions. So there is nothing essentially wrong with either. But while
Aristotle gives us the absolutely necessary parts of an inference, Gau-
tama's Nyāya has the form of a dialogue between two disputants.
For example, the प्रतिज्ञा is nothing but a dogmatic statement of what
you want to prove made with a view to excite opposition. When
therefore the opponent questions the validity of your statement, you
give your reason which constitutes the हेतु. The opponent then asks
what connection there is between the हेतु and the साध्य, to which you
reply by enunciating the व्याप्ति. And thus the dispute goes on. So
from the point of view of the form which Gautama wanted his Nyāya
to assume and of the purpose which he had in view viz to convince
an opponent of the truth of the conclusion that one has reached, all
the five members were necessary. But looked at from the point of
absolute necessity, the first two members of Gautama's Nyāya can be
safely dispensed with, for they are repeated in the fifth and the fourth
member respectively. Thus in fact has actually been done by a section
of the Vedāntins, who admit only उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन, which corre-
spond exactly with the three members of the Aristotelian syllogism.

Comparison of the Sanskrit Nyāya with the western syllogism
tells us that साध्य corresponds with the major term, सत्य with the minor
term and हेतु with the middle term. Similarly उदाहरण minus the दृष्टा न
represents the major premiss, उपनय the minor premiss and निगमन the
conclusion. In converting a Sanskrit Nyāya into a western syllogism

what we should do is to ignore प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु and the दृष्टान्त of the उदाहरण. Thus the usual अनुमान about the eternal smoking mountain may thus be converted into a correct syllogism (a Universal Affirmative in *Barbara*) as follows

(प्रतिज्ञा) पवनो वह्निमान् । To be omitted

(हेतु) धूमवत्तात् । To be omitted

(उदाहरणम्) यो या धूमवान् स न
वह्निमान् यथा गृहस्थम् } = Whatever is smoke is fiery
: : All smoke is fiery

(उपनय) अयं पवन वह्निमान् धूमवान् = This mountain is smoky

(निगमनम्) अस्मादयं पवनं वह्निमान् = This mountain is fiery

Similarly the hackneyed illustration of western logic about Socrates' mortality can thus be turned into a Sanskrit Nyaya

(Major premiss) All men are mortal = सर्वे मनुष्या मर्या or यत्र यत्र मनुष्यत्वं
तत्र तत्र मर्यामत् । Add to this a
दृष्टान्त such as यथा देविकेन्द्रे and
thus major premiss becomes a
correct उदाहरणम्.

(Minor premiss) Socrates is a man = सौकरिस् मनुष्य or साक्रेन्नि मर्या,
तत्र यत्र मनुष्यत्वमस्ति (उपनय)

(Conclusion) Socrates is mortal = अस्मात् सौकरिस् मर्या or मर्यामत् ।
(निगमनम्)

In order to make this conversion complete we have to add प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु, thus सौकरिस् मर्या : मनुष्यत्वात् । And the western syllogism becomes a correct Sanskrit Nyaya

(Line 18) — पञ्चकलावपन्नत्वं See section 24, for the five characteristics of a good अनुवचन. The reading पञ्चवचनेपरत्वात् is not good, as the characteristics of a सिद्ध are usually spoken of as लक्ष्य and not अवयवः. An अनुमानवाक्य is पञ्चवचन, but a सिद्ध वा हेतु (अनुवचननिर्देशः) is पञ्चकला

(20-23) These sections deal with the three fold division of सिद्ध which is based on the nature of the अगति in which it figures व्याप्ति or the invariable concomitance between the सिद्ध or साधन and साध्य, through the force of which the सिद्ध enables us to draw the conclusion, can be expressed in two ways positive and negative. When we say that a certain thing (such as fire) invariably follows the presence of another (such as smoke), we state the अगति positively (अनुवचन). Thus 'यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः । यथा गृहस्थते ।' is an instance of अनुवचनम्. It is so called because अनुवचन or the presence of smoke and fire is here seen in the kitchen. On the other hand when we declare that a certain thing (such as fire) being absent in a certain

place, another thing (such as smoke) is also absent from it, we state the *vyākṛti* negatively (*vyatirikṣa*). Thus 'यत्र यत्र बह्वर्थात् न तत्र धूमाभावः । यदा नृदे ।' is an instance of *vyatirikṣa-vyākṛti*. It is so called because *vyatirikṣa* or the absence of smoke and fire is here observed in the pool. It will be noticed that these two kinds of *vyākṛti* are just two different ways of expressing the same fact viz the invariable association between smoke and fire. For, to say that smoke is invariably associated with fire is the same thing as to say that fire being absent, smoke is also absent. The *अन्यव्यक्ति* can consequently be turned into the *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति* by what in western logic is known as obverted conversion. For example,

यत्र यत्र धूकतय तत्र वह्निः = 'All smoky is fiery'

By obversion, = No smoky is not-fiery

By conversion, = 'No not-fiery is smoky', that is, 'All not fiery is not-smoky

= यत्र यत्र बह्वर्थात् न तत्र धूमाभावः ।

It will be noticed that the absence of the *कारण* (i.e. the *साधन धूम*) in the *अन्यव्यक्ति* becomes the *व्यवहार* (and hence the *साधन*) in the *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति* (viz *धूम वाद*), similarly the absence of the *कारण* (i.e. the *साधन अग्नि*) in the *अन्यव्यक्ति* becomes the *प्रत्यक्ष* (and hence the *साधन*) in the *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति* (viz *बह्वर्थात्*)

The *अन्यव्यक्ति* and the *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति* being thus two different ways of expressing the same phenomenon of the invariable concomitance between *साधन* and *साधन*, it would appear that every *साधन* or *निष्कर्ष* could have these two *व्यक्ति*s. But this is not actually the case. For the rule is that the *व्यक्ति* is not complete unless it has a corresponding *वृत्ति* or example. Now it may so happen that a *निष्कर्ष* may have an example for both the *अन्यव्यक्ति* and *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति*, when it is called *अन्यव्यक्ति-व्यक्ति*. Another will find an example for only the *अन्यव्यक्ति* and none for the *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति*, when it is known as *अन्यव्यक्ति-व्यक्ति*. A third will possess an example for only the *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति* and none for the *अन्यव्यक्ति*, and it is then designated *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति*.

Thus (1) *धूमवत्* with reference to the *साधन* *वह्नि* is an *अन्यव्यक्ति-व्यक्ति*, because both kinds of *व्यक्ति* complete with examples are possible with regard to it. Another example of an *अन्यव्यक्ति-व्यक्ति* *निष्कर्ष* is *हृत्कम्प* when *अनिर्वाह* is *सम्प* & *ग* *शब्दादिव* । *हृत्कम्प* । यत्र यत्र हृत्कम्प तत्र तत्र अनिर्वाह इति । यत्र यत्र अनिर्वाह इति तत्र हृत्कम्प इति । यत्र यत्र हृत्कम्प तत्र तत्र अनिर्वाह इति । यत्र यत्र अनिर्वाह इति तत्र हृत्कम्प इति । (2) An example of *व्यतिरेकव्यक्ति* *निष्कर्ष* is *प्रमेयत्व* or knowability when *अभिधेयत्व* or nameability is the *साधन*, & *ग* *यत्र* *अभिधेयत्व* *यदव्यक्तम्* । यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्व तत्र तत्र

अभिधेयत्वं यथा एते । यत्र यत्र अभिधेयत्वमात्रं तत्र तत्र प्रत्यक्षत्वमात्रं यथा— Here we cannot find any example for the *व्यतिरेक-प्राप्ति*, because everything under the sun is knowable and hence nameable. The peculiarity of the *केवलान्वयि* लिङ्ग lies in this that here the *साध्य* and *साधन* belong to everything in existence, so that no entity which is characterised by the *साध्य* and the *साधन* may be thought of. (11) An example of *वैकल्यव्यतिरेकि* लिङ्ग is गन्धवत्त्व when इतरभेदः साध्यः, एवमपि इतरमिच्छा गन्धवत्त्वम् । यत्र यत्र गन्धवत्त्वम् तत्र तत्र इतरमिच्छा यथा— । यत्र यत्र इतरमिच्छात्वमात्रं तत्र तत्र गन्धवत्त्वमात्रं यथा ज्ञेयम् । Here we notice that no example is found for the *अन्यव्यपत्ति*, for everything which has *गन्ध* is *पृथिवी* and is thus included in the *वक्ष*. The peculiarity of the *केवलान्वयि* लिङ्ग is that here the *साध्य* and the *साधन* are co-extensive with the *वक्ष*, so that no entity, other than *वक्ष*, where they reside, can be found. In this case we find that *पृथिवी*, *पृथिवीतत्वेद* (which by the way means nothing but *पृथिवी*) and *गन्धवत्त्व* are all equally extensive. Another example of *वैकल्यव्यतिरेकि* लिङ्ग is as follows जीव-उत्तीरं सा प्रक प्राणादिमत्त्वात् । यत्र यत्र प्राणादिमत्त्वम् तत्र तत्र सामकत्वम् यथा— । यत्र यत्र सामकत्वमात्रं तत्र तत्र प्राणादिमत्त्वमात्रं यथा एते । Here we notice that no example for the *अन्यव्यपत्ति* is available, for everything which is possessed of vital airs etc. and has a soul is included in the *वक्ष* viz जीव-उत्तीरम् (a living body). Similarly the *वक्ष* जीव-उत्तीरं, the *साध्य* सामकत्वम् and the *साधन* प्राणादिमत्त्वम् are all co-extensive.

(21) The author tells us here why it is usual to give an instance of *अन्यव्यपत्ति* only, even in the case of an *अन्यव्यपत्तिरेकी* हेतु. The reason is—There is no point in giving both positive and negative instances, when our purpose is served by an instance of one type only, and therein we prefer the *अन्य* instance to the *व्यतिरेक* one, because an *अन्य* instance is more easily understandable, being more straightforward. The reading यथा शास्त्रोक्तिरिति etc. does not come in with propriety after the remark एवम् ये द्रष्टव्या, which suggests that the argument is over.

(22) (Lane 111)—अथ च व्यवहारः साध्यः The author draws our attention to the fact (which we are likely to overlook) that the *साध्य* in the argument in question is *प्रमाणमिति व्यवहारः* and not *प्रमाणम्*. For, if the syllogism is प्रत्यक्षार्थिकं प्रमाणम् । प्रमाद्वयं वातु, the position would be that the *साध्य* (प्रमाण) would be the same as the हेतु (प्रमाद्वयं=प्रमाण) and naturally no inference is possible if the हेतु and साध्य are one, if the *साध्य* is *प्रमाणमिति व्यवहारः*, it is different from the हेतु, प्रमाद्वयम्, and there would be no difficulty.

(24) In this section, Kesavamisra mentions the characteristics of a valid reason. They are five viz (1) पक्ष-म-वम् being present in

the वन The valid reason, smoke, for example, is present in the subject, mountain (1) सपक्षे सत्यम् being present in a similar instance e.g. the smoke is present in the kitchen (11) विपक्षद् व्याप्ति being absent from a dissimilar instance e.g. the smoke is absent from the great pool (12) अवाधितविषयत्वम् not having its object or साध्य disproved by a stronger proof Thus if we were to argue 'अग्निमुष्णं द्रव्यत्वं जलत्वं,' the विषय or साध्य viz अग्निमुष्णत्वम् would be साधित or disproved by a stronger proof viz द्रव्यत्व or direct perception, which tells us that fire is hot So the हेतु द्रव्यत्व is not अवाधितविषय and consequently cannot be a सपक्षे Smoke however does not possess its साध्य कहेत्यत्र disproved in this manner and hence it is a valid reason (3) असमनिरूप्यत्वम् not having a rival reason which proves the opposite of its साध्य For example, शब्दं नित्यं व्यक्तत्वात् शब्दत्ववत्, Here the सामान्य शब्दत्व is वाच्य or audible because of the rule 'वेदेन्द्रियेण यद् यदापि वेदेन्द्रियेण तद्गतं सामान्यं, तद्गतं सत्त्वात्, ननुमनोऽप्यप्यद् यदापि' It is also नित्यं So वाच्यत्व would seem to prove the eternality of sound But we find there is a rival reason which proves just the opposite of what वाच्यत्व seems to prove Thus one may with equal force argue 'शब्दं अनित्यं कार्यत्वात् यदवत्' Therefore the हेतु वाच्यत्व is said to be समनिरूप्य inasmuch as it has an equally powerful rival viz कार्यत्व which proves the opposite of its साध्य In the case of the smoke however there is no such rival and it is a valid reason consequently

These are then the five characteristics which a valid reason must possess and if a reason is deficient in one or more of these, it is fallacious It will be noticed that these five characteristics are found in an सत्यव्यतिरेकी हेतु only, such as युग्म in the stock example is A केवलसम्पत्ति हेतु and a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु cannot by their very nature have विपक्षद् व्याप्ति and सपक्षे सत्यम् respectively, because in their case a विपक्ष and सपक्ष do not exist

(25) See section 18 above

(26) हेतुभास — See section 28 below A केवलसम्पत्ति हेतु is valid though possessed of only the following four characteristics, पक्षपक्षत्वम्, सपक्षे सत्यम्, अवाधितविषयत्वम् and असमनिरूप्यत्वम् (विपक्षद् व्याप्ति is impossible)

A केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु is valid, though possessed of only the following four characteristics, पक्षपक्षत्वम्, विपक्षद् व्याप्ति, अवाधितविषयत्वम् and असमनिरूप्यत्वम् (सपक्षे सत्यम् is impossible)

(27) In this section the author is defining the terms पक्ष, सपक्ष and विपक्ष पक्ष is that with reference to which the thing to be proved is doubtful A simpler definition of पक्ष is सङ्क्षिप्तसम्भवम् Thus in the usual illustration of the smoky mountain the साध्य is वह्निमत्त्व A

वह्निमत् is not definitely known to be possessed by the mountain i.e. as it is doubtful with regard to the mountain, therefore we proceed to establish it by means of a formal syllogism. Hence वयम् is a वयम् — An objection is here raised. In the case of a वयम्-प्रमाण where after ascertaining the presence of the fire on the mountain for ourselves, we proceed to convince another of that fact, the mountain is not सविशयावयम्, because we know for certain that it is fiery. It is thus निश्चिनसावयम्. How can the mountain then be a वयम् in this case? The obvious answer to this is that though the mountain may be निश्चिनसावयम् to us, it is certainly सविशयावयम् to the man to whom we are proving its वह्निमत्. Hence it is a वयम् all right. There is also a pedantic answer to the above objection. According to this वयम् is defined afresh as 'निवाचयिविरहिमिश्रसिद्धयमव' (सिवाचयिविरहमिश्रसिद्धयमव १) i.e. in order that a thing should be a वयम्, it should possess the absence of definite knowledge (सिद्धे अभाव which by the way is nothing but सविशयावयमवयम्) characterised by the absence of a desire to prove. Now in the case objected to viz. where we want to prove the वह्निमत् of the mountain to another after having ascertained it for ourselves, there is certainly no सिद्धयमव with regard to the mountain, as we know definitely that it is possessed of fire. But this निश्चयमव, which is absent, is not characterized by निवाचयिविरह, since we possess सिवाचयिविरह or desire to prove. Therefore the mountain is a वयम् in spite of our definite knowledge. What the new definition of वयम् means is that in order to constitute a वयम् there should either be सिद्धयमव or सिवाचयिविरह. Thus in the present case though निश्चयमव does not exist inasmuch as we possess definite knowledge, the mountain can be a वयम् because there is निवाचयिविरह.

सपक्ष and विपक्ष are easily understood. सपक्ष or a similar instance is that which is definitely known to possess the सपक्ष. It forms the दृष्टान्त to the अन्वय-पक्ष which along with it is included under उदाहरण. The kitchen is the सपक्ष in the case under discussion. For both parties agree that the kitchen is possessed of fire and a सपक्ष or a दृष्टान्त should be such as is acceptable to both the parties to a dispute — विपक्ष or a dissimilar instance is the opposite of सपक्ष. It is that which is definitely known not to possess the सपक्ष महा-इदं which as everybody knows does not possess fire is the विपक्ष in the present case. विपक्ष constitutes the दृष्टान्त in the स्वतिरेकव्यक्ति.

(28) The author now proceeds to treat of हेत्वाभास. The word हेत्वाभास is used in two senses. First it means a fallacious reason (हेतुवद्भासासम्भे इति हेत्वाभासा इति हेतुवद्भासा इत्यर्थः १-पायकोपनिषत्) ॥ हेतुवत्पक्षमसिद्धिः हेतुवद्भासासम्भे

हेत्वभासा । p 30, foot note) and it is in this sense that our author has used the word Secondly, it means fallacy or the defect which renders a reason fallacious (हेतोः आक्षेप दोष इत्यर्थः) The five defects which underlie the five fallacious reasons enumerated by our author are असिद्धि, विरोध, व्यविचार, प्रतिषेध and बाध—An objection is here raised 'What is the use of learning about हेत्वभासा or fallacious marks ? If one knows what a valid mark is, that is quite enough The answer is that the knowledge of fallacious marks is necessary in order to detect fallacies in the arguments of our opponents and to avoid using such invalid reasons in our own

हेत्वभासा is also defined as 'अङ्गविकलो हेतुर्हवायम' (= reason which is deficient in one or more of its members or characteristics (of a valid reason mentioned in section 24 above)

The first हेत्वभासा is असिद्ध or unproven असिद्ध हेतु is that which is void of सिद्धि and सिद्धि is defined as 'व्यपन्न हेतोः पक्षपक्षयोः प्रतीति (see P 104, line 6) Now we know that this is nothing but पारमार्थ्य सिद्धि like पारमार्थ्य, thus consists of two elements, पक्षपक्षता and व्याप्ति and a हेतु which is deficient in one of these is असिद्ध A हेतु may lack पक्षपक्षता in two ways viz (1) when the पक्ष has no existence at all in the world of realities In this case the हेतु is known as आशयवैयर्थ्य because it has no substratum or support to reside in (2) When the हेतु is not actually present in the पक्ष This is known as रसस्यवैयर्थ्य, because the हेतु is in its own nature unproven in the पक्ष The third variety of असिद्ध is (iii) तत्त्ववैयर्थ्य, because it lacks व्याप्ति which is the second requisite of सिद्धि

(1) An instance of आशयवैयर्थ्य is 'यत्पद्मसिद्धि इ मुक्तसिद्धि इत्यत्र' । 'यत्पद्मसिद्धि' Here we find that the पक्ष, viz a sky-lotus, simply does not exist, because it is only an imaginary thing आशयवैयर्थ्य thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid हेतु viz पक्षपक्षता Another illustration of आशयवैयर्थ्य is 'यत्पद्मसिद्धि इत्यत्र पद्मसिद्धि इत्यत्र' । 'यत्पद्मसिद्धि' Here we find that the पक्ष, viz a sky-lotus, simply does not exist, because it is only an imaginary thing आशयवैयर्थ्य thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid हेतु viz पक्षपक्षता Another illustration of आशयवैयर्थ्य is 'यत्पद्मसिद्धि इत्यत्र पद्मसिद्धि इत्यत्र' । 'यत्पद्मसिद्धि' Here we find that the पक्ष, viz a sky-lotus, simply does not exist, because it is only an imaginary thing आशयवैयर्थ्य thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid हेतु viz पक्षपक्षता

Under तत्त्ववैयर्थ्य is also included the reasoning which is known as सिद्धसम्बन्ध or establishing a thing which is already well known, e.g. 'चन्द्रसिद्धि इत्यत्र चन्द्रसिद्धि' That the orb of the moon is round is not questioned by anybody and need not consequently be proved This reasoning falls under तत्त्ववैयर्थ्य, because the orb of the moon, though actually existing unlike the sky lotus, is not a पक्ष in the technical sense of 'सिद्धिपक्षपक्षता' For about 'चन्द्रसिद्धि इत्यत्र चन्द्रसिद्धि' there is no सन्देह whatsoever in the mind of any one It is only in this sense that the आशय viz पक्ष does not exist in the case of सिद्धसम्बन्ध Another illustration of सिद्धसम्बन्ध is 'देवदत्तो हस्तपादद्वयम् हस्तपादद्वयवत् हस्तपादद्वयम्'—It

should be noted that the stock example of western logic about Socrates and his mortality will fall under साधवासिद्ध, because Socrates cannot be considered as पक्ष, as his mortality is not a subject of doubt to any one

(11) स्वरूपासिद्ध is instanced by 'अन्योऽप्येत्य बाधुवत्वात् चरत्.' Here बाधुवत्त्व or variability is not found in the पक्ष इत्य् at all बाधुवत्त्व is पक्षे स्वस्वेष असिद्ध or unproven in the subject in its own nature This हेतु-मात्रं अलोक्य पक्षधर्म इत् Other illustrations are 'अदो द्रव्य धूमवत्त्वात् पननत्.' 'अथ धूम विपणितवत् बलीवदवत्.' 'आत्मा अनित्य इत्यन्यत्वात् पदवत्.' 'पट निम्न विभुत्वात् व्योमवत्.'

(12) 'व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध' is the third and last variety of असिद्ध. It is explained as व्याप्यत्वं (हेतो बद्धे साध्वेन धूयेन व्याप्यत्वम्) असिद्ध इति in which the व्याप्य of the reason is not established i.e. in which the reason is not व्याप्य or invariably associated with the साध्य. In a valid व्याप्ति (यत्र यत्र धूम, तत्र तत्र वह्निः) the हेतु (धूम) is व्याप्य or pervaded by the साध्य (वह्निः). If in an argument we find that the हेतु is not for some reason साध्यव्याप्य then that हेतु will fall under व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. Take the case 'धर्मो धूमवत् वह्निमत्वात्.' Here धूम is साध्य and वह्निः is हेतु. The व्याप्ति is stated as 'यत्र यत्र वह्निः तत्र तत्र धूम.' Now we find that the हेतु वह्निः is not व्याप्य or less extensive, i.e. a valid हेतु should be, with regard to the साध्य धूम. For fire is found in more places than smoke. Fire is present in all places where smoke is present and is in addition found in certain others where smoke exists not viz. a red hot ball of iron or a burning electric bulb. So in the above instance the व्याप्यत्व of the हेतु वह्निः is असिद्ध. Consequently the हेतु वह्निः in the syllogism 'यत्र धूमवत् वह्निमत्वात्' is a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु. Here we find that the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz. विपक्षोऽव्याकृतिः is violated. For the विपक्ष in this case is वह्निमत्तना-शब्देनोक्त or अवलम्बितवृत्तौ where धूममात्रं is definitely known to be present. But the हेतु वह्निः is not absent from these. Hence the violation of विपक्षोऽव्याकृतिः.

A व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु, as instanced in 'धर्मो धूमवत् वह्निमत्वात्' involves the violation of व्याप्ति, because the हेतु वह्निः is not धूम-साध्य or invariably associated with धूम. The reason why this is so is that धूम is not naturally or by its own nature associated with वह्निः. We find however that in most cases धूम is associated with वह्निः. But this association is due to an extraneous factor viz. आर्देन्वनसंयोगः. Only when fire is in contact with wet fuel, it will be invariably associated with smoke. Thus in order that the व्याप्ति 'यत्र यत्र वह्निः तत्र तत्र धूम' should be valid, or in order that the हेतु वह्निः in this case should be a sound one and not a हेतुमात्रं, we must add to the व्याप्ति a qualification viz. आर्देन्वनसंयोगे सति. Thus

only when it is forbidden. Thus निविद्वत्त्व is the उपाधि in this case. निविद्वत्त्व is found in all those places where the साध्य viz अर्धसाधनत्व is found for निविद्वत्त्व is the cause of अर्ध. Hence निविद्वत्त्व is सध्यव्यपक. Further, निविद्वत्त्व is not present wherever the साधन द्विष्टा is present, for slaughter in sacrifice is not only not निविद्वत्, but is actually विहित or enjoined. So निविद्वत्त्व is साधनाव्यपक. Both the characteristics of उपाधि being thus present in it, निविद्वत्त्व is a proper उपाधि and the हेतु द्विष्टत्व is consequently व्याप्य वासिद्धि or साध्याधिकार. —It will be noticed that the reason on द्विष्टात्व lacks उपसाहचर्यत्व, because विपक्षे अर्धसाधनत्वभावावधानि बहवः कारणेन हिमं चमयन्.

Another somewhat interesting example of the same हेतुभास is 'गमस्य निश्रान्तस्य इयम निश्रान्तवत्यन्तः । इमत्पुत्रवत् ।' There was a lady of the name निश्रा who had a few dark-complexioned sons (and one or two fair ones). When Mitra conceived once more, a student of logic argued in the above manner and tried to prove that the son in the womb would also be dark. But the argument is not correct. For we find that निश्रान्तवत्त्व is not the cause of इयमत्व. इयमत्व is caused in her sons because Mitra used to eat only vegetables and no ghee at the time when these dark sons were born. (According to the eugenics of the Naryāyikas, darkness of complexion is the result of the mother's partaking of vegetables only. If the mother ate ample ghee, she would have fair children. Persons interested should note this!) Hence शास्त्रपाकजत्व is the उपाधि in this case. 'यदयं इयमत्वं तत्र तत्र शास्त्रपाकजत्वम्'—thus शास्त्रपाकजत्व is साध्यव्यापक. Further, we cannot say 'इयमत्वं निश्रान्तवत्त्वम्' तत्र तत्र सर्वत्र शास्त्रपाकजत्वम्. For when her fair sons were born, she was subsisting on ghee. शास्त्रपाकजत्व is thus सधनव्यापक. Both the characteristics are thus found to be present in शास्त्रपाकजत्व which consequently is a proper उपाधि.

In all the cases we have seen that the हेतुभास involves the अस्तिद्धि or non-establishment of स्वप्ति, because there is an उपाधि which vitiates it. The अस्तिद्धि of स्वप्ति arises in two other ways also viz. (1) when there is no valid means of ascertaining the स्वप्ति and (2) when the स्वप्ति is inherently impossible. An example of (1) is गच्छन्ति सर्वत्र । यत् सत् सत् सन्ति सर्वत्र यथा जम्भार । This argument is based on the theory of the Buddhists who believe in the momentariness of all existing things. To the Naryāyikas no such entity as momentariness exists, because they believe that even the most transient object lasts for at least three moments, the moment of its production, the moment of its destruction and the moment that intervenes between these two. So there is no प्रमाण that can grasp the invariable concomitance

between सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्वं and consequently the variety is असिद्ध. Kesavamisra mentions this variety only and remarks that शब्द क्षणिक सत्त्व must not be regarded as an instance of लोपाधि व्याप्यत्वसिद्ध, for that would mean that we are prepared to admit the व्याप्ति between सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्वं, under certain conditions, and that there is a प्रयोजन (other than सत्त्व) for क्षणिकत्वं. All this is tantamount to saying that क्षणिकत्वं is a proved entity which it cannot be for an entity must remain for at least three moments (11) is illustrated by 'परतो वक्षिमात् काञ्चनमयधुपम्'. Here we note that though ordinary धुप is वक्षिमाय, काञ्चनमयधुप is not so. In fact no such thing as काञ्चनमयधुप exists. The रसादि therefore is असिद्ध and the हेतु काञ्चनमय धुप becomes व्याप्यत्वसिद्ध. —It will be noticed that this variety can be included under the first by saying that there is no धुप which can grasp the व्याप्ति between काञ्चनमयधुप and वक्षि.

The above discussion will give the student a fairly correct idea of लोपाधि व्याप्यत्वसिद्ध which of all the fallacious reasons is a bit difficult to understand. The characteristics of उपाधि विद् सध्वत्वापत्तयः and साधनाभ्यापत्तयः are best remembered by having a concrete instance of उपाधि such as आर्द्रत्वमयोज always in view. Further elaboration of उपाधि is unnecessary for a bala for whom this treatise is intended. We however quote the following passages wherein Ananabhatta mentions and illustrates four varieties of उपाधि. Read उपाधिभूतुषि । केरलभाष्यभाषकः, पञ्चमर्धविच्छिन्नसम्प्राप्त्यपत्तयः, साधनाधिविच्छिन्नसम्प्राप्त्यपत्तयः, उपाधिनवध्वत्वापत्तयः । अथ आर्द्र-ध्वनसंयोगः । द्वितीये वक्ष्ये धुपं प्रत्यक्षं प्रवक्ष्यामि । अथ वक्षिमायधुपसम्प्राप्त्यपत्तयः । तृतीये वक्ष्यामि विवाही जन्मवादिनि । अथ जन्मवाधिविच्छिन्नसम्प्राप्त्यपत्तयः । चतुर्थे वक्ष्यामि विवाही पञ्चमवादिनि । अथ जन्मवाधिविच्छिन्नसम्प्राप्त्यपत्तयः । दीर्घम् ।

We have seen that all cases of लोपाधि व्याप्यत्वसिद्ध involve the violation of the third characteristic of a valid reason viz विभाज्य व्याप्यत्वसिद्ध thus resembles सध्वत्वापत्तयः उपाधिनवध्वत्वापत्तयः (परतो वक्षिमात् धुपमयधुपम्) which also lacks निवसद्व्याप्यत्व (see section 30). The two must therefore be distinguished. The difference between the two is mainly based on what strikes one in each of them as prominent. Thus while in सध्वत्वापत्तयः strikingness lies in the too wide character of the reason which, being consequently present in the विषय, violates the concomitance, in व्याप्यत्वसिद्ध it is the presence of the उपाधि which violates the concomitance, that strikes one as prominent. In सध्वत्वापत्तयः the fact that the हेतु is associated with the साधनाभाव is more prominent. In व्याप्यत्वसिद्ध on the other hand what strikes us more is the fact that the साधन is not due to the हेतु, but to some extraneous

ous factor. There is another and more subtle point of distinction between the two, based on the nature of the *व्याप्ति*. In साधारण अनेकान्तिक the *व्याप्ति* is recognised as being positively *व्यभिचारित* or violated owing to the presence of the हेतु in the विषय. In व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध on the other hand the *व्याप्ति* cannot be grasped at all owing to the presence of the *व्याप्ति*. Thus while the one is positively defective, the other is only negatively so. *व्यभिचार* is a positive defect, *असिद्धि* represents only the negative side of the concomitance. साधारण अनेकान्तिक is easily noticed owing to its positive character. व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध on the other hand may easily pass undetected owing to the difficulty of locating the *व्याप्ति*.

It may be noted en passant that a view prevails among Naiyayikas which refuses to recognise व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध as a हेतुभाषा. For, they argue that if we keep the *व्याप्ति* in mind, it is quite possible to draw a correct conclusion from what is regarded as a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतुभाषा. Thus 'पवनो धूमवान् आर्द्रैश्चनसंयोगे सति वह्निपश्चात्' is a correct nyaya. In the case of other fallacious reasons on the other hand no matter what you do, you will not be able to draw a correct conclusion. For example, the साधारण अनेकान्तिक हेतु is 'पवनो वह्निपश्चात् समेष्वप्यत्र' cannot be rectified by the addition of a qualification or something of the kind. भोवाधिकृत्याप्यत्वासिद्ध thus stands on a different footing from the other hetvabhāṣas. The answer to this view is that for a proper syllogism an absolutely universal concomitance unfettered by any condition is necessary. In the above example the *व्याप्ति* 'यत्र यत्र आर्द्रैश्चनसंयोगे सति वह्निः तत्र तत्र धूमः' is no doubt true. But it will not do for a proper nyaya because it is conditioned by the *व्याप्ति* आर्द्रैश्चनसंयोग.

(29) This section deals with the हेतुभाषा विरुद्ध or contrary. A valid हेतु is सार्वभौमः i.e. invariably associated with the साधक. धूम for example is वह्निपश्चातः i.e. wherever धूम is found, वह्निः is also found. A विरुद्ध हेतु is just the opposite of this i.e. it is सत्त्वभववत्. This means that instead of tending to prove its proper साधक, it proves exactly the opposite. Hence it is significantly called विरुद्ध or contrary. For example, in 'शश्वो नित्यं कृतकत्वम्' we find that the हेतु कृतकत्वम्, far from being the *साधक* of नित्यत्वम्, is the *व्याप्य* of नित्यत्वाभाव. Thus we cannot say, 'यत्र यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम्'. But we can legitimately assert 'यत्र यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वाभावः' or अनित्यत्वम् यथा चटे. It will be noticed that the विरुद्ध हेतु कृतकत्वम् is present in the वस्तु शश्वत्, but is not found in a सार्वभौम (i.e. any eternal thing such as आकाशः), nor is it absent from a विरुद्ध (i.e. any non-eternal thing such as चट). Consequently it lacks सार्वभौम्यं and विरुद्धाद् व्याप्यते. The सार्वभौम्यं defines विरुद्ध as 'वस्तुविषयभावेन शैले विरुद्धत्वम्'. गौतम's definition is 'निर्द्वन्द्वमप्युदेव तद्विरोधो विरुद्धः' ग्या. सू. I 11 6.

विद्वद् must be distinguished from साधारण अनेकान्तिक Both resemble in so far as both tend to prove the साधारण But (1) while साधारण अनेकान्तिक can prove the साधारण in addition to the सत्य owing to its being too wide, विद्वद् proves the साधारण only on account of its being the व्याप्य with regard to it (2) Secondly, while साधारण अनेकान्तिक is present in the विद्वद् in addition to the सत्य, विद्वद्, though present in the विद्वद्, is never present in the सत्य विद्वद् सत्य = common to both But साधारण अनेकान्तिक has सर्वत्र सत्य also, which विद्वद् lacks

विद्वद् need not be distinguished from असाधारण (and अनुपसङ्गही, this is not admitted by Kesavamiśra, the Tarkasamgraha admits it) अनेकान्तिक because there is not much of a striking resemblance between these But one may, if one likes, say that विद्वद् resembles असाधारण अनेकान्तिक in so far as both lack सर्वत्र सत्यम् But (1) while असाधारण अनेकान्तिक is not present in the सत्य because it is confined to the सत्य only, विद्वद् is not found in the सत्य because it is associated with साधारण (2) Secondly, while असाधारण अनेकान्तिक does not tend to prove anything, neither the सत्य nor the साधारण, on account of its too narrow character, विद्वद् distinctly proves the साधारण

[Similarly विद्वद् may be said to resemble अनुपसङ्गही अनेकान्तिक in so far as both lack सर्वत्र सत्यम् and विद्वद् सत्यम् But (1) while अनुपसङ्गही lacks these because there can be no सत्य and विद्वद् at all विद्वद् is deficient in them because it is not present in सत्य and is not absent from विद्वद्, though सत्य and विद्वद् exist in its case (2) Secondly, अनुपसङ्गही cannot prove anything, because there is no complete सत्य for it विद्वद् on the other hand proves the साधारण]

(30) This section treats of the अनेकान्तिक fallacy अनेकान्तिक is explained as सत्यविपर्यय सत्यविपर्यय means that which involves the समिष्ट or violation of the सत्य or the invariable concomitance between the सत्य and सत्य It will be noticed that in each of the two varieties of अनेकान्तिक, the सत्य cannot be correctly stated The term अनेकान्तिक is significant and explains the general nature of this fallacious reason It means 'नोनेकान्तिक (एक अन्त सत्य सत्य) or that which does not possess only one extreme, i.e. that which does tend to prove not only one thing, but also its opposite' अनेकान्तिक thus means inconclusive The Tarkasamgraha calls this fallacy सत्यविपर्यय

अनेकान्तिक has two varieties, साधारण and असाधारण (1) साधारण or too wide is that सत्यविपर्यय or discrepant reason which exists in a place that is possessed of the negation of the सत्य or the thing to be established An illustration of साधारण अनेकान्तिक is सर्वत्र सत्यम्

प्रमेयत्वात् महारसवत् Here we find that the reason प्रमेय व is found even in a place which is possessed of the negation of the सत्य A pool is possessed of बह्विमत्ताभाव, but it is प्रमेय all the same. Consequently प्रमेय व is an invalid or fallacious reason. It will be noticed that the reason प्रमेय व involves the violation of the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षद्-वाक्यति—The अविवक्षित or violation of the व्याप्ति that is involved in this fallacious reason is thus explained यत्र यत्र प्रमेय न सत्र तत्र बह्विमत्ता is the nature of the व्याप्ति here प्रमेय व is सधन and बह्विमत्ता is सत्य. Now we know that in a correct व्याप्ति the सधन should be व्याप्य or less extensive and the सत्य व्यापक or more extensive. But the सधन प्रमेय व is not व्याप्य in this case. In fact प्रमेय व is perhaps the most व्यापक thing that we can ever conceive. Thus the व्याप्ति is अविवक्षित or violated in the case of this हेतु viz प्रमेय व which consequently becomes a हेताभास—This variety of अविवक्षित is called साधारण or too wide because the हेतु is not restricted to पक्ष and स्वपक्ष but extends to विपक्ष as well. The मन्त्रदर्शी defines this kind of हेताभास as पक्षव्यवृत्तित्वम्.—In the illustration of साधारण अविवक्षित given in the text शब्दो नित्य प्रमेय वात्-रोमयत् the हेतु प्रमेय व is found not only in the स्वपक्ष viz-शब्द but also in the विपक्ष viz any अनित्य thing such as घट. It is thus पक्षव्यवृत्ति.

A साधारण अविवक्षित हेतु should be distinguished from a valid केवलान्वयी हेतु as instanced in घट आभ्येय प्रमेयवात्. Both resemble in so far as both lack the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षद्-वाक्यति. But the difference between them is three fold (1) A केवलान्वयी हेतु does not possess the characteristic विपक्षद्-वाक्यति, because there is no विपक्ष at all. A साधारण अविवक्षित हेतु on the other hand possesses a विपक्ष, from which however it is not absent owing to its defective nature. (2) In the case of a केवलान्वयी हेतु the मन्त्र-व्याप्ति is quite sound, while with a साधारण अविवक्षित हेतु the व्याप्ति involves अविवक्षित and is thus defective. (3) The peculiarity of a केवलान्वयी हेतु is as we saw before that the सा व (अभिधेयत्व) and साधन (प्रमेय व) belong to everything in existence. This however is not so in the case of a साधारण अविवक्षित. Here the सत्य बह्विमत्ता cannot be said to belong to all things, though the सधन प्रमेय व is all-extending.

(11) The second variety of अविवक्षित is असाधारण or too narrow. This consists in the हेतु being present in the पक्ष only. It is thus too narrow since it does not extend to स्वपक्ष where it should really be found. The example is शब्दो नित्य शब्दत्वात्. Here स्वपक्ष is constituted by नित्य things such as आकाश, काल, दिक् and अन्त्र. विपक्ष is represented by अनित्य objects such as घट, इत. Now we find that the हेतु शब्द व is absent from all these अनित्य things which are स्वपक्ष as well as from all the नित्य

things which are the *vikāṣas*. It exists only in the *vyākṛ* viz *śāb*. Hence *सम्बन्ध* is *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु*. Here the second characteristic of a valid *हेतु* viz *सर्वत्र सम्बन्ध* is violated. The *व्यभिचार* consists in this that the *व्याप्ति* 'यत्र यत्र शब्दश्च तत्र तत्र नियमश्च' is not correct. For between the *साधन* *शब्दत्व* and the *साध्य* *नित्यत्व*, *अव्यभिचारसम्बन्ध* does not exist. In fact there is no connection whatsoever between *शब्दत्व* and *नित्यत्व*.—In the illustration of the *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु* given in the text, 'पूर्विका मन्थवन्तः' we notice that the *हेतु* *मन्थवन्त* is absent from all *निव* and *अनिव* things which form the *सूक्ष्म* and *विश्लक्ष* respectively.

The *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु* must be distinguished from a valid *केवल-व्यभिचारी हेतु*, from which also the characteristic *सर्वत्र सम्बन्ध* is absent. An instance of the latter, as we saw before, is *जीववृत्तिः स नर माण दि-मन्वात्*. Here also we find that the *हेतु* *माणदिमन्* is *वत्सवावृत्ति* and that it is not possessed of the characteristic *सर्वत्र सम्बन्ध*. But the difference between the two is as follows. (1) For a *केवलव्यभिचारी हेतु* the characteristic *सर्वत्र सम्बन्ध* is not possible, because there is no *सामान* at all. In the case of an *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु* on the other hand *सम्बन्ध* certainly exists. But the *हेतु* is not found in them on account of its defective nature. (2) The *व्याप्ति* in the case of a *केवल व्यभिचारी हेतु* is sound, though it is stated negatively. In the case of an *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु* on the other hand, the *व्याप्ति* involves *व्यभिचार* or the violation of the invariable association of the *साधन* and the *साध्य*. (3) In the case of a *केवल-व्यभिचारी हेतु* the *साधन*, *साध्य* and *वत्स* are all equally extensive. Thus *समनन्तर*, *प्रणादिसम्बन्ध* and *जीववृत्ति* are all equally extensive. In the case of an *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु* on the other hand this is not so. For we can easily see that *नित्यत्व*, *शब्दत्व* and *शब्द* are not of equal extent.

The *समवयवी* designates the *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु* by the term *अव्यभिचारिण* and defines it as 'सामानसाधकत्वे सति वत्सवावृत्तिः निश्चयमात्रसिद्धत्वात्'. This is a better definition than our author's, for the expression *सामानसाधकत्वे सति* serves to exclude a valid *केवल-व्यभिचारी हेतु* from falling within the definition of *अव्यभिचारिण*. Both a *केवलव्यभिचारी हेतु* and an *अव्यभिचारिण* or *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक हेतु* are *वत्सवावृत्ति*. But while a *केवल-व्यभिचारी हेतु* is *सामानसाधक* on account of the correct *व्यभिचार-व्याप्ति* with which it is connected, an *अव्यभिचारिण* is *सामानसाधक* or cannot prove the *साध्य* owing to its defective nature. Our author's definition of an *असाधारण अवैकान्तिक* will include a valid *केवलव्यभिचारी हेतु* as there is nothing in it to exclude the same. The definition is thus defective to that extent.

[A third variety of *अवैकान्तिक*, *अव्यभिचारी* or non exclusive, is given in the *Tārābhāṣī*. This consists in the reason being void of a similar or dissimilar instance. This can only happen when every-

thing in existence is included in the वस्तु itself, so that nothing is left out that can be considered a सपक्ष or विपक्ष. An example of अनुपसहृणी अनेकातिरु हेतु is 'सर्वमनित्व प्रमेयत्वात्'. As 'सर्वम्' which includes everything forms the वस्तु, no similar or dissimilar instance can be thought of. Thus the peculiarity of this हेतुभास is that its वस्तु includes everything. It will be noticed that both सपक्षे सत्त्वम् and विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति are wanting here. The व्यभिचार consists in the fact that the व्याप्ति is incomplete in the absence of a positive or negative instance. Another example of this हेतुभास can well be 'सर्वं नित्य प्रमेयत्वात्'—उपसहृणिम् means that which withdraws or withholds, that which excludes, exclusive अनुपसहृणी consequently means non exclusive. This हेतुभास is so called because it does not exclude anything from its वस्तु i.e. it includes everything in it so that nothing remains for being regarded as सपक्ष or विपक्ष.

(31) प्रकरणसम or स प्रतिपक्ष or counter balanced is easily understood. It is that reason for which there exists another reason proving the opposite of its साध्य. Another example is 'शब्दो निय आद्यत्वात् शब्दत्ववत्' and 'शब्दाग्नि र्कार्वाचत् पटवत्'. Here we note that while आद्यत्वम् seems to prove the नियत्व of शब्द, कार्वाच proves the opposite viz अनियवत् with equal force. So आद्यवत् has a well matched rival (सम् प्रतिपक्ष वत्) and is therefore rightly known as समप्रतिपक्ष. In order to make the definition clearer and more accurate we should add तु-पक्ष before हेतुत्वम्. This हेतुभास violates the fifth characteristic of a valid हेतु viz अस प्रतिपक्षत्वम्.

गीतम् designates this हेतुभास by the term प्रकरणसम which has been adopted by the तर्कभाषा and सत्तराशी (It is called समप्रतिपक्ष in the Tarkasamgraha). प्रकरण means an argument and प्रकरणसम is explained as प्रकरणेन सम or प्रकरणमनतिक्रान्त i.e. a reason which is like an argument i.e. which does not go beyond the argument. This means that the प्रकरणसम हेतु does not carry the argument any step further, but leaves it where it was, as it cannot prove definitely either this or that.

प्रकरणसम must be distinguished from विरुद्ध. In both we find that साध्याभाव is proved. Thus they resemble each other. But (1) while विरुद्ध itself proves the साध्याभाव, प्रकरणसम does not do so itself, but has another powerful rival which does it. प्रकरणसम is consequently rendered inconclusive. (2) Secondly, in विरुद्ध only the साध्याभाव is proved, in प्रकरणसम, on the other hand, the साध्य is proved by the हेतु proper, but there is also another हेतु which proves the साध्याभाव.

(32) The fifth and the last hetvabhāsa is कालावयवदिष्ट or पारित, which consists in having the negat on of its साध्य already a certain

by another proof. Its example is 'अग्निमुष्ण इव यत्नात्' or 'हृत्तम इव जलमत्'. Now we know by the perceptive cognition of touch that fire is hot and as इत्यत्र is a stronger proof than अनुमान उष्ण इव which we know through it, contradicts or annuls the अनुमानत्वं that is intended to be proved by the reason द्रव्यत्वं or हृत्तमत्वं. Hence द्रव्यत्वं or हृत्तमत्वं is a कारणमपवादित हेतु. Here the fourth characteristic of a valid हेतु viz अवान्ति-रिष्यत्वम् is violated.—In order to make the definition of कालावसानादिहेतु clearer and more accurate we should add कालवसतत्वं before प्रमाणान्तरेण.

कालावसानादिहेतु must be distinguished from प्रकरणसम्य. Both resemble in as far as in both the साध्याभाव is established by another प्रमाण. But (1) while in प्रकरणसम्य the other प्रमाण which proves the साध्याभाव is an other हेतु of equal strength (as indicated by the term मतिवत्) in कालावसानादिहेतु the प्रमाणान्तरा proving the साध्याभाव is much stronger and is usually पक्षतः. This is also indicated by the term कालावसानादिहेतु for only a stronger प्रमाणान्तरा can annul or contradict the first. (2) Secondly in प्रकरणसम्य the first म प 1 merely rendered doubtful by the existence of another reason which proves its opposite. In कालावसानादिहेतु on the other hand the more powerful प्रमाणान्तरा completely disproves the साध्या which consequently is rendered false.

कालावसानादिहेतु is the term which is adopted by the सप्ततन्त्राव' also for this हेतु the Tarkasamgraha calls it कालावसानादिहेतु means that which is stated after the proper time for it has passed away. A हेतु is to be stated when the म प 1 is doubtful. In the case of a पक्षतः or कालावसानादिहेतु the साध्याभाव (अवयवभावः) is long known. So the हेतु द्रव्यत्वं or हृत्तमत्वं comes a day too late. Hence the name कालावसानादिहेतु.

Kesavamisra follows Gautama in mentioning five fallacious reasons. Gautama's names for three of them are however different. His five hetvabhāṣas are सवधिका (=अनेकानि) विरुद्ध प्रकरणसम साध्याभाव (=असिद्ध) and कालान्तरेण (=अवधि) See 'न्यायसूत्र' I 11 4. These are the five hetvabhāṣas which the Naiyayikas the followers of Gautama, admit.—The सप्ततन्त्राव' however enumerates six viz असिद्ध विरुद्ध पक्षतः कालान्तरेण अनवसित कालावसानादिहेतु and प्रकरणसम्य. But the असिद्धानि and अनवसितम् are nothing but the साध्याभाव and अनावयवभावः respectively of our author. So the number comes to five ultimately.—The Vaisika on the other hand admit only three hetvabhāṣas viz सवधिका or सदिग्धा विरुद्ध and असिद्ध ('विरुद्ध सिद्धसाध्यावच्छिन्न कारणदोषादिति') and thus represents one of the principal points of distinction between the Naiyayikas and the Vaisikas.

(33) Now we proceed to the third kind of proof viz प्रमाण. Kesavamisra has followed Gautama in admitting four प्रमाण. See

न्यायसूत्र I : 3 'प्रवक्ष्यामि नैवमानशब्दा प्रमाणानि' The Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise उपमान and शब्द as independent प्रमाणs. They include them under अनुमान.

उपमान is the instrument of उपमिति or analogical cognition which consists in the knowledge of the connection between a name and the object expressed by it. For producing this उपमिति, knowledge of similarity is necessary. Therefore उपमान is सादृश्यज्ञान. A man does not know the meaning of the word गवयः. He is told by a forester, who often has opportunities of seeing gavayas in the forest, that a 'gavaya' is like an ox 'यथा गो नृश गवयः' or 'गोमूढशो गवयः' is what the forester tells him. This sentence is known as अनिदेशवाक्य or directing sentence. —आनदेश technically means extended application, application by analogy or by transference of attributes. The sentence 'गोमूढशो गवयः' directs the transference of the attributes of the known animal गो to the unknown animal गवयः and is hence known as अनिदेशवाक्य. —Now this ignorant fellow goes to the forest after having heard this directing sentence and sees an animal resembling an ox. Then he recollects the directing sentence after which the cognition असौ गवयश्च शब्द च arises in him. This cognition is known as उपमिति.

It will thus be seen that for the production of उपमिति two previous cognitions are necessary viz अनिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञान obtained from some authoritative person and सादृश्यज्ञान obtained by actual observation. Of these सादृश्यज्ञान is the कारण of उपमिति and is therefore called उपमान. अनिदेशवाक्यार्थ is recollected after the सादृश्यज्ञान and this recollection helps the सादृश्यज्ञान to produce the उपमिति. So the stages in the rise of उपमिति are सादृश्यज्ञान—अनिदेशवाक्यार्थप्रमाण—उपमिति. As the अनिदेशवाक्यार्थप्रमाण comes between the कारण सादृश्यज्ञान and the कार्य उपमिति, it is known as अन्तर्मातृकारण or intermediate or accessory mental operation. It will be seen from this that the view about कारण that Kesavamitra takes here in 'कारणम् अन्तर्मातृकारणम्' is correct. But in asserting 'निद्रुष्यतां एव अनुमानिकारणम्' in section 16 our author relied on 'कारणमिव चकार कारणम्'.

The purpose of उपमान is to obtain knowledge of something unknown by its similarity to something known. We know a certain term (शब्द) such as गवयः. But we have never seen the object denoted by that term (वस्तु). This means we have not obtained the knowledge of the connection existing between that term and its object. This knowledge, it is argued, cannot be produced by वचन or अनुमान. Hence उपमान is admitted as an independent Pramāṇa to account for its production. Read 'सह एव परिच्छेदः (निद्रुष्यतां) मन्त्रात् मनसि तद् मन्त्रादि-रूपं शब्दवत्तुत्वं हि ॥' कृष्णचन्द्र of उपमानार्थ.

We have seen above that *व्यभिक्ति* or the knowledge of the connection between a term and the object denoted by it or the knowledge of something unknown from something which is known, is produced by *सदृशवद्भास*. But this is not, it is pointed out, the only way of producing *व्यभिक्ति*. We sometimes get the knowledge of an unknown entity by learning about its special characteristic. For example we know what a rhinoceros is when we are told that it has a horn adorning its nose. Then again we sometimes come to know an object by merely learning that it has certain characteristics not found in some entity that we are familiar with. Thus a camel might be recognised by us if we were to know that it does not possess a level back and short neck like a horse. These two cases are also included under *व्यभिक्ति* by considering the expression *सदृशवद्भास* in the text to be merely an *उपपत्त्य*. Read 'तद्येषामत्र त्रैविध्यम् (1) सदृशवद्भासविशेषात् (2) यथा गोसादृशवदिदं (3) यथा (4) अक्षयपानयमवशिष्टविशेषात् (5) यथा साक्षिगामित्वेकसादृशवद्भासः (6) वैधर्म्यविशेषाद्विषयजननम् । एवम् उच्यते । यथायथा समानाधिकरणम् । इत्यर्थः ।

(36) The passage ५५३ (line 2) is dropped in some manuscripts.

(37) Sections 30-38 deal with the last of the four proofs, namely, *शब्द*. Just as a *śabda* correct knowledge from perception, inference and analogy, in the same way we get correct knowledge from word. But such word must have been spoken by a trustworthy person and a trustworthy person is he who asserts things as they are i.e. the truth (*वचनमस्य यथावत्*) I will thus be seen that the authoritativeness of word as regards the knowledge which it gives rise to is ultimately based on truth. However trustworthy a man may be supposed to be if he does not state what is exactly the truth he ceases to be *शब्द* and his word will have no value.

A sentence is formed by a group or collection of words. A word is defined as *शब्द* or possessed of the power of expressing its conventional meaning - *शब्द इत्युच्यते । अस्मात् पशुद्वयस्यैव शब्द इत्यत्रात्मनोऽत्र शक्तिः । तत्रासदृशः ।* Explain *शब्द* as *शब्द शक्तिः । शब्दस्य शक्तिः । शब्द शक्तिः ।* *असदृशः* is the convention of God that a certain meaning is to be understood from a certain word. Here we get the Naiyayikas' philosophy regarding the origin of the expressive power of words. Words convey a meaning because God has willed that they should do so. *शक्ति* is the same as *शक्ति* or the expressive power of words which denotes their conventional meaning.

Here a doubt arises. What about words like *दि* *व* *द्वि* *तृ* *च* *पञ्च* and *सप्त* to which meaning is assigned by the sense or will of human

beings? All proper nouns fall under this class, for the meaning which they convey depends not on the will of God but on that of individuals. To escape from this difficulty the moderns define शक्ति as इच्छाशक्तिम्. Thus in the case of proper nouns it is human will, and in the case of other words divine will that give them their conventional meaning. Others stick to the old definition of 'इच्छाशक्तेन' and account for the expressive power of proper nouns by saying that men, in designating certain individuals by such names as इन्द्र etc., are really impelled by God and hence even proper nouns have ultimately divine will as their source.]

वाक्य was defined as a collection of words. But in order that this collection of words should be able to convey authoritative meaning it must be possessed of three characteristics viz अकाङ्क्षा, योग्यता and सन्निधिः. आकाङ्क्षा or expectancy is defined in the Tarkasamgraha as पदान्तरस्य अपेक्षस्य प्रतिरेक्षण अभावेन प्रयुक्तम् (रस्यचित् पदस्य) अन्वयानुमानजनकम् अत्रित यदोपासनरूपम्. आकाङ्क्षा thus means the inability of a word to convey a connected meaning (अन्वय) in the absence of another word. Read 'यदस्य यदकाङ्क्षाप्रयुक्तम् यदोपासनरूपम् न तदस्यार्थोपादानं यदस्य आकाङ्क्षा' न तदर्थो. Words are said to be आकाङ्क्ष when the expectancy created by one is satisfied by another. Thus the words 'ब्रह्म नाम गच्छति' are possessed of expectancy, because as soon as ब्रह्म is uttered a desire to know something about him ('किं तस्य') arises in us and that desire is satisfied by the words नाम गच्छति. But disconnected words like नी अथ पुरुषा हस्ती are निराकाङ्क्ष, because they do not mutually fulfil the expectancy created by each. Therefore such a group of words, though forming a sentence technically, since it is a पदसमूह, is not authoritative because it lacks आकाङ्क्षा.

The second requisite of an authoritative sentence is योग्यता or compatibility defined as अवायव्यता or absence of contradiction. This means the meanings of the various words constituting a sentence must be compatible or consistent and not contradict one another. Take the sentence अम्रकं पिबति. The mango fruit is not a thing to be drunk. There is therefore वाच्य or contradiction between अम्रकम् and पिबति. The sentence अम्रकं पिबति thus does not possess योग्यता and is consequently unauthoritative. Similarly अग्निः सिञ्चति lacks योग्यता, because fire is incompatible with the action of sprinkling.

Expectancy and compatibility are not enough to make a sentence authoritative. It must have सन्निधिः or juxtaposition as well. Juxtaposition means uttering words without undue interval between them. Thus in order that the sentence ब्रह्म नाम गच्छति should be authoritative

live, you must utter the words one after another without long delay between them. If on the other hand you pronounce देवदत्त now, पञ्चमू three hours hence and मन्त्रिनि another three hours later, the three words would not form a sentence proper owing to the absence of सम्बन्धि between them and so would not be authoritative. Read in this connection the following 'वाक्यं स्वाद् योग्यतारान्वहतामसिपुस्तं पदोच्चय ॥ योग्यता एतावता परस्परसम्बन्धे वाक्यमात्रे । पदोच्चयस्यैकदेशान्ते प्रवि वाक्यवन्ते 'अस्मिन्ना सिद्धिनि' इत्याद्यदि वाक्यं स्यात् । आराद्धाया प्रतीतिपयस्तन्निर्दिष्ट । स च श्रेयःसिद्धिमाप्नुय । निश्चयानुसृत्य वाक्ये 'गीर्वाणं पुष्पं हस्ती' इत्यादिनामपि वाक्यस्य स्यात् । अस्तित्वं तु द्वयस्य उद्देशः । उद्दिष्टिभेदेऽपि वाक्यवन्ते दृष्टान्तमुदाहरित्य देवदत्तज्ञानस्य द्विगुणशक्तिरिति मन्त्रिनीति एवेति मनसि स्यात् । अत्र आराद्धायायोग्यतारान्वहतामसिपुस्तं पदोच्चयपद-समुदायात् ।' तादृश-पदवर्णः

(36) The matter discussed in this section may be thus summarised. Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are declared to be the characteristics of words. But expectancy is really an attribute of the human soul and compatibility a feature not of words, but of the meaning denoted by words. When the word देवदत्त is uttered, it is we who entertain expectancy to know something about दशरथ. Similarly incompatibility exists not between the words अस्मिन्ना and सिद्धिनि, but between the senses conveyed by those words. Juxtaposition alone belongs properly to words. How can we then speak of expectancy and compatibility as the characteristics of शब्दसमूहः? The answer is that आराद्धा and शीर्षका, though primarily the attributes of अन्तरा and वाङ्मय, are said to be शब्दसमूहस्य only metaphorically.

The objector says—आराद्धा can not certainly belong to the words. When we utter the sentence अस्मिन्ना पञ्च कल्पानि गच्छन्ति, the word पञ्च has no आराद्धा for the sense नीर. The sense of the word कल्प may have आराद्धा for the sense of the word नीर. But strictly speaking, आराद्धा can not belong to the sense either. आराद्धा, being of the nature of इच्छा, is an attribute of the soul.

The siddhāntin replies—(1) अक्षरान्ता should be regarded as primarily belonging to अक्षरा, as they create it in the mind of the hearer, and secondarily to the words as being expressive of those अक्षरा, or (2) आराद्धा primarily belongs to the soul and secondarily to the words, and also to the things expressed by them. Words primarily signify अर्थः and afterwards give rise to आराद्धा with reference to other अर्थः. That is why they are metaphorically called आराद्धा.

(Lane 9)—समर्था आराद्धा. It would be better if we drop आराद्धा, because the author is now dealing with योग्यता and has finished with the discussion about आराद्धा or construct आराद्धा शब्दः

(2) सवय is of two kinds — (a) सवय and (b) सवय

(a) सवय can exist only between द्रव्य or substances, सवय is no द्रव्य, therefore there can be no सवय with reference to सवय

(b) सवय exists between अयुक्तविद् objects and सवय does not figure in any of the five pairs of अयुक्तविद् objects. Therefore there can not be सवय either

(3) As regards the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव, it is no सवय at all it is a mere figment of the imagination of the opponent. A सवय to be regarded as such, must satisfy three conditions—

(a) It must be different from the objects it connects (विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is different from भेद and दृष्ट)

(b) It must depend upon both the objects it connects (भेद-दृष्टभाव depends upon both भेद and दृष्ट)

(c) And it must be one (विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is one)

विशेषणविशेष्यभाव does not satisfy any one of these conditions. Thus, take the instance of दृष्टदृष्ट (दृष्टविशेष्य दृष्ट) where दृष्ट is the विशेषण and दृष्ट is the विशेष्य—

(a) दृष्टदृष्टभाव is not different from दृष्ट and दृष्ट. The विशेषण of दृष्ट is not a different object but its own nature, so the विशेष्यत्व of दृष्ट is not a different object but his own nature

Similarly in सवयसवय दृष्टदृष्ट, सवय is the विशेषण, but its विशेषणत्व is not a different object, but its own nature, in पुनरेव सवय, सवय is the विशेष्य, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object, but its own nature. सवय also is not possessed of सवय etc, which would have enabled us to think of its सवय with something else

So विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not different from विशेषण and विशेष्य

(b) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not उपपादित for in the विशेषण, there is only विशेषणभाव, and no विशेष्यत्व, and in the विशेष्य, there is only विशेष्यत्व and no विशेषणभाव

(c) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not एक, for the compound expression, when analysed gives us the idea of two things (1) विशेषणभाव and (2) विशेष्यत्व

This proves that विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is no सवय

(4) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is only metaphorically called सवय, so the use of the expression सवय with reference to it, should not be regarded as an

(2) सवयः of two kinds — (a) सवय and (b) समय

(a) सवय can exist only between दृश or such instances शब्द is no दृश, therefore there can be no सवय with reference to शब्द

(b) समय exists between अयुक्तविशेष्य and समय does not figure in any of the five pairs of अयुक्तविशेष्य objects. Therefore there can not be समय either.

(3) As regards the उपपन्नविशेष्य it is no सवय at all it is a mere figment of the imagination of the opponent. A सवय to be regarded as such, must satisfy three conditions—

(a) It must be different from the objects it connects (भेदविशेष्यभाव is different from शरी and दृश)

(b) It must depend upon both the objects it connects (शरी दृशसंयोग depends upon both शरी and दृश)

(c) And it must be one (भेदविशेष्यभाव is one)

विशेष्यविशेष्यभाव does not satisfy any one of these conditions. Thus, take the instance of दृशदृश्य (दृशदाश्रित दृश्य where दृश is the विशेष्य and दृश्य is the विशेष्य)—

(a) दृशदृश्यभाव is not different from दृश and दृश्य. The विशेष्यत्व of दृश is not a different object but its own nature, so the विशेष्यत्व of दृश्य is not a different object but his own nature.

Similarly in दृशभावात् दृश्यत्व, दृशभाव is the विशेष्य, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object but its own nature, in शरी दृशभाव, शरीभाव is the विशेष्य, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object, but its own nature. अद्वैत also is not possessed of मय etc, which would have enabled us to think of its सवय with something else.

So विशेष्यविशेष्यभाव is not different from विशेष्य and विशेष्य

(b) विशेष्यविशेष्यभाव is not उपपन्न for in the विशेष्य there is only विशेष्यभाव, and no विशेष्यभाव and in the विशेष्य, there is only विशेष्यभाव and no विशेष्यभाव.

(c) विशेष्यविशेष्यभाव is not एक, for the compound expression, when analysed gives us the idea of two things (1) विशेष्यभाव and (2) विशेष्यभाव.

This proves that विशेष्यविशेष्यभाव is no सवय.

(4) विशेष्यविशेष्यभाव is only metaphysically called सवय, so the use of the expression सवय with reference to it, should not be regarded as an

argument in favour of its being a भवन्व. The reason why विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is figuratively called सवच is this —Just as in the case of भेरीदण्डसंगम, the सवच implies the cognition of both भेरी and दण्ड, so in the case of दण्डपुष्प also, the knowledge of both दण्ड and पुष्प is necessary. That is all.

(a) As regards the so-called सव-व्य, व्याप्यव्यापकभाव, कार्यकारणभाव etc it is easy to show that they are not सवन्व but the natures of the objects concerned viewed in a particular light. Thus—

(a) In दध धूम तत्र बद्धि, बद्धि is the व्यापक, and the व्याप्यत्व of बद्धि is but its own nature capable of producing the cognition of धूम invariably associated with it. Likewise in दध बद्धयभाव तत्र धूमाभाव, धूमाभाव is the व्यापक and the व्यापकत्व of धूमाभाव is but its own nature and not a different thing.

(b) तद्गु is the cause of पद, but this कारणत्व of the तद्गु is nothing but their very nature of being present or absent, when the effect पद is present or absent.

Likewise कारणत्व belongs to घटप्रमाणभाव (which is considered to be one of the causes of the production of the घट), but this कारणत्व of घटप्रमाणभाव is nothing but its very nature, and not a different thing.

The व्याप्यवादकभाव or the कार्यकारणभाव with reference to अभाव can not be explained away in any other manner, as अभाव can not possess सामान्य etc. Therefore व्यापकत्व and कारणत्व which belong to अभाव, are not different from अभाव. But they represent its very nature in a particular aspect.

All this shows that it is impossible to cognize अभाव by means of the sense-organ which could not have any contact with it.

The siddhantin replies —Your dissertation on the nature of सव प etc is a very learned one no doubt but unfortunately all your arguments are beside the point for they are based upon the unwarranted supposition that all cognition by पश्यन is caused by the contact of the sense-organ with the object. As a matter of fact, the सवद्वारप्राहकत्व of the sense-organs refers to भावपदार्थ only. It is unreasonable to argue that there should be the same rule obtaining in the case of both भाव and अभाव, other kinds of objects, other methods of perception. What is true of भाव objects need not be true of अभाव also. So because भाव objects are perceived by sense-organs coming into contact with them there is no earthly reason why अभाव also should be perceived exactly in the same way. We hold that अभाव is perceived by the sense-organ by means of the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव सन्निकृ

It might be argued that if the sense organ is not *संयुक्तविग्रहक* in the case of *अवयव*, it would cognise anything and everything. If *वक्ष* can perceive *वक्षः* with which it is not connected, why should not *वक्ष* then perceive at the same time *वक्षः*, *अवयव* etc. which are all unconnected with it? To this objection, our answer would be as follows.—In the first place the objector is treating the matter lightly, which we strongly deprecate. For though there is no ordinary *संयुक्त* between the sense organ and *अवयव*, there is the *विशेषणता* which ordains that only a particular *अवयव* should be perceived and not any and every *अवयव*. Secondly, the objector, in his malicious enthusiasm, has overlooked the fact that the same fault with which he is charging us, obtains in the case of his reasoning also. For we ask the objector who wants to admit *अवयव* as a separate *वक्षः*, 'How is it that *वक्षः*, for example is cognised by your *अवयव* *वक्षः* only in a particular place?' His answer per force has to be 'Because that particular place is qualified by that *वक्षः*.' So the objector is required to admit *विशेषणता*, however unwillingly. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further, for when a fault together with its removal is common to the arguments of both the disputants, none of the disputants should be backed about it. This is the general rule about the conduct of debates. Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones at others.

(Lane 6)—*वक्षः वक्षः ज्ञेयं* etc., this syllogism is given because the first syllogism *ज्ञेयं वक्षः वक्षः प्रकाशराशिः। ज्ञानकरणत्वत्। अत्रावयवः।* may not be regarded as quite conclusive. Because the objector might argue that *ज्ञेयं* is also in a way *ज्ञानकरण* (the *वक्षः* can not function without *ज्ञेयं*) and still *ज्ञेयं* does not come into contact with *वक्षः* for *वक्षः* *वक्षः*. No objection can be taken by the objector to the second syllogism, *वक्षः ज्ञेयं वक्षः प्रकाशराशिः। ज्ञेयं-वक्षः। वक्षः वक्षः।* for both the *ज्ञेयं* and the *वक्षः* are acceptable to him.

(Lane 38)—*वक्षः वक्षः* etc. is taken from the *शेखरवर्तक* of कुमरिलभट्ट (circa 8th century, a commentator on शास्त्रवत्).

(42) This section deals with the very important question whether cognition has *एव* *अवयव* or *एव* *अवयव*. This is a very interesting topic, though rather abstract, and the student should study this question very carefully and remember the pros and cons thereof.

The controversy arises in this way—I perceive water at a distance, the same agency which enables me to perceive the water, enables me to apprehend the validity (*अवयव*) of that perception, and then on knowing that my cognition is valid, I proceed afterwards to bring

the water. This is as it should be, for if I knew that my cognition had no validity (that is, what I had perceived was not water, but merely mirage) I certainly would not take the trouble of going to that place for water. Thus the validity of any cognition must be taken to be produced by the same agency which produces that cognition. The validity does not depend upon any other factor; in other words ज्ञान has स्वतः प्रामाण्य.

The other view is that ज्ञान has परतः प्रामाण्य. The अनुमान enables me to perceive the water and the cognition of water takes place by means of मानसप्रत्यक्ष. I then repair to the place, if I find water there I infer that my cognition is valid, if I do not find water there, I infer that my cognition is invalid. Thus cognition is due to मानसप्रत्यक्ष but its validity is due to अनुमान. In other words ज्ञान has परतः प्रामाण्य.

Kesavamisra holds the second view and controverts the argument put forth by the opponent who believes in the स्वतः प्रामाण्य of ज्ञान.

OBJECTOR

SIDDHĀNTIN

When I secure the knowledge of वस्तु, my cognition is वस्तु ज्ञान, from which one can infer that the वस्तु ज्ञानता (knownness) is produced in the वस्तु. A वस्तु that is not known has not this ज्ञानता. So that वस्तुज्ञान is the cause, and ज्ञानता is the effect. And as ज्ञानता cannot be accounted for otherwise by presumption we can conclude that its कारण ज्ञान must have been there. Hence, even before a man proceeds to bring water, by अनुमान is proved the ज्ञानज्ञान as the ज्ञानता of the ज्ञान cannot be accounted for otherwise, and by means of the अनुमान itself the validity of that knowledge is apprehended.

अनुमान-वस्तुता for the matter of that, is nothing but being the abode of ज्ञानता, produced by वस्तु. (So you can not get rid of वस्तुता easily

1 We challenge your statement that ज्ञान is apprehended by अनुमान on account of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for ज्ञानता. For, what is ज्ञानता after all? ज्ञानता is not a new attribute created in the object. ज्ञानता (knownness) is not over and above ज्ञानविषयता (being the object of knowledge, being cognised).

2 You are all wrong. You are unnecessarily making a simple thing difficult to understand. The distinction between अनुमान

by simply asserting that it is ज्ञानविषयता) You possibly cannot explain this ज्ञानविषयता in any other way

(a) ज्ञानविषयता cannot be due to तादात्म्य or identity, वस्तु and ज्ञान are not known to be identical

(b) ज्ञानविषयता of वस्तु cannot be due to the fact that वस्तु causes that knowledge for in that case the sense organs also could be called ज्ञानविषय, because they too produce the knowledge

So we infer that there must be something produced in the वस्तु by the ज्ञान, which also makes the वस्तु ज्ञानविषय. Thus owing to the impossibility of accounting for the ज्ञानविषयत्व of वस्तु otherwise, the existence of ज्ञानतत्त्वं is established by अभावादि.

In order to avoid the अनवस्थात्व I say that the ज्ञानतत्त्वं does not require another ज्ञानतत्त्वं to make it ज्ञानविषय, it becomes ज्ञानविषय by its very nature

(object) and ज्ञान (knowledge) is a natural one and it is patent to every one. If ज्ञान were to produce ज्ञानतत्त्वं in the actual object, we can never have any knowledge of past and future objects for ज्ञानतत्त्वं can not be produced in objects that do not exist

Again let us suppose that ज्ञानतत्त्वं is produced, but how is this ज्ञानतत्त्वं to be known? वस्तु ज्ञान produces ज्ञानतत्त्वं in the वस्तु so ज्ञानतत्त्वं must produce another ज्ञानतत्त्वं in ज्ञानतत्त्वं this ज्ञानतत्त्वं produces ज्ञानतत्त्वं 2 and so on. Where is this series to end? There would thus be the fault of endlessness which cuts at the root of all your argument

3 If you are prepared to allow that ज्ञानतत्त्वं can become ज्ञानविषय through its very nature why do you want this ज्ञानतत्त्वं in the case of वस्तु itself? Let वस्तु also be admitted to be ज्ञानविषय by its very nature

Granting for argument's sake just to satisfy you that ज्ञानतत्त्वं is there then by ज्ञानतत्त्वं ज्ञान is apprehended but how is the validity of the ज्ञान apprehended by that ज्ञानतत्त्वं?

4 In saying this, you are giving your position away. Does this not mean that ज्ञान and its validity are not apprehended by the same agency? You are condemned out

5 I hold that ज्ञान only is apprehended by ज्ञानतत्त्वं, and its validity is apprehended by a ज्ञानतत्त्वंविधि in variably associated with validity

of your own mouth for now your position is —

(1) ज्ञान is apprehended by मानना

(2) ज्ञानप्रमाण is apprehended by ज्ञाननाविशय

ज्ञानना and ज्ञाननाविशय are obviously two different agencies

I shall amend my statement and say that both ज्ञान and ज्ञानप्रमाण are apprehended just together by ज्ञाननाविशय which is invariably associated with valid knowledge.

4 This would never do. The अज्ञातत्व of ज्ञान is apprehended by means other than the ज्ञान—this can never be disputed.

ज्ञान is apprehended by मानसद्वय and its प्रमाण by अज्ञान. The अज्ञान can be put in the following कवल-पतितिके form, विवादा-यामिन ज्ञानान् प्रमाणम् ननु प्रमाणं न तद् समर्थं प्रवृत्तिं जनयति यथा प्रमाणमात्रम् । There cannot be अज्ञानप्रमाण, as when we are going to prove the सत्य for the first time, there cannot obviously be a प्रमाणद्वयम्.

(Lane 58)—न तु प्रमाणं सत्यं व्यभिचरति —The author wants to make it quite clear what the सत्य is in the above syllogism. प्रमाणम् is the सत्य, but the word प्रमाण used in the syllogism is ambiguous. प्रमाणम् might either mean correctness (सत्यत्वम्) or the character of being a right knowledge (प्रामाण्यम्). It is not the प्रामाण्य of the ज्ञानान् in question that he wants to establish. For if that were so, his तद्वि-वेकसि in यत्र प्रमाणं (= प्रमाणं) अवकाशे would be found violated in the case of remembrance. For, we often find that remembrance, though not a प्रमाण, (as remembrance is different from सत्यप्रमाणम् which is प्रमाण see section 2) is सत्यप्रमाणजनकम्. The reading प्रमाणत्वम् for प्रमाण does not appear to be satisfactory. प्रमाण does mean प्रामाण्यम्, so प्रमाण could be understood in the sense of प्रामाण्यम्. But as the प्रमाण are sufficiently well known no one is likely to regard ज्ञानान् as the प्रमाण (in its technical sense). But whether the ज्ञानान् is प्रमाण (1.2) or

5 If we accept this absurd statement, we might as well give up our studies of Nyaya, fallacies etc, and say that ज्ञान and its invalidity also are apprehended just together by a ज्ञाननाविशय invariably associated with wrong knowledge. So that let the invalidity of knowledge be self-established!

6 If we are agreed about the प्रमाण-प्रमाणत्वम् of ज्ञान, you have per force to admit the प्रमाण-प्रमाणत्वम् of ज्ञान as well.

cognition) or not, may well be a matter for dispute. Hence *अप्रामाण्य* seems to be the right reading.

(Line 60) — *अत्रैव केवलव्यतिरेकबलवत्त्वेन अन्यासदृशावस्य*, *अप्रामाण्य*-repetition, *अन्यासदृशा*—unrepeated state, situation at the beginning. The idea is as follows — When we are trying to find out the validity of the *अनुमान* for the first time, we shall have to make use of the *प्रामाण्य* *अतिरेकबलवत्*, but when the inference is once drawn, we can utilise the knowledge thus gained for the purpose of adducing a *सम्यग्ज्ञान*, when we are drawing an inference in a similar case later on (*अन्यासदृशावस्य*), so that the *इति सम्यग्ज्ञानजनक* could then be *अप्रामाण्य*, the *अप्रामाण्य* being stated in the form *इति सम्यग्ज्ञानजनक* *प्रमाण* *यस्य प्रामाण्यं न च नाना*. And on the strength of such *समानातीत्य* *ज्ञान*, we can draw the inference even before the *प्रतीति*. The reading which refers to the *केवलव्यतिरेक* *अनुमान* to the *अप्रामाण्य* and *अप्रामाण्य* *अनुमान* to *अप्रामाण्य* seems to miss the point altogether in the argument in question. Dr Jha translates *अप्रामाण्य* *वन्न* as 'after it has become rightly effective by giving rise to fruitful exertion'. It is doubtful if *अप्रामाण्य* could possibly have that sense.

(Line 65) — *वचनम्*—As a true Naiyāvika, Kesavamisra once again asserts that there are only four *Pramāṇas*, neither more or less.

(43) — *आत्मज्ञाने* Following Gautama, Kesavamisra mentions *अप्रामाण्य* etc. as the *प्रदेव*. Of these *आप्रामाण्य* and *वन्न* are mentioned again under *द्वय* in section 47, and *बुद्धि* under *गुण* (section 74), so that there is a lot of overlapping and consequent absence of proper arrangement.

(44) and (57) — *आप्रामाण्य* — *ज्ञानविक्रमम्* (the substratum of knowledge) is another definition. In section 57 the definition is given as *आप्रामाण्य* *विमलप्रकाशम्* and not as *आप्रामाण्य* *सामान्यवाद*. Apparently the author felt that after all *आप्रामाण्य* may be rightly regarded as one, as the Vedantins say, but *विमल* owing to the *उपनिषद्*. If *Ātman* is one, there can be no *सामान्य* for it. To make allowance for this view, the definition is also given as *आप्रामाण्य* *विमलप्रकाशम्*. The *Tarkasamgraha* adds — *न द्विरपि परमात्मनो जीवमात्मनो*. नैवेष्टुं सत्यं परमात्मनो एव. The way in which these definitions are explained by commentators shows that by *आप्रामाण्य* is to be understood *जीवमात्मनो* (*आप्रामाण्य* is explained as *सत्यमेव प्रदेव* *आप्रामाण्य*). The *Viśveśvakaśūtras* do not mention *द्वय*, probably because they were concerned with the exposition of *द्वय* that all would understand. It is almost the king to see the *वन्न* (who is *सत्यं द्वयं सर्वं भाग्य* *सत्यं सत्यमात्मनो*) dubbed as a *द्वय* and placed on the same level with *आप्रामाण्य* who is different from *वन्न* in many respects, only on the

The existence of ईश्वर can be inferred only thus—*क्षिप्रदुर्गादि कृत्तृणामप्यन्याद्वयत्* (also *क्षिप्रदुर्गादिव जगत् स्वर्गदुर्गादिव नाम च* । *क्षिप्रदुर्गादिव कणादाद्यवच्छेदे* ॥ and *कर्मयोगजनप्रसंगे पदात् प्रयत्नं युते* । वाक्या नवगतिविज्ञानं च माधुर्ये विशदिदं च ॥), सर्वज्ञी अवधारणायापनीतिरेवैवर्तये मायम् । A potter does require a potter to fashion itself, similarly this huge world could not have come into existence without an intelligent creator viz ईश्वर This argument seems to be satisfactory from a common sense point of view but it can easily be shown to be fallacious First why did the ईश्वर create evil in this world (if evil is said to be due to the प्रसङ्ग of the जीव, we have to admit that the world is अव्यक्त)? Again, what is the relation between ईश्वर and the other विद् objects like अमन्, आराधितो? Are they independent of ईश्वर Does every वय necessarily presuppose an intelligent agent and so on This problem has survived the ingenuity of philosophers of all times and no satisfactory solution is yet found Sāṅkara of course regards ईश्वर, the world etc as merely phenomenal, only निर्गुण Brahman being real Some Naiyāyikas believe ईश्वर to be pos sessed of a body Others regard अमन्, आराधितो, जीव etc as the body of ईश्वर (followers of Ramanuja hold this view)

(Line 5)—*बुद्ध्यादयः* etc Kesavamisra first shows that बुद्धि etc are गुण, and then they are विज्ञेयगुण which cannot have the eight द्रव्य, बुद्धि etc (in section 47, nine द्रव्य are mentioned, the eight द्रव्य, दृष्टी etc are those nine minus the Ātman) as their substratum So there must be a separate ninth द्रव्य which could be the substratum, and that is Ātman. This is proved by inference, by a केवलान्तिके अवयव or अवयवयन्तिनि अन्तर्गत गुणगुण्य—*तल्लि* nine qualities बुद्धि, दृष्ट, दृष्ट, इन्द्र, दृष्ट, मन, चक्षुर्वर्ण, and स्पर्श (भवन्) These are गुण because they are अनित्ये सति ऐक्यद्रव्यात् This गुण of गुण consists of two parts अनित्य and ऐक्यद्रव्यात्, both these ingredients are necessary [अनित्य is dropped, स्पर्श which is गत by the चक्षुर्वर्ण्य would be a गुण But स्पर्श is really a ज्ञानि So अनित्ये सति excludes it, for as a ज्ञानि, स्पर्श is eternal Similarly if अनित्य alone constituted the definition of गुण, दृष्ट, दृष्ट, etc would be गुण because they are non eternal So to exclude दृष्ट, दृष्ट, etc we put in ऐक्यद्रव्यात् (that with all this दृष्ट, दृष्ट, etc would not be excluded, for they are ऐक्यद्रव्यात्, the definition ought to be amended by reading ऐक्यद्रव्यात् for ऐक्यद्रव्यात्, for दृष्ट, दृष्ट etc are not ऐक्यद्रव्यात्, they are चक्षुर्वर्ण्य as well as स्पर्शगुण Shall the definition remain objectionable all the same For दृष्ट which is a गुण is not ऐक्यद्रव्यात्, being capable of perception by both the sense of sight and the sense of touch Again, the author himself would tell us later that the

qualities residing on the atoms are eternal, so there is no propriety in putting अनित्यत्वं सति in the definition ')

(Lane 9)—विशेषणवात्—A विशेषण is that which resides in one substance only at one time, e g सुख, दुःख etc A general quality is that which resides in two or more substances jointly, e g सहस्य, सयोग etc

(45)—शरीर is the body, residing in which the अहम् enjoys the विश्वस्य (चहेन्द्रियार्थाद्यं शरीरम् । गौतम). It is so called because it dies away every moment (शरीरेने दानि, मनेसम सौद्यमाण देह शरीरम्) According to the Vaisesikas the human शरीर is पार्थिव only and not वाय्वैजैतिक or constituted of three elements as the Vedantins say शरीर is two fold, बोधेजम् (शुक्लशोणितमिषानाम्) and अयोधेजम् (शुक्लशोणितमिषानामपेक्षम्, for instance, the bodies of मनु, ब्रह्मरूप and others) बोधेजं पार्थिवशरीर is two fold, जरायुजम् (मानवपशुपुष्पाणाम्) चण्डज च (पक्षिसरीसृपाणाम्), अयोधेजं पार्थिवशरीर is three-fold, हेतुजम् (शुद्धजं पुनःपुनश्चानां यज्ञरश्मीनाम्) उद्भिजम् (इन्द्रगोपमण्डूकप्रभतीनाम्) and अद्भुतविशेषजम् Though the Ātman is विद्यु, the उपाधि of the शरीर causes the लुप्तलुप्तदिविचित्र्य in different persons The expression अन्यथापदि is put in to exclude hands and feet etc which are भोगावयव, but they are not the अवयवविधि, for they themselves are the अवयव of the body But the body is not the अवयव of any thing else

(46)—इन्द्रिय is the means by which knowledge is secured, sense-organs (भोगसाधनानि इन्द्रियाणि) The sense organ comes into contact with the object of sense and carries the impressions to the mind which in its turn takes them to the Ātman who thus is enabled to have the knowledge required (आत्मा मन्सा सयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण । इन्द्रियमर्थेन । इन्द्रियणा मृतसद्वद्वस्तुमन्साशरिरम् ।) The Tarka Dipika defines इन्द्रिय as शब्देनरी-दृष्टान्तविशेषणानामवयवे सति ज्ञानकारणमन सयोगावयवम् । मन is sometimes called an अन्तरिन्द्रियम्. The बहिरिन्द्रिया (ज्ञानेन्द्रिया) are five घ्राणम्, रसनम्, श्रोत्रम्, दृष्टिम्, and स्पर्शम्. Some admit ten इन्द्रिया, five ज्ञानेन्द्रिया and five कर्मेन्द्रिया (वाक्प्राणपद्मादुपस्थानि) इन्द्रिया are super-sensuous, that is, they cannot be perceived by the sense-organs The tip of the nose is not the घ्राणिन्द्रिय, but the abode of the imperceptible sense of smell

The propriety of each word in the definition शरीरसमुक्त ज्ञानकरणम् अतीन्द्रियम् is as follows—

(1) If we drop शरीरसमुक्त and ज्ञानकरणम्, दिक्, काल, etc would be इन्द्रिया, for they are अतीन्द्रिया But दिक्, काल etc are साधारणकारण of ज्ञान, and not करण (which is असाधारण and साधनम्) To exclude दिक्, काल etc we put in ज्ञानकरणम्

(2) If we drop शरीरसमुक्त and अतीन्द्रियम्, इन्द्रियवत् वेत्त्यं would be इन्द्रिय, so to exclude it शरीरसमुक्त is put in

would be rejected by those who do not admit the existence of the समवाय relation which is the special creation of the Vaisēṣikas and again this definition also would not extend to a द्रव्य at the first moment. In the definition गुणप्रयो द्रव्यम्, it has been already remarked that गुणप्रय means 'capable of being a substratum of qualities.'

The nine द्रव्य mentioned, consist of the five well known elements and काल and दिग्, two most well-known notions which we can hardly do without, and आत्मन् and तमस्. The inclusion of आत्मन् among the द्रव्य is bound to make a Vedantist shudder, but the Vaisēṣikas had, it appears no option but to regard it as a द्रव्य or mere substance. नवेद—the propriety of एव is that it is not necessary to recognise darkness and gold as additional द्रव्य as is done by the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsākas respectively. Those who regard तमस् as an additional द्रव्य argue as follows.—We have the प्रतीति, शुद्ध गौ चलनि and we recognise गौ as a द्रव्य, now we have a similar प्रतीति नील तम चलनि showing that तमस् has both रूप (which is a गुण) and क्रिया—and a द्रव्य is known to be क्रियायुगलम्—so, तमस् must be a द्रव्य. It can not be included in आकाश, जल, दिग्, आत्मन् and मनस्, because these five have no रूप it cannot be वायु, as it has no स्पर्श and is not always moving like वायु, it is not तेजस्, as it has no hot touch and does not give any light it is not जड as it has no cool touch and has a बलिरूप, while जड has शुद्धरूप it is not पृथ्वी, as it has no गन्ध and is स्पर्शरहित, while पृथ्वी has घट and स्पर्श. Therefore we must recognise तमस् as the tenth द्रव्य. This is refuted as follows. तमस् is not a द्रव्य having रूप as the opponent says, for we find that all द्रव्य having रूप in this world require the presence of light, for being perceived. Such is not the case with तमस्. Besides, the प्रतीति नील तमचलनि which is made so much of by the opponent, is a misapprehension. The तमस् does not really move and it itself is नीलरूप imposed on something else. It has no positive existence it is merely the absence of प्रेक्षाकार. Gold is nothing but तेजस्, if we grant the contention of the opponent, it may at best come under पृथ्वी but it is not necessary to regard it as a separate द्रव्य (see section 30 below).

(48) तृपिथी is defined as गच्छन्ती which expression is to be taken to mean गच्छन्मगद्विगतम्, otherwise घट and देहा could also be said to be गच्छन्. गच्छ is a विशेषण of पृथिवी and so the definition is correct. The Vaisēṣikasutra सार रूपमगच्छदात्री तृपिथी. According to the Bauddhas (सर्व मत् क्षणिकम्) द्रव्य are उत्पन्नविनष्ट, so the definition गच्छन्ती would not apply to तृपिथी which would be विपुल at the first moment (according to the dictum प्रथम द्रव्य निष्कृन्नेत्येवमप्यत्र तमसवता मजा उत्पद्यते) the definition should therefore be modified as गच्छन्मगद्विगतम् तृपिथी.

away (thus there is the destruction of the *परमाणुसमूह* which is the असमवायिकारण of *द्रव्य*) and the *द्रव्य* is no more the destruction of the *द्रव्य* (which are the समवायिकारण of the *परमाणु*) causes the destruction of the *परमाणु* and so on. According to the traditionalists *द्रव्य* is destroyed by the असमवायिकारणनाश, and all further creation is destroyed by the समवायिकारणनाश (This is the view referred to in the passage beginning with *वृत्ति* in line 10). The moderns hold that all *द्रव्यनाश* is caused by the असमवायिकारणनाश (This is the view of Kesavamisra). The ordinary *द्रव्य* causes *संस्कारद्रव्य* while the *महाप्रलय* causes *संस्कारकारणवस्तु*. It would be seen that the order of *विनाश* given above is the same as the order of *उत्पत्ति*. Now this is quite absurd and opposed to all common sense. The *विनाशक्रम* should be exactly the reverse of the *उत्पत्तिक्रम* you gradually commence undoing the things as finally formed at the time of destroying it. A *घट* is first broken into *खण्ड*s, then these *खण्ड*s are further broken into smaller bits and ultimately we go to the *द्रव्य*. One does not start at the *द्रव्य*, and supposing one did start like that where would the remaining *घट* stand when the *द्रव्य* is destroyed? It might be said that it would topple down like a house of cards all of a sudden but this way of destruction is opposed to all experience (Sankaracarya in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedāntasūtras* (II 3 14) says *विषयवशं तु प्रत्यक्षमेव उपनिष्क्रम द्वैतमदिति तथाहि लोके दृश्ये देव क्रमेण सोपानमा रुद्धस्तनो विपरीतेन क्रमणावर हति ।*) The modern *Naiyāyikas* by favouring the असमवायिकारणनाश throughout seem to hold the common sense view about the *विनाशक्रम*.

6. The *Vaiśeṣika* theory of atoms resembles considerably the atomic theory of Greek philosophers. Democritus believed in atoms possessing size movement etc. The *Vaiśeṣika* atoms are possessed of *रूप* etc. in addition. Empedocles and Anaxagoras like Kanada regarded mind also as atomic. Sankaracarya (see his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedāntasūtras* II 3 11, 15) denounces this atomic theory with all his philosophical acumen showing how the first *kṛyā* in atoms is impossible, how the atoms cannot possibly be possessed of *viscous* etc.

The qualities *रूप* etc. of a product are produced by the qualities of the *कारण*, and they are destroyed either by the destruction of their substratum or by the appearance of contrary qualities, due to heat etc.

(53) The existence of atoms is proved by *अवयव*. Everything that is a *कायद्रव्य* is necessarily produced by a *द्रव्य* of lesser magnitude and that *महद्द्रव्य* *परमाणु* is a *काय* in its turn so proceeding in this way we come to the *द्रव्य* (the smallest component part) and the *द्रव्य* is composed of still smaller parts which are called *परमाणु*s which are

अन्तर (Line 9) — अथ वक्ष्यामि — The objector says — How can you say that the atom is not a product, because if you said so, the general rule that a component of a product must itself be a product, would be violated? — This is answered by saying that if an atom were regarded as a product, there would result an endless series of products. And in that case, the mountain Meru (or Sumera) and a mustard seed would come to be regarded as of similar dimension *being equally the products of infinite component parts*. So this series of component parts must stop somewhere. The product where it stops, is the *वस्तु*.

The Meru (or Sumera) is a fabulous golden mountain, the highest of all mountains, round which the sun and the stars are supposed to revolve.

(Line 13) — The author now shows how *ग्रन्थ* is composed of two atoms only, and the *वस्तु* of three *ग्रन्थ* only.

ग्रन्थ is composed of two atoms only. One atom cannot obviously produce a *ग्रन्थ* there is no run on to suppose that three atoms are required for that purpose. So two atoms may be regarded as sufficient to produce a *ग्रन्थ*. The *वस्तु* of a *ग्रन्थ* is *अणु* (and *हस्त*), the *वस्तु* of a *ग्रन्थ* is *अणु* (and *हस्त*) as the *ग्रन्थ* is the smallest thing visible. The *वस्तु* of an *अणु* is said to be *वर्तमानम्*.

(Line 14) — *अथवा* The question is what is the minimum number of *ग्रन्थ* required to produce the dimension in a *वस्तु*. It must be remembered that the dimension of a *ग्रन्थ* is of an altogether different nature from that of a *ग्रन्थ*. The *अणु* dimension in a *वस्तु* is either produced from the *अणु* dimension of the *ग्रन्थ* or the number of the producing factors (or from *अवशिष्टाः कारणवद्वा*, *वर्तमानवद्वा*, *अवशिष्टाः कारणवद्वा* — *Varierikāṣṭra* VII 14) as circumstances permit. Now

(1) One *ग्रन्थ* cannot obviously produce a *वस्तु*.

(2) Two *ग्रन्थ* cannot produce a *वस्तु* either. For the *अणु* dimension in a *वस्तु* cannot be produced by the *अणु* dimension of the *ग्रन्थ*, which is of a different nature. Thus the dimension of a *ग्रन्थ* is *अणु*, the dimension of two *ग्रन्थ* would be *अणु*, instead of *अणु*. So we fall back upon the *वर्तमानम्* for the production of the dimension of a *वस्तु*. The *ग्रन्थ* have to be *अणु* to produce a *वस्तु*.

(3) *अणु* means any number greater than two. So we fix upon three (which is the maximum number to make up *अणु*) as the number of *ग्रन्थ* required to produce a *वस्तु*.

(54) शब्दगुणम्—शब्द is the विशयगुण of आकाश, to emphasise this, the word गुण is used in the definition (अथ गुणवदमाकाशे शब्द एव विशेषगुण इति योमनय न तन्निष्पन्नत्वमात्राय । समवायेन शब्दत्वमात्रस्य सम्बन्धत्वात्—वायवेऽपिनी) Other definitions of आकाश are शब्दसमवायिकारणम्, सणोपाजन्यजन्यविशेषगुणसमानाधिकरणविशेषाधिकरणम्. By inference we are able to prove the existence of आकाश which being विभु is अनिन्दित, शब्द पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याभिन्न अष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वं सति समवायिकारणत्वात् । यन्नैव तन्नैव यथा रूपम् । It can be easily shown that शब्द cannot have the eight द्रव्य, पृथिवी and others, as its substratum, so a ninth द्रव्य आकाश must be supposed to exist. Others prove the existence of आकाश by arguing that stars and other heavenly bodies must have a resort which is आकाश. According to the Sāṃkhyaas निष्कर्मणादित्थम् is आकाशावुपायक (Lane 10) येदे प्रमाणापावात्, the divisions घटाकाश, पत्राकाश etc are due to the उपाधि विभु-सर्वभूतदेशसयोगित्वम् विभुत्वम्, । सर्वत्र परितोऽन्तर्परिमाणस्य किंवाचनं वा । (नरुदीरिका) विचम्—because all विभु things are necessarily eternal. The reading प्रमत्तवर्तित्वे परिशेष gives a more or less cumbersome definition of परिशेष—When it is denied that a thing resides in certain objects out of a number of objects in which it is sure to reside, it follows that it must reside in the remainder on account of the impossibility of its remaining anywhere else. The conclusion thus arrived at, is called परिशेष (Lane 4)—साधनत्वत्वं सति प्राप्ताय is the definition of a विशयगुण—रूपरदाक्षी नमिषार वायवितु नय-वम् । एक-द्रव्यमात्रत्वं चक-द्रव्यमात्रमात्रत्वम् । नात्र घटाक्षी नमिषार । आत्मनि नमिषार वायवितु प्राप्ताय । (यौवचन) आमदाक्षी is put in to exclude yogins who are possessed of miraculous power.

(55) काल—Time (अ विभुपरिवर्तनीयायतनत्वात् चतस्रश्चाधिक-रणाधार परत्वावगन्तव्य-कृष्णकाल ।) अने तादि-उद्धारहेतु (the definition in the तर्कसंग्रह) cannot be regarded as a definition of काल, it only expresses in a popular manner the idea about time. हेतु must be taken here to mean 'a special cause,' for all our cognitions are based upon conceptions of time and space. त्रिभुवे सति दिनसमवेदपरत्वात्समाधिकारणाधिकरणम् would be a technically correct but practically useless definition of काल. एक—The three-fold nature of काल, past, present and future, is due to उपाधि. According to the Sāṃkhyaas काल is to be included in आकाश, others regard काल as identical with ईश्वर the different क्षण being different from him. According to the Naiyāyikas काल is अनिन्दित, the followers of Prabhākara regard it as चक-द्रव्यत्वम्.

(56) दिक्—space, other definitions of दिक् are—अकाश-सम्बन्धविशेषगुणमहती, । त्रिभुवे सति देशिकत्वम् । अपरत्वात्समाधिकारणसंयोगावयवत्वाद्युपाधिकार दिक्त्वम्, जादिव-संयोगानु साधनत्वपद-वाममव विज्ञापणाधार परत्वात्समाधिकारण दिक् । Space is the cause of the notion of देशिक nearness or distance (दूत-निरादिहेतु) काल is नियतक्रियासंभवचक्र, that is, its divisions are fixed (what is present

time for one is at the present time for another living at that time) but दिग् is अदिगतेष्वनुपपत्तिः (for an object which is to the right of one, may be to the left of another person, or of himself if he turns about) Strictly speaking, there is no necessity of admitting both अकाश and दिग् as द्रव्य. Why should not अकाश be regarded as capable of showing direction in addition to its being समवेत with शब्द? The Vaiśeṣikas apparently admitted both as अकाश could not be ignored being one of the five well known elements and दिग् could not be ignored as the notion of space is as old as the hills. अकाश is one of the five material elements, has a special quality शब्द and thus has an objective existence, while दिग् is not an element has no special quality is the कारण of all effects does the work of showing direction and is to be perceived by the mind. दश—Though one दिग् owing to उपदिशेद् is regarded as four fold (प्राची पश्चिमी उत्तरी and दक्षिणी the four main quarters) or ten fold (प्राची उत्तरार्ध पश्चिमी दक्षार्ध आग्नेयी वैश्वी वायवी विशाखा the four by quarters, दश and अष्ट these are also named क्षेत्रावयवैश्च दशान् or यत्त्रैद्री, पञ्चमरी वायुः क्षेत्री वायुः वायुः चतुर्वर्षी विशाखी, त्राक्षी and मारी) or eleven fold (with the addition of त्रैद्री)

(57) See section 44 above संप्रत्यक्ष—सत्यं परिमाणम्, रूपरसस्पर्श, स्यात् and विभाग

(58) मनस-म-ने मन इति मन, स्वप्नादृतं च सति क्रियावत्तु मनस लक्षणम् It is not clear why the author says मन्मात्रमित्युच्यते instead of मनस सामान्यवद् Though the all-pervading Ātman is always in contact with the various इंद्रियाणि, we do not have their ज्ञान always (for instance, in deep sleep) this shows that there must be some other factor essential for the production of ज्ञान and that is मनः (आकाशे पक्षे चैतरे ज्ञानस्य मादो मावन्न मनसो लिङ्गम्) मनः acts as a sort of clearing office for the various impressions for which the sense-organs are responsible. If there had been no मनः, there would have been simultaneous knowledge through the various sense organs, which is not the case (सुषुप्तज्ञानावस्थाने मनसो लिङ्गम्) मनः is विद्यमान as there is no ज्ञान to believe that it is possessed of parts. It is different for different bodies for in this way alone we can account for different cognitions in different individuals. As regards its size, it is atomic. It cannot be मध्यमपरिमाण, for in that case it would be अविद्यमान. As it is विद्यमान, it can either be विद्युत् or अणुपरिमाण (for विद्युत् and अणुपरिमाण things are always विद्यमान) We shall now show why मनः can not be विद्युत्. It has already been mentioned that according to the Vaiśeṣikas, ज्ञानम् comes into contact with मनः (अज्ञा यत्ना सद्-वत्) before any cognition can be had. Ātman is definitely known to be विद्युत्, in order to make a contact between अज्ञानम् and ज्ञानम् possible, मनः must

not be विद्यु, for how can there be a contact between two all-pervading things? मनस् therefore must be taken to be अणु, so that आत्मन सयोग, the असमवायिकाण of ज्ञान may exist. If we admit the सयोग of two विद्यु things, then आत्मन् and मनस् would always be connected together and there would be no सुषुप्ति (where मनस् lies low and there is a cessation of knowledge). If on the other hand, मनस् is taken to be अणुपरिमाण, सुषुप्ति becomes possible when the atomic मनस् enters the पुतिन्त् vein (somewhere near the heart) where the आत्मन सयोग comes to an end. Cognition arises when मनस् comes out of the पुतिन्त् vein. This is obviously a very weak argument of the Vaisesikas. For, if Ātman is विद्यु, how can we assert that आत्मन सयोग ceases in the पुतिन्त् vein? The all-pervading आत्मन् cannot surely be prevented from entering the पुतिन्त् vein. The cessation of knowledge is due to the absence of इन्द्रियमन सयोग, rather than of आत्मन सयोग. But in that case there ought to be cessation of knowledge in dreams where also there is no इन्द्रियमन सयोग. Thus there is difficulty both ways. At any rate, the Vaisesikas are right in arguing that there could not be any contact between two विद्यु things and so all things considered मनस् should be taken to be atomic in size. मनस् is the internal sense-organ. It is not प्रायज्ञ, but अनुवेद्य. The Mīmāṃsakas regard मनस् to be विद्यु and the Vedāntins take it to be सत्त्वविद्वत्तामस्कृतिमज्ञ-न ज्ञाणम्.

(Line 3) —सहस्राष्टादशगुणवत्—The eight qualities are समता, अनुपरिमाणम्, दृढत्वम्, सयोग, विभाग, वातव्यम्, अपारत्वम्, and वेग. Others say, परापरवस्तुतायां पञ्च वेगश्च यावत्से.

(39) गुणः are twenty-four. A गुणः is द्रव्यस्य विदेशाभावेन सिद्धवस्तुपर्ययः (Kavyaprakāśa II). The Tarka-Dīpikā defines गुणः = द्रव्यमित्यन्ते सति सामान्यवान् (we shall see later how सामान्य can only reside in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्, so the expression द्रव्यमित्यन्ते सति excludes द्रव्य and कर्मन् and the definition applies to गुण only) or गुणरजानिमान्. The Vaisesika-sūtras say द्रव्यान्मप्यगुणवान् (having द्रव्य as its substratum and having no qualities, for if गुण were to be possessed of गुण there would be अनवस्था) सन् गतिभागेऽप्यगुणमनवेद्य (this expression excludes कर्मन् which is नो द्रव्याभावे and अनुपरिवत्, for क्रिया is the cause of सयोग and विभाग) इति गणलक्षणम्. The sūtras give only seventeen Guṇas, उपरामग-धर्मज्ञा मत्ता परिमाणानि दृष्टव्यं च सत्येतिमगोपरकारणे बुद्धयः सुखदुःख इत्यादौ प्रयत्नात् गुणाः. According to the commentators the च in प्रयत्नात् is meant to imply the seven गुणः च, द्रव्य, रस, दाम्, धर्म, अर्थ and सत्यता that are not expressly mentioned by name. Some add to the list the following:—लघुत्व (which is but दृढत्वान्वय), कृद्रव्य and कटिद्रव्य (which are but अवयवभेदेन विदेशः) and मयव्य (which is but परस्परव्यवयव), but it is not necessary

to recognise them as separate *gūṇa* and the number of *gūṇa* may be said to be twenty-four only. Of these *samānā* is three-fold (वेग भावना स्थितिरावकाशेति) and *dravya* two-fold (संसादिक and वैवर्तिक). These twenty-four *Gūṇas* can be classified in various ways. Thus (भावनेश, p. 263)

(I) (i) *सूतृगुणा* —सम्यक्, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, वायुम्, अपात्यम्, पुष्पम्, द्रव्यम्, स्नेह, वेग and स्थितिरावकाश (11)

(ii) *असूतृगुणा* —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, मयल, धर्म, अयम, कर्म and शब्द (10)

(iii) *सुतृसूतृगुणा* —सम्यक्, परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, सयोग and विभाग (5)

(II) (i) *अवेकादिना* —सयोग, विभाग, द्विगुणित, तत्परा, द्विगुणकपादक,

(ii) *एकादिना* —तद्विना द्विगुणित ।

(III) (i) *विशेषगुणा* —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, मयल, धर्म, अयम, कर्म, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, स्नेह, संसादिक-द्रव्यम्, कर्म and शब्द (16) बुद्ध्यादिष्वङ्गक-व्यवस्था स्नेह-संसादिकी द्रव्य । अदृष्टभावावकाशा-अथौ वैवर्तिका गुणा ।

(ii) *सामान्यगुणा* —सम्यक्, परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, सयोग, विभाग, वायुम्, अपात्यम्, वैवर्तिकद्रव्यम्, पुष्पम् and वेग (10) भावनादिष्वङ्गक-व्यवस्था द्वयो वैवर्तिकरुणा । सुकृतवेगौ सामान्यगुणा एते परस्परिर्गतौ ॥

(IV) (i) *द्विविधगुणा* —सम्यक् परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, सयोग, विभाग, वायुम्, अपात्यम्, द्रव्यम्, स्नेह, वेग and स्थितिरावकाश (11)

(ii) *बाह्यैकद्रव्यगुणा* —सम्यक्, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श and शब्द (5)

(iii) *अन्तर्द्रव्यगुणा* —पुष्पम्, धर्म, अयम and वायु (4)

(iv) *अन्तर्द्रव्यगुणा* —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, मयल (6)

(V) (i) *अकारणगुणोपपत्त्या* —बुद्ध्यादिष्वङ्गक, भावा and शब्द (10)

(ii) *कारणगुणोपपत्त्या* —अकारण-सामान्य-भावा, अनुभावा एवम्, अकारण-द्रव्यम्, स्नेहवेगपुष्पकानि, पृथक्त्वम्, परिमाणम् and स्थितिरावकाश

For further interesting details about the characteristics of different *gūṇa*, see भावनेश. A *सूतृगुण* is one which resides in one or corporeal substance. A *सामान्यगुण* can exist in two or more *dravya* at one and the same time, while a *विशेषगुण* can exist in one *dravya* only at one time. The भावनेश्वर gives in the following verses how the various *gūṇa* exist in the nine *dravya* : सत्त्वादिबोद्धी वेगाद्यवकाशा ५०-विगुणा । अतो एतादृशा-स्य द्रव्यो वेगस्य वेगादि । सत्त्वादिबोद्धी वेगस्य पुष्पम् च द्रव्यकम् । सत्त्वा-सम्पत्त्या स्नेहो कारणादि-५०-विगुणा ॥ सत्त्वादिना गन्धपुष्प-स्थितिरावकाशा ५१-विगुणा । बुद्ध्यादिष्वङ्गक-सामान्यगुण-वायुना तथा ॥ घनवर्मा गुणा एत आत्मनः सुखदुर्गता । सामान्यगुणक-कारणित्यौ शब्दस्य ते च सत्त्वा-सामान्य-

Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold quite different views as to how these *वस्तुगुण* are produced. The Vaiśeṣikas are called *वीहृ-* (वीहृत् परमाणवः) *वाक्यादिना*, because they hold that it is the *परमाणु* that are baked. Thus the application of heat causes a commotion in the atoms which become separated, and their contact—the non-intimate cause—being destroyed, the products *ग्रन्थक* etc are destroyed. The whole black jar is destroyed and the atoms become baked and a new *रूप* (redness), *गन्ध* etc are created in them. Then these *परमाणु* with the new qualities come together to form *ग्रन्थक* etc and ultimately the new red jar is produced. The *वीहृवाक्यादिना* maintain that fire can not penetrate into the thick jar to create a new *रूप* which must be supposed to be created by the *रूप* of the *परमाणु* which alone are fit to be operated upon by fire. It is easy to see the flaws in the above argument. Where does the *वट* stay when the *परमाणु* get separated? If a new *वट* is created, how are we to account for the fact that we continue to recognise the *वट* to be the same old one though somewhat changed? The Vaiśeṣikas do try to answer these objections, but their answers are dogmatic and unconvincing. The Naiyāyikas are *विटरवाक्यादिना* (*विटर* means *कार्यकारणमनुदाय*, *अवयवावयविसमुदाय*) and take a more sensible view of the matter. Their view is as follows—The jar is *संविद्ध*, hence fire can easily penetrate into it. The old jar is not destroyed, but fire acts upon the parts of the jar, right up to the *परमाणु*, and changes their *रूप*. Thus as the old *वट* for all practical purposes remains in tact, we are able to recognise it.

(Line 5)—*इति च सत्त्वाद्यः महत्त्वेन सह एकं वै वटादित्ये समवेकत्वे*. What this sentence means is that these four qualities must be developed (or manifested) and must inhere in an object possessed of magnitude, in order to become directly perceptible. The sentence is intended to show that these qualities, when they belong to atoms, and the *वैजस* colour of the sense of sight, are not perceived, because, in the former case, they reside in objects that do not possess magnitude, and in the latter case, the colour is *अनुद्भूत* (unmanifested or undeveloped).

(64) *सत्त्वा—एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतु* is hardly a definition of *सत्त्वा*. हेतु is used here in the sense of *असत्कारणकारण*. The Mīmāṃsākas regarded *सत्त्वा* as a separate *वस्तु*. *सत्त्वा* is perceived by *बुद्धि* as well as by *बुद्धि*. It is thus a *सामान्यगुण* *एकव* belonging to *वस्तु* is said to be *वस्तु*, and *द्विवादि* is *अतिव* everywhere. From the passage *द्विवा* *अव्यक्ते* it is clear that Kesavamisra had clearly grasped the nature of duality etc which are merely phenomenal, being based upon *अव्यक्ताव्यक्ति*. Unity alone is real and eternal, everything else is more relative. Thus the

idea of two can be grasped when we understand one twice, it has no independent existence. All numbers can be shown to be based upon द्वात् which alone has no relative existence, *pace* Dr. Ernst. अनेकत्वद्वयोः संपेक्षा बुद्धिदृश्यते—the notion which refers to many unities is called relative notion. When we see two things, the idea of their duality does not at once arise in our mind. We first apprehend the two things separately in the form 'this is one, this is one.' (इदमस्मि, इदमेवम्) This notion which refers to many unities is called अपन्नाबुद्धिः. It is this combined notion of two unities that produces the conception of duality and then we realise the things as being two. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold different views regarding the nature of द्वित्व, the former hold that it is अपन्नाबुद्धिराद्य, and the latter अनेकत्व द्वित्वम्.

(68) परिमाणम्—परिमाणवत्तत्त्वम् । मानस्यवहार—इत्येवमित्यवधारितवहार or मान परिमिति नस्व यो न्ववहार इदं कश्च इदम् अणु इत्याद्याः परम् । त्रिपुराणि १३ वरमहत्, the परिमाण of an अणु is अणुत्वं and that of a परमाणु is परिमाणवत्त्वम् निम्नगत परिमाण १३ नि य, अनित्यगतपरिमाण १३ अन्तिय अनि-परिमाण is three fold, सत्त्वाज्ञ-यम्, परिमाणान्तम् प्रचदज-य च । तत्राद्यम् परमाणुद्वि रान्तम् अणुत्वं । अणुत्वं च द्वि रान्त-य च सत्त्वाज्ञे । द्वितीयं सत्त्वाज्ञपरिमाणान्तं यं परिमाणम् । तृतीयम् तृत्वाद्यवसरेणान्तं यं तृत्वाद्यवसरेणान्तं परिमाणम् । The Sāṃkhya and the Vedāntins do not regard द्वैतत्वं and द्वैतम् as separate परिमाणम्.

(69) दृक्त्वम्—अद्वैतान्वयवृत्तकारणम्—The Mīmāṃsākas regard दृक्त्वम् as identical with अन्योन्याभावः दृक्त्वम् is different from अद्वैतान्वयवृत्त, as the latter simply says that one thing is not another, but the former positively says that one thing is distinct from another अन्योन्याभावः माह tell us that यद is not यत्न and vice versa, but दृक्त्वम् would say that यद is distinct from यत्न. The notions conveyed by अन्योन्याभावः and दृक्त्वम् are different.

(67) संयोग —संयुक्तव्यवहारद्वयम्, the नन्ददीपिका says that the expression सप्तमिदं should be used to exclude the सप्तमिदंकारणम् (these are eight, ईदं नन्दान्वयवृत्तान्तं सप्तमिदं कालं द्विज्जट्टम् (सप्तमिदं), पदिय-परमाणुव्यवहार in addition, according to some) The relation between two द्रव्यद्वयम् (the relation between the व्युत्पत्तिद्वयम् is सप्तमिदं) is संयोगः संयोगः is कर्मज and सौम्यज, कर्मज again is two fold (१) अन्तरकर्मज, the contact between a vulture and a mountain, (२) उभयकर्मज, the contact between two wrestlers or rats. संयोगजः is अवयवसंयोगजः, इत्येवमित्यवधारितवहारः सप्तमिदं सप्तमिदं (this might arise from one, two or many अवयवः) संयोगः is अन्तर्गम्यवृत्तः (that is, reaching only in a part of the thing, not covering up the whole object) or सप्तमिदंकारणम् (having the same mode as that of its absolute negation)

(68) विभाग — विभक्त्यद्वयद्वारा समाधारण कारणम् would be a better definition, emphasizing the positive nature of विभाग Some do not regard विभाग as a separate गुण, calling it merely स्यात्पदस्य Like सदेग, विभाग is कमज (अन्यतरूपज, —वेवेनशैलयोर्विभाग, उमयर्मज, —मेघयोर्विभाग) and विभागज (कारणमात्रविभागजस्य, —कपालद्वयविभागात् कण्डलपुत्रदेशविभाग, कारणान्तरविभागजस्य —हस्तपुस्तकविभागात् काण्डपुस्तकविभाग) The Naiyayikas do not recognise this विभागजविभाग, the Vaisesikas do

(69) परत्वारित्व—विष्कृन्तपरत्वारित्व resides in घनद्रव्य, कालघनपरत्वारित्व in जम्बद्वय १० वि० १३ पर व with reference to time, विष्कृष्टत्वं १५ परत्वं with reference to space

(70) गुरुत्व—अत्र the definition is put in to exclude वेग which is the असम्भारिकरण of द्वितीयपतन पतनम्—अधादेशसंयोगादुक्तो व्यापार । The Vaisesikas obviously were ignorant of the notion of gravity, but they evidently knew that the initial पतन was not caused by वेग etc, and accounted for it by postulating the existence of the गुरुत्व quality गुरुत्व is अवश्य Some Naiyayikas consider it to be a रश्मिवेग संयोगवेग, the Vaisesikasūtra is सम्प्रसारणे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् (V 1 7)—The conjunction of the fruit and the stalk, the velocity of an arrow, and the conscious effort of the hand prevent the fruit, the arrow and the bird respectively from falling, and in their absence the falling is due to gravity

(71) द्रवत्वम्—वेग would be the असम्भारिकरण of द्वितीयपतन नैसर्गिकम् natural not caused by अन्धादेशवेग In hail and snow there is नैसर्गिक (or सानिद्रिक) द्रवत्व only lying low owing to excessive cold नैसर्गिक due to नन स्यात्

(72) स्नेह —स्नेहजनिमान् शुभ, it is the विशेषगुण of water स्नेह is two-fold प्रहृष्टस्नेह and अहृष्टस्नेह, the former is found in oily substances

(73) शब्द —शब्द resides in आकाश only and is perceived by only श्रोत्र It exists only for three moments and is अनिरु According to the Sankhyas and Vedantins, शब्द resides in all the five elements According to our author शब्द is three-fold (1) सयोगज, मेरीदुष्टसयोगजस्य (2) विभागज, यथा कश्चिन्माने द्रव्यविभागज वध्न्यवगशब्द (3) शब्दज, मेघादिदेशमात्र्य श्रोत्रवन्त द्वितीयादिशब्द According to others these three varieties constitute the स्वयं पञ्चशब्द which should be distinguished from वगमात्र शब्द (महत्तमावाप्तिम् अस्मात्तुर्विर्जलक्षण) Another division of शब्द is (I) बुद्धिहेतुक which is sub-divided into (1) सामाविक वगदिशानामिष्टपञ्चको हमित रुचिनादिरूप, (11) काल्पनिक —(1) वायादिशब्द, (2) गन्धिन्, (3) वगमात्र and (II) अबुद्धिहेतुक मेघादिशब्द वगामशब्द is also further sub-divided

impossible for both the 99th and 100th शब्द to exist till they are destroyed together. For a शब्द can exist only for three moments. When the 99th शब्द is in its third moment, ready to be destroyed, the 100th शब्द being in its second moment of existence, has yet one more moment to live and can not be destroyed for one more moment. The 100th शब्द can not be destroyed in its third moment by the 99th शब्द which cannot be in existence at that time. So we shall have to suppose that the 100th शब्द is destroyed by the destruction of the 99th शब्द and not by the 99th शब्द. (According to some, शब्द exists for two moments only and not three, but this does not affect the main argument.)

(Lane 24)—विनाशित्व च. The destructibility of शब्द can be proved by the following syllogism—शब्द अनियः । सामा दधने सति अस्मद् विनाशोद्भिद्य प्रसङ्गात् । घटवत् । (Incidentally, अनियः is explained as 'having a nature liable to destruction' and not 'having मावत् (or सत्तायोग) liable to destruction. For, if अनियः meant having मावत् liable to destruction' प्रागभाव which is acknowledged to be अनियः by all would not be अनियः, as प्रागभाव has अयत्नः and so the definition would not be applicable to it. But प्रागभाव has a nature liable to destruction, hence the definition विनाशोद्भिद्य प्रसङ्गात् would cover it.) The author now points out how each and every word in the हेतु सामा दधने is significant. If the हेतु is simply इन्द्रियप्रसङ्गात्, the व्याप्ति would be

य य इन्द्रियप्रसङ्ग स स अनियः,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, as आपत् is इन्द्रियप्रसङ्ग (mind which cognises Ātman is also an इन्द्रिय, the internal sense organ), but नियः. So we must amend the हेतु.

If the हेतु is बोधोद्भिद्यप्रसङ्गात्, the व्याप्ति would be

य य बोधोद्भिद्यप्रसङ्ग स स अनियः,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, as बोधाय is बोधोद्भिद्यप्रसङ्ग (by the yogins), but नियः. So the हेतु requires still further emendation [this is rather hypercritical for in all our arguments, we tactfully rule out of order all extraordinary or supernatural considerations.]

If the हेतु is अस्मद् विनाशोद्भिद्यप्रसङ्गात्, the व्याप्ति would be

य य अस्मद् विनाशोद्भिद्यप्रसङ्ग स स अनियः,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, for सामा दधने सति अस्मद् विनाशोद्भिद्यप्रसङ्ग (according to the rule येनेद्भिद्यं यद् वृत्तये etc see section 60 above) but नियः. So we add सामा दधने सति this effectually shuts out सामा दधने, for सामा दधने has no further सामा दधने.

Thus the हेतु, सामा दधने सति अस्मद् विनाशोद्भिद्यप्रसङ्गात्, is an unobjectionable हेतु.

(Line 32)—अमेतद्भावे प्रमाणम्—Atoms are knowable things, we might not be able to see them, but there must be some who are able to do that and they are yogins, gods etc

(Line 36)—सामान्य इति न प्रमाणम्, विशेष and समान (and अप्रमाण) have no सामान्य See section 83

(74)—See section 87. The passage वेत्ति is not read in some manuscripts. As Kesavamurti has not directly mentioned बुद्धि under Ātman (as the तर्कसंग्रह, for instance, does), this passage referring to वेत्ति बुद्धि appears to be suspicious

(75-76)—सुख is defined as that which is experienced as agreeable by all. This is a faulty definition. For there can be nothing in this world which is experienced as agreeable by all. Even the most unalloyed pleasure in the world will be looked down upon by a philosopher as being nothing but misery. If we therefore drop सर्वत्रयत्वं the definition will be all right. The Tarkasamgraha gives the same definition, except that it substitutes सर्वम् for सर्वत्रयम्. Annambhatta evidently knew the faulty character of his definition, for in the वैदिकी he says 'सुखी अयम्' इति अत्रयत्वं सुखस्य इति चेत् लक्षणम्. This means pleasure is that after experiencing which one feels the consciousness 'I am happy'. This criticism applies manifestly not only to the definition of सुख as well.—The तद्वत्त्वम् divides सुख into two varieties सांनिधिक and स्वर्ग, defining them as 'परस्परव्यापकव्यवस्थायाम् सुखं सांनिधिकम् । इत्याद्याय चीनोपपत्तयः सुखं स्वर्गम् ।'

(77)—इच्छा is explained as वृत्ति (इच्छा काय, Tarkasamgraha)

(78)—हेतु is वृत्ति, section 91 gives one more synonym अ-वृत्ति

(79)—प्रयत्न is उत्साह (वृत्ति according to तर्कसंग्रह) The word प्रयत्न is used in the sense of conscious mental effort (the word does not mean effort in general, which is the meaning of the word in Marathi)

बुद्धि, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, हेतु and प्रयत्न are perceived by the internal sense-organ, mind, and (together with चर्मा and श्रोत्र and भ्रूणरश्मयः) are the special qualities of Ātman, because they are subjective as opposed to other qualities such as रस, रस etc which have an objective existence

Even the most ardent admirer of Kesavamurti could hardly argue that his treatment of the above six qualities बुद्धि etc is in any way illuminating. But as they are hardly of any use to a Naiyāyika proper, they are treated with such scant courtesy

Cognition, desire and effort are non eternal in the individual soul, because they are lost when the individual soul is released

But in the case of God they are permanent. Note 'बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना अस्मदादिनष्टा अपि वा युक्ततावापिनेषामुच्छेदात् । इत्यनिष्टा धृतिरित्या एव तेषां सार्वदिकत्वात् ।'

(80) धर्म and अधर्म are otherwise known as पुण्य and पाप. Kesava-misra gives only an academical definition of धर्म and अधर्म. The Tarkasamgraha gives a more useful definition, विहितकर्म-वो धर्म, and निषिद्धकर्म-अधर्म. विहित and निषिद्ध mean वेदविहित and वेदनिषिद्ध respectively. Injunctions and prohibitions occurring in works other than the Veda such as the Smritis etc. receive their authority from the Veda on which they are based. They are thus included under the terms वेद-विहित and वेदनिषिद्ध. विहितकर्मन् or enjoined actions are those that are laid down by Vedic injunctions such as उमेतिहोमन स्वयं कामो वजेत, अहरह रत्ना वा मन्त्रमुपानीत. These lead to merit. It may be noted by the way that according to the Naiyayikas सत्त्वा इव is followed by a positive effect viz धर्मनिवृत्ति. Actions which bring in demerit are those that are forbidden by Vedic prohibitions such as न यत्न (flesh of a deer or any other animal struck with a poisoned weapon) भक्षयेत्, न सुग विभेत्. The reading तो चाप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणप्रमाणानुमानाभ्यां च is clearly an improvement upon the original passage which does not refer to आगमप्रामाण्यत्व, and for that very reason is likely to be a later emendation. The शरीरादिभेदश्च must obviously have been caused by something and that something is धर्म and अधर्म. (Line 8)— प्रयत्नाद्वा न, प्रयत्न cannot produce the शरीर, because प्रयत्न becomes possible only after the body has come into existence.

(81) सत्त्व is the last of the 24 qualities. It has three varieties, वेग or velocity, साधना or mental impression and लघुनिश्चाय (साकार) or elasticity. Our author does not define सत्त्व in general. Its first variety वेग is defined as क्रियाहेतु. The सत्त्वदर्शी defines वेग as 'कर्मज्ञ सत्त्वो वेगः'. When an arrow is shot from a bow, the action of discharging it produces velocity in it. So velocity is born from action. Velocity resides in द्रव्यी, अणु, तेजस्, वायु and मनस्. These are सूत or corporeal substances. The very idea of velocity or motion implies that its abode must be of limited dimension. Hence it is natural that it resides in corporeal things which are limited. An all pervading thing like ether cannot have velocity or motion.

साधना or mental impression is produced by apprehension. Every अनुपपन्न that we have leaves an impression on our mind. That impression is known as साधना. This साधना is the cause of producing remembrance. We perceive Devadatta today. That perception leaves on our mind a certain impression which lies there in a latent state. A few days afterwards we happen to see a person resembling Devadatta.

This सदृशानुभव exists or awakens the latent impression left by देवदत्त-
दर्शन and the impression thus awakened or उद्बुद्ध produces remem-
brance Thus मायना is स्मृतिहेतु — मायना or mental impression being of a
subjective nature belongs naturally to soul only सादृशानुबुद्धिनिपादा —
न्यायसूत्र III 2 42 gives an exhaustive list of स्मृतिहेतुजरोधक-प्रविधयः निमित्त-
मायनादिद्वयवशात् उद्बुद्धि-सदृशमायनाभिनयनसमय-नन्दनियोगैरुक्तानि । अतिशयमात्र-व्यवधानसुख —
इत्येव उद्बुद्धिसमय-वैतानिकेयागमवर्धननिमित्तेभ्यः ।

स्वित्तिपादक — Supply सस्तर after this स्वित्तिपादक सस्तर means
elasticity It is that quality which reproduces in an object its origi-
nal condition when that condition is disturbed The best example of
स्वित्तिपादक is a dog's tail Try to straighten it in any way you like,
it will again assume its crooked character Kesavanisra gives the
example of a bow When a bow is straightened, it bends back again
This is due to its स्वित्तिपादकत्व After a time the bow may lose this
characteristic But that is a different matter The Tarka-saṅgraha
gives the example of a mat स्वित्तिपादक belongs to earth

These three kinds of सस्तर are so different in character that it is
difficult to discover the exact reason of their inclusion under one class
The same fact is responsible for the difficulty of giving a general
definition of सस्तर The best definition of सस्तर is given by तादिकर
१२ ' यज्जातीयस्य वृत्तलज्जातीयस्य कालम् । एवमस्तराद्विजातीय सस्तर स दुर्गो यत् ॥'
This means सस्तर is that quality which creates an effect similar to its
own cause though it is itself dissimilar from that cause or effect This
definition is applicable to all the three kinds of samakars Velocity
is produced from action and it produces action in the arrow, though
it is itself not of the nature of action Mental impression is produced
from सस्तर and gives rise to स्मृति which is सज्जातीय or of the same kind
as सस्तर, both being बुद्धि But mental impression is not of the nature
of बुद्धि स्वित्तिपादक is created by the action of rolling For when
mats are kept in a roll, they become elastic स्फुटित्तिपादक also produces
the action of rolling when the mat is spread But स्वित्तिपादक is not
itself of the nature of action Read ' स्तोपादकसज्जातीयस्य स स्तर एवम् च
गद्विजातीयोऽयं सस्तर । यथा स्फुटितेन सस्तर, यत् किं अनुपपन्नजन्य-
स्फुटितान्तेन
स्तर न ज्ञानज्जातीय । यथा यत् वेग कमज्ज कमहेतु एवम् एवम् भवति । यथा च स्फुटि-
त्यस्य वेदनादिकमज्ज वेदनादिकर्मकारण एव च न कर्मत्वम् ।' (तार्किकसंग्रह ७५ तादिकर)

(82) The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras give the same divisions of कर्मत्वम् in the
text, and define कर्मत्वम् as इन्द्रियमगुण (reading: in one substratum and
having no गुण, as कर्मत्व by its very nature is opposed to गुण कर्मत्व is सत्य
वस्तुत्वम्, while गुण is सिद्धवस्तुत्वम्) सकोनविमलिनस्तेजसागमम् (the absolute cause
of सत्त्व and विमल) The तार्किकसंग्रह practically says the same thing.

सयोगभिन्नत्वे सति (this expression is put in in order to exclude हस्तपुस्तक-सयोग which is the असमवायिकारण of कायपुस्तकसयोग, and to confine the लक्षण only to कर्मन् direct) सयोगसमवायिकारणम्, कर्मन्मात्रमिदम्. The divisions of कर्मन् or motion in the text are obviously based upon the popular view about motion in general, upwards, downwards, hitherward, thitherward and general. भ्रमण need not be a separate division as it can be included in गमन अविभुद्रवरिमाणेन सम्पन्न—This simply means that कर्मन् can reside in corporeal substances only.

(83)—सामान्य generality or genus. Objects which belong to the same class have something common about them, which is known as सामान्य. For instance, पत्रम् can be said to reside in all वृक्ष howsoever they might differ in size or shape. It is thus the cause of अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय. It is also defined as नित्यैकमनेकादुगतम्. If the definition were simply एकमनेकादुगतम् it would extend to सयोग, so to exclude हयोग etc. नित्यम् is put in. नित्यैकम् would extend to जलपरमाणुगतत्वं which is नित्य and एक, so to exclude it. अनेकादुगतम् is put in. सामान्य is नित्य as even though the individual व्यक्ति perish, the class notion would still remain. The Vaisesikasutras simply say सामान्य विशेष इति द्वन्द्वरेषम्, thus pointing out how the idea of सामान्य really depends upon the angle of vision of the person concerned. Kesavamisra means exactly the same thing when he says तच्च वाच्यतेऽपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद् विशेषः । Whether a quality is to be classed as सामान्य or विशेष would depend upon how you would look at it. If you consider it to be something common to a class of objects, it becomes a सामान्य, if you regard it as peculiar to something, it becomes a विशेष. Later on, सामान्य seems to have come to be regarded as a positive thing residing in the first three पदार्थ viz. द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्.

It is easy to see how सामान्य cannot reside in the remaining four पदार्थ, viz. सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव. सामान्य cannot reside in सामान्य, for there would thus be अनवस्थादोष, if चञ्चल has a सामान्य व चञ्चलम्, this चञ्चलम् should have also a सामान्य and there would be no end to this kind of argument. So it is best to admit that सामान्य has no further सामान्य. सामान्य cannot reside in विशेष, for thereby सामान्य and विशेष would both lose their very nature. विशेष implying as it does particularity which enables us to distinguish one thing from another, cannot possibly have any thing to do with सामान्य which implies an absolutely contrary notion. You might as well expect light to reside in darkness. समवाय cannot have any सामान्य as समवाय is only one and there can not be any class notion with reference to one object. *Again वस्त्रम् and its लक्षणम् व वस्त्रम् are related together by the वस्त्रम् relation, what relation can there be between समवाय and समवायम् ? Not another*

सम्भार, for there would be अनवस्था, how can we account for the existence and work of this other सम्भार ? अम्भार cannot have a सम्भार as सम्भार is obviously सम्भार and it cannot have any सम्भार with an अम्भार. Thus सम्भार can exist only in द्वय, गुण and कर्म. सम्भार is two fold, पर (highest, most extensive) and अवर (less extensive, or species). सम्भार is the परसम्भार as सम्भार (existence) resides in all objects द्वय, अवर are अवरसम्भार as they are obviously less extensive. The Saptapadartha recognises a third division viz वर्ण. Thus द्वयत्व is an अवरसम्भार with reference to सम्भार, but a परसम्भार with reference to वर्ण. द्वयत्व is explained as सम्भारानां साधनानामुक्तो नित्यो धर्मः सम्भारम् वा वा कर्मार्थं बुद्धिं प्रकृते विवेकपरिष्कारेण यथा बहुधा विवर्तते यं व्यवहर्तते कोऽर्थादिकं प्रत्ययानुसन्निहितम् । (वाल्मीकि २।१।६८)

It is usual to divide सम्भार into जलिसम्भार (which is also called simply जल) and उपविष्टसम्भार (which is also called simply उपवि or सम्भार). As the Saptapadartha says सम्भारम् जलिसम्भारोपविष्टम् च । जलिसम्भारोपविष्टम् सति । उपविष्टम् पाच्य-यदि विषयकं सम्भारं जलिसम्भारम् स्यादुपविष्टम् । Though जल and सम्भार (or उपवि) are often used promiscuously, there is a vital difference between the two notions represented by these two terms. सम्भार is more or less a loose idea of generality existing in a set of objects, while जल represents a distinct class or genus and religiously respects the division of genus and species. Thus मनुष्यत्व would be a proper जल representing it does the genus of मनुष्य, but अणुत्व would be a mere सम्भार, as it exists in different well defined classes of मनुष्य, अणु etc. In other words, a जलिसम्भार is the very essence of the class of objects to which it refers, while an उपविष्टसम्भार refers to certain adventitious features which are common to widely different objects that are not homogeneous. अणुत्व exists in अणु, cows, men etc, but अणुत्व cannot be a जलिसम्भार, as अणुत्व does not make अणु, cows or men what they are. जलिसम्भार thus comprises members of a joint family, while उपविष्टसम्भार takes into account hostel boarders who are mere birds of passage brought together by accident.

The following verse of उपनिषद् mentions the circumstances which must not exist in the case of a जलिसम्भार (an उपविष्टसम्भार can exist in some cases) अन्तरेवेकत्वम् सत्त्वोपविष्टम् । अणुविष्टसम्भारो जलिसम्भारम् । Thus (1) अन्तरेवेक — There can be obviously no जलिसम्भार or उपविष्टसम्भार when there is only one अणु. (2) अणुत्वम् — when the individual अणु is the same only differing in name अणुत्व and अणुत्व can not be two different अणु. (3) अणु — अणुत्व and अणुत्व can not both be जलिसम्भार. Both अणुत्व and अणुत्व exist in अणु, अणु, अणु and अणु, only अणुत्व is found

in मन्त्रम् and only धूतम् in आकाशः. Thus if we were to regard सूत्रम् and धूतम् as जातिः, what becomes of the द्वय-व्यभिचारी which comprises all the द्वयः. There would be all confusion and cross division so such जातिः should not be admitted. We can have धूत-व and सूत्र-व as उपाधिस्वसामान्यः but not as जातिसामान्यः. It would thus be seen that a जातिसामान्य-व alone is a true full fledged सामान्य, उपाधिसामान्य is a सामान्य only through courtesy (1) अनवगमिनि —As already seen before सामान्य cannot have a further सामान्य. (2) व्यावृत्तिनि —विशेषः cannot have a सामान्य-व, otherwise they would lose their very nature which is as poles asunder from that of सामान्य. (3) असम्बन्ध-व —सम्बन्धः cannot have सामान्य, for it cannot be in सम्बन्ध relation with it as every सामान्य is required to be with reference to its possessor.

(Line 11) —अत्र उच्यते. The objector says that it is unnecessary to understand सामान्य-व as distinct from the individual व्यक्ति. The answer is that it is सामान्य alone that can properly account for the cognition of similarity or sameness in diverse, dissimilar objects. Such a cognition must depend upon something and that something is सामान्य.

(Line 9) —ननु अद्यावन्निर्दिष्टकारणा बुद्धिः, this represents the view of the Banddhās who do not admit सामान्य. According to them, गो means गोत्वसामान्य, we do not know from गो what गो is (for every thing is सामान्य), but what is different from what is not a cow. In other words, cognition takes the form of negation or exclusion, it is never positive. The एकारणा बुद्धिः in गो-वक्ति is therefore merely अगोत्यावृत्ति-वदम्. The answer is that what the objector represents, is opposed to all our experience and common sense. The एकारणा बुद्धिः appears in a positive form. We get a positive idea of sameness from गोत्व, and not of अगोत्यावृत्ति.

(84) —विशेषः Individuality or particularity. The विशेषः reside in विन्यस्तः (विन्यस्तः इत्यस्य परमाणव आकाशादिवत्तत्त्वं च तत्र वदन्त्याणि । नर्क-विका) and are व्यावृत्तः that is, distinguishing one thing from another. The Vaiśeṣikasūtras call these अत्यविशेषः to distinguish them from the ordinary particular characteristics that distinguish objects from one another. The Vaiśeṣikas are said to be so called, because they admit the existence of these विशेषः, a doctrine which is repudiated by modern Naiyāyikas, Ānandīlaka, the followers of Prabhākara and the Vedāntins. The Vaiśeṣikasūtrakara Kanada also does not regard it as a characteristic doctrine of his school. But as the Vaisesikas alone of the seven Pādarthikas directly refer to the atoms of which the Vaisesikas are highly enamoured, they seem to have so much importance attached to them. The necessity of admitting these Vaisesikas, —every atom having its own particularity— is thus demonstrated. We are able to distinguish gross objects from one another by means

of their different sizes and shapes, but the atoms are not possessed of parts at all (as they are supposed to be *niravayava*), hence unless we believe that the atoms of a *Ghata* are possessed of *Viśeṣas* different from those possessed by a *Pata*, all the atoms would be of the same kind and different objects would not come into existence. The *Viśeṣa* of an atom is also capable of distinguishing itself from another atom of the same genus. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas* the *Viśeṣas* do not stand in need of other *Viśeṣas* for distinguishing themselves from other *Viśeṣas*, for there would thus arise *अवयवः*. The *Viśeṣa* is therefore *एतन् एव व्यावर्तकः*. Against this it might be reasonably argued that if the *Viśeṣas* are *एतन् एव व्यावर्तकः* what harm is there in supposing that a *द्रव्य* is also *एतन् एव व्यावर्तकः* on account of its *अवयवः* or *संघातविशेषः*? What need is there to postulate the existence of a separate *Viśeṣa* at all? (The *Vaiśeṣikas* have no satisfactory explanation to offer on this point. Read the following from *प्रज्ञापनपादुभाष्य*, *अपान्नविज्ञावेतिर पदम् यत् करमान् एतन् एव व्यावर्तनियमस्य प्रयोजितान् वा कर्तव्यं इति चेत् न । आह्वानात् । इह तादात्म्यस्वरूपविभिन्नसंज्ञां यजति । यथा अनासक्तिनी एतन् एवाज्ञाविशेषम् तदाभावात् यनाम् । तदेव हि तादात्म्याविवेकिषु स्वत एव व्यावर्तितव्यम् । नवीनात् एतन्व्यावर्तितव्यम् ।) The *Viśeṣas* are *प्रयत्नः* to the *Yogins* so these *Viśeṣas* reading as they do in the *Upaniṣads* are useful to them only in distinguishing the atoms from one other. The *Viśeṣas* reside in the *niravayava*s by the *समवयव* relation and have no *अङ्गं*.*

(85)—See section 7 (Lane 1)—*अवयवः पदं ते*—The objector says—The *अवयवः* is not different or distinct from the *अणवः* so we cannot speak of any relation such as *समवयव* between them. For a relation exists only between those objects which are different. The answer is—When we perceive a jar, our cognition is that one gross object is perceived and not that *hundreds of minute supersensuous atoms* come in close connection are perceived. You cannot argue that this cognition is wrong, for that is not contradicted in any way. We can actually make use of that *एव* for purposes for which it is intended, with this very cognition.

(Lane 7)—*विशेषः*—having a positive form of a positive nature.

(86) *अणवः*—It has been remarked before that the *Vaiśeṣikas* do not explicitly recognise *अणवः* as a distinct *वस्तु* and that *Śaṅkara-carya* also who is very scrupulous in giving the views of his opponent correctly, mentions only six *Padarthas* as having been admitted by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. *अणवः* is usually explained as *अवयवविशेषः* *वस्तु* *प्रतिवेदितव्यं* *धीनान्वयितव्यं*, that is the knowledge of *अणवः* can be had only when we have the knowledge of its counter entity (*प्रतिपक्षिन्*). Thus

घटाभाव can only be known if we have the knowledge of घट which is the प्रतियोगिन् of घटाभाव असमवायत्वे सयसमवाय or समवायभेदेन सन्नि समवायसूत्र्य are mere technical definitions. There are in all four varieties of अभाव, अभाव is first divided into two (1) सहाभाव and (2) अन्योन्याभाव, and सहाभाव is further sub-divided into प्रागभाव, प्रवृत्ताभाव and अत्यन्ताभाव.

प्रागभाव - Before the घट is produced, the घटप्रागभाव exists and has been existing from times immemorial (घटप्रागभाव is thus अनादि) When the घट is produced घटप्रागभाव comes to an end.

घटप्रवृत्ताभाव is produced when the घट is destroyed (it is thus उत्पत्तिभाव) and this प्रवृत्ताभाव would continue till eternity, hence it is अनिनाशी प्रागभाव and प्रवृत्ताभाव have the idea of सहग with reference to future time and past time respectively and so are varieties of सहाभाव.

अत्यन्ताभाव refers to a सहग with eternity or विकास.

अव्यक्ताभाव is defined in the text as वैकालिकाभाव which is a very simple definition. The Tarkasamgraha defines it as वैकालिकसहाभाव-च्छिन्नप्रतियोगितात् (the Dīpikā says अ-योगाभावेऽप्रतिवर्तमानायाः सहगविच्छिन्नेति । सहाभावयोगनिष्पत्तिकारणाय वैकालिकेति) It is absolute negation or non-existence शशङ्क, व-यापुत्र etc are popular instances of this अभाव. But they are not correct, as every अभाव must have a प्रतियोगिन् which exists. Now in the case of शशङ्क etc, what प्रतियोगिन् could possibly be there? Annambhatta gives भूतले घटो नास्ति as an instance of अव्यक्ताभाव. It is difficult to reconcile this instance with the expression वैकालिकसहाभाव-च्छिन्न in the definition given above. For though the घट might not be on the भूतल at the time of speaking, there is nothing to prevent the घट from being there at any subsequent time. Annambhatta seems to have been forced to include भूतले घटाभाव under अव्यक्ताभाव, for it could not be included under प्रागभाव (unless we take the अवयव to refer to भूतले अस्तित्व of the घट and not to the उत्पत्ति of घट, but there is गौरव in regarding भूतले अस्तित्व as a कार्य) or प्रवृत्ताभाव or अन्योन्याभाव (for here we have घटाभाव on भूतल but not घटसूत्रगभाव, thus there is no mutual negation). So all cases of अभावs not covered up by प्रागभाव, प्रवृत्ताभाव and अन्योन्याभाव, have to be included under अव्यक्ताभाव. As regards प्रवृत्ताभाव, Annambhatta says सादित्वेन प्रवृत्तः । उपस्थित्यन्तर काव्यम्, about प्रागभाव he says उत्पत्तयुक्त काव्यम्. प्रागभाव is always there before the कार्य is produced, but प्रवृत्ताभाव can occur only after the कायनिनाश which would necessarily be after उत्पत्ति, but any length of time may intervene between उत्पत्ति and निनाश. It would have been better therefore if the expression निनाशावन्तर had been used instead of उपस्थित्यन्तरम्. Kesavamisra's illustrations and explanation of the different varieties of अभाव are distinctly better and simpler than those of Annambhatta.

The siddhāntin simply brushes aside these views, declaring that as the वृक्ष अणु is directly perceived by प्रत्यक्ष, it is futile to deny its existence. [The matter, however, is not so simple as to be dismissed in one sentence. The difference between the view point of the Naiyāyikas and that of the idealists, is fundamental and philosophically, the view of the Advaitavedāntins is the only correct one. The whole problem is exceedingly complex and cannot and need not be presented here even briefly]

(87) — बुद्धि — ज्ञानम्, उपपत्ति-व are synonymous terms with बुद्धि according to Gautama, बुद्धिश्चक्षुषावयन्ती, जानामि त्वनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानम् (अनुव्यवसाय- subsequent cognition in the form घटज्ञानवानहम्. When we perceive a घट, the चक्षुर्निद्रिय comes into contact with the घट and the impressions are carried to the mind which transfers them to the Ātman in whom the प्रतीति घटज्ञानवानहम् or घटमह जानामि arises. This प्रतीति is called अनुव्यवसाय. Without this प्रतीति perception does not become complete) are other definitions of बुद्धि. बुद्धि is स्वव्यवहारहेतु as contrasted with लक्षणा, लक्षणेग etc. which are the हेतुs of some particular व्यवहार. It is clear that without cognition no व्यवहार (बुद्धोपपत्तिवर्तुः कृत्यप्रयोग or आहारादिवाद्यदय) of any kind is possible. According to the Sāṃkhya, बुद्धि is महत्तत्त्व, the first product of प्रवृत्ति, it is निष्प्रकाश वस्तुविबुधदन्त इत्यम् according to the Vedāntins. The बुद्धि of ईश्वर is निरुद्ध, that of जीवानाम् is अशुद्ध. See section 5 for the meaning of प्रमाण.

(Line 6) — अक्षुटे, because a diseased eye would give wrong knowledge. वक्ष्यमाणम् is four fold, referring to the four प्रमाणs.

(Line 9) — अक्षयण अनुमान is प्रमाण, प्रवृत्ति इह रजतम्, रजतत्वाभावर नि प्रवृत्ती रजतव्यवहारके अनुमान तदभावरति तदप्रकारकोऽनुभव as a definition of अनुमान is taken exception to by an objector in this way. A monkey is in contact with the top of a tree, the cognition वृक्ष कविसंयोगी is therefore correct. Now applying the above definition of अनुमान we can say कविसंयोगभावर नि (for the whole of the tree excepting the कविसंयुक्त portion is कविसंयोगभावर नि) कविसंयोगप्रकारक अनुमान exists in the case of the tree. So here प्रमाण becomes अनुमान. The answer is obvious. If there had been the अनुमान of कविसंयोग in those portions where there is no कविसंयोग, then alone the cognition would be अनुमान. We are not concerned with the rest of the tree at all. The cognition concerns only with the portion where there is contact between the monkey and the tree. The objector is thinking of वृक्ष as a whole one time (when he talks of the वृक्ष as कविसंयोगभावर नि) and then only the कविसंयुक्त portion of it (when he talks of the वृक्ष as having कविसंयोगप्रकारक अनुमान). Thus he takes वृक्ष in two different senses which is responsible for the confusion in his mind.

Read the following from the तच्छिपिका नन्द सयोगीति प्रमाणानुसंगिते च ।
 नन्दस्यैव यत्तु शब्दवत्तत्त्वेन तत्त्वज्ञानवत् निर्मितत्वात् सयोग्याभाव-उद्देश एव
 न न तत्त्वज्ञानवत् सयोग्यात्त्वेन सयोग्यात्त्वं सन्त्याज्यविराजति ।

(Line 3)-समग्रबलमें बढ़ये—in sections 96 and 101, below

(Line 11) - *विषय* or error is really the proper incorrect apprehension. When we cognise a thing to be what it is not, we commit error as when we mistake a rope for a serpent or a mother-of-pearl for silver.

(Line 14) - दीरवद्वेन तपि In dream we see things as though they are actually happening before our eyes, even though they are पौन. Thus when we see a horse in a dream, our knowledge ought to be in the form न अय (because the अय is पौन) but actually it is in the form तप अय. What should have been in the form of दृश takes the form of तप.

(88) (Line 2)—सुखं च ज्ञानं निराकारम्—This is intended to refute the Suddha view (साक्षात्कारवाद) that cognition takes the form of the object, owing to the object producing its form in the cognition (जने ज्ञानेर्धर्मो ह्यकारो जयन् इत्येकं पक्षः । स्वाकाराविशष्ट इत्यपि जयन् इत्येकः) This has been already refuted in section 86 when the Siddhanta showed that मय was distinct from ज्ञान

When the *vyākhyāna* is refuted, it follows that the view (चक्षुः
प्रमाणेन न ज्ञेयं न च कार्यं चक्षुःप्रमाणेन हि) that the existence of *artha* is
to be proved by inference from the form of *artha* which the cognition,
as a matter of fact the object such as a jar is
actually perceived by us, and all cognition can be had as proceeding
from the object and connected with the object. The cognition takes
the form 'I know a jar and not simply I know'. If cognition
were unconnected with the *artha* the cognition ought to have been
simply 'I know'.

(89)—See section 08

(89) — See section 48
(90) — धर्मात्मानं धर्मोपनिषत् न्यायसूत्रम्—The Nyayasutra is therefore to be rejected as it is not warranted by the sutra (I 1 17) (I 1 18)

(91) — *यथा* *अथर्ववेद* : (Nyayasūtra, I 1 18) — *यथा* *अथर्ववेद* : (Nyayasūtra, I 1 19) —

{01}—इति अथ प्रवृत्तिप्रमाणम् । { Nyāyasastra, I 1 19 }—इति प्रवृत्तिप्रमाणम्, लेख्यम्
{02}—इति अथ प्रवृत्तिप्रमाणम् । { Nyāyasastra, I 1 19 }—इति प्रवृत्तिप्रमाणम्, लेख्यम्

(02) — पुनर्गति प्रश्नात् । (पञ्चावतारम्) ।
अथ गणेशाय नमः । (पञ्चावतारम्) ।

(93) — कस्मिन् नृपेति । (Nyāyasastra I 1 20)
 (94) — कस्मिन् नृपेति । (Nyāyasastra, I 1 21)

(94) — वायनाडवत् दुषयम् । (Kṣanyasūtra, I 1 21)

different and thurdly, they must be contradictory Thus 'इषी घटपटी' is no doubt, because though the attributes or alternatives, घटत्व, and पटीत्व, are different and contradictory (they are contradictory because they can never be समवायिविभक्त्यं or reside in the same entity), the घटत्व is not one For we are here speaking of two entities, घट and पटी Similarly, 'एत एविकद्वयत्ववत् अय एव' is no doubt, because though the एवमेव एत is one, the एवमेव or attributes are not many For एवमेविकद्वयत्व is just one attribute Lastly, 'अय एत येन द्वयम्' is also no doubt, because, though the entity is one and the attributes, एतत्व येन ए and द्वयत्व, different, they are not contradictory For they can all reside in one whole as they do in a घट So it will be seen that the words 'एतस्मिन्' 'माना' and 'विकद्वय' have each special significance attached to it Read 'घटपटी इति समवायवनेति यद्विधाय एवेति । घटी द्वयम्' इत्यादौ अतिव्याप्तिवत्ताया विरुद्धेति । 'एतएविकद्वयत्ववत् अय एव' इत्यादौ अतिव्याप्तिवत्ताया नास्ति । इति । A proper instance of सज्ञय is the cognition 'एतद्युक्ता दुर्गवा' arising with reference to one dimly visible entity Here एतद्युक्त and दुर्गत्व are different attributes They are contradictory because they cannot reside in the same object One and the same एतद्युक्त cannot both be a pillar and man

According to Gautama, सज्ञय is समवायिकथनेवचरिणितरेकता एवद्वयत्ववत्ताया विज्ञाविज्ञे विज्ञा । (Nyāyasūtra, 1 1 23)

सज्ञय = three-fold — विज्ञेयानुज्ञेयं तानि

(1) मानपरकज्ञेयज्ञ — The stock instance is एतद्युक्ता दुर्गवा । The doubt arises owing to the fact that we are conscious of the common features (इतद्युक्तिरूपं) of एतद्युक्त and दुर्गवा, but are not aware of any special feature such as एतदेतद्वयत्व belonging to एतद्युक्त alone or एतदेतद्वयत्व belonging to दुर्गवा alone, which would enable us to resolve our doubt

(2) विज्ञेयविज्ञेयज्ञ — When doctors differ the lay man is naturally puzzled Some one says एतद्वयत्व is विज्ञेय another asserts एतद्वयत्व is अज्ञेय . Thus doubt arises and can be resolved only when one of the assertions is proved to be wrong

(3) अज्ञापरकज्ञेयज्ञ — When it is possible to draw any conclusion you like, from a peculiar characteristic of an object, this doubt arises From एतद्युक्त, you can not say anything definitely, for as एतद्युक्त is a peculiar property of एतद्युक्त alone, it is not a safe guide for postulating anything about दुर्गवा, as there can be no similar instance

(97) प्रयोजनम्-वचनं यद्विज्ञेयं तद्विज्ञेयम् । (Nyāyasūtra, 1 1 21)

(98) एतदेतद्वयत्ववत् अय एव इति । (Nyāyasūtra, 1 1 25) It is necessary that both the disputants must accept the एतद्वयत्व,

otherwise no inference can be drawn. Of course, it is presumed that none of the disputants is deliberately perverse *साधर्म्यदृष्टान्त* in accordance with *अवयववृत्ति*, *वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्त*, in accordance with *वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्त*.

(99) सिद्धान्त — We quote here the relevant *Nyāyasūtras* in this connection, together with the *Gautama* on them.

Gautama defines सिद्धान्त as *न्यायविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि सिद्धान्तः* (I 1 26), *सर्वतन्त्रविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि सिद्धान्तः* (I 1 27).

[सिद्धान्त is a category, on the nature of which the difference of view between *साधर्म्य* and *वैधर्म्य* is clearly noticed. *Kesava-misra* follows *Vātsyāyana*, the *Bhāṣyakāra* of *Gautama* who follows the old view. *Govardhana* the commentator on the *Tarkabhāṣā* follows *Viśvanātha*, the *Vṛttikāra* on *Gautama* the representative of the old school]

The four kinds of *Siddhānta* are as follows —

(1) सर्वतन्त्रविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि सिद्धान्तः ।

(*Nyāyasūtra*, I 1 26)

भाष्यम्—यथा घ्राणदीर्घद्विषाणि गन्धश्च इन्द्रियाणीं पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि, प्रमाणैरेवं सर्वतन्त्रविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि ।

This means, according to *Vātsyāyana* and our author, a principle which is admitted by all schools. According to *Vat-yayana*, the example of a सर्वतन्त्रविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि सिद्धान्त is the existence of the five senses and their objects etc. शब्द would be an example, according to our author. People may have a doubt as to the eternal or non-eternal character of शब्द. But all admit that there exists such a thing as शब्द.

According to the modern school, सर्वतन्त्रविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि सिद्धान्त possesses a special and restricted sense, being applicable to a principle which has been accepted by two disputants as the basis of their discussion. Thus when two parties dispute regarding the nature of sound, whether it is eternal or non-eternal they mutually admit the existence of sound as such. Or when they dispute as to whether darkness is *भावश्च* or *अभावश्च*, they have already admitted that there is such a thing as तमस्.

(2) समानतन्त्रविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि सिद्धान्तः ।

(*Nyāyasūtra*, I 1 29)

भाष्यम्—यथा वासन-ताम्रताम, न सन-आत्महान, निगविशवाश्वेनता-देहेन्द्रियमन-तु विषयेषु तत्त्व-रूपेषु च विशेष इति सादृश्यकाम्, प्रत्यक्ष-मात्रेणैव भूतसर्ग-कर्महेतुको दृष्टः। प्रत्यक्ष, स्वप्रमाणविशेषणामुपगममभिधानि, अवयव-रूपेण तत्त्व-विशेषणे इति योग्यायम् ।

Older view —A doctrine, which, though not established in one's own school, is proved in another which is similar to it. Thus the Naiyāyikas hold mind to be a sense organ. But it has actually been proved to be such in the Vaiśeṣika system. Other illustrations may be drawn from *sūtras* and *śloka* that hold common views.

Modern view —A doctrine which is accepted by one school and rejected by another. Thus *śabd-nityatā* is admitted by the *śāṅkhya* and rejected by the *Nैयायिक*.

(3) यत्सिद्धादभ्यप्रकरणासिद्धि साधधिकरणसिद्धान्तः । (Nyāyasūtra, I 1 30)

भाष्यम्—यस्याप्यस्य सिद्धान्तस्या अनुषङ्गते न तैर्विना स ऽयं सिध्यति तस्या यदपि ज्ञानं सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः । यथा वह्नेर्द्रव्यनिरिक्तो ज्ञाता दर्शनस्य शब्दाभ्यामेकं यमहणादिति । अत्राहुव द्विगोऽप्या इन्द्रियतान्त्रिकं नियतविषयाणां निद्रयाणि स्वविषयप्रवृत्तिलिङ्गानि नातुर्ज्ञानसाधनानि । गन्धादिषु यानि निद्रिय द्रव्य गणाधिकरणमन्यतविषयाश्चेतना इति पूर्वाय सिद्धान्ते ऽप्या सिद्ध्यन्ति न तैर्विना सोऽयं समवर्तीति ।

Regarding this variety, the *prācīna* and the *anācīna* views are the same. It means a principle which follows the establishment of another principle. Thus when it is established that the earth etc. being a product, must have a creator, it follows the creator of such earth etc. must be omniscient.

(4) अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमासिद्धिशेषपरीक्षणमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः । (Nyāyasūtra, I 1 31)

भाष्यम्—यत्र किञ्चिदर्थज्ञानमपरीक्षितमभ्युपगम्यते अस्ति द्रव्यं शब्दं स तु विचार्यमानो य इति, द्रव्यस्य सतो विद्यता अनिद्यता वा तद्विशेषं परीक्ष्यते सोऽभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः । शब्दद्रव्यानि शब्दचित्त्व्यादिविषया परबुद्धयवज्ञानाच्च प्रवर्तत इति ।

On the nature of this variety, the difference between the older and modern *Nैयायिक*s, is most marked.

Older view —When in arguing with an opponent one admits his view without question, and proceeding to draw a conclusion there from, shows that the conclusion contradicts another view of the opponent, such admission is called *अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः*. Thus a *वर्तक* is arguing with a *Nैयायिक* regarding the nature of sound. He admits sound is a quality. Then he proceeds to say that as sound is a quality of the all pervading ether, according to the *Nैयायिक*s, it must be without parts, and so it cannot grow in size. But this conclusion is against the *Nैयायika* view of the non-*eternity* of sound, which is based exactly on the fact that it grows and diminishes in intensity.

[This process has some common features with *Tarka* or hypothetical reasoning. See section 101 below]

Now arises the occasion for using नर्क. We admit for a moment his contention बहिर्भासु. We thus deliberately suppose बह्वयमान which is व्यापक or less extensive and thereby force on him वृणयति which is व्यापक or more extensive by saying 'यदि अत्र बहिर्भासे स्यात् तर्हि बह्वयमान इत्यन्यत्'. But the presence of smoke is directly perceived. Our opponent is thus reduced to the position of either pointing out an instance where there is smoke, but no fire, or of admitting that his assertion 'बहिर्भासु' was wrong. And as no such instance can be found, he admits the falsity of the contention 'बहिर्भासु' and thus indirectly accepts the presence of fire on the mountain. In this way by the supposition of the व्यापक (बह्वयमान) we impose the व्यापक (वृणयति) नर्क is therefore व्यापकविशेष व्यापकविशेष. The मन्त्रार्थार्थ defines नर्क as 'अनिर्दिष्टव्यपकप्रधान नर्क'.

It will thus be seen that नर्क is quite a legitimate method of forcing a conclusion on an inconvenient opponent by making him admit व्यतिरेकवाचि (यदि यत्र बह्वयमान इति तत्र वृणयति) when he is unwilling to accept the अन्वयवाचि. But why नर्क should be regarded as a variety of अन्वयवाचनम् does not appear to be at first clear. The reason however is that because in नर्के we make the admission of the अवयव thing viz बह्वयमान, it must be considered as a variety of अवयव. Looked at from another point of view नर्क would appear to be a kind of अवयवावृत्तम्, because the वृणयति which is forced in अवयव, since वृणयति is actually seen. —It must be confessed that the reasons advanced for regarding नर्क as a division of अवयवावृत्तम् do not appear to us to be convincing. For neither the बह्वयमान nor the वृणयति which we hypothesize or force on the opponent can by any stretch of imagination be regarded as अवयव बह्वयमान and वृणयति are अवयव we admit. But that does not make नर्क which only deals with them in a hypothetical manner, assume the character of अवयवावृत्तम्.

नर्क and विपर्यय resemble in so far as in both something opposed to truth is realised. But while in नर्के the incorrect admission made is deliberate or volitional, in विपर्यये the incorrect apprehension received is through some defect and we are not conscious of its incorrectness as long as we are labouring under the error.

Ancient Navyāyikas admit eleven kinds of नर्क, of which only five are accepted by the moderns viz व्यापकत्व or *ignoratio elenchis*, अवयववाचक or *dilemma*, बह्वयमान or *reasoning in a circle*, अवयववाचक or *regressus ad infinitum* and अवयववाचक or *reductio ad absurdum*. Only the last has been mentioned and defined by Keśavamisra.

Tarka is different from मन्त्र, as the latter is इत्यन्यत्वेति (व्यापकवाचक) यत्र—here the cognition oscillates between the two कल्पित or alterna-

(Lane 4) —अथैवमेव मुख्यम्—The reference is to उदयन's लक्षणमाला वेदेन is an important name in the history of Nyaya and Vaisheshika systems. He flourished in the last quarter of the 10th century. His most famous work is कुतुम्भजलि which is 'the classic exposition of the proof of the existence of God' (Kaith)

Udayana's definition of सिद्धि lays down two characteristics for सिद्धि, namely व्यभिचारी and पक्षपक्षता of the हेतु, and the absence of these is असिद्धि. Now this असिद्धि must exist in some way or other in all हेतुभावः. The objector's contention therefore is, that all हेतुभावः should be called असिद्धि. The division into five हेतुभावः is incorrect, for surely the वैशेषिक or अनेकान्वित हेतुभावः does contain असिद्धि, why then are these different divisions made, with different names?

The answer is the 'प्रमाणेन व्यवस्थाप्यम्' न्याय. It is perfectly true that असिद्धि in a general sense exists in all the five varieties. But we are perfectly justified in ascertaining what kind of असिद्धि strikes us more, and then we name the हेतुभावः accordingly. When the striking feature of the असिद्धि is known and the हेतु proved to be a हेतुभावः, we do not bother ourselves about the less prominent features of असिद्धि existing in the हेतुभावः which depend upon or are subaltern to the more prominent ones. When, for instance, the व्यभिचारीत्व strikes us more prominently, we dub the हेतुभावः अनेकान्वित, when the feature साधकत्वव्यभिचारी is prominent we call the हेतुभावः वैशेषिक and so on.

(Lane 15) —यत्र पुनः—our emendation for ते पुनः. The author says in line 14 that व्यभिचारः and others gave rise to अनेकान्वित and other fallacies. The reading ते पुनः would refer to व्यभिचारः or अनेकान्वित, in either case, that would come into conflict with असिद्धिरूपः etc. in line 16. It is more natural that the author should explain in this passage असिद्धिरूपः as he explains व्यभिचारः in line 14. On these grounds, we have read यत्र पुनः for ते पुनः.

(107) —In गणनासिद्धिः मुख्यम् : अनेकान्वितः, the हेतु is अनेकान्वितः because the भावः, गणनासिद्धिः does not exist at all.

(Lane 7) —अनेकान्वितः : कार्यत्वम् : This is given as an instance of अनेकान्वितः. Now, unlike गणनासिद्धिः, वर actually exists, how can we then regard this as an instance of अनेकान्वितः? The answer is—वर might be existing in reality, but for purposes of the above अनुमान, it does not exist. For अनुमान has scope for something about which there is a doubt. The अनेकत्वम् of वर is beyond all doubt, therefore वर is an अविद्यमान वस्तु for this अनुमान and so does not exist for the purposes of the अनुमान. Con-

existence of the अमय therefore also means non existence for the purposes of the अनमय

(108) —मयान्यम् अस्तित्वम् । इतरत्वात्—Here the हेतु, इतरत्वं does not exist in सामान्य, so this is an instance of स्वस्वप्राप्तिद्व

तृपद्व्यवस्थितर परमाणवा निया गद्यवत्त्वात्—

Here म-तृपद्व्य does not exist in the atoms of water fire and wind (existing only in the atoms of earth) thus the हेतु is not to be found in a part of the पक्ष, so this is an instance of भागानिर्द्ध

(109) (1) शब्दो नित्य । द्वय संश्लिष्टावशात्, this is also an instance of स्वस्वप्राप्तिद्व (विशेषणसिद्ध variety) For द्रव्यत्व (the विशेषण) does not exist in शब्द, as शब्द is a गुण It cannot be argued that a part of the हेतु, अवशावत्त्व (विशेष्य) exists in शब्द, therefore it cannot be स्वस्वप्राप्तिद्व The answer is द्रव्यवशिष्टावशात् शब्द is one idea, and even if only द्रव्यत्व or only अवशावत्त्व does not exist in a particular object, the whole द्रव्यवशिष्टावशात् does not exist there For instance, इन्द्रियस्वरूपमय must be said to exist, even if only इन्द्र (विशेषण) or only स्वर (विशेष्य) does not exist

(2) शब्दो नित्य । अवशावत्त्वे सति द्रव्यत्वात्, that is अवशावत्त्वविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वात् .

Here the विशेष्य, द्रव्यत्व does not exist in शब्द, therefore it is an instance of the विशेष्यप्राप्तिद्व variety

(3) शब्दो नित्य । गुणत्वविशिष्टावशात्, that is गुणत्वविशिष्टावशात् .

Here the विशेषण, गुणत्व is like अज्ञानत्वन, it serves no purpose, the विशेष्य, अज्ञानत्व is quite capable of proving the नित्यत्व of शब्द The addition of the विशेषण, गुणत्व, far from helping the विशदय, अज्ञानत्व, actually makes the हेतु fallacious For the हेतु गुणत्वविशिष्टावशात् is a विशदय हेतु, and any lapse on the part of either the विशेषण or the विशेष्य, reflects on the whole

One peculiarity must be noted here : Here the विशेषण, गुणत्व does exist in शब्द, (so also the विशेष्य, अज्ञानत्व, at least according to some) how can then this be an instance of a स्वस्वप्राप्तिद्व ? The answer is —It is true that गुणत्व exists in शब्द, but our contention is that गुणत्व being impotent cannot be regarded as a विशेषण at all That alone can rightly be called a विशेषण of the हेतु, which serves the purpose of excluding others by particularising it But here गुणत्व serves no purpose, as it is incapable, and is therefore useless like the हेतु या न युते न युजते The above शब्दो नित्य etc is therefore an instance of असमर्थविशेषणसिद्ध variety of स्वस्वप्राप्तिद्व

(4) शब्दो नित्य । अवशावत्त्वे सति अज्ञानत्वात्—Here the विशेषण गुणत्व is impotent, the विशेषण alone being capable of proving the नित्यत्व The विशेष्य being असमर्थ is as good as not existing in शब्द, so the विशदय हेतु

does not exist in *शब्द*, hence this is an instance of *अवयवविशेषातिशय* variety of *सामानाधिकरान्त*.

(110) There are two varieties of *सामानाधिकरान्त* —

(1) *साधनसहसृति*, where there is no *प्रमाण* to apprehend the *व्यति* between the *हेतु* and the *साध्य* *विशेषातिशय* जन्तु *द्वारा* : *सम्बन्ध*—Here there is no *प्रमाण* to show that there is *व्यति* between *साध्य* and *अनिवृत्त*.

(2) *साधनसहसृति*—

(a) *संज्ञा* : *मेघनिवृत्त*—Now *मेघनिवृत्त* is not the cause of *साध्य* but *साधनसहसृति*. And *प्रमाण* is the *व्यति*, hence here the *व्यति* would be correct only when this *व्यति*, *साध्य* *सहसृति* is lacked on to the *हेतु*.

(The definition of *व्यति*, *साध्य* *सहसृति* *संज्ञा* *व्यति* can be shown to be satisfied thus —

यत्र यत्र साध्यतः तत्र तत्र साधनसहसृति (*साधनसहसृति*, the *व्यति* is the *व्यति* of the *साध्य*, *व्यति*), but *यत्र यत्र मेघनिवृत्त* तत्र तत्र *साधनसहसृति* (this *व्यति* cannot be correct as some of *मेघनिवृत्त* are not *साध्य* so *साधनसहसृति*, the *व्यति*, is *साधनसहसृति*)

(b) *वर्तमान* : *वर्तमान*—Here *वर्तमान* is the *व्यति*, being the *व्यति* of *वर्तमान*. Thus *यत्र यत्र वर्तमान* तत्र तत्र *वर्तमान* (*वर्तमान*, the *व्यति* is the *व्यति* of the *साध्य*, *व्यति*) but *यत्र यत्र वर्तमान* तत्र तत्र *वर्तमान* (this is not correct, as the *व्यति* is *वर्तमान* in the case of red hot iron ball where there is fire, but no smoke, so *वर्तमान* is *वर्तमान*)

(c) *वर्तमान* : *वर्तमान*—Here *वर्तमान*, being the *व्यति* of *वर्तमान*, is the *व्यति*.

Thus, *यत्र यत्र वर्तमान* तत्र तत्र *वर्तमान* (*वर्तमान*, the *व्यति* is the *व्यति* of the *साध्य*, *व्यति*) but *यत्र यत्र वर्तमान* तत्र तत्र *वर्तमान* (this is not correct, as the *व्यति* is *वर्तमान* in the case of *वर्तमान* where there is *वर्तमान*, but no *वर्तमान*, the killing in sacrifices being sanctioned by the *व्यति*) So *वर्तमान* is *वर्तमान*)

(111) *वर्तमान* : *वर्तमान*—Here the *व्यति* is not between the *हेतु* and the *साध्य* (the *व्यति*), but between the *हेतु* and the *व्यति* (*व्यति*)—*यत्र यत्र वर्तमान* तत्र तत्र *वर्तमान*—This is an instance therefore of *वर्तमान*.

(112) *वर्तमान* has two varieties—*साधन* and *असाधन*.

(1) *वर्तमान* : *वर्तमान*—Here the *व्यति*, *वर्तमान* exists in the *व्यति*, (*व्यति*), in the *व्यति* (*व्यति*) and in the *व्यति* (*व्यति*) It is *वर्तमान* *वर्तमान* and so this is an instance of *वर्तमान* *वर्तमान* *वर्तमान*.

(2) अ विनाः सत्त्वत्वात्—Here the हेतु exists in the मय (द्वारी) alone, it does not exist either in the मय (आमय) or in the विम (अ०)—This is therefore an instance of असंशयवैकल्यम्

(Line 14)—अभिचारम् Kesavamisra is now defining what अभिचार is (as the हेतु अनेकान्तिक is also called सत्त्वविचार he points out how the two varieties of अनेकान्तिक illustrated by him are possessed of अभिचार, and so can rightly be called सत्त्वविचार) For मयसत्त्वविचारहेतु, there is the reading नियममवसात् सत्त्वविचारहेतु हेतु It appears to us that the proper reading here should be अभिचारो नियममवसात् सत्त्वसत्त्वविचारहेतु सत्त्वहेतुनिमित्तं इति विरसाद्व्याकृतिके नियमो गम्यत्वात् । मय च साध्य

What is meant is this — अभिचार means violation of the rule. The rule is that an अनेकान्तिक हेतु should be present in the मय and absent from the विम, because that alone enables us to arrive at a correct conclusion. The violation of the rule is possible in three ways —

(1) When the हेतु is absent in the मय and present in the विम (This type of अभिचार is the proper province of the विकृत हेतुनाम, and so it need not be taken into consideration. Strictly speaking this cannot be called a अभिचार. To exclude this type from the province of अनेकान्तिक, the expression सत्त्वविचारहेतु has been used in line 10, for a विकृत हेतुनाम is सत्त्वविचारहेतुनाम)

(2) When it is present in the मय as well as in the विम (This is साध्यावैकल्यम्)

(3) When it is absent from the मय as well as from the विम (This is असाध्यावैकल्यम्)

The second variety and the third variety alone can legitimately be called अभिचार. For अभिचार undoubtedly presupposes that there is सत्त्व between the हेतु and the साध्य, only that this सत्त्व is not invariable. In the case of the first variety, there is सत्त्व between the हेतु and the साध्यावैकल्य, with which the question of the original अभिचारहेतुनाम is not concerned. That is why Kesavamisra rightly speaks of अभिचार being two-fold. To take a more familiar instance. Suppose we issue an order to a person in Poona. On arriving at Bombay, purchase a Rolls Royce. Now this order can be violated in the following two legitimate ways —

(1) On arriving at Bombay, he purchases not a Rolls Royce but a Ford

(2) On arriving at Bombay, he does not purchase the car

Here we presume that the man would go all right to Bombay. In the same way, when a man tries to state a सत्त्व, we

Presume that the man is on right lines in having noticed some connection between the हेतु and the सत्य, only that he may be wrong in imagining an invariable connection between them in some cases. But when a man states a हेतु which has व्यभिचर with the सत्यकार, he is not playing the game, as far as the व्यभिचर idea in the तर्क is concerned. He is either a downright knave or a fool. Similarly in the above familiar instance, if the person goes to Mysore and purchases an elephant, that would be technically a violation of our order, but that would not be what we had bargained for in this case.

(113) शत्रु अनिय निवर्णमनुपलभ्ये, has for its rival the equally powerful शत्रु निव अनियवर्णमनुपलभ्ये । What is essential in the case of the परमाणव हेतुत्वमात्र is that its प्रतिपक्ष हेतुत्व must be equally powerful, for if the rival हेतुत्व were stronger, the original हेतु would go to the wall, if the rival हेतुत्व were weaker it itself would go to the wall. In either case, there would be no rival हेतु in the field at all.

उपजीव्यम्—That on which something else depends, the stronger one

उपजीव्यम्—That which depends on something else, the weaker one

The author shows how the so called rival हेतु for अनिय परमाणु । द्वातयात् । is उपजीव्य or वापक. In other words the दुर्द्वय हेतु can not be regarded as a परमाणवहेतुत्वमात्र. The so called rival हेतु is stated to be अवलम्ब्य, as is परमाणु निव । अवलम्ब्यत्वात् । (see section 53) Now this अवलम्ब्य हेतु, while proving the निव of the परमाणु proves the existence of the परमाणु as well. So that when the दुर्द्वय हेतु is put forward to prove the अनियत्व of the परमाणु, the person in question has tacitly admitted the existence (and along with it, the निवत्व) of the परमाणु. For, unless the existence of the परमाणु is admitted, there cannot be any question as to whether परमाणु are निव or अनिय. Any discussion as to whether the परमाणु is fit for marriage or not is absurd. The दुर्द्वय हेतु thus has for its उपजीव्य, the अवलम्ब्य हेतु on which it depends. अवलम्ब्य हेतु is not its rival, but its task-master. अनिय परमाणु । दुर्द्वय हेतु is thus उपजीव्य or a दुर्द्वय हेतु.

(114) अग्निं व्युत्पन्नं । कृतकत्वात् । शत्रुत्वम्—Here कृतकत्व is कालावधारित, because the उत्पन्नत्व or उत्पन्न of अग्नि is actually directly perceived by the sense of touch, and so the सत्य is definitely contradicted by a stronger proof.

एतं समिप । सत्यत्वात्—Here the सत्यत्वमात्र, रक्षयित्व is actually cognized by the recognition-perception. We recognise the एतं as the same which we had seen before. Now this cannot happen unless the एतं is not समिप.

In the case of this हेतुमान the सत्य must be contradicted by a stronger proof, usually the प्रत्यक्ष. The reading प्रत्यक्षज्ञानादिप्रमाण seems to be suspicious as it is more elaborate the emendator being anxious to state in detail how the perception of घट is characterised by recognition and hypothetical reasoning such as 'If the घट had been different, it would not have been recognised.

(Line 14) - चतुर्विंशत्यस्य. The author now shows how the fallacies due to wrong definitions could be included in the five fallacies already described (For the three दास्य of लक्षण see section 3)

अनिर्वाहः—इयं गौ गोत्वजनितमनीः पशुत्वात्—Here the हेतु पशुत्व exists in the दध्न (गौ), in the सत्य (another cow) and in the विषय (अथ). So this is an instance of अनिर्वाहितहेतुमान.

Or this might be a case of सोपानिर्वाह्यकारणित्व, for पशुत्व is not the cause of गोत्वजनितमनी but साक्षाद्विषय (which being the प्रयोजक, is the दवाधि).

अव्याप्ति—If the हेतु is शाश्वदेवम् (this might also mean being descended from शक्य the कामधेय) it exists only in some cows hence this is an instance of मगमिद्वद्द हेतुमान.

असम्बन्ध—The हेतु, एतद्वत्त्व does not exist at all in cows so this is an instance of स्वरूपासिद्ध हेतुमान.

(115) उत्तरम् वचनविषयौ प्रविश्योपपन्नोऽयम्।

(Nyayasutra, I 2 10)

उत्तर consists in purposely perverting the meaning of the opponent and finding fault with his argument. It is three fold, thus (Nyaya sutra I 2 11)—तद् विविध वाक्येन साध्या यत् उत्तरम् उपपन्नोऽयम्।

(1) वाक्येन—आवृत्तौ प्रविश्ये प्रकृत्यभिप्रायादुपावरकल्पना।

(Nyayasutra, I 2 12)

This is the only variety referred to in the text. अवकल्पितोऽयं हेतुदत्त is the instance. Unless we dissolve the compound in a particular way, we cannot know what the expression means. The speaker uses it in the sense नव (new) कम्बल अस्य the उत्तरादिवर purposely understands it in the sense नव (nine) कम्बल अस्य, and takes the opportunity to preach a sermon to his opponent. 'What rot are you talking? Devadatta is known to be quite poor, he cannot afford to have even two कम्बल? How can he have nine? Do you mean to tell us that he is a thief?' and so on.

(2) साध्या यत् उत्तरम्—सम्बन्धाप्रमाणानि साध्या यद्योग्यसमुपावरकल्पना।

(Nyayasutra I 2 12).

सम-वक्षसि त्वम्—When the speaker remarks about some one, ब्रह्मणोऽत्र विद्यावर्णस्य, the उत्तरादिर् purposely misunderstands it to mean that the speaker wants to state a general proposition that a ब्राह्मण is सदाचारस्य, and goes on to say 'How could you say that a Brāhmaṇa is सदाचारस्य? Then a शब्द (a सत्काम्यो ब्रह्मणः) also would be सदाचारस्य. This is absurd' and so on.

(3) उपपत्त्युक्तम्—यद्यपि वक्तुं निर्दिष्टं सद्भाष्यं नैवेद्यः ।

(Nyayasūtra, I 2 14)

A word has three meanings, वाच्य लक्ष्य and व्यङ्ग्य. When the speaker uses a word, say in a वाच्य sense, the उत्तरादिर् purposely misunderstands it in a sense other than वाच्य, and finds fault with the speaker's statement. Thus, the speaker says मञ्जुः काष्ठानि, using the word मञ्जु in its लक्ष्यिक sense मञ्जुषा वाचा. The उत्तरादिर् understands मञ्जु in its वाच्य sense and goes on to say 'How can the inanimate मञ्जु cry?' It is a novel discovery that you have made for which the world ought to be grateful to you' and so on.

It would be seen that उपपत्त्युक्तम् is not the same as वाक्युक्तम्. In वाक्युक्तम्, the word has two वाच्य meanings. In उपपत्त्युक्तम् the word is used in a figurative sense. So the two have their respective spheres. (वाक्युक्तम् वाच्योऽत्र तद्व्यङ्ग्यम्) न तद्व्यङ्ग्यं न वाच्यम् । अपेक्षितं वा निमित्तं सदाचारकम् । लक्ष्यम् । Nyayasūtra, I 2 15-17.) The reading अपत्ति would mean 'Thus the उत्तरादिर् comes to grief and is made to eat his words, when the proper meaning is pointed out to him.

(116) सत्पक्षेऽप्यपत्तिः प्रत्यक्षान्तरात् । (Nyayasūtra I 2 18) अपत्ति is futile objection व्यङ्ग्य—of twenty-four kinds. Nyayasūtra V 1 explains all of them. Our author mentions only two.

उपपत्तिः consists in attributing some व्यङ्ग्य which is not concomitant with the हेतु, to the व्यङ्ग्य on the strength of the हेतु न being possessed of that व्यङ्ग्य. Thus, when the syllogism is मञ्जुः शब्दोऽपि शब्दोऽपि, the opponent says if शब्द is possessed of अपि शब्द like व्यङ्ग्य, then व्यङ्ग्य should be regarded as being सत्पक्ष, because व्यङ्ग्य is सत्पक्ष.

अपत्तिः consists in attributing some व्यङ्ग्य which is not concomitant with the हेतु, to the व्यङ्ग्य on the strength of the हेतु न being possessed of that व्यङ्ग्य. Thus in the same syllogism, मञ्जुः शब्दोऽपि शब्दोऽपि, व्यङ्ग्य, the opponent says if व्यङ्ग्य is possessed of अपि व्यङ्ग्य, like व्यङ्ग्य then व्यङ्ग्य should be taken to be not audible, as व्यङ्ग्य is not audible.

(117) निरूपणानि—Occasions for reproof. Nyayasūtra mentions and describes the following twenty two of them—

प्रतिज्ञाह नि प्रतिज्ञान्न प्रतिज्ञाविरोध प्रतिज्ञासम्बन्ध हेतुत्वनम् अर्थान्तर निरर्थकम्
अतिशयोक्त्यम् अर्थान्तरम् अपातकाल न्यूनम् अर्थान्तर पुनरुक्तम् अननुभूतम् अज्ञानम् अप्रतिभा
विरोध मनावृत्ता पर्यवृत्त्यर्थोपक्षेपण निरनुयोज्योपयोग अपसिद्धान्त हेतुभाषा ।

These are the pitfalls against which the disputant must guard himself if he wishes to carry his point. Our author mentions only seven of them

(1) न्यूनम्—हीनमन्वयमेवाप्यवश्यम् - नूनम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V. 2 12)

A syllogism must be put forth in a proper form, all complete with the five members. If the disputant gives only four members or less, the निग्रहस्थान 18 - नून

(2) अधिक्तम्—हेतुजाह्वनाधिक्यम् अधिक्तम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 13)

Adding unnecessary adjuncts to the हेतु or उदाहरण etc (हेतुजाह्वनेत्युपपन्नम् । धर्मावलोकात् महानमवचनवर्धित्वादिकं तु विना समनवन्धं दाहयद्विधमा दुर्बलमधिकम्-न्यायसूत्रानि)

(3) असिद्धान्त—सिद्धान्तवन्मुपेत्य जनियमात् कथावत्तम असिद्धान्त ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V. 2 24).

When a disputant, having agreed to discuss according to the tenets of a particular system of philosophy, agrees, in the course of the discussion, to something contrary to those tenets, there is the निग्रहस्थान called अपसिद्धान्त

• (4) अर्थान्तरम्—वदन्तादर्थप्रतिपत्तिनद्वार्थम् अर्थान्तरम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 7)

When a disputant talks at random about something not connected with the प्रश्न, there is the निग्रहस्थान called अर्थान्तर.

Thus after stating the syllogism, शब्दोऽनित्य इत्युक्तत्वात्, the disputant goes on saying 'Sabda is a special quality of ether, the word Sabda begins with the letter sa, and ends with the letter da'-all of which is quite true, but has nothing to do with the matter in hand

(5) अप्रतिभा—उत्तरस्य अप्रतिपत्ति अप्रतिभा ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 19).

Being dumb-founded, or non-plussed or unable to answer the opponent

(6) मनावृत्ता—मनावृत्ते नोपपत्त्युपपत्त्यात् परस्मै दोषवशमे मनावृत्ता ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 21)

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